[AC原创编译]流亡遇上本土：侨居藏族的政治、演出与正统性

rhapsody

【原文标题】Exile meets homeland: politics, performance, and authenticity in the Tibetan diaspora
【原文作者】Emily T Yeh（叶蓓，美国科罗拉多大学地理系）
【登载媒体】Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2007, volume 25, pages 648 - 667
【来源地址】http://spot.colorado.edu/~yehe/society%20and%20space.pdf
【声明】本译文供Anti-CNN网站使用，未经译者和网站同意请勿转载，谢谢！
【编译校对】政治不正确、墨羽、音乐盒、忧心、rlsrls08、rhapsody
【译者前言】本文系学术论文，由于译者水平有限，译文难免出现错漏，望有识者指正，谢谢！

叶蓓，是一位美籍台湾人，嫁了给一位流亡印度藏人。她精通汉、藏、英三语。她这篇论文以详实的事例举证，客观的分析，指出海外的藏独运动只是人为地制造了西藏，印度与美国不同地方藏人文化的割裂。事实上藏人对什么为藏族文化的定义都很模糊，三地的藏族文化都在受到外来的影响不断地演化中。海外藏独运动把文化发展政治化，不仅不利于藏文化的发展，而且使藏人不能享受文化应该给他们带来的乐趣。
政治不正确 发表于 2009-3-23 02:19

叶蓓

【摘要·译文】
Tibetans are often imagined as authentic, pure, and geographically undifferentiated, but Tibetan identity formation is, in fact, varied and deeply inflected by national location and transnational trajectories. In this paper I examine the frictions of encounter between three groups of Tibetans who arrived in the USA around the same time, but who differ in their relationships to the homeland. The numerically dominant group consists of refugees who left Tibet in 1959 and of exiles born in South Asia; second are Tibetans who left Tibet after the 1980s for India and Nepal; and third are those whose routes have taken them from Tibet directly to the United States. Whereas the cultural authority claimed by long-term exiles derives from the notion of preserving tradition outside of Tibet, that of Tibetans from Tibet is based on their embodied knowledge of the actual place of the homeland. Their struggles over authenticity, which play out in everyday practices such as language use and embodied reactions to staged performances of 'traditional culture', call for an understanding of diaspora without guarantees. In this paper I use habitus as an analytic for exploring the ways in which identity is inscribed on and read off of bodies, and the political stakes of everyday practices that produce fractures and fault lines.
藏族常常被想象成正统﹑纯粹，和毫无地区差异的。但事实上，藏族身份的形成是多样化的，并且深受国家区位以及跨国轨迹的影响。本文将探讨生活在美国的三个不同藏族群体交往中发生的摩擦。他们几乎在同一个时期来到美国，但他们与家乡存在着不同的联系。人数上占主导地位的一个群体是那些1959年逃亡或者出生在南亚的流亡者；第二群是在上世纪80年代离开西藏前往印度和尼泊尔的藏人；第三群是那些直接从西藏来到美国的藏人。长期流亡藏人宣称的文化权威源于在西藏境外保存传统的信念，而本土藏人的文化权威却是基于其对家乡这一实际地方的具体认知。藏族侨民团体间对于“正统”的争议，从语言运用和具体反应等日常活动，到传统文化表演，都有待研究。本文用”惯习”（habitus）作为分析方法，探讨民族身份是如何形成的，又是如何体现的，以及对日常行为的政治划分是如何造成分裂与断层的。

"Oil and water cannot mix
Tibetans and Chinese cannot mix ...
We are Buddhists
You are its destroyers
We are yak meat-eaters
You are dog meat-eaters
We are tsampa-eaters
You are worm-eaters"
Red Chinese Robber Gang by Techung, a California-based Tibetan artist
“油水不可交溶
藏汉不可交溶
我们信仰佛教
你们将其破坏
我们吃牦牛
你们吃狗肉
我们吃糌粑
你们吃虫子”
——《红色匪帮》，加州藏族艺术家德琼

【正文·译文】

一个侨民的故事 (A diasporic story)

In February 2004 the board of directors of a regional Tibetan Association received an anonymous letter, written in bright red capital letters, accusing one of its members of "faxing documents to the Chinese government" about Tibetans in the USA, and of receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars for his 'spying' activities. The accused, who I will call Tenzin, is a Tibetan man in his mid-thirties. Raised in a village in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, he fled to India after participating in Tibetan independence protests in the late 1980s. Not long after arriving in Dharasmala, India, seat of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile, he was picked by lottery to participate in the Tibet US Resettlement Project. In the USA he has been actively involved in the local Tibetan community. He also communicates regularly by telephone with family and friends in Tibet, remaining up to date on the latest trends in music and the changing economy of his home village.
2004年2月，一个地方的藏族协会的理事会收到一封用红色大写字母写的匿名信，举报其中一个会员把关于在美藏人的文件传真给中国政府，并且凭这些间谍活动得到数十万美元的收入。被告发的是一个35岁左右的藏人，笔者将称他为丹增。他出生在中国西藏自治区的一个村庄，在80年代末参加了争取西藏独立示威后逃亡到印度。到达兰萨拉（达赖喇嘛和西藏流亡政府所在地）不久后，他获抽签选中参加“藏人定居美国计划”。他在美国积极加入到当地藏族社区，也经常电话联系仍在西藏的家人和朋友，了解最新的音乐潮流和老家村庄的经济变化。

Despite having been naturalized as a US citizen, Tenzin has not returned to Tibet because of lingering fear for his family members and because of the fact that they have already been made to suffer for his actions; one brother was jailed for six years. When I met his elderly mother in Tibet, she pleaded, "please, tell him not to come back for another couple of years at least" even though she longed to see her son after a separation of more than a decade. The family's experience is both tragic and exemplary of the type of political repression to which the transnational Tibet Movement has called attention. The fact that he is a political refugee, together with his dedication to improving conditions in Tibet, suggest that Tenzin should be a poster child for the Tibet Movement, held out by the community as a model for others. Why, then, has he instead been suspected and accused (more than once) of being a spy for China?
尽管丹增已归化为美国公民，但出于难以挥去的对家人的担忧，他还没有回过西藏；他的家人们确实也因为他的活动而受苦，他的一个兄弟就坐了六年牢。当笔者在西藏见到他年迈的母亲时，虽然她很想见到分别十多年的儿子，但仍然恳求道：“请你告诉他别要回来，至少要等多几年”。这个家庭的经历既是一个悲剧，也是一个跨国西藏运动要唤起世人注意的政治压迫的典型案例。丹增作为政治难民的事实以及他对改善西藏状况的努力表明他应该是西藏运动的一个模范，被社区当作典型来进行宣传。那么为什么恰恰相反，他（不止一次地）被怀疑及指控为中国间谍？

Significantly, Tenzin is one of the very few Tibetans in the area to have spent a good part of his life in Tibet, rather than in India or Nepal. To at least a few Tibetans from India, the fact that he is from Tibet, is very active in the local organization, and has at times refused to have his photograph posted on community websites is 'proof ' enough that he is a spy. More generally, his strong ties to the homeland, and the way the homeland is inscribed on his body, make him the object of derision and suspicion.
值得注意的是，在当地社区中，丹增是为数不多的在西藏本土而不是在印度或尼泊尔渡过大部分人生的藏人。至少对于一部分从印度来的藏人来说，他来自西藏、在当地组织非常活跃、有时拒绝把他的相片放在社区网站上，这些事实已经足够“证明”，他是一个间谍。更广泛地来说，他与家乡的紧密联系，以及他身上所铭刻的那种家乡的印记都使得他成为一个被嘲笑与怀疑的对象。

Migrants' stories have theoretical power beyond their own uniqueness. Tenzin's story alerts us to some of the political and cultural contradictions of the Tibetan diaspora which emerge around the issues of migrants' roots and routes. Like other groups of transnational immigrants, Tibetans in the USA"forge and sustain multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement". Yet the structure of Tibetan immigration to the USA is such that the 'society of origin' to which the vast majority of Tibetans have immediate ties is in South Asia, not in Tibet. Tibetan immigrants in the USA can be divided into three groups vis-à-vis their embodied experience of Tibet and their immediate society of origin. First, the largest group is comprised of those who either left Tibet in 1959 or were born in South Asian refugee communities: for convenience, I refer to them here as 'exile Tibetans'. Second, a smaller number, who I refer to as 'new arrivals', were born and raised in Tibet, but left for India or Nepal in the 1980s and 1990s. Third, the smallest group are those whose routes have taken them directly from Tibet to the United States; I call them 'Tibetans from Tibet'.
移民的故事具有超越其自身独特性的理论性力量。丹增的故事提醒我们注意一些由移民的原籍和路线的不同而在藏族侨区引起的政治上和文化上的矛盾。与其它跨国移民群体一样，在美国的藏人也“形成并维系着千丝万缕的社会关系，这些关系联结着他们的原居地社群和移居地社群”。然而移居美国藏人的构成现况是这样：对大部分藏人来说，“原居地社群”最直接指向的地方是南亚而不是西藏。根据他们的原居地社群和体现的西藏经历，在美国的藏族移民可以分为三组：第一组，也是最大的一组由1959年离开西藏或者出生在南亚的难民社区难民组成，为方便起见，我把他们称为“流亡藏人”；第二组是人数较少的一组，我称他们为“新来者”，他们在西藏出生和长大，但在上世纪八九十年代前往印度或尼泊尔；第三组是人数最少的一组，是那些直接从西藏来到美国的藏族人，我把他们称为“本土藏人”。

In this paper I examine struggles over the authenticity of everyday embodied practices as well as of staged performances of 'Tibetan culture', which fracture the imagined unity of a seamless diasporic community. Marked as 'Tibetan' in distinct ways by the varied national locations through which they have traveled, Tibetans also draw on different strategies for establishing their authority to speak as Tibetan. Tibetans from Tibet draw on the embodied knowledge and experience of homeland, whereas 'exile Tibetans' seek to recenter authentic Tibet-ness away from the physical territory of the homeland and toward other geographical spaces - particularly Dharamsala. Exile Tibetans are numerically dominant in the USA, and it is their views that set the discursive terrain. However, their authority is challenged by the Tibetans from Tibet whom they encounter. The project of recentering the locus of authenticity is thus unstable, and requires an enormous amount of everyday cultural work.
本文将探讨关于日常生活中以及舞台表演的“藏族文化”正统性的冲突，这些冲突撕破了藏族侨区看似天衣无缝的和谐幻像。虽同为“藏族”，但经由不同的国家地区迁居而来的藏人群体，都在运用不同的策略来争取让自己成为权威的藏族发言人。本土藏人倚仗的是他们对家乡的具体认知和经验。相反的，流亡藏人寻求把“正统藏族”重新定位，由地理上的传统家园转移到其它区域，尤其是达兰萨拉。在美国，流亡藏人在数量上居主导地位，这种不着边际的地理定位也正是他们的观点所在。但是他们的权威受到了本土藏人的挑战。因而正统性地理中心的重新定位这一课题是不牢靠的，需要进行大量的日常文化工作。

侨居、身份与惯习 (Diaspora, identity, and habitus)

Responding to celebrations of diaspora and of border crossings as metaphors of emancipation, transgression, and subversion, critical geographers have suggested rethinking diaspora as being 'without guarantees', to borrow from Hall. That is, a diasporic condition may indeed be subversive or transgressive, but it is not necessarily so. Furthermore, diasporic identities and communities are always multiple and contested. All of this is quite evident in the lyrics of Red China Robber Gang by Techung, a popular California-based Tibetan singer. In exuding a sense of defiance and pride in Tibetan identity, the song also plays directly into existing Western stereotypes of Chinese as alien, dog-eating, and/or Communist Others. This demonization of the Chinese is often extended by Tibetans reared in South Asia to Tibetans who have grown up in Tibet - who are suspected of being 'brainwashed' by China.
对于把藏族侨区和跨越国境宣扬为解放、抵制和反抗的象征，地理批评家主张重新审视藏族侨区，为“缺乏理据”的——一个引自霍尔的词汇。也就是说，侨区状况可能真的具有颠覆性或进攻性，但不是非得如此。此外，侨民身份和侨民群体一直是多样化及具争议性的。由加州藏族流行歌手德琼创作的《红色中国匪帮》的歌词是其中一个很好的例证，除了流露出（对汉族的）蔑视以及对藏族身份的自豪感外，这首歌直截了当地附和了西方对中国人的刻板印象：怪异、吃狗肉以及共产党异类。在南亚长大的藏人经常把对中国人的妖魔化扩大至在西藏长大的藏人，怀疑他们已经被中国洗脑。

The need to recognize that a diasporic condition is not always already politically progressive is acute in the Tibetan case, because of the way in which the diasporic struggle has been structured by the Cold War and by the conflation of Chinese-ness with Communism. The CIA's covert support for the Tibetan resistance army, Chushi Gangdrug, from 1956 until 1972 grew directly out of the Cold War project to contain Communism. These geopolitical entangle- ments have made for strange political bedfellows; former Republican Senator Jesse Helms, known for his distaste for what he called "Red China" and the "barbarous, Communist Chinese government", was one of the earliest and most vocal supporters of the Tibetan cause in the US government. In an ironic twist, perfor- mances in the 1970s by the Dharamsala-based Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts were heckled vociferously by audiences in Washington DC, Madison, and Berkeley, who were ideologically supportive of, if not well-informed about, the Communist project in China. The partial structuring of the internal politics of Tibetan communities by this field of global geopolitics makes their dynamics all the more important to tease apart.
认识到侨区状况在政治上不一定总是进步的，对西藏运动至关重要，因为流亡藏人的抗争方法跟冷战以及中国特色与共产主义的结合息息相关。中央情报局从1956年到1972年间对四水六岗藏人抵抗军队的秘密援助，完全是出于遏制共产主义的冷战策略。这些地缘政治上的瓜葛造就了政治上的临时伙伴；以憎恶中国并称之为“红色中国”、“野蛮的中国共产党政府”而闻名的前共和党参议员杰西·赫尔姆斯，是美国政府中最早和最强烈的西藏运动支持者之一。一个啼笑皆非的插曲是，上世纪七十年代，达兰萨拉藏族表演艺术学院的演出常常被华盛顿、麦迪逊和伯克利的观众喝倒彩，他们在意识形态上支持中国共产党，尽管不甚了解。藏族群体内部的党派政治斗争在世界地缘政治的大气候中得到了加强而不是分裂。

