【2010.6.15 欧洲对外关系委员会】Policy Brief: A global China Policy

magicboy

先放这里，方便以后用
刘作奎：评欧洲对外关系委员会报告《欧盟需要一个全球性对华政策》
http://ies.cass.cn/Article/cbw/qt/201006/2631.asp
2010年6月欧洲对外关系委员会（European Council on Foreign Relations）出版了由弗朗索瓦•古德蒙（Francis Godement）撰写的政策简报（Policy Brief），题目是：欧盟需要一个全球性的对华政策（A Global China Policy）。

    2009年4月古德蒙和约翰·福克斯（John Fox）共同撰写了《中欧关系实力审核》（A Power Audit of EU-China Relations）的政策报告，在中欧关系研究界引起了不小的波澜。报告认为迄今为止欧盟对中国采取的政策是失败的。欧盟乐观地认为让中国逐渐融入全球体系后，它在利益和价值观上会与欧洲逐渐趋同，因此采取了“无条件交往”（unconditional engagement）政策。结果是中国不但没有成为西方所希望的“负责任的利益相关者”，反而充分利用“无条件交往”政策来收割国际体系带来的利益，并在事实上产生了“淘空”（hollowing out）国际体系的后果。

    该份政策报告继承了2009年4月报告的论调，并继续为欧盟对华政策的失败“开解救的药方”。报告认为，随着中国经济实力的日益增强，它已经深刻影响到全球的每个地区（从非洲到中东）和每个问题（从贸易问题、经济问题、气候变化到核不扩散）。对此，欧盟成员国不应以双边关系的角度看待中国，而是应该从欧盟所有外交政策领域、以及与所有其他国家和地区关系的角度来看待和处理中国的影响。成员国需要有效地协调在欧盟层面的政策并与其它国家合作来增加制衡中国的力量。简而言之，欧盟要有一个全球性的对华政策。当然，中国国内一些关键决策行为体也需要引起欧盟的关注，欧盟认为中国目前益利多元化，中国军方以及一些有影响力的公司、利益集团和党派对中国决策影响日增，认清这些行为体的政策考虑并与他们接触，是让中国调整甚至改变对外政策的一种途径。

    报告认为，中国经济虽然在迅速增长，影响日增，但是它与周边国家及美国的关系日益紧张，这就为欧盟组成新的联合阵营来制衡中国提供了机会。同时为了使这项全球性的对华政策起作用，欧盟需要关注有限的几个优先领域，报告总结了五个领域：贸易和投资政策、产业和技术问题、气候变化问题、伊朗与核不扩散问题、人权问题。

    古德蒙一再对中欧关系提出悲观论调，源于他对中国发展存在的偏见以及时隐时现的欧洲中心论思想。报告无视中国与欧共体建交近40年来在经贸、政治和文化领域所取得的一系列突破性进展，也根本无视中国在加强中欧经贸合作、积极开展中欧人权对话、妥善应对包括气候变化和核不扩散等全球和地区性问题上采取的积极主动态度，有“选择性”的选取负面案例甚至是错误解读部分案例来构筑其悲观论点。报告以中国是否遵从西方的价值观和利益划线，如果中国经济发展没有按照西方的设想走下去，就被认为或者是欧盟政策的失败，或者是中国发展“不负责任”，如此非此即彼的价值判断标准深刻反映出了部分西方学者的傲慢与偏见。

忧心

Human rights
人权问题

Human rights is an important issue not just in its own right but also because Europe increasingly puts its credibility with China on the line when it defends human rights. Although Europe and most of its member states have criticised China on human rights issues, they have also frequently backed down. For example, France and Germany stopped voting for resolutions against Chinese human rights abuses at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1997. However, this decision – justified as a switch to quiet diplomacy – divided Europe and did not result in any real progress in China. Moreover, by backing down and changing tack, Europe does not just fail to achieve results but also creates a perception of weaknesses that affects its ability to win concessions from China on other issues. The apparent lack of any joint initiative with the US does little to enhance the West’s credibility among the Chinese elite.