Of course, Tibetan communities have always been cross cut by multiple identities. Nevertheless, practices such as long-distance trade and pilgrimage gave a relative coherence to Tibetan cultural identity, including a sense of shared history, a common literary language, aspects of genealogy, myth, and religion, and folkloric notions such as Tibetans as eaters of tsampa (ground barley flour). However, the 'imagined community' of Tibet as a nation and the belief that Tibetans should thus have a unique nation-state, emerged strongly only in the early 20th century, after the 13th Dalai Lama fled to India and then to Mongolia after British and Chinese invasions, and especially after the 1951 incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China (PRC).
当然，藏人群体一直为各种各样的身份特征所切割。尽管如此，长途贸易和朝圣等活动使藏族文化具有了特征相对的连贯性，包括共同的历史、共同的书面语言、血缘联系、神话和宗教，还有比如藏族吃糌粑（青稞粉）的民俗概念。然而，到了二十世纪初期，在十三世达赖喇嘛因为英国和中国的侵略而逃亡到印度再前往蒙古，尤其是1951年西藏并入中华人民共和国后，把藏族群体想象成一个国家，并且认为藏人应该有一个单一民族的国家的信念强烈地凸显了出来。

Prior to this century, Tibetans conceived of themselves primarily in relation to sectarian and regional affiliations. Thus, the term Bod-pa, now a general term for 'Tibetan', was used only in reference to nonnomadic inhabitants of Central Tibet. Even in the 1970s the Tibetan government in exile worked hard to forge a national Tibetan identity to supercede divisive regional and sectarian identifications. In exile communities today there are still undercurrents of regional divisiveness, but, like the 'Kham for the Khampas' movements of the 1930s and the history of the Kham-oriented Chushi Gangdrug resistance movement (McGranahan, 2005), they are largely papered over in the transnational nation-building project of the Tibetan government in exile and of the Tibet Movement. Tibetans in exile insist today that, "For more than two thousand years, Tibet ... existed as a sovereign nation". As Renan has observed, "To forget and ... to get one's history wrong, are essential factors in the making of a nation."
在二十世纪以前，藏人对自身的认识主要是宗派和区域的隶属关系。因此，bod-pa，也就是现在的"藏人(Tibetan)"这个词，仅仅指生活在西藏中部的非游牧民。甚至到了上世纪七十年代的时候，西藏流亡政府还在致力锻造一个全民族的藏族特性，来取代地区性和宗派性的身份认同。直至现在流亡藏人群体内仍涌动着地区派系的暗潮，例如三十年代的“康巴人的康区”运动和起源于康区的四水六岗抵抗运动。但这些历史大体上被西藏流亡政府和西藏运动的跨国建国计划隐瞒了。如今的流亡藏人坚称：“在超过二千年的时间里，西藏一直是一个主权国家”。正如Renan评论道的那样：“忘记……或者错误地理解历史，是编造一个国家的必要因素。”

In addition to regional affiliation, axes of identification that were socially relevant both in the 1950s and today (in diaspora as well as in Tibet) include gender, age, class, and social status (aristocrats and commoners), religious and sectarian affiliation, and the lay-monastic divide. However, these differ from the contestation of identities that are the specific focus of this paper: the varying routes to the US diaspora through different national locations, and the consequent forms of identification with homeland. The latter are the product of the diasporic process itself, and thus constitute a newly formed axis of struggle and consent. This axis is not, however, independent of other axes of identification, particularly that of region, as I discuss below. Though these distinctions are relatively new and are not as formalized in linguistic categories as are other types of identifications, they are nevertheless social facts that permeate everyday practices and struggles around recognition.
无论是五十年代还是在今天（包括流亡聚居地和西藏），民族特征组成的基准除了区域隶属之外，在社会关系上还包括：性别、年龄、阶级与社会地位（贵族与平民）、宗教和派系从属，以及教徒与僧侣的区别。但是这些都与本文所专注讨论的民族特征不同：从不同的居住地经由不同的路线前往美国侨居，和由此形成的对家园的认定。后者是侨居过程的自身产物，由此构成了新的争论与认同的基准。但这一基准并不是独立于其它民族特征之外的，特别是我将在下面讨论的区域性特征。虽然这些差异性相对来说比较新，并且不像其它特征那样有一个正式的名称，但它们却渗透到日常活动中并寻求认同。

The importance of everyday practice, and the ways in which the 'authenticity' of Tibetan identities is both inscribed on and read off of bodies, suggests habitus as a productive analytical frame. Bourdieu emphasizes that habitus is a set of 'durable dispositions', a kind of historical sedimentation in and of the body: "The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective practices ... it ensures the active presence of past experiences which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the 'correctness' of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms". Habitus mediates between places and selves; it is the way in which bodies bear traces of the places in which they have dwelled. Casey describes these traces as being "continually laid down in the body, sedimenting themselves there and thus becoming formative of its specific somatography."
日常活动的重要性，以及所谓的“正统”藏族身份形成和表现于个体的方式，说明“惯习”是一个有效的分析框架。布尔迪厄强调，惯习是一系列“持久的习性”，一种历史的沉淀，它作用于机体又由其表现出来：“惯习是历史的产物，产生个体和集体的实践活动……它确保既往经验的有效存在，这些既往经验以感知、思维和行为图式储存在每个人身上，与各种形式规则和明确的规范相比，能更加可靠地保证实践活动的一致性和它们历时而不变的特性。”惯习作用于场所与自身之间；个体透过这种方式表现出它栖身过的场所的痕迹。凯西将这些痕迹描述为“持久地潜藏并自我沉降于个体里，且由此成为其自我生发的形成要素”。

Despite the remarkable influence that this concept has had on contemporary understandings of culture and society in critical human geography, habitus has been relatively neglected in geographical studies of diaspora and transnationalism. However, Kelly and Lusis write that "the habitus of Filipino immigrants is constructed not just within a geographically contiguous space, but also through transnational linkages with their place of origin", a useful observation for understanding how Tibetan immigrants, who imagine that they should share a set of unique and recognizable characteristics with all other Tibetans, nevertheless have divergent embodied, durable dispositions, constructed through transnational linkages with different national locations. The variations in habitus encounter the expectation of similarity and recognizability, leading to the frictions explored here.
“惯习”的概念显著影响了当代人文地理学中对文化和社会的认识，然而在对侨居和跨国现象的地理学研究中，它相对而言被忽略了。然而，凯莉和露西斯写道“菲律宾移民的惯习不仅形成于地理学的邻近空间中，还通过他们与原居地的跨国关联”，这一观察有助于理解藏族移民的思维。藏族移民设想所有藏人应该具有共同的独特性和易于辩认的特征，但他们有通过不同民族区域的跨国关联而形成的不同的持久习性。当惯习的变更与相似和易辨的预期相遇时，就产生了本文所要探讨的摩擦。

Sedimentations in the body include the deployment of particular languages and of words within a language, as well as taken-for-granted dispositions such as intonation, gestures, and 'taste', appreciation for or reaction against particular styles, such as of dress, food, and staged performances of 'authentic' song and dance. Habitus is durable, but not eternal. As a sedimentation of past determinations it has a certain inertia which confers "upon practices their relative autonomy with respect to the external determinations of the immediate present". On the other hand, change - within limits of continuity - can occur through a dialectical confrontation between habitus and social field; this happens when "dispositions encounter conditions (including fields) different from those in which they were constructed and assembled", such as in a rapidly changing society. This describes the Tibetan diaspora in the USA, in which the habitus of Tibetans from Tibet, of Tibetans from exile, and of those who have experienced both are unmoored from their social fields and places of sedimentation and encounter each other. Thus, I do not argue in what follows that the community fractures described here are fixed forever, but rather try to capture the present moment of confrontation and negotiation.
沉积在个体里的习性包括：特定语言的使用，和一种语言中特定词汇的运用，自然而然的腔调、势态和“品味”，对特定风格的好恶，比如衣着、饮食，还有舞台表演中的“正宗”歌舞。惯习是持久的，但不是永恒不变的。作为过往判断的沉积，惯习具有惯性，受制于当前的外部影响。另一方面，在保持有限的延续性的同时，惯习与社会环境也会辩证的对抗。这种情况发生在”习性遇到与之形成过程中完全不同的条件（包括场域）时”，比如一个急速变化着的社会。它描述了美国侨居藏人的状态，其中包括来自西藏的藏人、流亡藏人和那些兼具两处体验的藏人，他们离开了他们的社交场所和沉积惯习的地方，并遭遇彼此。因此，我不去争论本文所描述的群体断裂会以何种形式永久固定下来，而宁愿试着去捕捉当前这一对峙与妥协的瞬间。

After a brief overview of the Tibetan diaspora, I trace the experience of 'new arrivals' such as Tenzin from India to the USA. Next, I turn to two key arenas of struggle over authenticity: language choice and staged 'cultural' performances, includ- ing embodied reactions of appreciation or distaste for certain types of performances. Of importance here is not only the fact that dispositions, mannerisms, and apprecia- tion of style are different but that each set of dispositions is understood as the only way to be authentically Tibetan. After this I examine different strategies of establishing cultural authority, and, finally, look at the political stakes in seemingly inconsequential matters of taste.
在对侨居藏人作一番简要概述后，笔者会追踪“新来者”的经历，比如从印度来美国的丹增。接下来，会转而介绍正统之争的两个关键场所：语言选择和舞台“文化”表演，包括对某些表演形式的具体反应为欣赏或厌恶。重要的是，各方不仅仅性情、癖好和欣赏方式有所不同，而且都认为自己才是唯一的藏人正统。之后，笔者将审视建立文化权威的不同策略，最后会讨论在看似无足轻重的品味里所含的政治利害关系。

The multisited ethnography presented here draws upon participant observation and a series of semistructured interviews with Tibetans living in Lhasa, Tibet, northern California, and the Denver metro area of Colorado. By participant observation, I refer to attendance at picnics, meetings, parties, discussions, and performances, and visits in private homes. The approach is grounded in the understanding that "unearth[ing] what the group takes for granted" requires extensive interactions and familiarity with social setting. Interviews and unstructured conversations and interactions were conducted primarily in Tibetan, and, less frequently, in Chinese.
这里出现的多点民族志，借由参与观察法和一系列对藏人的半结构访谈来实现，被采访者居住在西藏拉萨、加利福尼亚州北部和科罗拉多州丹佛地区。我的参与观察法，指的是出席(藏人的)野餐、会议、聚会、讨论、表演和到私人家里拜访。此方式建立的基础，是发掘这一群体视之为理所当然之处需要广泛的互动和对社会情境的熟悉。访谈，随性的对话及互动主要以藏语进行，其次以汉语。

藏族侨区概况 (The Tibetan diaspora in brief)

After the failed uprising in Lhasa in 1959, roughly 80 000 Tibetans followed the 14th Dalai Lama to exile in South Asia. Some lived in towns such as Kathmandu, Delhi, Mussoorie, and Dharamsala, and others settled in agricultural and handicraft settlements established by the government in exile with the help of Western aid organizations. After the peak years of exodus from 1959 to 1961, the borders of Tibet were effectively closed. The political isolation of China meant that there was very little contact between Tibetans inside Tibet and the refugee community for more than two decades.
在1959年的拉萨暴动失败后，约8万名藏人随14世达赖喇嘛往南亚流亡。一些人住在加德满都、德里、马苏里和达兰萨拉等城镇，其他人定居在西方援助组织帮助流亡政府建立的农业和手工业定居区里。在1959至1961的出走高峰年份之后，西藏边境事实上被封锁了。中国的政治孤立意味着西藏境内的藏人和（境外流亡的）难民团体之间有二十多年是几近隔绝的。

Only after the death of Mao, the beginning of reform, and the then Chinese Party Secretary Hu Yaobang's fact-finding visit to Tibet in 1980 were restrictions somewhat loosened. In the early 1980s refugees were allowed to visit their relatives in Tibet if they applied for 'overseas Chinese' passports (many refused to do so). Between 1985 and 1988 some Tibetans were given permission to go on pilgrimage and to visit relatives in India, where many of them stayed. At the same time, parents began to send their children to schools in India to receive a Tibetan education.
只有到了毛泽东去世后，改革开始之际，以及当时的中共总书记胡耀邦1980年到西藏的实地考察之后，才使得限制稍微有所放松。上世纪八十年代早期，难民被允许到西藏探亲，如果他们申请“华侨”护照的话（许多人拒绝这么做）。在1985到1988年间，一些藏人获得许可去印度朝圣和探亲，许多人就在那儿呆了下来。同时，家长们开始将他们的孩子送到印度的学校以接受藏族教育。

However, the pro-independence demonstrations in Lhasa from 1987 to 1989 led to the imposition of martial law. Traveling legally to India became difficult once more, but the political crackdown that ensued produced another wave of Tibetans who fled to India. An estimated 2000 - 3000 Tibetans continue to leave illegally for India every year, though in recent years this has become increasingly difficult with the Chinese government's pressure on Nepal to arrest and forcibly repatriate Tibetans passing through to India. 'New arrivals' - as members of this second wave of Tibetans arriving in India are often referred to - are estimated to constitute more than 10% of the total diasporic population, which was estimated at 150 000 in 2002.
然而，1987到1989年间拉萨支持独立的示威致使政府实施戒严。合法前往印度再度变得困难，但接踵而来的政治镇压却在藏人中掀起了又一波逃往印度的浪潮。近年来，中国政府对尼泊尔施压要求逮捕和强制遣返经由尼泊尔入印度的藏人，又使情形随之变得日益困难，但据估计，每年仍有二到三千名藏人继续非法前往印度。这第二波抵达印度的藏人成员常常被称为“新来者”，据估计在2002年侨居藏人的15万总人口中占到了超过10%的比例。

The two major processes in the Tibetan diaspora of interest here are, first, the arrival of this second wave of refugees from Tibet after 1985; and, second, the large-scale movement of Tibetans from South Asia to the USA after the passage of the 1990 Immigration Act. Section 134 of the Act, the Tibetan US Resettlement Program (TUSRP), granted permanent resident status to 1000 Tibetans living in South Asia. These were chosen by quota according to categories, including 100 slots for 'new arrivals' from Tibet. Beginning in 1996 the lottery winners, who had been assigned to resettlement clusters in eighteen states, became eligible to bring their families to the USA.
侨居藏人的两大进程令人感兴趣，第一，1985年后这第二波来自西藏的难民的到来；第二，在《1990年移民法》通过后，藏人自南亚大举迁至美国。根据该法案第134章，藏人定居美国计划（下简称TUSRP），居住于南亚的1000名藏人被授予了（美国的）永久居留权。这些人是依照各类别配额被选中的，包括给来自西藏的“新来者”的100个名额。1996年开始采取抽签的办法，已被分配到18个州定居点的抽中者，可以将他们的家人带到美国。