人权成为一个重要问题，不仅出于它本身的正义性，也由于欧洲在捍卫人权的问题上，越发拿其在中国的信义来冒险。虽然欧盟及其大多数成员国一直在人权问题上批评中国，但它们也经常做出退让。比如，1997年，法国和德国在联合国人权委员会中不再支持反对中国侵犯人权的议案。然而，这一决定——被证明是向温和外交政策的转变——分裂了欧洲，而并未在中国取得任何实质性进展。此外，通过退让和调转方向，欧洲不仅未能取得成果，还造成了弱点，这一弱点会影响到欧洲在其它事务中赢得中国让步的能力。明显缺乏与美国的共同倡议无助于加强西方在中国精英中的信誉。

Criticism of Chinese human rights abuses is now increasingly made at the EU level, which leaves member states free to pursue their bilateral interests with China. If member states make high-profile gestures at all, they focus increasingly on popular issues such as Tibet and the Dalai Lama and ignore other political dissidents who are less well-known outside China. The primary goal of European policy on human rights in China should therefore be greater consistency and persistence. The danger that criticism of China and action on human rights is “kicked upstairs” to the EU institutions is now particularly acute because of the creation of the EEAS.

如今，对中国侵犯人权的指责日益停留在欧盟层面，从而使其成员国得以自由的寻求它们同中国的双边利益。即使某些成员国彻底做出了高调的姿态，他们关注的焦点也越来越集中在热点问题上，比如西藏和达赖喇嘛，而忽略了其他在中国以外不广为人知的持不同政见者。因此，欧洲对华人权政策的首要目标应该是拥有更强的一致性和持久性。由于欧盟对外行动署（EEAS）的成立，批评中国的风险和欧盟机构人权行动“明升暗降”的情况如今尤为严重。

In order to avoid this, the EU should create a new mechanism to co-ordinate human rights policy more effectively. Firstly, the team within the European institutions that collects information on human rights violations in China (currently the human rights units in the Council Secretariat and the European Commission’s China desk) should report to COASI and thus be integrated into wider regional policy. Secondly, decisions about which cases are going to be raised by European officials with their Chinese counterparts should be taken at COASI meetings. Thirdly, the European Council should decide whether and when to publicly criticise China and, crucially, whether it is willing to back up the criticism with action. This three-level mechanism would prevent individual member states (or the European Parliament) from raising other cases, but would make it more difficult for them to disassociate themselves from European human rights policy. Europe should agree a minimal code of conduct on key issues such as the treatment of the Dalai Lama.

要改变现状，欧盟应当建立一个新的机制更有效的协调人权政策。首先，由欧盟机构内的团队（目前是欧盟理事会秘书处人权机构及欧洲委员会中国事务部）收集中国侵犯人权的信息，该团队应向欧盟理事会亚洲事务协调会议（COASI）报告，以确保这些信息被整合到更广泛的区域政策中去。然后，至于那些案例将会由欧盟官员提交给他们的中国同行，这一决策应交由欧盟理事会亚洲事务协调会议讨论。最后，由欧盟理事会来决定是否及何时公开指责中国，以及更关键地，决定欧洲是否愿意以行动支持对中国的指责。这一三级机制可能会阻碍单独的成员国（或是欧洲议会）提出案例，但也会让个别成员国更加难于脱离欧盟的人权政策。欧盟应该达成一个最基本的处理规程以应对一些关键问题，比如对待达赖喇嘛的问题。

Chinese public opinion does play a role in the effectiveness of external criticism. Therefore the EU should focus its criticism in particular on categories of human rights violations and governance issues that violate both international norms and China’s own laws. These include administrative detention and sentencing, the lack of proper defence counsel, prosecution for non-violent religious and political beliefs, and torture and disappearances. The EU should also focus on human rights abuses under Chinese law where it has played a key role in defining international norms – for example, the death penalty. As with other issues that are important to Europe, member states should consider how they can give China positive and negative incentives to adhere to international human rights standards.

中国的民意也对外部批评的有效性起到了作用。因此，欧盟应该将指责尤其集中于各类侵犯人权的行为及那些既违反本国法律又违反国际法的政府行为上。这些行为包括行政性拘留和审判，缺乏适当的辩护律师，对非暴力宗教和政治信仰的起诉以及刑讯和失踪。欧盟也应关注中国法律下的人权侵犯，这对国际标准的制定起着关键作用——比如，死刑。和在其它对欧洲来说重要的问题上一样，成员国也应考虑如何通过奖惩措施引导中国遵循国际人权准则。