A secondary effect of both the remittances that they began to send home and the heavy representation of Tibetan elites among the participants was the accumulation of social capital to the migrants. This has motivated and facilitated the migration of Tibetans from Nepal and India through non-TUSRP channels as well. The current estimate of 10 000 Tibetans in North America is far beyond what TUSRP had originally envisioned. Economically, there is intense pressure for remittances, and, symbolically, 'the West' has come to be seen in South Asian exile communities as a surrogate Shangri-la, diametrically opposed to China.
他们开始往家里汇款以及参与者中许多是藏族中的精英这两个因素产生了一个次生效应，即移民社会资本的积聚。这一效应同样诱使和便利了藏人通过非TUSRP渠道从尼泊尔和印度向外移民。当前估计有1万藏人生活在北美，已远远超过TUSRP的初始预想。在经济意义上，对汇款的需求相当迫切；而在象征意义上，“西方”已经成了在南亚的流亡团体眼中“香格里拉”的代名词，与中国一词截然相反 。

Increasingly, however, the USA has also become the destination of Tibetans who travel directly from Tibet. They are few in number, no more than a handful in all but the largest Tibetan communities (such as, New York or San Francisco). Though a few have rural origins and minimal educational background, the dominant pattern of their transnational migration is through channels that rely on extensive education in the PRC, which in turn favors urban backgrounds. Some were cadres or staff for the small but increasing number of foreign development projects in Tibet, who come to the USA as visitors, trainees, or students. Their numbers also include a few who had come under political suspicion in their work units in Tibet. The contentious politics of authenticity between the long-time exiles, the 'new arrivals', and the Tibetans from Tibet, in the USA, grows out of the earlier reception of 'new arrivals' in India, to which I turn next.
渐渐地，美国也成为了来自西藏的藏人的直接目的地。他们数量很少，零星地散布在各个藏人群体里，除却一些大型社区（比如，纽约或旧金山）。尽管有少数人出自农村，只受过基础教育，但他们跨国移民的主要方式是通过在中国受高等教育而得来的出国渠道，而城市的藏人更容易享有这种机会。西藏对外发展项目数量虽少却在日益增多，有些人是这些项目的干部或员工，他们到美国探访、培训或留学。一些在他们西藏的工作单位受到政治上的怀疑的人也在其中。在美国的长期流亡者、“新来者”，以及本土藏人间对于正统的争议政见，产生于接收来自印度的“新来者”的早期，接下来我会谈到这个。

rhapsody

“新来者”：从印度到美国 ('New arrivals': from India to the USA)

Virtually all organized Tibetan community activity outside of Tibet has focused on reclaiming political control of the national homeland, and on speaking and struggling on behalf of those Tibetans who remain in Tibet. When Tibetan border policies were first relaxed in the mid-1980s, the newcomers were warmly welcomed. Political prisoners and religious leaders, such as the 17th Karmapa, who have escaped Tibet recently continue to receive unreserved welcomes. However, this is not necessarily the case for many ordinary Tibetans. New arrivals, whose first destination is usually Dharamsala because it is the residence of the Dalai Lama, are, in fact, crucial to the exile community as sources of the latest information about the situation in Tibet. However, when exiles, particularly the younger generation, find themselves face to face with the new arrivals and with their unfamiliar and hence 'Chinese' habits, mannerisms, and clothes the image of their fellow Tibetans as pure and uncorrupted quickly gives way to a belief that they have been brainwashed by their upbringing under Chinese rule. The fact that Tibetan identity in exile has been constituted in opposition to China contributes to both the scorn and suspicion of the 'Chinese' appearance and behavior of new arrivals who, because they are different, are seen as less than authentically Tibetan.
实际上，所有有组织的西藏境外藏人团体活动的焦点都集中在：声称受到中国的政治管控，为那些仍在西藏的藏人利益代言和抗争。上世纪八十年代中期，西藏边境政策首次被放宽时，新来者受到了热情的欢迎。政治犯和宗教领袖一直都受到毫无保留的欢迎，比如近年逃离西藏的十七世噶玛巴。然而，这不是可供许多普通藏人参考的例子。新来者的第一目的地通常是达兰萨拉，因为那里是达赖喇嘛的居住地，实际上，他们对于流亡团体来说至关重要，因为他们是西藏局势最新消息的来源。但是，当流亡者，尤其是年轻一代，发现当他们真正面对新来者，面对其不熟悉的——因而是“汉族”的，习惯、癖好和衣着，纯正和未堕落的同胞印象随即转变成这样一种想法，即新来者在中国统治下的教化中被洗脑了。流亡藏人的“藏族身份”被塑造得与中国水火不容，引致了对与其不同的新来者的“汉族”外表和举止的鄙视和怀疑，认为他们是不纯正的藏族。

Even worse than being considered brainwashed, some new arrivals are suspected of being spies for the Chinese government, a situation that is reinforced both by the politics of language use, discussed in detail below, and by events such as the arrest in 1995 and 1998 of several new arrivals in Dharamsala for allegedly spying for China. (6) As a result, many new arrivals report that they feel like outsiders among Tibetan exiles in India. Even those who leave because of political difficulties sometimes feel they are not completely trusted because their narratives do not conform to the standard, expected story of Chinese oppression. The situation is made no easier by the occasional Tibetan on an official visit to India. A PRC-based Tibetan who has founded a nongovernmental organization focused on cultural preservation, and who attended the 2004 World Social Forum in India, told me: "When I saw all of the Tibetans there [in India], I felt they were my brothers and sisters, but [because he was being closely monitored], I ignored them and acted like I didn't know anything." Such 'acts' by Tibetans concerned about repercussions back home confirm long-term exiles' fears and also feed suspicions of new arrivals.
甚至比被认为洗脑了更糟，一些新来者被怀疑是中国政府的间谍，一种语言运用的政治（后面会详细讨论）以及几名据说为中国从事间谍活动的新来者在1995年和1998年被逮捕等事件强化了这一现象。结果便是，许多的新来者反映，他们觉得像是印度流亡藏人的局外人。即使那些因政治困境离开的人，有时也感觉他们不完全被信任，因为他们的叙述不符合所期待的关于中国压迫的故事的常规。一名来自中华人民共和国的藏人曾组建了关注文化保留的非政府组织，曾参加2004年印度的世界社会论坛，他告诉我：“当我看到那儿（在印度）的所有藏人，我觉得他们是我的兄弟姐妹，但是（因为他是被严密监视的），我不理他们并装作什么都不知道。”藏人担心回去后产生不良影响的这种“装作”证实了长期以来流亡者的担心，也滋长了对新来者的猜疑。

The other major reaction to the new arrivals' unfamiliar bodily stylizations is scorn and embarrassment. These attitudes, with a strong element of class and urban con- descension, are primarily directed at new arrivals from rural backgrounds; they tend to be looked down on, rather than seen as politically suspect (though sometimes the two reactions are mixed). Young Tibetan exiles often refer to the new arrivals (sarjor) as being kacha, or 'raw' in Hindi, which is a reference to their unfashionable clothing, haircuts, and musical tastes. Decades of living in South Asia have produced a shift in style among Tibetan communities, whether it is the wearing of shawls and the salwar kameez by Tibetan women, or the Bollywood-inspired slicking back of men's hair. However, the exile community's view of themselves as the defenders and preservers of Tibetan culture (particularly in Dharamsala) prevents these influ- ences from being fully acknowledged. Like all styles, those read as kacha vary over time, but among men they have included the wearing of large blocky sunglasses popular in Tibet, polyester pants, and thin-soled olive-green cloth army shoes (in contrast to the US-inspired jeans, T-shirts, and brand-name sneakers favored by exile youth). According to one exile from Nepal, in the late 1980s, "the most important thing was whether your pants were tapered or flared at the ankles; only the sarjors' pants were tapered." These sarjor are also said to be recognizable by their ruddy complexions, their propensity for wearing multiple thick layers of long underwear, and, say some, their tendency to bathe too infrequently.
对新来者那生疏具体的风格化的其他主要反应表现为轻蔑和尴尬。这些态度带有一种很强的阶层因素和城市人的居高临下态度，主要针对有农村背景的新来者；他们会被瞧不起，多过被从政治方面的猜测来对待（尽管有时这两种反应是混合的）。年轻流亡藏人经常用“kacha”，也就是印度语“土气”来描述新来者（sarjor），这是因为他们不时尚的衣着、发型和音乐品位。几十年来在南亚居住已使藏人群体在（服装）样式上发生了变化，不论是藏族女子穿披肩和旁蔗普服，还是藏族男子从背后看来有着宝莱坞风尚的油光水滑的头发。但是，流亡社团视自己为藏族文化的维护者和保存者（特别是在达兰萨拉），阻止这些完全公认的影响。同所有样式一样，那些被视为kacha的样式，也随着时间在变化，在西藏的人们也流行戴太阳眼镜，穿聚酯材质的长裤和薄底橄榄绿军鞋（与流亡青年喜爱美国时尚的牛仔体恤和名牌运动鞋相反）。一位八十年代后期从尼泊尔来的流亡者说：“最重要的一点在于你的裤子在脚踝处是收窄还是张开；只有sarjor的裤子是张开的。”据说这些sarjor还可通过以下几点来辨认：他们的红润肤色；他们穿多件又厚又长的内衣的癖好；以及有些人说的，他们太不经常洗澡了。

An important and related image of the new arrivals is that they are 'impolite' and behave poorly, and that the men are 'aggressive' and prone to fighting. The Bir School for new arrivals was known for being a site of frequent fighting in the 1990s. Similarly, in the three main Gelukpa monasteries in exile, new arrivals are characterized by teachers and other students alike "as having less respect for monastic discipline as well as being wild and unruly" (Stro « m, 1997, page 41). For Tibetans in exile, long attuned to their positive public image as compassionate and gentle, nonviolence has become internalized as a marker of authentic Tibetan-ness (Huber 2001; Sperling, 2001). The Dalai Lama himself has framed the issue of authenticity in this way; when asked about the loss of Tibetan culture in a recent interview he replied:
一个对新来者的重要和相关印象是他们是“不礼貌的”和缺乏教养的，以及他们是“挑衅的”和好斗的。新来者就读的比尔学校，在上世纪九十年代是出了名的频繁斗殴场所。与之类似，在流亡政府的三大格鲁派寺院，新来者被教师和其他学生描述为“不遵守寺院规章，就像是野蛮和无法无天的”。对流亡藏人来说，长期以来，习惯于其有同情心和温和的正面公众印象，非暴力已被内化为正统的藏民族性。在近期的一次采访中，被问及藏族文化的丧失时，达赖喇嘛自己以这样的回答表述了正统问题：

"There are clear signs of the degeneration of the Tibetan traditions, and of moral principles. In recent years there have been a number of murder cases in the Tibetan community in India. All of them took place among people newly arrived from Tibet. This shows the degeneration of the spirit of tolerance and self-discipline. And then in Tibet itself, there is gambling and also prostitution".
“有明显的迹象表明藏族传统和道德信念的退化。近年来印度藏人社区中发生了一些谋杀案。这些案件都发生在来自西藏的新来者之间。这表明了忍耐和自律精神的倒退。而在西藏境内，有赌博，还有卖淫。”

Violence, then, is read as proof that Tibetans from Tibet have been Sinicized and are no longer authentically Tibetan. What this framing obscures is the long history of socially and culturally sanctioned codes of honor and revenge, and the celebration of weaponry and fighting as a performance of masculinity in some parts of Tibet (for example, Norbu, 1997). This is not to suggest that all behavior of new arrivals is an unproblematic continuation from a pre-1959 past, but it is equally problematic to assume that everything that Tibetans in exile now associate with authentic Tibetan-ness is a true preservation of a single 'pure' Tibetan culture.
暴力于是被认为是本土藏人被中国化而不再是正统藏人的证据。这种说法掩盖了在长期的历史里，社会上和文化上认可的荣誉与复仇的准则，以及颂扬武器与格斗在西藏某些地方被看作是男子气概的表现。笔者并不是说新来者所有的行为都肯定是来自于在1959年前已经形成的习惯，但如果认为流亡藏人现在所声称的正统藏族特色的事物都真正保存了单一纯正的藏族文化的话，那也同样是荒谬的。

The behavior of some new arrivals is also seen as deplorable because of the exiles' self-understanding of Tibetans as refugees, temporary guests of the Indian state. Long- term refugees believe that bad behavior on the part of the new arrivals engenders Indian resentment towards the Tibetan population as a whole, giving them an undeservedly bad reputation. These issues are exacerbated by the scarcity of resources in South Asian exile communities, which are further taxed by continual arrivals from Tibet. Thus, although sarjor means literally new arrival, many of those labeled sarjor understand the term as an insult.
由于流亡藏人将自己看作难民、印度政府的临时客人，一些新来者的举止也被视为是可悲的。老难民认为，部分新来者的不良举止会使印度人迁怒于整个藏人群体，带来与其不相符的坏名声。这种观点由于南亚流亡团体的资源稀缺而被放大了，因从西藏持续不断到来的新来者加重了他们的负担。因而，尽管sarjor在字面意义上意味着新来者，很多被打上这个标签的sajor都将这个词理解成一种侮辱。

In the USA, the new arrivals are on a more level playing field with other Tibetans than was the case in South Asia, where they were more structurally dependent on the larger Tibetan community. Almost everyone struggles to make ends meet, and the immediate Tibetan community diminishes in economic as well as in political impor- tance. In interviews several former new arrivals pointedly claimed that they were as successful in the USA as the long-term exiles, if not more so. Nevertheless, the term sarjor continues to be used in sometimes perjorative ways. "That man is such a sarjor", said one exile who himself had recently immigrated to the USA, as a marker of his exasperation with another man with whom he squabbled over a downtown Oakland parking space. On another occasion, when one Tibetan man called out in jest to two other Tibetan basketball players on a languid Saturday afternoon in Denver, "hey, you two sarjor are pretty darn good at basketball", the comment nearly provoked a fistfight, again indicating that the term continues to be saturated with meanings far beyond the length of residence time in a particular place.
在美国，新来者与其他藏人的交往有一个比起南亚更公平的环境，在南亚他们更多地是被结构性地嵌入和附庸于更大的藏人群体。在美国，几乎每个人都在努力维持生计，藏人群体在经济上和政治上的影响力随之减弱。在访谈中，几位曾经的新来者直陈，他们在美国与那些长期流亡者一样成功，至少并不差于他们。然而，sarjor这个词仍然时常被用于贬损他人。最近刚移民到美国的一位流亡者提起在奥克兰市中心为一个停车位与人吵架时，骂道：“那个人真是个sarjor”。在另一例里，在丹佛一个慵懒的周六下午，当一位藏人对另两位打篮球的藏人开玩笑，“嗨，你们两个sarjor，篮球打得不错啊”，这一句话几乎挑起了一场互殴，这又一次表明这个词蕴含的影响力远远超过了在某个特定地方居住的时间长度。