囧囧人

A European strategy [7]
欧洲策略

Europe needs a new approach to China that is global in two senses. Firstly, it should recognize that China is now a global challenge for Europe: its policy choices no longer affect only its neighborhood but every global issue from trade and the economy to climate change and nuclear proliferation, as well as every region from Africa to the Middle East. Instead of thinking of its relationship with China in bilateral terms, Europe therefore needs to reframe its policy on China in global terms. Secondly, however, it should also develop a global response based on the recognition that Europe will be more effective if it is less Beijing-centric and more focused on co-ordinating with others to shape China’s choices. It must also learn more about China’s new foreign-policy decision-makers in each policy area and region around the world.
欧洲需要有一个全球性的对华政策，这一“全球性”有两层意义。第一，该政策应意识到，中国现已成为欧洲的一个“全球性”的挑战：中国的政策抉择不再仅仅影响其周边地区，而是辐射至全球每个问题（从贸易和经济问题到气候变化和核不扩散）和每个地区（从非洲到中东）。因此，欧洲不应再以双边关系的角度看待中国，而要在全球范围内重新构筑其对华政策。第二，欧洲如果能少点北京中心论而能更关注通过与其他国家和地区的合作来制衡中国的（政策）抉择的话，欧洲将会更加有影响力。基于这样的一种认知，该政策也应发展一种“全球性”的应对机制。它必须也要去更多地了解中国在世界各地区各领域内各项政策的新的外交政策决策主体。

This new global China policy should be based on the idea of “reciprocal engagement” that we outlined in our report a year ago. This means that Europe should be prepared to respond to China’s interest-based approach with an interest-based approach of its own. This approach should be based on two principles: firstly, that Europe should focus the relationship with China on a limited number of policy areas; and, secondly, that Europe should be prepared to use incentives and leverage to ensure that China will reciprocate.
这一全新的全球性对华政策，应基于我们一年前在报告中概述的“互惠接触”这一理念之上。这就意味着，欧洲应该准备好去响应中国及欧洲自身的利益驱动途径。这一途径要遵循两条原则：首先，欧洲需要在有限的几个政策领域关注与中国的关系；其次，欧洲应该准备利用刺激方式和杠杆效益来确保中国能做到有来有往。


In other words, there should be political trade-offs between Europe and China. A consistent, persistent, well-coordinated European position must be able to exercise linkage on issues with China, something no single member state is any longer capable of obtaining.
换句话说，在欧中之间总有政策的相互权衡。一个一贯、持续、配合良好的欧盟状态必须能运用联合的力量来同中国处理问题，这并非哪个单独的成员国就可以实现的。

As a first step toward developing such a global China policy, Europe needs to set clearer priorities.  Important Chinese officials and experts constantly repeat the same question: What does Europe want? The EU should therefore identify a limited number of issues of strategic importance and be consistent in communicating to China what they are. In particular, the EU should focus its relationship with China on five issues: trade and investment policy; industry and technology; climate change; nuclear proliferation and Iran; and human rights. Several of these issues, such as investment, proliferation and human rights, are also short-term priorities, while others, such as industry and technology, are areas in which there is a need for a Europe-wide rethink in the longer term that goes beyond EU-China relations. But, in each case, Europe needs to co-ordinate policy more effectively, identify possible coalition partners and co-operate with them to increase leverage, and identify interest groups and constituencies within China with whom Europe may share interests.
要迈出构筑以上这种全球性的对华政策的第一步，欧洲需要设定一个更为清晰的优先顺序。重要的中国官员和专家一直在重复同样的问题：欧洲究竟想要什么？因此，欧盟应该确定一系列有限的战略重要性的议题，并且一以贯之地在同中国的交往过程中去实现。欧盟尤其要在以下五方面议题中关注对华关系：贸易和投资政策、产业和技术问题、气候变化问题、伊朗与核不扩散问题、人权问题。其中，如投资、核不扩散及人权问题等都属于近期优先；而其他的，如产业和技术问题则属于需要全欧洲反思的、超越欧中关系的一个更长远的领域。不过，在每个国家中，欧洲还需要进行更为有效的政策合作，确定可能的联盟伙伴并与其合作来增加杠杆效益，还要确定欧洲或将与其分享利益的中国国内的一些利益集团和群体。

Rok-Viv

Introduction [2]

简介


China feels more powerful than ever. Chinese foreign policy experts saw the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 not as a one-off crisis but as a structural change in the global distribution of power. Since then, China has become assertive across a range of foreign policy issues. China has repeatedly snubbed Europeans in response to their support for the Dalai Lama and Tibet. At the same time, it has become even less apologetic about its own human rights violations. China has deepened economic ties with North Korea and put minimal pressure on Pyongyang after it crossed the nuclear threshold and even after it torpedoed a South Korean navy vessel in May.  China has also slowed down progress on international efforts to impose new sanctions on Iran while benefiting from a burgeoning economic relationship with Tehran. Finally, at the Copenhagen climate conference– a wake-up call for many in the West in general and in Europe in particular – China used tough tactics to achieve its objective of preventing an agreement on a binding commitment for developing countries (although, in this case, it may have overplayed its hand). In short, China has frustrated hopes for increased global responsibility sharing while pursuing its own economic and strategic interests through international institutions and stalling when such institutions challenge its own positions.

中国自认为比以往都要强盛。中国的外交政策专家并未将2008年9月雷曼兄弟的破产看作是一次简单的危机，而是全球力量分布的一次结构性改变。此后，中国在各种外交问题上变得非常自信。中国多次轻视欧洲，以此作为对后者支持达赖和藏独的回应。同时，对其人权问题，中国也愈发坦然。中朝经济关系不断深化。而且，中国在朝鲜核问题上施加的压力是最小的。甚至在“天安舰”事件上，中国的态度也是如此。中国还有意放缓国际社会对伊朗进行新一轮制裁的步伐，因为中国可从不断发展的中伊经济关系中得到好处。此外，哥本哈根气候峰会号召西方国家，尤其是欧洲国家，采取气候行动而会中，中国则通过强硬的政策来达到其目的，即阻止签订针对发展中国家的约束性承诺。但中国似乎玩过火了。总之，中国通过国际机制达到其自身的经济、战略利益；而在这些国际机制对其地位构成挑战时又进行阻挠。全球责任理应由各国共同承担，但中国却打破了这一希望。


These developments vindicate the findings of ECFR’s Power Audit of EU-China relations, published in April 2009, which argued that Europe’s approach toward China was failing. The  report argued that Europe’s policy of “unconditional engagement”  with  China  was  based  on  an  assumption that, as China  integrated  into  the global economic system, it  would  slowly  but  inexorably  converge  with  European values and  interests. But, we argued, rather than becoming a “responsible stakeholder” as  the West hoped, China was taking advantage of the policy of “unconditional engagement” to take the benefits of the international system while resisting international requests in key areas. In doing so, it was having the effect of “hollowing out” the international system.

这些证明了欧洲外交委员会“中欧关系实力审核”（A Power Audit of EU-China Relations）报告的正确性。该报告发表于2009年4月，报告称，欧洲对华政策正走向失败。报告认为，欧洲对华的“无条件交往”政策基于一个假设，即在中国成为全球经济体系的一部分时，它必将逐步与欧洲拥有共同的价值观和利益。但我们也认为，中国并非如西方国家期望的那样，会共同承担全球责任；而是通过“无条件交往”政策，一方面利用国际体系带来的好处，另一方面在要重问题上拒绝国际社会的要求。


In  the  report, we  also  argued  that  divisions  between EU member states have weakened Europe collectively and each member state individually when they have faced difficulties in  their  bilateral  relations  with  China. We showed how Europe was divided along two fault lines within Europe: firstly, a divide between free traders and protectionists; and, secondly, a divide between those who were more interested in applying political conditionality and those who were more accommodationist. Since the publication of the report, these divisions have led to a series of further embarrassing failures by member states.  For example, China has successively isolated the governments of Denmark, France and Germany because of their support for the Dalai Lama. Conversely, China did not reward the UK for moving to recognise China’s sovereignty over Tibet in 2008.  Instead, China made a point of ignoring repeated pleas by the UK government and executed Akmal Shaikh, a British citizen who was mentally ill, in December 2009.

在报告中，我们提到，欧盟成员国间的分歧削弱了整个欧洲的实力。而且在与中国的双边关系中，成员国也遇到各自的难题。在此，我们想阐明欧洲是如何变得“四分五裂”的：首先，贸易自由主义与保护主义的分歧；其二，赞同政治需要条件限制者与妥协迁就着的分歧。自报告出版以来，这些分歧导致成员国一连串的失败，令人难堪。例如，中国接连孤立丹麦、法国及德国政府，原因就在于这些国家支持达赖喇嘛。然而，英国在2008年承认中国对西藏的主权，却没有从中得到中国的好处。相反，2009年12月，中国执意驳回，英国政府及患有精神疾病却被判死刑的英国人阿克毛•沙伊克的再三请求。


The  lack  of  European  unity  is  compounded  by  the inconsistencies  that exist between different dialogues and agreements in different sectors at the EU level, and between trade  and  economic  policy  on  the  one  hand  and  foreign policy and governance issues on the other. To make matters even worse, the EU has often changed its positions on China (including  at EU-China  summits)  and has  thus  struggled to use even  the  limited  leverage  it has. China, meanwhile, has been consistent in demanding that the EU lift the arms embargo imposed in 1989, grant China market economy status, and limit contacts with Taiwanese and Tibetan leaders. In the report, we recommended moving from unconditional engagement to a policy that we called “reciprocal engagement” – in other words, a shift from a foreign policy predicated on an assumption of  shared values and naturally  converging interests to a relationship in which bargaining and trade-offs would become the norm.