In fact, the term sarjor is used in the USA in reference not only to Tibetans such as Tenzin who arrived in India in the 1980s but also to those who have migrated directly from Tibet to the USA. This suggests that the term has taken on multiple valences. As discussed above, those who have migrated directly from Tibet to the USA are often urban and educated, and thus are not seen as "raw" or uncouth. But their more urban styles are read even more strongly as 'Chinese'; something as innocuous as wearing glasses, which is much more common in the PRC than among Tibetans in South Asia, can come to be read as part of a 'Chinese' rather than Tibetan gestalt. These Tibetans are treated with much greater political suspicion, particularly because of their linguistic practicesöone of the most emotionally charged arenas of struggle over authenticity.
实际上，sarjor一词在美国不只是被用来指像丹增一样在八十年代到印度的藏人，也指那些直接从西藏移民到美国的藏人。这表明，这个词有了更多种含义。如上所述，那些直接从西藏到美国的移民者通常为城市人和受过良好教育者，因而不被视作“土气”或粗野。但是他们的越是城市化却越是被认为“汉化”。有些事情本是区区小事，比如戴眼镜，因为这在中国比在南亚藏人间更为普遍，所以被认为是“汉族的”而不是藏族的形格。这些藏人受到更多政治上的怀疑，很重要的原因是他们的语言运用，语言运用正是关于正统的争论最情绪化的一个环节。

语言政治 (The politics of language)

Language - dialect and words used, as well as intonations and accompanying gestures - is an embodied competence which in turn structures social relations. Bourdieu writes that:
语言——方言、用辞以及语调和相应手势——是一种能力的具体体现，这种能力转而又塑造了社会关系。布尔迪厄写道：

“every confrontation between agents ... brings together ... systems of dispositions, such as a linguistic competence and a cultural competence, and, through these habitus, all the objective structures of which they are a part, structures which are active only when embodied in a competence acquired in the course of a particular history (with the different types of bilingualism or pronunciation, for example, stemming from different modes of acquisition)” (emphasis in original).
“行动者相互间的遭遇将诸如语言能力和文化能力等习性体系串联起来；而透过这些惯习，又把所有的客观结构串联起来，有些结构仅当被包含在某一特定历史时期所需的某项能力之时才有效。比如，起源于不同类型需求的各种双语能力或发音方法”。

Not surprisingly, then, a key element in the distrust of 'new arrivals' in India, and, even more so, of Tibetans from Tibet in the USA, is the fact that they speak Chinese, which is understood as 'the language of the enemy'. Many Tibetans who escaped to India in the 1980s - particularly those who came of age during the Cultural Revolution - recounted to me their frustrations at arriving in Dharamsala unable to read or write Tibetan because they had not been taught in school.
一点也不奇怪的是，对印度的“新来者”——甚至是对那些从西藏来到美国的藏族人不信任的一个关键因素是他们讲汉语这样一个事实，而汉语被认为是“敌人的语言”。很多在20世纪80年代——尤其是在文化大革命的岁月里逃到印度的西藏人向我叙述了到达兰萨拉后无法读写藏语而遇到的挫折，因为此前学校并没有教他们藏语。

Linguistic tensions are considerably heightened by certain characteristics of the Tibetan language itself. Classical literary Tibetan has a remarkably conservative orthography, but the many spoken dialects have changed dramatically, such that they are consistent neither with the literary language nor with each other. Vernacular Tibetan is highly nonstandardized, with large regional variations that are mutually incomprehensible; dialects diverge significantly even within small geographical areas. In exile a version of Lhasa dialect is taught in schools and has become the common, standardized language of the diaspora. As a result, few younger Tibetans in the diaspora are able to speak or understand regional dialects. In Tibet, by contrast, regional dialects continue to be used, but much less has been done to promote a transregional standardized Tibetan - with Mandarin instead filling the role of a lingua franca. Linguistic differences thus inflect the different national contexts with which Tibetans are associated.
藏语本身的某些特点也在相当程度上加深了语言上的紧张关系。正统的书面藏语采用的是一种非常保守的拼字法，但许多藏语方言口语已经发生了巨大的变化，这些方言口语不但和书面语不同，而且相互之间也不一致。藏族土语非常不标准，区域间口语的差异大到了难以相互理解的地步。即便是在小范围的地理区域内，方言的差异也很显著。在流亡地区，学校教授的是拉萨方言的一种版本，这种方言已成为这一侨区共同的、标准化的语言。其结果是，侨区里几乎没有年轻的藏人能够讲或听懂其它地域的方言。反过来，在西藏，地区方言继续通行，但未能形成一种跨地区的标准化藏语，反而是普通话充当了通用语的角色。语言上的差别使维系着藏人的民族背景在其彼此之间发生了相异的变化。

As a result, many new arrivals from the eastern regions of Kham and Amdo are perfectly fluent in their own Tibetan dialects, but have a great deal of difficulty with the Lhasa dialect that has become the diasporic standard. On the other hand, many of them can speak at least some Chinese. Indeed, several Tibetans from Gyalthang, in Yunnan, recalled that, when they first arrived in Lhasa on the way to India, they resorted to Chinese to communicate with other Tibetans, even though their own Mandarin was far from perfect. When they tried the same way of communicating in India, however, they were chastised for speaking Chinese. Another man from Chamdo remembers, "When I first arrived in India, I constantly had to explain [to other Tibetans] that just because I sometimes read a Chinese newspaper didn't mean that I didn't understand [Tibetan] politics. I always had to explain that one must consider the contents of a book or what someone is saying, not just what language it's in." These misunderstandings are exacerbated by the changing regional composition of the diasporic population. In 1991 only about 5% of Tibetans in South Asia were from Amdo, though Amdo accounted for 27% of the Tibetan population before 1959. The proportion of Tibetans from Amdo leaving Tibet has been increasing, however. The fact that Amdo dialects are the most divergent from the 'standard' Lhasa dialect means that these Tibetans are especially likely to encounter these linguistic difficulties, which are sometimes read as problems of authenticity and, by extension, of national loyalty.
因此，许多来自西藏东部的康巴及安多地区的新来者说起自己地区的藏语方言非常流利，但说起已成为侨区标准的拉萨方言来却有很大的困难。另外，他们中的许多人至少都会讲一点汉语。的确，几名从云南建塘来的藏民回忆说，当他们在去印度的路上第一次来到拉萨时，他们可以借助汉语来和其他藏人交流，尽管他们的普通话也不算好。但到了印度，当他们想如法炮制时，却因讲汉语而遭到了责骂。另一名从昌都来的男子记得：“当我刚刚到达印度时，我不断的（向其他藏人）解释说，我有时看下中文报纸并不能说明我就不懂（藏人的）政治。我老是不得不解释说，人们要看一本书或是一个人说的是什么内容，而不能只看它（他）用的是什么语言。”由于侨区的人口来源地成分不断变化，这类误解被加剧了。在1991年只有约5％的南亚藏人来自安多，但是1959年前安多藏人已占到当地藏族人口的27％。并且，来自安多的离藏人员比例一直在增加。事实上，安多方言和“标准”的拉萨方言差的最远，意味着安多藏人格外可能遇到语言上的麻烦，这有时候会被当作正统与否的问题，甚至上升到民族忠诚度的问题。

For example, one day in the winter of 2001 I walked down a busy street in Berkeley, California, with a young woman from Amdo whom I had worked with several years prior, in Qinghai province, and who had just arrived in the USA. We ran into an older man, a former headmaster of a Tibetan high school in India. I introduced the two, and was part of the following exchange:
例如，2001年冬季的一天，笔者和一位刚从安多来到美国的年轻女子（数年前曾和她在青海省共事）一起走过加州伯克利市的一条繁忙的街道。途中碰到了一个老人，他是印度一所藏人高中的前任校长。笔者介绍这两人认识，并参与了如下的对话：

Man [in Lhasa Tibetan]: "So you're from Amdo? Did you come to the US for school?"
Woman [not comprehending]: [no response]
Man [in Lhasa Tibetan]: "I said, did you come to the US to go to school?"
Woman [to me in Chinese]: "What did he say?"
Author [in Chinese]: "He asked whether you came to the US to study."
Woman [in Amdo dialect to man]: "No, I came to visit my boyfriend."
Man [in Lhasa Tibetan, not understanding her response]: "Such a shame. When I see Tibetans who can't speak Tibetan, I feel very sad."
Author [in Lhasa Tibetan, protesting]: "But she's speaking Tibetan!"
老人（拉萨方言）：“你从安多来的？你是来美国上学吗？”
女子（听不懂）：（没回答）
老人（拉萨方言）：“我是说，你是来美国上学吗？”
女子（汉语；对笔者）：“他在说什么？”
笔者（汉语）：“他问你是不是到美国来学习的。”
女子（安多方言；对老人）：“不，我是来看望男朋友的。”
老人（拉萨方言；听不懂她的答复）：“真让人感到羞耻。当我看到藏人不会说藏语时，我都感到非常难过。”
笔者（拉萨方言；抗议）：“但她说的（也）是藏语啊！”

The linguistic sensibilities of the long-time exiles include not only the view that using Chinese is unacceptable but also, particularly among the younger generation, a tendency to code switch with Hindi and English. Indeed, many younger Tibetans in South Asia speak Hindi and Nepali as well as, or better than, Tibetan; in the USA, virtually all Tibetans speak English better than Tibetan. However, whereas mixing Hindi and English words into Tibetan sentences is considered hip and stylish, the use of Chinese words is considered unacceptable. For them, a Tibetan who speaks Chinese cannot be truly Tibetan and cannot be trusted for his or her political viewpoints.
长期流亡者的语言情结不仅包括认为使用汉语是不可接受的，也包括——尤其是在年轻一代中——那种与印地语及英语进行语码转换的倾向。事实上，很多南亚的年轻藏人印地语和尼泊尔语说得和藏语一样好，甚至比藏语更好；在美国，几乎所有藏人英语都说得比藏语好。然而，虽然把印地语和英语单词混入藏语句子中被看做是新潮和时尚的，使用汉语词汇却被认为是不可接受的。对他们来说，一个讲汉语的藏人不是真正的藏人，其政治观点也是不能信任的。

By contrast, those Tibetans who have experienced 'new arrival' status in India have had personal experience in Tibet and thus have had a closer engagement with Chinese culture. Though many of them left Tibet for political reasons, they do not assume that other Tibetans' use of the Chinese language has a necessary connection to political views. There is an even greater linguistic gap between long-time exiles and the Tibetans who come directly from Tibet, because many of the latter come having finished college in the PRC, and thus may find speaking Chinese just as convenient as speaking Tibetan (or, at least, Lhasa-dialect Tibetan). Even more than the new arrivals in India, they are likely to speak excellent Chinese, enjoy Chinese television and music, and have mannerisms, gestures, and taste in food and clothing that mark them as 'un-Tibetan' to the Tibetan exiles from South Asia.
反过来，那些在印度有过“新来者”境遇的藏人都有在西藏生活的亲身经历，从而与中华文化有过更近的接触。虽然当中的许多人是由于政治原因而离开西藏，但他们并不认为藏人使用汉语就与政治观点存在必然联系。在长期流亡的藏人和从西藏直接过来的藏人之间还有一个更大的语言差距，就是后者里边有许多人都是在中国完成大学学业的，因此，人们可能会发现他们讲汉语就像讲藏语（或至少像讲藏语拉萨方言）一样方便。比起印度那些新来者更甚的是，他们很可能会讲流利的汉语，欣赏汉语的电视和音乐；还有着不同的习惯、手势，以及食物和衣着品味——对于来自南亚的流亡藏人来说，这些都标志着他们是“非藏人”。

They also use Chinese loan words. Indeed, Tibetan intellectuals in exile as well as Western Tibet scholars have expressed dismay at the general inability of most Tibetans in Lhasa to speak Tibetan without extensive borrowing of Chinese. This includes not only relatively new words, such as 'television' and 'fax', for which Tibetan equivalents have been created but have failed to be widely adopted, but also familiar words such as numbers and days of the week. Tibetans in Tibet are well aware of, and worried about, the fact that Tibetan literacy rates are low, and that some youth, particularly those whose high marks allow them to study in schools in other parts of China, have a hard time speaking pure Tibetan. In Tibet today some Tibetans privately voice dismay that their own language is, in their words, 'so useless'. With both government affairs and business conducted in Mandarin there is little incentive for students to study Tibetan.
他们还使用外来的汉语词汇。事实上，对于大多数拉萨的藏人在说藏语时通常没法不大量借用汉语的状况，流亡藏人知识分子及西方的藏学学者都表示失望。这种借用不但包括“电视”和“传真”等相对较新的词语，这些词语有着相应的藏语词汇却未被广泛采用；而且还包括一些常用词语，如数字和星期几。西藏的藏人完全认识到并在担心着这样一个事实，藏语识字率很低，一些年轻人——尤其是那些得到高分可以在中国其它地区学校学习的藏人，不太会说纯正的藏语。如今，西藏的一些藏人私下里表达了对他们自己的语言是——用他们的话说——“那样无用”的失望之情。在政务和商务都是用普通话进行沟通的情况下，几乎没有什么动力能激励学生学习藏文。

At the same time, however, many 'homeland' Tibetans wonder about Tibetan intellectuals in exile who feel more comfortable speaking English. From their perspective it is the diasporic Tibetans who really have a choice about whether to use Tibetan, and, in this, they have done no better than those who live in Tibet. Thus, they point out the hypocrisy of diasporic critics who also have trouble speaking Tibetan without code switching - to English. In fact, except in some remote areas in Tibet, in monastic settings, and among the elderly, there are few spaces in the contemporary world in which Tibetans do not make extensive use of loan words and code switching to another language. A historian in Lhasa spoke caustically to me about the criticisms he had encountered at an international conference of Tibetan scholars:
然而，与此同时，许多“本土”藏人质疑流亡藏人知识分子更习惯于讲英语的现象。从他们的角度来看，藏族侨民是真正能够选择是否要使用藏语的，但侨民在这方面并没有做得比那些生活在西藏的藏人更好。因此，他们指出侨居批评家们的虚伪，这些人也没法说不经（英语）语码转换的藏语。事实上，除了在西藏某些偏远地区、寺院环境里和长者中间，当代世界中几乎没有空间留给未广泛使用外来语或未与其它语言进行语码转换的藏语。一位拉萨的历史学家谈到他在一次国际会议上遭遇藏人学者的批评时，尖刻地对笔者说道：

"The Tibetans outside [Tibet] call us ra-ma-lug [literally 'neither goat nor sheep', ie hybrid or mixture, implying that they are not 'real' Tibetans]. Well, I'd like to challenge them to a contest. I'd like to see who can speak more Tibetan without mixing in another language! We'd [Tibetans in Tibet] win that competition for sure. Then we could find out for sure - who is more ra-ma-lug?! "
“（西藏）外边的藏人说我们是ra-ma-lug（字面意思是“既不是山羊也不是绵羊”，即杂种或混合物，暗示他们不是“真正的”藏人）。那么，我愿意和他们来场比赛一试高下——我倒要比比看谁能说更多没有混入其他语言的藏语！我们（本土藏人）肯定能赢下这场比赛。然后我们就可以清楚地知道：究竟是谁更ra-ma-lug了？！”

Unlike this scholar, whose own mastery of literary Tibetan makes him resentful of exile charges of linguistic incompetence, a Tibetan woman from Amdo, who spent a number of years in Beijing before immigrating to the USA, calls her own inability to read and write Tibetan "a victory for the Chinese government". She explained to me that she wants independence for Tibet and is a Tibetan Buddhist (nangpa, literally an 'insider'). However, she also believes that Tibetans outside should not hold anything against the Chinese language, people, or culture per se. Even more importantly, she would like more sympathetic understanding from other Tibetans in the USA that she cannot just erase seventeen years of Chinese education, and, at the same time, that this does not make her sems (mind) any less Tibetan.
这位学者对藏文的精通使他不满流亡者对于语言上的无能的指责，与他不同的是，一个来自安多的藏人妇女移民到美国前在北京待过多年，她认为自己无法读写藏文是“中国政府的胜利”。她向笔者阐明，她希望西藏独立，自己是藏传佛教教徒（nangpa，字面意思是“会员”）。然而，她也认为海外藏人不应该不顾一切地反对中文、中国人或中华文化本身。更重要的是，她希望得到其他在美国的藏人更多地同情和理解，她没法抹去在中国所受的十七年教育，但这一点都改变不了她的西藏心。

'Homeland' Tibetans also bring their own linguistic sensibilities, shaped in the reality of contemporary Tibet, with them to the USA, leading to considerable friction. In addition to language choice, regional dialect, and the actual vocabulary used, divergent linguistic sensibilities also include the more subtle issue of how words are spoken. Even when the same Lhasa dialect is being spoken, there are subtle differences in intonation and insertion of marker words. As Bourdieu writes, "Body hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the form of postures that is both individual and systematic ... a way of walking, a tilt of the head, facial expressions, ways of sitting and using implements, always associated with a tone of voice, a style of speech, and ... a certain subjective experience." Class habitus, and the distinction between aristocratic and nonaristocratic ways of speaking, remains strong even today in the diasporic community. At the same time, speech patterns and movements, such as a subtle tilting of the head to indicate agreement or dissent, or gestures that indicate embarrassment, can distinguish PRC Tibetans from their South Asia counterparts. Thus, even Tibetan that is relatively 'pure' in vocabulary and authentic to some, can sound or feel 'Chinese' to others.
在当代西藏的现实生活中，“本土”藏人也形成了自己的语言情结，并把这些情结随他们一起带到了美国，从而引发了大量的摩擦。除了语言选择、地区方言和实际词汇的使用外，形形色色的语言情结里还包括述辞方式这样更微妙的问题。即使都在说同一种拉萨方言，在语调的变化和标记词的插入上也会有细微的差异。正如布尔迪厄所写的那样，“身体素性直接向运动官能阐明了既是个人的、也是社会的各种举止形式……走姿、坐姿、摆头、面部表情和器物使用等，总是与语气、讲话风格以及……某种特定的主观经验有关。”阶级惯习以及贵族和非贵族之间讲话方式的区别，时至今日仍在侨居社区里强烈地存在着。于是，讲话方式和一些动作——如轻摆头部表示同意或反对，或者用手势表示尴尬——可以用来区分中国境内的藏人和南亚的藏人。因此，对于一部分人而言是用辞相对“纯正”和正统的藏人，对于另一部分人而言却仍能听出或是感觉出其中的“中国味”。

rhapsody

搬上舞台的“文化演出” (Staging 'cultural performance')

Another arena in which habitus becomes important in struggles over authenticity is what anthropologist Diehl calls 'sound values' - particular types of music and dance, including accompanying bodily stylizations, intonations, and gestures, and appreciation (or not) of these performances. Diehl describes a performance she witnessed by a number of women from Lhasa who managed to travel to Dharamsala on religious pilgrimage. They gathered one day in a square and sang patriotic songs about Tibet - some of which they could be imprisoned for singing inside Tibet. Although the "high wavering tones" and "sweeping arm gestures" of their songs were unfamiliar to the exile context, the lyrics were not. Nevertheless, not a single Dharamsala resident participated in or watched the pilgrims' performance. Instead, after it was over, a group of older exile Tibetan women, "amused each other by singing parodic imitations" and "howled with laughter" at the Tibetans from Tibet.
惯习在正统之争中渐具重大影响的另一领域便是人类学家迪赫所称的“正确价值观”——特定类型的歌舞，包括与其相随的形体风格、声调、姿势，以及对这些表演的欣赏（或不欣赏）。迪赫描述了她曾目睹的一次演出，从拉萨到达兰萨拉朝圣的一群妇女某天在一个广场集合，唱热爱西藏的歌曲——其中一些歌曲如果她们在西藏本土演唱有可能会因此入狱。尽管流亡藏人不熟悉她们歌里“高音调颤音”和“挥舞手臂的动作”，但却熟悉那些歌词。然而，没有一位达兰萨拉居民加入她们或观看她们的演出。相反，演出结束后，一群年长的流亡藏人妇女，“滑稽地模仿她们唱歌来互相取乐”，并对着那些来自西藏的藏人“高声大笑”。

In the USA staged performances of 'traditional culture' are fraught spaces of encounter of different habitus. The larger Tibetan communities organize gatherings, demonstrations, and parties for the Tibetan New Year, the Dalai Lama's birthday, 10 March (uprising day), and so forth. There are also regional events such as the 'West coast Tibetan gathering' that has been held every summer since 1995. These gatherings usually include staged performances, mostly by young Tibetans, of traditional songs and dances from different regions of Tibet, 'cultural competitions' in which such performances are rated against each other, and more free-form open-mikes and talent shows. These open mikes and talent showsetitions' in which such performances are rated against each other, and more free-form open-mikes and talent shows. These open mikes and talent shows typically feature many renditions of Hindi and Nepali pop songs, an increasing amount of singing in English, few Tibetan songs, and no songs at all in Chinese (even though there are typically feature many renditions of Hindi and Nepali pop songs, an increasing amount of singing in English, few Tibetan songs, and no songs at all in Chinese (even though there are now a number of popular Tibetan singers in China who sing Tibetan-themed songs in Chinese). Singing in Hindi or Nepali, like watching a Hindi movie, is a normal and unremarkable activity in the US-based Tibetan diaspora, but singing in Chinese continues to be unthinkable. At the same time, nobody seems to mind that only a few participants sing in Tibetan for the talent show portion.
在美国，“传统文化”的舞台演出充斥着不同惯习相互冲突的纷纷扰扰。在藏历新年、达赖喇嘛生日、3月10日（起义日）等日子，较大的藏人团体会组织集会、示威和聚会等活动。另外也有一些地区性的大型活动，比如自1995年起每年夏季举办的“西海岸藏人集会”。这些集会通常都有举办舞台演出（大多由年轻的藏人表演），节目包括：源于西藏不同地区的传统歌舞、“文化竞赛”（对表演进行打分和排座次），以及更多的不拘形式的即兴表演和才艺展示。这些即兴表演和才艺展示的典型特征就是：唱印度语和尼泊尔语流行歌曲的相当多，唱英语歌的越来越多，唱藏语歌的很少，而唱汉语歌的一个都没有（尽管现在中国有一些为大众喜爱的藏族歌手用汉语演唱西藏题材的歌曲）。唱印度语或尼泊尔语歌曲，和看印度电影一样，都是美国侨居藏人再寻常不过的活动；但是唱汉语歌仍被认为是匪夷所思的。而且，似乎没有人介意才艺展示时唱藏语歌的人只占很少的比例。

The more scripted traditional Tibetan songs and dances provoke stronger reactions. In 2002 I attended one such 'cultural show' in the San Francisco Bay Area at a celebration of the anniversary of the founding of the Tibetan Youth Congress, with Drolgar, a Tibetan woman from Lhasa. Drolgar had told me a number of times that she disliked socializing with other Tibetans because, she said, she had learned that they talked behind her back about the possibility that she might be a spy. As we watched the performances, with a motley collection of Tibetan regional costumes, Drolgar turned to me and whispered, in Chinese, "watching them is so funny - it's hilarious". A few minutes later she turned to me again and said, this time in Tibetan, "snying-rje" - meaning 'poor things' several times. She then switched back to Chinese and said "poor things - they don't know anything about Tibetan culture, they only know the very surface", implying that, no matter how hard they tried with their dancing and costumes, they would never be as authentically Tibetan as herself, someone who had personally experienced growing up in Tibet.
传统藏族歌舞越是照本宣科，激起的反应就越是强烈。2002年，与来自拉萨的卓嘎一起，笔者就出席了这样一场“文化表演”，在旧金山湾区举行的藏青会成立一周年庆典上。卓嘎对我说过很多次，她不喜欢与其他藏人交往，因为他们在背后议论她可能是个间谍。当我们在观看一个五花八门的藏族地方服饰表演时，卓嘎转过来，用汉语小声地说：“看他们多可笑，太滑稽了”。几分钟后，她又转过来，用藏语说了好几次：“snying-rje”——意思是“可怜的东西”。接着她又换回汉语说，“可怜的东西——他们完全不了解藏族文化，他们只知道皮毛”。这意味着，不管他们多么努力地跳舞和展示服饰，他们也不会成为她那样的正统藏人，她可是在西藏长大的。

Another example that I will discuss at some length was a picnic held at a park in the San Francisco Bay Area in 2002. An official Tibetan song and dance troupe from Lhasa had been invited to California as part of a larger cultural exhibition and exchange program. However, the exhibition had been quickly shut down by protests, and the troupe was unable to perform at the exhibition as planned. A few days later, the Tibetan Association of Northern California (which was not officially involved in the protests, but a number of whose members had participated in protest action through other groups, such as Students for a Free Tibet) invited the Lhasa Tibetans to perform for the local community. They agreed, and on a bright and cloudless Saturday after- noon the two groups came together for a picnic. The troupe from Lhasa performed a number of songs, after which a California-based Tibetan band also performed.
笔者要花些篇幅讨论的另一个例子是2002年在旧金山湾区某公园举办的一次野餐会。有个来自拉萨的官方藏族歌舞团应邀到加州参加一个文化展览和交流项目。然而，展览由于受到抗议很快就中止了，这个团也就无法按计划在展览上演出。数天后，北加州西藏协会（该团体没有正式参与抗议，但是其许多成员通过其他团体，比如自由西藏学生运动，参加了抗议行动）邀请拉萨藏人们为当地社区表演。他们同意了，在一个晴朗无云的周六下午，两个团体聚在一起野餐。拉萨歌舞团演唱了一些歌曲，之后加州当地的藏人乐队也表演了节目。

For most of the show, I sat listening with several former new arrivals and a few other Tibetans who had arrived in California from Lhasa. They appeared to be having a tremendously good time, singing along, clapping frequently, and making remarks such as "Today is just like being at the Norbulinkga" (the summer palace of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, where summer picnics are frequently held); "it's just like being at Zholdon" (a yoghurt festival held in Lhasa every August); "it's just like being at a nangma" (a Tibetan-style karaoke popular in Lhasa); and even "for those who haven't been to Lhasa, this is just like taking them there for the day!" One woman, who had just received political asylum in the USA, exclaimed to me that this was her happiest day since she had arrived in the United States two years earlier, because "it's just like being back in Lhasa".
在表演的大多数时间里，笔者与一些新来者（在西藏出生和长大，在上世纪八九十年代前往印度或尼泊尔，然后移民美国者）和几个从拉萨直接来加州的藏人坐在一起聆听。他们显得极为高兴，频频鼓掌，并评论道，“今天就像在罗布林卡一样（达赖喇嘛在拉萨的夏宫，在那儿常举行夏日野餐）”；“就像是在雪顿节上（每年八月在拉萨举办的一个酸奶节）”；“就像是在一次囊玛上（拉萨流行的一种藏式卡拉OK）”；甚至“就像是带那些从未到过拉萨的人去了一次拉萨！”一个刚获准在美国政治避难的妇女对我惊呼这是她自两年前到美国以来最开心的一天，因为“就像回到了拉萨”一样。

Immersed as I was in my friends' pleasant nostalgia for Lhasa, memories of which flooded back to them as they listened to the Tibetan singers, I assumed that everyone present was enjoying the music. When I walked around, however, I realized that this was not the case. A mother and daughter, both participants in TUSRP, complained to each other about the way the performers sang in such a strangely un-Tibetan way, their tones too high, and their smiles and gestures too perfect and too dramatic. The daughter then said that she had had enough of this, and suggested, "let's go watch a Hindi movie". When I later asked other long-time exiles about their reactions, some said that they "didn't know whether to laugh or to cry, whether to be happy or sad". Although they were happy to see Tibetans perform, they felt strongly that everything about the way these Tibetans had been trained - from the way they opened their mouths and smiled, to the way they stressed certain syllables in their songs, to their use of nasal tonesöwas 'very Chinese'.Whatever happiness they might have expected to feel upon their encounter with those from the homeland for which they have been longing was dissipated by the alienness of what they saw and heard. Indeed, according to several, it was only a measure of their graciousness and goodwill that helped them refrain from laughing at the performers.
笔者沉浸在朋友们对拉萨的喜悦怀乡之情中，当听到藏族歌手演唱时，他们对拉萨的记忆如开了闸的洪水一般涌现。本以为每位在场者都很享受，但当笔者四处走动时，才意识到并非如此。一对通过TUSRP来美国的母女相互抱怨道，演出者唱歌的方式非常奇怪，非常的“不藏族”，他们的音调太高，而且他们的笑容和手势都太完美和太戏剧化。接着，女儿说她受够了，并建议：“我们去看一场印度语电影吧”。后来当笔者询问其他长期流亡藏人的反应时，一些人说他们“不知道该笑还是该哭，该高兴还是该悲伤”。尽管很高兴看到藏人演出，但他们强烈感到，这些受过培训的藏人无一处不是“非常中国式的”，从张嘴和微笑，到在歌里加重某些音节，再到对鼻音的运用。见到一直渴望见到的家乡人而可能产生的快乐，却因他们看到和听到的四不象演出消失殆尽了。实际上，有几个人说，只是出于礼貌和善意，他们才抑制住自己，没有去嘲笑表演者。