欧洲内部不够统一。而且其内部各行业间对话、协议的不一致以及经贸政策、外交政策的不同，使得缺乏统一的问题更为糟糕。欧洲对华态度时常改变（在中欧领导人会晤时也经常如此），并竭尽全力影响中国。这就导致该问题进一步恶化。同时，中国坚持要求欧洲取消1989年采取的对华武器禁运、承认中国市场经济地位，并减少与台湾领导人及达赖的联系。报告中，我们建议欧盟改变过去对华的“无条件交往”政策，而采用“互利交往”政策。换言之，过去的对华政策是基于中欧共同价值观和利益的假设来制定的，而如今，“讨价还价”、制衡应该成为中欧关系的基准。


This policy brief, which is intended to launch ECFR’s China programme, explains in more detail what the key elements of such an approach should be. It argues that Europe needs to reframe its China policy in global terms. Instead of thinking of its relationship with China in bilateral and traditional foreign policy terms, Europe needs to take into account China’s impact across a range of policy issues and in relations with all other countries and regions. The brief argues that Europe needs to co-ordinate its own policy more effectively and to co-operate with other countries to increase its limited leverage over China. Finally, it shows how Europe might begin to develop such a global China policy in five priority areas:  trade and investment policy; industry and technology; climate change; nuclear proliferation and Iran; and human rights.

该政策简报旨在推出ECFR的中国计划，并通过更多的细节，解释这种政策的关键因素应该是什么。报告提到，欧洲应该重新制定一个全球性的对华政策。欧洲不应该只以双边和传统的外交政策来看待中国，而应从所有政策问题以及它与别国和地区关系的角度来考虑中国的影响。

Rok-Viv

翻的比较迟，不好意思~

連長

我要赶紧加油了！都翻这么多了

Rok-Viv

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评析欧盟东扩政策中的条件限制模式.pdf (227.44 KB, 下载次数: 353)

2010-7-1 13:09 上传

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提供两个之前翻的时候找到的资料
希望对大家有用~

千年明月

China’s increasing leverage [4]
中国增加的影响力（中国手中的筹码越来越多）

Alongside  the changes  that have  taken place within China, its position in the world has also shifted as a result of global shifts.  China  is  currently  reaping  the  benefits  of  several converging factors: a long period of favorable demography and  steady macro-economic  policies;  its  classification  as a developing  country when  it  is  actually  the world’s  first trading nation and second-largest economy; and  its skilful and pragmatic diplomacy, which has combined lip service to global  integration and  international  institutions with  lavish care for bilateral relations.

伴随着中国内部发生的改变，作为全球变化的结果，它的国家地位也发生了变化。中国当前正在几个焦点上获益：长期良好的人口统计结果和稳定的宏观经济政策；中国被归类为发展中国家，当它事实上是世界上第一贸易国和第二大经济体；它很有技巧和务实的外交政策随着对双边关系的过度关注，已经把口惠和全球一体化以及国际机构联合起来。

The strategy of divide-and-rule is far from new. In fact, China has played foreigners off against each other at  least since the Qing emperor Qianlong fought the last Mongol empire. Similarly, the nationalist Chiang Kai-shek advocated pushing back the West by “playing barbarian against barbarian”. Republican China led – and in 1942 finally won – a struggle to end all Western extra-territorial privileges. In  fact, whether  it was strong or weak and whether  it had allies or was strategically isolated, China has consistently had a hyper-realist strategic culture. What has changed is simply that its leverage has kept increasing

分而治之策略早已不新鲜。事实上，中国早在清朝乾隆帝国时，就已经利用外国人之间相互争斗打败了最后的蒙古帝国。与此相似，国民党蒋介石倡议通过“以夷制夷”来击退西方。民国领导——在1942年最后取得胜利——是一场结束了西方治外特权的抗争。事实上，是强是弱，是盟国还是策略性孤立，中国始终如一地实行超级现实主义战略文化。改变的仅仅是它的影响力在增加。

In the past, when China had less leverage than it does now, it made several long-term international concessions. It signed arms-control agreements between 1992 and 1998 and took steps  to  join  the World Trade Organization between 1999 and 2001. During the same period, China also formed a new security concept  that highlighted mutual  trust and shared interests. Within  three  years,  from  1996  to  1998,  it  also established partnerships with all of its key partners, including a “long-term and stable constructive partnership” with the EU  that was  agreed  in April  1998. China  also  considered confidence-building  measures  with  the  Association  of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 and proceeded to build up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with a frst meeting in 1996