What I want to stress here is not just the bodily stylizations and sounds of those on stage, but also the audience's reaction to these various performances. Their sometimes visceral reactions to different styles of song or dance, their perceptions of performers as authentically Tibetan or not, and their accompanying appreciation, distaste, or condescending laughter are also shaped by habitus as a structuring structure which "engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others". In other words, significations of transnational migrant identity take place not only in the structured compulsion to repeat particular gestures, manners, and bearings, but also in structured reactions to embodied practices. In the next section I turn to a more detailed exploration of the sources of authority to which differently routed Tibetans appeal.
在此笔者想强调的不只是舞台表演者的身体风格和声音，还有观众对这些各种表演的反应。他们有时对不同歌舞风格的骨子里的反应，他们对表演者是否是正统藏人的看法，和伴随的欣赏、嫌恶，或施舍的笑声，也是由惯习作为一种构建中的结构所决定的，这种结构“产生了与那些处境相符的所有想法、所有感知，以及所有行为，无它”。换言之，跨国移民身份的差异性不仅在于重复特定的手势、态度和举止，还在于对具体实践的反应。在下一部分里，笔者会更详细的揭示不同路线藏人所宣称的权威的来源。

代表家乡的权威与主体形成 (Authorities of homeland and subject formation)

When Drolgar reacted toTibetan exile youths' performance of traditional Tibetan songs by exclaiming "poor things!" and "they don't know anything about Tibetan culture", she implied that she had greater authority than they to judge what is and what is not truly, or authentically, Tibetan. She commented that the regional styles of dance meant little to the performers, who most likely did not know the location of one region in relation to another. Her claim to cultural authority is based on her personal experience of the actual place of the homeland, and particularly on her concrete geographical and embodied spatial knowledge of it. Another woman from Amdo, Wangmo, who had also recently arrived in the San Francisco Bay Area after living in Beijing for some years, had similar reactions after the picnic described above.Witnessing the silence and unenthusiastic reception of the exiles to the Lhasa performers, she had the following to say about most of the Tibetans she had encountered in California: "I think these Tibetans here - are not real, pure Tibetans. They've already changed. I think in the future there will be a lot of trouble among Tibetans. These people here don't understand what Tibet is really like. They really should go to Tibet for themselves - then they would understand." Tibet, in her view, is best known through embodied, lived experience.
卓嘎对流亡藏族青年表演传统西藏歌曲的反应——惊叫“可怜的东西！”和“他们完全不了解西藏文化”——暗示着她（认为自己）比他们更具有权威来判定什么是或不是真正的、正统的西藏风格。她评价道，对那些很可能连某个地区在哪个方位都搞不清楚的表演者来说，舞蹈的地方风格毫无意义。她所宣称的文化权威是基于其个人在家乡这个具体地方的体验，尤其是她对家乡在地理实体上和具体空间上的认知。另一位来自安多的女士王沫（音译）在北京居住多年后，最近来到了旧金山，她在参加了上述的野餐会后亦有相似的反应。目睹了流亡藏人对拉萨表演者的冷漠接待后，她对于在加州所碰到的大多数藏人评论如下：“我认为这里的这些藏人……不是真正、纯正的藏人。他们已经变了。我觉得将来藏人之间会有很多麻烦。这些人根本不知道真正的西藏是什么样的。他们应该亲自到西藏去，那样他们就会明白了。”西藏，在她看来，最好是通过具体的、活生生的体验来了解。

In contrast, the authority that exile Tibetans claim to speak for Tibet is based neither on embodied experience of place nor on concrete geographical knowledge, but rather has a strong temporal dimension. Indeed, it is rare for Tibetan diasporic youth to have much concrete geographic knowledge beyond the most general regional divisions; Ström notes that he "met very few... who are able to relate to a map of Tibet or locate an area according to the four directions ... ." Instead, their relationship to Tibet as homeland is based on tradition, and on the claim that they have preserved the authentic Tibetan culture that existed before it was destroyed in Tibet, and transplanted it to Dharamsala, "a temporary home preserving a historical culture in its pure form before an inevitable return to the original homeland". Exile is "a time when it is vital to preserve a pure form of this civilization since it is itself under erasure in the original home".
与之相反，流亡藏人所宣称的对西藏的权威，既不是建立在具体地方的体验上，也不是建立在地理实体的认知上，而是有着一种强烈的时间意识。的确，除了最基本的地域划分，侨居藏族青年几乎没有任何具体的地理知识；斯特伦提到，他“碰到的流亡藏人，几乎没人懂西藏的地图或能用东南西北来指出一个地方的……”相反，他们与西藏本土的关系仅仅是建立在传统之上，以及宣称他们保留了在被毁灭之前存在于西藏的正统藏族文化，并将它移植到了达兰萨拉，“在终将返回家园之前，（达兰萨拉）是一个临时的家，维持着一种历史文化的纯正的形式”。流亡是“保存文明纯正形式的一段重要时期，因为这种文明自身在它原来的家乡遭到了毁灭”。

As a result, everything that is viewed as authentically Tibetan derives from what older Tibetans remember from a time before 1959. Although the Tibetan government in exile has been careful in recent years to clarify that it does not object to 'development', and to change over time in Tibet per se, there is still a sense in which a pre-1959 moment is the point of comparison for all contemporary change. A certain nostalgic longing for the past, imbricated in romantic portrayals of an idealized but lost landscape, can be offensive to both kinds of new arrivals. Because they have experienced the complexities of change in Tibet, it seems to them that the 'old arrivals' wish to freeze Tibet in time and to deny modernity to the majority of Tibetans living in Tibet.
结果，所有被看作是正统藏族的东西，全都来源于老藏人对1959年前的回忆。尽管西藏流亡政府近年很小心地澄清，它并不反对“发展”，以及西藏本身随着时间推移发生的转变，但在潜意识里，1959年以前的时刻仍是与所有当代的变化相比较的一个标尺。把对过去的些许怀旧渴望，倾注在被理想化却已失去了的山水的浪漫描绘上，这可能会让两类新来者都感到不快。因为他们体验过西藏变化的错综复杂，这让他们觉得，“旧来者”希望把西藏封存在过去，并拒绝承认大多数生活在西藏的藏人的现代性。

For Tibetans who fled in 1959 and have spent most of their adult lives in exile, and for younger Tibetans raised in South Asia, being a refugee is a foundational principle of identity. Exile youth learn their parents' nostalgic memories of an idealized pre-1959 Tibet, and claim them as their own. However, their attachment to the idea of Tibet as homeland is not complicated by the reality of living in Tibet over the past half century. Instead, they hold tightly to what Malkki, in her study of Hutu refugees, calls a 'mythico-history' - a recasting and reinterpretation of the past in fundamentally moral terms. In this mythico-history, Tibet was a culturally unique and completely independent nation-state with a well-defined geographical territory, until it was occupied by China. Tibetans outside Tibet are responsible for preserving Tibetan culture and traditions that have been destroyed within the PRC, with the ultimate goal of returning to the homeland with this preserved culture.
对于1959年逃跑并且在流亡中度过成年生涯的藏人、和生长在南亚的年轻藏人来说，最基本的身份就是难民。流亡青年通过他们父母的回忆了解到的，是一个被理想化的1959年前的西藏，并把它当成自己的。然而，他们对西藏故土的眷恋之情并未因半个世纪以来生活在西藏的真相而复杂化。实际上，他们紧紧抓住“神话式历史”不放。“神话式历史”是玛尔基在关于卢旺达胡图族难民的研究中发明的词，指的是从根本意义上对过去的重新盘点和阐释。在这个神话式历史中，在被中国所占领之前，西藏是一个文化独特、完全独立、（领土）版图明确的单一民族国家。西藏外的藏人们有责任保存在中国境内已不复存在的西藏文化和传统，其终极目标是带着这些保存完好的文化回归家乡。

This mythico-history is constituted not just as a set of 'facts' to learn about Tibet, but also through emotions. The mythico-history and its attendant bodily dispositions are formed through repetition, such as the singing of the Tibetan national anthem in schools, and rituals and rallies commemorating the Dalai Lama's birthday, Democracy Day, and National Uprising Day. National Uprising Day includes the singing of Rise up (Long Shog), the lyrics of which include: "Rise up!/The butchering enemy, their hands red [with blood]/The enemy of the religion, the red Chinese/We will drive them out of Tibet/Rise up, rise up, patriotic people of Tibet!" When practicing the song, children in Tibetan schools are admonished, "No smiling! Look serious [literally, 'show a black face']!" The mythico-history and the locus of Tibetan-ness are literally inscribed on bodies as children learn not only the words but also the proper emotions to associate with them; one Tibetan exile recalls from his elementary school days, "Many of the adults cried when they sang 'Rise up', so I felt sad too, even when I was too young to fully understand the lyrics." Remembering the student-led songs at Tibetan anniversaries and festivals at the holy site of Boudnath, he stated:
这个神话式历史不止是作为关于西藏的一系列“事实”而建立起来的，也是通过情感建立起来的。神话式历史及其伴随的身体习性是经多次反复形成的，比如在学校唱西藏国歌，以及庆祝达赖喇嘛生日的仪式和集会、民主日、西藏人民起义日等。西藏人民起义日包括唱“起来”，歌词有：“起来！/杀人成性的敌人，双手沾满鲜血/宗教的敌人，红色汉人/我们要把他们赶出西藏/起来，起来，爱西藏的人民！”在练唱这首歌的时候，藏语学校的孩子们被告诫道，“不许笑！表情严肃点[字面意思是‘摆个黑脸’]！”孩子们学到的不仅是歌词，还有与之相符的情感，神话式历史以及藏民族性的定位亦随之铭刻在了他们的身心；一位流亡藏人回忆他上小学的时候：“许多大人在唱‘起来’的时候哭了，于是我也觉得悲伤，尽管我那时很小，还不完全懂得歌词的意思。”忆及在西藏纪念日和在博达纳圣地的节日上，由学生领唱的歌曲，他陈述道：

"Most of these songs are very serious in nature. We learned and practiced these songs for months prior to public gathering. I remember students getting punished for not taking them seriously. Some patriotic songs required us to make a serious face, raise our fists and make angry gestures against our 'enemy.' I had a difficult time making those gestures not because I was not conscious of the Tibetan plight but because it was difficult to relate to directly. However, I got better at it as I did it again and again. Furthermore, in public gathering as I found many older Tibetans getting sad and shedding tears, I also became sad and started shedding tears."
“事实上，这些歌大多非常严肃。在公众集会前，我们花了数月时间学练这些歌。我记得有学生因为不够认真而受到处罚。一些爱国歌曲要求我们满脸严肃，举起我们的拳头，对我们的‘敌人’做出愤怒的手势。刚开始时做那些手势对我来说挺困难的，不是因为我没意识到藏人的困境，而是因为很难把两者关联起来。但是，经过一遍一遍的重复后，我做得越来越好了。而且，在公众集会的时候，当我发现许多老藏人变得悲伤并且流泪时，我也悲伤起来并开始掉眼泪了。”

My intent is not to suggest that Tibetans from Tibet or new arrivals may not also agree with or be moved by the words of patriotic songs. However, the structure of exile institutions predisposes particularly situated Tibetans to react in specific ways, and this is partly how the homeland becomes less a topographic entity than a moral destination for many exiles. The embodied and visceral nature of habitus make the encounter with other Tibetans who do not meet predisposed expectations of 'Tibetan-ness' that much more fraught.
笔者并不是说本土藏人或新来者不认同或不会被爱国歌曲的歌词打动。但是流亡群体的机制让（流亡）藏人形成了在特定情况下所产生的特定反应。这就在一定程度上可以解释这种现象：对许多流亡者来说，家乡变得更像是一个道德上的目的地而不是一个地形上的实体。而惯习的内在和外在特性，使得遭遇到不符合事先预期的“藏民族性”的其他藏人变得是那样的更为烦恼。

Another difficulty for young Tibetans born in exile is posed by the fact that Tibetans from Tibet seem 'too Chinese', despite their embodied experience with the homeland which they themselves have never seen. One reaction has been the emergence of an alternative imagined geography of homeland, particularly among young elites from Dharamsala. Frequently referred to as 'Little Lhasa', Dharamsala has become the center of Tibetan diasporic geography. As the Dalai Lama's residence, it is the major site of Tibetan pilgrimage outside of Tibet. Although it is considered a 'temporary resting place' for Tibetan culture before its inevitable return home, some Tibetans have begun to see it, rather than Lhasa, as the center of Tibetan symbolic geography and as the locus of authentic Tibetan culture. Being from Dharamsala, not Lhasa, becomes the mark of pure Tibetan-ness, and geographical proximity to Dharamsala, rather than to Lhasa, is a measure of one's Tibetan-ness. This is what enables occasional comments, for example, that Tibetans who live 'too close to the border' of Tibet, in Nepal, are deficient in the determination and resolve they have toward the 'Tibetan cause' (of independence). In this frame, it is contemporary Tibet (rather than the Tibet of the idealized past or the hoped-for future) that cannot be the site of authenticity.
尽管在流亡地出生的年轻藏人也有（所谓）关于家乡的具体体验，但他们从未亲眼见过家乡；他们遭遇到的另一个困难便是，来自西藏的藏人看起来“太中国味”了。（他们的）反应之一便是，对想象中地理故乡的某替代物的出现，尤其是在来自达兰萨拉的年轻藏人精英间。常被指作“小拉萨”的达兰萨拉已成为藏人侨居的地理中心。作为达赖喇嘛的居住地，它是西藏境外的藏人主要朝圣地。虽然它被看作是流亡藏人终将重返家园之前藏文化的一个“临时栖息地”，但一些藏人已开始注意到，它比拉萨更像是藏族的象征性地理中心，以及正统西藏文化的所在地。来自达兰萨拉，而不是拉萨，成了纯正藏民族性的标志；与达兰萨拉，而不是拉萨，在地理上的接近程度，成了衡量一个藏人民族性强弱的标准。在此思路下，一些议论由是应运而生，比如说，在尼泊尔，藏人如果住得“过于靠近”西藏边境，就是缺乏对“西藏事业”（独立）的决心和意志。在此框架下，当代的西藏（而不是理想化了的旧西藏或是向往的未来西藏）是不可能成为正统所在地的。