在过去，当中国的影响力比现在弱时，它制定了几项长期的国际优惠。它在1992年至1998年签署了军控协议，并且在1999年和2001年有步骤地加入了国际贸易组织。同时期，中国塑造了新的安全概念，强调相互信任并且分享利益。在3年中，从1996年到1998年，它与所有的重要伙伴建立了合作关系，包括1998年4月与欧盟签署的“长期和稳定建设性伙伴关系”。中国还在1997年考虑与东南亚联盟（ASEAN）建立互信措施，并且在1996年第一次会议上着手建立上海合作组织。
These steps toward integration into the international system prompted optimism that China as a joiner and learner would soon become a  contributor and  eventually a  “responsible stakeholder”. But as China’s  leverage has  increased during the  last decade,  it has become more and more reluctant to sign new agreements that would have  integrated  it further into the international system. What was thought in the  late 1990s to be a floor for further Chinese engagement in several key areas has, in fact, turned out to be a ceiling. A particularly good example  is climate change policy,  in which China has consistently  rejected  legally binding agreements since  the Kyoto Protocol  in  1997.  In  that  sense,  its  attitude  at  the Copenhagen climate conference  in December 2009 should have been no surprise.
这些进入国际体系的整合步骤促进了乐观想法，即中国作为加入者和学习者将很快成为一个贡献者，并最终成为一个“负责任的利益相关者”。但既然中国的影响力在过去的十年间已经增加，它越来越不愿意签署会使其与国际体系更加一体化的新协议。1990年代后期，（人们）期待在几个关键领域更进一步的与中国交往，结果却出乎意料。一个典型的好例子是气候变化政策，中国自从1997年京都议定书以来一直拒绝具法律约束力的协议。从这个意义上说，它在2009年12月哥本哈根气候大会上的态度就不足为奇了。

China’s forward-looking diplomacy has become increasingly focused  on  sub-regional  or  even  bilateral  rather  than multilateral agreements. China’s relations with South-East Asia are  the best  illustration of  this.  In 2001 –  the year  it joined the WTO – China offered an innovative free trade pact to ASEAN. In 2002,  it signed a  (non-binding) declaration of  conduct  with  ASEAN  states  to  resolve  peacefully maritime  issues. In 2003,  it signed the (also non-binding) ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, which commits signatories to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

中国前瞻性的外交越来越集中在次区域或者甚至双边而不是多边协议。中国与东南亚的关系是这方面最好的例证。2001年——也就是中国加入世界贸易组织的那年——中国向东盟提供了一项创新的自由贸易协定。2002年，它签署了一项与东盟国家和平解决海事问题的（不具有约束性）声明。2003年，它签署了（也不具约束性的）东盟友好与合作条约，条约承诺签署了和平解决争端。

These days, however, China holds only bilateral negotiations to deal with the delimitation of maritime borders in the South China Sea. China abides by the terms of treaties it has already signed, but it is no longer willing to undertake new legal commitments. China has  taken  the same approach  to negotiations about nuclear proliferation  issues. It took part  in four-party talks on North Korea in New York between 1997 and 2000, and set up the six-party talks in 2003, but it has never gone beyond its  limited  role  as  a  facilitator,  let  alone  put  pressure  on North Korea.
然而，这段时间以来，中国仅仅进行双边谈判以解决南中国海海上边境的东海大陆架划界问题。中国遵守它已经签署的条约的各项条款，但它不再愿意去承担新的合法承诺。中国在核不扩散谈判议题上采取了同样的方法。1997年至2000年间，它在纽约加入了朝鲜问题四方谈判，并于2003年建立了六方谈判，但它从来没有超出推动者的角色限制，更不用说对朝鲜施加压力。

China has also made it clear that it is unwilling to  contemplate any binding  commitment  to  international sanctions,  apart  from narrowly defined  sanctions  against targeted  individuals. As a result, resolutions 1718 and 1874 on North Korea and resolutions 1737 and 1803 on Iran have been  far  less effective  than  they could have been.

中国还清楚地表明，它不愿意考虑对国际制裁附加任何承诺，除了狭义定义制裁目标个人。因此，（联合国）1718号和1874号对朝鲜以及1737号和1803号对伊朗决议的执行远比它应有的更低效。

There  is little evidence that China will change its approach. The most one can realistically hope for is negative consent at the UN in cases in which China does not think its own “core interests” are at stake. For example, China made  it clear to the US as early as October 2002 that it would not veto the use of force against Iraq.' y. F" b8 n8 G/ w

没有任何证据表明中国将改变它的姿态。实际上，只有在那些不危及中国的“核心利益”的联合国决议上，人们能指望得到中国消极的赞成。例如，中国早在2002年就对美国清楚表明，它不会投票否决对伊拉克使用武力。

千年明月

Industry and technology [9]
工业与技术

China’s protective  industrial policies,  intellectual-property rights and the insecurity of web-based communications make it more difficult for European and American companies to do business in China. China is reluctant to liberalize its domestic policies in these areas because to do so would imply it was no longer a developing country under WTO rules. For example, in the lead-up to the Copenhagen climate conference, China campaigned  to protect  the existence of  so-called Annex B countries under the 1997 Kyoto Convention. This group of countries, classifed as developing even  though  it  includes OECD member  states  such as South Korea, has  far  fewer obligations  than  developed  countries.

中国的保护性产业政策，知识产权和网络通讯的不安全感使欧洲和美国公司在中国做生意更困难。中国不愿意在这些领域放宽其国内政策，因为这样做暗示着中国在WTO规则下不再是一个发展中国家。例如，在哥本哈根气候大会上，中国致力于保护在1997年京都会议框架下所谓“附录B国家”的存在，这些国家被归类为发展中国家，尽管它包括了OECD成员国如韩国，承担比发达国家更少的义务。

However,  China’s continuing status as a developing economy is a handicap for truly developing countries that are,  in effect, trying to play catch-up.  It also allows China  to keep  in place protective rules  in many sectors of the Chinese economy that restrict opportunities for European and American firms. The United States could  therefore be a potential coalition partner  for Europe on industry and technology policy.
然而，中国继续作为发展中国家的身份是对真正发展中国家，实际上，是对正在奋起直追的国家的不利因素。它还允许中国在中国经济的很多方面保留保护性条例，这些条例限制了欧洲和美国公司的机会。结果，美国可能成为欧洲在工业和技术政策上的联盟伙伴。

In order to face the challenge from China’s industrial policies (and  the  production  triangle  it  has  formed  with  more advanced East Asian producers in some cases), Europe needs to  take  a  radical  step  and  create  a  federal  industrial  and technology policy for the frst time.This means moving from simply unifying  its domestic market to fostering  industrial competitiveness, maintaining cutting-edge technology levels, and ensuring that its scientific and patent base is not raided under the pretext of an open market. This will enable Europe and China to move from an adversarial situation – in which the lack of a level playing feld and of cross-ownership links creates an  incentive  for preferential  rules and  intellectual-property  theft  – to  greater  interdependence.  

为了面对来自中国产业政策的挑战（以及它某些情况下已经形成的、拥有更先进东亚生产商的生产三角区），欧洲需要采取激进的一步，并第一次创建联邦工业和技术政策。这意味着从简单地统一它的国内市场到培育工业竞争力，保持前沿技术水平，并确保它的科学和专利基地不会在开放市场的借口下被袭击。这将使欧洲和中国能够从对抗局面转向更加相互依赖，在对抗下，缺乏公平竞争的环境和跨所有权的链接为优先规则和知识产权的窃取创造了动机。

Such  an industrial and technology policy could  include technical co-operation on China-related issues of cyber-security; funding and technical support to enable European frms to assert their intellectual-property rights and patents  in China,  including redress against Chinese frms that used technologies  leaked in  third  countries;  the  creation  of  a  European  funding agency to encourage cross-European co-operation on next-generation  technologies;  and  a  scheme  to  set  up  jointly-owned companies./ d: I' N5 y- C: S5 J8 G$ R4 q

这样一个工业和技术政策可能包括在中国网络安全问题上的技术合作、基金和技术支持以使欧洲公司能够维护他们在中国的知识产权和专利，包括纠正中国公司，这些公司使用了被泄露给第三世界国家的技术，欧洲基金机构的创建鼓励了新技术上的跨欧洲合作，以及建立合资公司的方案。

忧心

回复 28# 千年明月


   
与此相似，国民党蒋介石倡议通过“利用野蛮人反对野蛮人”来击退西方。

提个小建议，应该译成“以夷制夷”论吧。

The most one can realistically hope for is negative consent at the UN in cases in which China does not think its own “core interests” are at stake.