Tibetans from Tibet, of course, do not agree. Although they acknowledge that there are significant differences between themselves and most of the Tibetans they encounter in the USA, it does not follow to them that they are any less Tibetan than the others or that Dharamsala is the real center of Tibetan culture. In contrast to the mythico-history of Tibet in exile, Tibetan-ness in the PRC stands in dialectical relationship to the imagining of Chinese-ness. Tibetans are, on the one hand, subject to negative stereotypes of Tibetans as backwards, dirty, lazy, and barbaric. On the other hand, urban and well-educated Tibetans are sometimes complimented for being difficult to recognize as Tibetan, a position which motivates them to identify more strongly with Tibetan-ness. Identifications with Tibetan-ness can be rooted, ironically, in the specters of their own potential inauthenticity. According to Drolma, who grew up in Xining, Qinghai province:
来自西藏的藏人当然不同意以上说法。尽管他们承认他们与大多数在美国遇到的藏人明显不同，但不等于他们比其他人更不像藏人，他们也不同意达兰萨拉是藏文化的真正中心。与流亡者的西藏神话式历史不同，藏民族性在中国境内，与（设想的）汉民族特之间存在着辩证关系。一方面，藏人通常受困于诸如落后、肮脏、懒惰和野蛮等负面印象。另一方面，城市里受到良好教育的藏人有时会被称赞说他们不象藏族，却促使他们对藏民族性有了更强的认同感。而具有讽刺意味的是，对藏民族性的认同可能根源于他们内心对于自身潜在的不正统的恐惧。在青海西宁长大的卓玛说：

“When I was young I didn't think there was any difference between Tibetan and Han. I didn't think it was a big deal being Tibetan, since we were just another minzu [nationality; ethnic group]. But other people wanted to make me different. When I go out with my friends in the city and dress like a city girl, no one believes I am Tibetan. Even when I tell them, they always ask me 'which one of your parents is Han, your father or your mother?' ... They congratulate me for not being like a Tibetan ... . Whenever a rural Tibetan gets on a city bus, people hold their noses and walk away and make very rude comments. Once I took my cousin from the village to a hospital in Xining. All of the doctors tried to ignore her, each telling the others to go and examine the dirty Tibetan ... I started to feel: okay, I am Tibetan. I'm not at all like you Han people. Then after I finished junior high I decided to go back to another school to learn Tibetan for several years. I volunteered to teach for a year in a nomadic area ... . Now I'm proud of being Tibetan ... I think it's very important for us to keep our Tibetan culture.”
“小时候，我没有想过藏人和汉人之间有什么不同。我也不觉得身为一个藏人有什么了不起，因为我们只是另一个民族而已。但是其他人想让我不一样。在城里，当我和朋友们一起出去，我穿得像一个城里女孩，没有人相信我是藏人。就算我告诉他们了，他们也总问我‘你父母亲中哪一位是汉人，你父亲还是你母亲？’……他们恭喜我不像一个藏人……每当一个农村藏人上了公共汽车，人们捏住鼻子走开，还用粗鲁的话来议论。有一次，我带从乡下来的表姐去西宁的一家医院。所有的医生都不理她，互相推脱让其他人来检查这个脏脏的藏人……（那时）我开始意识到：好吧，我就是藏人。我和你们汉人完全不同。后来，在我上完初中后，我决定回去到另一个学校学几年藏语。我义务在一个牧区教了一年书……现在，我为自己是藏人自豪……我觉得，对我们来说，保持藏文化是非常重要的。”

Younger Tibetan elites who have been educated and raised in urban China often come to first identify and then to perform their own Tibetan-ness through a contradictory process in which the misrecognition of Tibetans as a group, together with their own misrecognition as Han, is precisely what engenders their desire to become 'real' Tibetans, to inhabit and embody the category 'Tibetan'. At the same time, their identity is also shaped within the context of state discourse. The Chinese state actively promotes its own version of history, according to which Tibet has been part of China since the 11th century. It also seeks to shape imaginations of belonging through the regulation of linguistic categories and through the promotion of popular songs according to which, for example, “the Han and the Tibetans are daughters of one mother”.
在中国的城市中长大和受教育的年轻藏族精英们常常会首先表明自己（藏族）身份，然后通过一种自相矛盾的过程来展现他们自己的藏民族性。在此过程中，他们把藏族人误识为单一群体，再加上他们自己对汉族的误识，使他们产生了要成为“真正的”藏族、融入并体现“藏族”这一族群的愿望。与此同时，他们的身份也是在国家宣传的背景之下成形的。中国政府积极宣传它自己的历史版本，而根据这个版本，西藏自十一世纪起就是中国的一部分。政府还试图通过调整语言类别，以及推广“汉藏一家”之类主题的流行歌曲以建立藏人的归属感。

The processes and contexts of Tibetan subject formation within the PRC contrast starkly to the experience of exile, where constant repetition and verbalization of the mythico-history of Tibet is a primary way in which identity is constituted and performed. These differences are then brought into the cultural politics of Tibetan-ness in the USA. Tibetans from Tibet challenge the critique that others make about their engagement with Chinese culture. One such man does so by criticizing some of the exiles for mistakenly reifying Tibetan culture, or in his words: "treating Tibetan culture like a thing which can be put on a table, bounded, and moved around." These Tibetans base their claims to authenticity in an authority of place: they are, after all, literally from Tibet. They know what Tibet is like, whereas, they say, the long-term exiles carry around an image of Tibet in 1959 and act as if it is still accurate now. For them, being Tibetan is no more incompatible with speaking Chinese than it is with speaking English or enjoying Hindi movies. If some of these Tibetans are genuinely concerned with the way their own Tibetan-ness has been diluted by outside influences, or, more commonly, if they are concerned with the younger generation of Tibetans in the PRC, they see this as no different from the Indian and Western influences observable in the styles and language of Tibetans from exile.
藏族主体在中国境内形成的过程和背景与流亡者的经历完全相反，不断复述西藏的神话式历史是后者确立和表现身份的主要途径。这些差异之后被带到了美国，带进了关于藏民族性的文化政治之中。本土藏人则反驳其它人对于他们接触中国文化的批评。其中有一个人就批评一些流亡藏人将藏文化错误地实物化，用他的话来说就是：“把藏文化当作一件物品，可以把它放在台上、扎起来和拿着到处走”。这类藏人对正统性的宣称是基于一种所在地的权威——他们毕竟是真正来自西藏的。他们知道西藏（现在）是什么样的；而在他们看来，长期流亡藏人对西藏的印象停留在1959年，却还装作如今依然正确的样子。对于他们（本土藏人）来说，藏人说汉语，跟藏人说英语或看印度电影一样，没什么不能兼容的。即使有些本土藏人由衷地担心他们自身的藏民族性被外界影响给稀释了，或者更广泛地，即使他们担心中国境内的年轻一代藏人，他们也会觉得这与流亡藏人在风格与语言上显然受到了印度和西方的影响没有任何区别（两者同样值得担忧）。

rhapsody

政治与国家区位 (Politics and national location)

Why are these issues of cultural authenticity so contentious? Part of the reason is that the diasporic problem of maintaining a distinctive cultural identity faces new challenges in the USA, despite the fact that a major premise of TUSRP was precisely to help Tibetans "preserve Tibetan culture and identity" (Yeh and Lama, 2006). In contrast to South Asia, the Tibetan national anthem cannot be sung in school, and inflexible work schedules make protests much smaller and more poorly attended. Defiant teens in baggy pants, oversized athletic jerseys, gold chains, sporting cornrows appear at Tibet Youth Congress events dedicated to celebrating Tibetan culture (Yeh and Lama, 2006). In this context, the encounter with other Tibetans who appear alien and 'Chinese' looms as an even bigger problem - another challenge to the already vexed problem of cultural preservation - than it might otherwise be. Another reason is that, in the Tibetan diaspora, cultural and political identity are assumed to stand in for each other. Thus, a Tibetan who appears to be culturally 'other' is assumed to be politically 'other' as well - that is, to be sympathetic to the Chinese state's claims of Tibetan 'liberation', rather than to the counternarrative of Tibetan occupation and colonization. The flip side is that only those who loudly proclaim a desire for independence are assumed to be authentically Tibetan - that is, not to have been hopelessly 'brainwashed' by China.
为什么这些有关文化正统性的观点如此有争议？部分原因是，侨民如何保持自身独特的文化特征这一问题在美国面临新挑战，尽管准确说来，事实上TUSRP的一个主要前提就是帮助藏人“保存西藏文化和特征”的。与在南亚不同，藏人在（美国的）学校里不能唱西藏国歌，而且，工作安排缺乏弹性使抗议规模大为减小，参加的人数也更少。身着肥大的裤子、宽大的运动毛绒衫、戴金链、梳运动型玉米辫的叛逆期少年们，现身于藏青会组织的旨在宏扬西藏文化的一些活动中。在这种情形下，遭遇到其他看似异族的藏人和“中国人”，被放大成了个可怕的问题——对已经很令人烦恼的文化保存问题的又一项挑战——尽管可能并非如此。另一个原因是，在侨居藏人中，文化身份和政治身份被看作是相辅相成的。因此，一个看上去在文化上“异类”的藏人，在政治上亦会被视为“异类”，比如：（这个人）赞同中国政府声称的对西藏的“解放”，而不是与之相反的——西藏被占领和殖民。另一方面，只有那些大声宣称渴望独立的人被视为正统藏人，换句话说，还未无可救药地被中国“洗脑”。

The in-between position of the new arrivals in India who then come to the USA, between the long-term exiles and the new Tibetans from Tibet, speaks to the intensity of struggles over authenticity because of the new arrivals' imbrication with struggles for the nation. Like the 'homeland' Tibetans, the new arrivals can claim an authority derived from embodied knowledge of the homeland. However, as a group they tend to be less fluent in Chinese language and styles. At the same time, many are nevertheless enthusiastic consumers of Chinese music and movies, which can lead to ambivalence from others. A resident of Oakland, Dawa grew up near Lhasa but fled to India in the late 1980s. He also happens to be fond of watching Chinese soap operas, a hobby which led to a confrontation with a resentful roomate from India. Dawa defended himself by talking about his relatives who had been killed while they were participating in pro-independence rallies, and about his own harsh experience fleeing over freezing mountain passes to India. Content, he suggested, not language, is the better gauge for a person's political sympathies. Like him, many former new arrivals try to 'prove' their authenticity through public statements of their personal suffering and commitment to the Tibetan struggle. Others prominently display photographs of themselves at demon- strations or with the Dalai Lama, or work for Tibet Movement advocacy groups, but as in the case of Tenzin, such strategies do not always work.
之后来美国的印度新来者的立场，介于长期流亡和来自西藏的藏人之间，这印证了正统之战的剧烈程度，因为新来者同样也在为民族而斗争。与“本土”藏人一样，新来者会宣称（自身）是一种源于家乡的具象化知识的权威。然而，他们这群人很少说流利汉语或具汉人风格。同时，许多人仍然是中国音乐和电影的爱好者，而这可能导致同他人的矛盾。住在奥克兰的达瓦在拉萨附近长大，二十世纪八十年代后期逃到印度。他正好也喜欢看中国肥皂剧，这个爱好引起了来自印度的同屋的不满，两人因此产生了争端。达瓦在谈话中为自己辩护道，他的亲戚在参与主张西藏独立的集会中丧命，而他自己在翻越冰山要隘去印度时经受了严酷体验。他建议，衡量一个人政治主张的应该是内容，而不是语种。同他一样，许多曾经的新来者都有各自的个人遭遇和投身于西藏斗争，他们尝试借公众对他们的说法来“证明”自己的正统。其他人主要是展示他们示威时的照片，或与达赖喇嘛的合影，或是为拥护西藏独立运动的团体工作时的照片，但是正如丹增的案例所示，这些办法并不总是奏效的。

Assumptions about authenticity and identity are read off of national location and citizenship. The Chinese state works hard to interpellate Tibetans as citizens of China, fostering Tibetans' conceptions of themselves as 'people of China' (zhongguo ren). Many Tibetans in Tibet do, in fact, use this term, regardless of how they might feel about issues of cultural identity, political repression, or future autonomy. The same Tibetan scholar who complained to me about the level of Tibetan linguistic compe- tence of many Tibetan exiles also surprised me by telling me he was happy that the PRC (zhongguo) had finally won the bid for the 2008 Olympics, because "one is always happy when one's country [guojia] is shown to be powerful". At the same time, he is also committed to the project of keeping alive Tibetan language and culture, and sees himself as authentically Tibetan; he does not see these stances as being incompatible. The fact that a number of dissident intellectuals as well as political asylum seekers have emerged from among urban Tibetans who have been educated within the Chinese system (for example, the poet Woser, who writes in Chinese) suggests that a self-identification of a Tibetan as a 'person of China' is not necessarily evidence of complete political allegiance to the PRC (it may instead simply be a practical acknowledgement of the current political situation). However, what the exiles insist on is precisely this ability to read political interests from these other signs.
关于正统和身份的判定很容易由说话者的民族区位和国民身份识别出。中国政府努力为藏人的中国公民身份正名，培养藏人自身的“中国人”概念。许多本土藏人事实上的确在用（中国人）这个词，不论他们对文化特征、政治压迫或未来自治的观点如何。令笔者惊讶的是，那位曾向笔者抱怨过许多流亡藏人的藏语能力水平的藏族学者，也声称他很高兴中国最终赢得了2008年奥运会的主办权，因为“人总是为其国家的强大感到高兴的”。同时，他也决心投身保存藏语和藏文化的项目，并视自己为正统藏人——他并不将这两类立场看作是相互背道而驰的。实际上，许多政治上持异见的知识分子和寻求政治庇护者，都是在接受了中国系统教育的城市藏人中产生的（比如用中文写作的诗人唯色），而这表明，藏人自我认同为“中国人”，也不一定会在政治上表现出对中国的完全忠诚（也许仅仅是对当前政治局势的务实性承认）。然而，流亡人士所坚持的，更确切的说，正是这种从其他一些标记上解读出政治利益的能力。