实际上最多希望在联合国大会上（中国）消极地赞成，中国（在这些决议中） 没有考虑到它的“核心利益”危如累卵。

实际上，只有在那些中国的核心利益不受损的决议上，人们能指望得到中国在联合国里消极地赞成。

千年明月

回复  千年明月


   
与此相似，国民党蒋介石倡议通过“利用野蛮人反对野蛮人”来击退西方。

提个小建 ...
忧心 发表于 2010-7-2 17:26

谢谢！
“以夷制夷”和“利用野蛮人反对野蛮人”表达的是相同意思，但“以夷制夷”是蒋介石的原话，应该更恰当，语言也更简洁。
下面那一句，你确实是对的，我马上就把这些地方改过来，感谢指出！

vivicat

China now affects every global issue from trade and the economy to climate change and nuclear proliferation, as well as every region from Africa to the Middle East. Europe therefore needs to reframe its China policy in global terms. Instead of thinking of their relationship with China in bilateral terms, EU member states need to take into account China’s impact across all of the issues in European foreign policy and in relations with all other countries and regions. Europe needs to co-ordinate its own policy more effectively, preferably at EU level, and to co-operate with other countries to increase its limited leverage over China. In short, Europe needs a global China policy. At the same time, many of the key decisions in China’s foreign policy are now taken by domestic actors who are largely unknown to foreigners. Europe needs to identify and engage with these actors.

不论是经济贸易还是气候变化，抑或是核武器扩散，乃至从非洲到中东所有的地区，每一个全球性问题现都在被中国影响着。如此看来，欧洲需要重构他们的对华政策。欧盟成员国需要兼顾中国在一切欧洲外交政策问题上的影响，以及和所有国家及地区的关系，而不仅仅是考虑本国与其的双边关系。欧洲各国必须更有效地协调他们的政策，最好在欧盟层面上与其他国家合作以增加（欧洲各国）对中国尚属有限的筹码。简单的说就是欧洲需要一个全球性的对华政策。反观现在，（各国）对华重要政策都是由不为他国所熟知的国内官员所决定的。欧洲（各国）必须认清这些执行者并与之积极合作。

In the past, EU member states have struggled to co-ordinate even their own policy toward China, let alone co-operate with other countries. But although China now feels more powerful than ever, especially after the global economic crisis, greater tension between China and both its neighbours and the US offers new opportunities for Europe to form new coalitions and to increase its leverage over China. Europe should also reach out to the new actors in the Chinese system with whom it may share interests. To make this global China policy work, however, Europe will need to focus on a limited number of priorities. In particular, the EU should focus its relationship with China on five issues: trade and investment policy; industry and technology; climate change; nuclear proliferation and Iran; and human rights

过去，欧盟成员国即便是统筹自己国家的对华政策也十分艰难，更遑论与其他国家合作了。但尽管中国现在看起来比以往都要强大，尤其是在全球经济危机之后，中国及其邻国和美国之间的紧张局势将为欧洲建立新形势提供良好机遇，并增加其应对中国的筹码。欧洲也要让那些新的执政者明白与谁合作才能在中国的制度下（与中国的交往中？）分得一杯羹。为制定全球性的对华政策，欧洲要把注意力放在几项注意事项上。中欧关系应当特别集中在这五个问题上：贸易和投资政策、工业与科技、气候变化、伊朗核扩散及人权问题。

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忙的四脚朝天的终于还是翻完了。。。错误肯定很多大家帮忙改正～～

rhapsody

自领[8]，不过完成可能比较慢

忧心

回复 32# vivicat


    Europe should also reach out to the new actors in the Chinese system with whom it may share interests.
欧洲也要让那些新的执政者明白与谁合作才能在中国的制度下（与中国的交往中？）分得一杯羹。

欧洲也应和中国政坛中的新角色接触，欧洲或许能和他们分享利益。

vivicat

回复  vivicat


    Europe should also reach out to the new actors in the Chinese system with whom  ...
忧心 发表于 2010-7-4 06:26

原来是这样。。。我意群果然还是分错了。。。

rlsrls08

这周末是美国独立日，活动比较多，刚准备坐下来把我干了一半的活儿做完。

汗ing~~

rhapsody

这周末是美国独立日，活动比较多，刚准备坐下来把我干了一半的活儿做完。

汗ing~~ ...
rlsrls08 发表于 2010-7-6 01:03

没事，您还是先忙自己的~不过过后有空的话就多校对一些，O(∩_∩)O哈哈~

MiaT

应vivi的号召，来领校对。如果Summary还没有人校的话，先领这个吧。

rhapsody

应vivi的号召，来领校对。如果Summary还没有人校的话，先领这个吧。
MiaT 发表于 2010-7-6 14:10

欢迎~~那楼上就先给某猫翻的Summary改改吧~~

medien

A new China? [3]
一个全新的中国？
China has undoubtedly become economically more powerful in the  l ...
千年明月 发表于 2010-6-27 19:42

其它的没有仔细看，这段好像有问题：

It now challenges US ships  that enter  its maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) while its own ships enter its neighbours’ EEZs.
它现在在挑战美国船只的海上专属经济区（EEZ），与此同时自己的船进入了邻国的专属经济区。