Thus, a Tibetan from the PRC who identifies as such is immediately suspect. This extends to the type of passport he or she possesses.When some of the first Tibetan exiles were naturalized as USA citizens, they found that they were not allowed to list 'Tibet' as their 'place of birth' because the USA does not officially recognize Tibet as a country. A long struggle ensued, leading to the concession in which Tibetans are allowed to list the city or town of their birth, without appending either 'Tibet'or 'China' after it. Given the symbolic importance of this issue, many exiles are somewhat taken aback by Tibetans who travel to the USA as Chinese citizens with Chinese passports. This has resulted in misunderstandings and in a closing down of chances at dialogue. One Beijing-based Tibetan researcher, originally from Lhasa, recalled an academic trip to the USA several years ago. It was his first visit to the USA, and he was excited about meeting other Tibetans, until they asked him "strange questions, like 'do you have a Chinese passport?' Well, what kind of passport did they think I could possibly have? Then they seemed to become very wary of me, so I didn't spend that much time with them after all." There is no way to make the journey from Tibet directly to the USA except with a Chinese pass- port, which categorizes the passport bearer as 'a person of China'. For Tibetan exiles, however, this identification with China is sometimes understood not as a practical necessity but as a capitulation, as a rejection of Tibet's mythico-history, and thus further confirms the apparent rightness of recentering the locus of authenticity away, at least for the time being, from the actual place of the homeland.
因此，一位来自中国的藏人被确定有这些特征的话，就会立即引起怀疑。这延伸到了他或她所持有的护照类型。当首批流亡藏人中的一些人归化为美国公民时，由于美国官方不承认西藏是一个国家，他们发现“出生地”一栏没有列“西藏”。接下来他们作了漫长的抗争，最后官方妥协为藏人可以填自己出生的城镇，但不许在后面加上“西藏”或“中国”。鉴于这一问题具有重要的象征意义，许多流亡者在遇到以中国公民身份持中国护照到美国的藏人时总不免要“触景生情”。这种情形导致了误解隔阂的产生以及对话机会的丧失。一位原籍拉萨从北京过来的藏族学者，想起几年前一次到美国的学术访问。这是他第一次到美国，遇见其他藏人他很兴奋，直到他们问他“诸如‘你持有中国护照么？’这样一些奇怪的问题，他们以为我可能会拿什么护照？接着他们就显得对我小心翼翼，我就没再花那么多时间和他们在一块了。”从西藏直接到美国是不可能不持有中国护照的，只要他是“中国人”。但是对于流亡藏人来说，与中国的这项关联有时并不被理解成是一种实际需要，而被看作是一种投降，一种对西藏神话历史的抛弃，从而进一步证明了，重新确立正统中心所在地而不是在家乡的实际位置，显然是正确的，至少暂时是这样。

Unlike Tibetans from exile who have been engaged in political protest for their entire lives, Tibetans from Tibet often profess that they have no interest in politics. Their studied lack of interest in 'politics' and the low priority given to attending protests, rallies, and meetings arise not only out of the frictions of their encounter with other Tibetans but also importantly from their concern about repercussions for close family members in Tibet and for their own possible plans to return. There is, in fact, a wide spectrum of political opinion among Tibetans from Tibet vis-a-vis Tibet's political status, though many are focused on a hope for policies that will allow for equitable economic development without a complete loss of Tibetan language and culture. Regardless, most Tibetans came to the USA for reasons similar to those that motivated most TUSRP participants - because they see it as a way to a better life, whether through the opportunity for higher education or through the ability to send remittances home. However, because of the structure of migration to the USA and the cultural politics of routedness, they are challenged to 'prove' their Tibetan-ness in a way that others do not have to.
与那些终生从事政治抗议的流亡藏人不同，本土藏人常常声称他们对政治不感兴趣。他们有意识地缺乏“政治”上的兴趣，并将参加抗议、集会和会议的活动置于次要地位，这不仅仅是出于他们与其他藏人相遇时产生的摩擦，更重要的是因为，他们担心这会对他们在西藏的亲属和自己可能回国的计划产生不良影响。实际上，本土藏人对于西藏政治地位的政治观点差别很大，尽管许多人寄希望于政策能允许公平的经济发展，同时不完全丢失藏语言和文化。不管怎样，大多数藏人到美国的原因与那些TUSRP期盼者相似，他们都将它视为一种过更好生活的途径。但是，因为美国移民的结构和路线化的文化政治，他们受到挑战，得用一种他人不必采用的方式来“证明”他们的藏民族性。

结论 (Conclusions)

The many layers of romantic projection and desire that refract Western perceptions of Tibetans, as well as the lingering effects of Cold War perceptions of China on global imaginaries, make analyses of Tibetan diasporic politics particularly important. The discussion offered here should emphatically not be read as an attempt to undermine Tibetan struggles for human rights, for an end to religious and political oppression, or for other political claims. Instead, it is motivated by a concern that the idealized image rather than the empirical reality of Tibetans has produced certain uncritical forms of Western support and activism. The particular forms of support made available not only have been limited but "may have damaged the political prospects of the Tibetan issue as much as it helped them". An understanding of diaspora without guarantees requires a grounding of analyses in everyday social relations and situated practices, which can then reveal the limits of the liberatory potential of diasporic political projects.
折射出西方对藏族的看法，以及残存的对华冷战思维的多层次想象和愿望，使得对藏族侨居政治的分析显得格外重要。需要强调的是，这里给出的论述并非试图否定藏人为争取人权、结束政教压制及其他政治诉求所作的努力，而是出于这样一种担忧：对藏族的美好想象压过了真凭实据，让西方产生了有些盲目的支持和狂热。现时这种形式的支持所起的作用不但是有限的，而且“对西藏议题政治前景造成的损害可能不亚于起到的帮助”。对藏族侨居的理解缺乏理据，就需要有对日常的社会关系和情境惯例进行的分析作为（理论）基础，而这可以揭示出侨居政治事业在解放潜能方面存在的局限性。

Contestations over what constitutes proper "Tibetan" behavior, and what gets recognized as authentically Tibetan and what does not, reflect very different processes of subject formation at work in the different transnational routes that link the Tibetan homeland to the United States. The Tibetan identity of exile is constituted by the mythico-history of Tibet, a recasting of the past in moral terms. Viewing themselves as preservers of the traditions that have been destroyed within Tibet itself, they appeal to a kind of temporal authority to affirm their authentic Tibetan-ness. To be Tibetan is to be part of a community of sentiment in which the experience of exile is geared toward the eventual recovery of the homeland. In the meantime, however, the locus of authenticity is recentered, away from contemporary Tibet. By contrast, the (significantly fewer) Tibetans who arrive straight from the PRC locate their Tibetan-ness in the embodied authority of experiencing the homeland as a living place. Hence, despite the pervasive image of Tibetans as constant and pure across space, Tibetan identity formation is varied and greatly inflected by national and linguistic locations. The question of what gets recognized as Tibetan by Tibetans in the new US diaspora, and why, is productive in that it forces us to examine the complex relationships between Tibet as a moral destination and Tibetan as a category of cultural identity, and the spaces in which these relationships are deployed and contested.
对于何谓恰当的“藏族”举止，以及何谓正统藏族与否的争论，反映出联结西藏本土和美国的不同跨国路径之间，有着不同的主体形成过程。流亡藏人的身份是借由西藏的神话式历史，以及对过去的道德化解读而建立起来的。流亡藏人视己为西藏境内已遭毁灭的传统的维护者，他们诉诸的是一种世俗的权威，以此来确认自己是正统的藏族；成为藏族也就是成为持这种观点的社团的一分子，即流亡的经历是为了最终能光复家园。但与此同时，（其认定的）正统所在地也移到了当代西藏以外的地方。反过来，直接从中国过来的藏人（数量上明显处于弱势）将其藏民族性定位于一种具体的权威之上，即他们居住于（西藏）本土的经历。因此，尽管藏人被想象成不分地域都是不变而纯粹的，藏族身份的形成却存在着差异，并且深受国家和语言区位的影响。在新的美国社区里，藏人将什么视为藏族的，又为何将其视为藏族的？这个问题促使我们审视作为道德上目的地的西藏，以及作为一类文化身份的藏族之间存在的复杂关系，还有这些关系活动和角逐所在的那些空间。

While homeland thus means very different things to differently routed Tibetans, the conscious meanings of Tibet are not the only ones that matter. Even more important is the embodied performance of Tibetan-ness - in language, dialect, code switching, grammatical patterns, as well as in the details of clothing, gesture, and taste. In short, the habitus, or set of 'durable dispositions', is a bodily inscription of the places and national locations through which differently positioned Tibetans dwell and travel. However, such dispositions are often unexpected; each group of Tibetans imagines that Tibetan-ness will always be easily recognizable through familiarity if not through selfsameness. It is the very visceral reaction to unfamiliar embodied aspects such as style of clothing, taste in music, and language usage that causes exile Tibetans to be disappointed by the apparent alienness of Tibetans from Tibet. This then becomes a lost opportunity to forge connections between exile and homeland.
家乡因而对于循不同路径的藏人而言，代表的可能是很不一样的东西；同时西藏的意识涵义也不是唯一重要的事物。更为重要的是藏民族性的种种外在体现——语言、方言、语码转换、语法模式，以及服饰、姿势和品味的种种细节等。简而言之，不同地方的藏人居住和往来于不同的国家和地区，这些地方在他们身上留下的印记，也就是所谓的惯习，或者说是一系列“持久的习性”。然而，这些习性经常是出人意料的；各个藏族群体却都以为藏族特色能通过与自己的相似以至相同的程度轻易地辨认出来。正是对服饰风格、音乐品味和语言运用等方方面面具体的不熟悉之处的本能反应，使得流亡藏人对于本土藏人的明显异族特征感到失望。这进而有导致了流亡和本土之间建立联系的机遇的丧失。

【正文结束，多谢阅读】

sep123321

谢谢谢谢 翻译辛苦了

no7of2001

好长，楼主太辛苦了，慢慢看。

vivicat

各位辛苦了

Stevenyaung

文章 真好，应该 让 Dorje 这样 的  藏人看看，不管这个网上的“dorje" 来自哪里。

孜心

其中有一个人就批评一些流亡藏人将藏文化错误地实物化，用他的话来说就是：“把藏文化当作一件物品，可以把它放在台上、扎起来和拿着到处走”。

看到一篇The Seoul Time (首尔时报？)上以前的一篇文章，作者是个印度人
http://theseoultimes.com/ST/?url=/ST/db/read.php?idx=776
"Special report
Spirituality on Sale in India's Little Lhasa

Special Contribution
By Manpreet Singh

Dharamsala
Home to nearly 15,000 Tibetan refugees in India's mountainous state Himachal Pradesh, Dharamsala is becoming world's busy spiritual pilgrims' destination. Tibetan Buddhism is the new fad with the spirituality-shoppers who flock to this "Little Lhasa in India." The place got famous after the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, got Nobel Prize for peace in 1989.

With Tibetan image becoming popular worldwide, anything with Tibetan tag is a big business here. Ready-made variety of spiritual experiences is the packaged deal.

Advertisements of courses in Buddhist spirituality, meditation and philosophy cluttering the walls in Dharamsala overshadow a few posters exhorting boycott of Chinese-made goods and seeking Tibet's freedom.

Foreign tourists with freshly tonsured heads (some in newly acquired maroon Buddhist robes) make a beeline to attend philosophy and meditation classes. Squatting in the dimly-lit incense-smoked rooms, and struggling to chant in Tibetan language some ‘mantras' after the Lama's voice—is the scene they love to be in.

Thubten Samphel, Information Secretary with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile sees the commercialization of Buddhist spirituality in a larger context, "The materialistic western world finds itself in a spiritual vacuum and looks towards the east; and it becomes a demand-and-supply kind of thing. It's sad, but you can't prevent people's greed to make more money."

Thubten even justifies this ‘flirtation' with Tibetan Buddhism as it is politically desirable, "It all may seem commercial but it is an opportunity for us to make the world aware of what's happening in Tibet. There are foreigners who have supported our cause of Tibet's liberation, only after taking interest in Tibetan Buddhism, wisdom and culture."

But many Tibetan Lamas find presenting a romanticized view of Tibetan culture and Buddhism as "deplorable and crazy." "Buddhism is a very deep and intensive religion," says Tenzin Kunga, a young monk at Tse Chok Ling Monastery. "Foreign tourists after attending a 3-4 day course, consider themselves to be the masters of religion. It's ridiculous. They have made Buddhism a fashionable commodity."

Tyler Dewar, 24, a Canadian studying Buddhism for the last two-and-half years in Dharamsala, sums up the scenario, "I think most foreigners are testing waters or may be looking for some entertainment through spiritual experimentation. Moreover, they also need to fill time in a remote country."

Admitting spiritual starvation of the west Tyler explains, "The young people in the west find Buddhism and other eastern religions attractive as they are not authoritative like some other religions."

Hence, attracted by the charismatic Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and Tibetan Buddhism, the spirituality-shoppers from world over land in Dharamsala. Dalai Lama himself holds annual spiritual teachings which are favourite with the westerners. Tibetan Government in Exile offers courses in Buddhist philosophy at nominal prices. Only these courses have some amount of seriousness.

The other private spirituality-shops that have mushroomed all over the town seek to rake moolah, religiously. Spiritual healers, Yoga and Reiki masters have also joined the bandwagon, lured by lucre.

An old monk R.Tsering blames the spirituality-shops for undermining Buddhism as a religion, "Many people have opened spiritual shops to fleece the foreigners. And they offer religion like a new dish. In the race for money religion becomes secondary, and the sanctity is lost."

But for those making business of religion, sanctity lies in making more profits. They promise and tempt foreign tourists with ‘complete awakening', ‘spiritual clarity' or ‘multi-dimensional vision' in this unusual spiritual pilgrims' destination. The only enlightenment the naïve seekers may get, from the roadside spiritual gurus is in the lighter weight of their wallets.

Some may experience certain spiritual awakening, most return as dry as they had come, even disillusioned. "

雨蛙蛙

好长，坚持看下来，楼主翻译得好。

communicator

很有意思，真是冷战思维啊！

袭明

似 乎 和 东 南 亚 华 人 历 史 上 的 境 遇 有 些 类 似 处 。

Stevenyaung

似 乎 和 东 南 亚 华 人 历 史 上 的 境 遇 有 些 类 似 处 。
袭明 发表于 2009-8-17 00:43

关键是东南亚华人 还是 东南亚最富有的群体。彼此对于“身份”问题没有什么冲突，当然这与中华文化有很大关系。因为  政治立场不同争来争去，但大家都认为彼此都是正宗华人。

blueoj

这篇翻译很强大，楼主辛苦了，拜读

朝露晨光

简单的说，那就是一群可悲的、被拉木登珠当做工具和炮灰的人。为了能捡食到拉木登珠嘴边掉下的肉渣，不得不丢掉人的自尊，去迎合那些得了“分裂中国综合症”的各色人。
这个世界很公平，人人都需要为自己的行为负责任。

64396170

没用的折腾，中国的强大势不可挡，西藏的独立根本不可能

可可树

作者写的很深入。特别是有关藏语的。以前我认识一藏族小伙，他说他就听不懂旁边村子的话，那村子和他所在的村不过隔了一条河

花花

非常难得的好文!翻译辛苦了!

靠!人权?

很好的一篇论文，对我们了解海外藏族群体很有帮助~~
全球化的背景下，谁是正统的？谁是纯正的？
都是你中有我，我中有你了~~

北门北风

真长啊，楼主辛苦了，
看了文章。不禁为从西藏出去的藏人深深的担忧和同情。