本帖最后由 MiaT 于 2010-7-14 23:32 编辑
China and the international system [5] 中国与国际体系
China’s strategy should not be seen as a revisionistchallengeto the international system and its rules. In fact, Chinaoften acts as an upholder of existing international lawand sovereignty. At the same time, however, itbuilds negative coalitions to restrain any new internationalnorm-building. Furthermore, it builds these coalitions on the basis of tacticsrather than principle. For example, in October 2009, Chinaand Indiasigned a climate pact to defect any pressure on the two countries toset legally binding emissions targets. One month later, China unilaterally announced its own target onemission reductions, leaving a surprised Indiawithout its own face-saving proposal. China appeared to be making acontribution to action on climate change while it had, in fact, with India’s help,already blocked any binding agreement.
对国际体系和国际规则来说,中国的政略并不构成修正主义威胁。事实上,中国对现存的国际公法和国家主权往往是表示拥护和支持的。然而,与此同时,中国也与一些国家联合起来,用消极遏制的方法阻碍国际新准则的建立。更何况中国的这种对外合作不是以原则为基础,而是以战略为基础。比如说,中国与印度在2009年10月签订气候协议时约定,两国将拒绝设定任何有法律约束力的减排目标;可是一个月后,中国就单方面宣布了自己的减排目标,这让毫无准备的印度大吃一惊,根本拿不出减排方案来挽回面子。从表面上看,中国在为遏制气候变化做贡献,但实际上,中国早已借助印度,防止了任何有约束力的协议的达成。
China has become very skilful at building these coalitions.It lobbies and entices partners; rewards those who co-operateand threatens those who donot; forms coalitions aroundissues such as sovereignty and trade; and occasionallybrushes off, intimidates or isolates reticent partners. It claims inpublic that it is acting on principle,but in reality these principles are largely a formal andquasi-ritual form of public diplomacy. China always presents what inreality is offensive as defensive and castigates opponents as eithertroublemakers or consensus- or rule-breakers. As a result, China’s partners are often reluctant even toadmit publicly that they have fallen out with China. For example, the US envoy to Chinadefended the success of President Obama’s visit to Chinain November 2009, even after it became clear that itwas a failure, and has recently accused his own administration of“trampling on China’score interests”. Similarly, the EU presented the EU-China summit in Nanjing in December 2009as a success even though it had not achieved any tangible result. Such is China’sskill that to have a public row with it becomes a sign of one’s own failure.
中国实现类似合作的技巧十分娴熟。中国围绕主权与贸易问题寻求合作,并且游说和引诱可能的合作对象,对配合者予以酬谢,对不配合者施以威胁;一旦合作对象过于谨慎或有所保留,中国就有可能对其假以颜色,进行威胁或孤立。中国对外宣称自己是恪守原则的国家,但事实上,中国的公众外交原则通常只是走走过场而已。中国习惯于以攻为守,把反对者斥责为“麻烦制造者”或“打破规则或共识的一方”。因此,中国的合作伙伴往往不愿公开承认与中国意见不合。比如说,虽然2009年11月奥巴马的访华之旅明显以失败告终,但美国驻华公使却从始至终都坚称访问是成功的,他还在最近批评自己的政府“践踏了中国的核心利益”。与之类似,尽管2009年12月在南京召开的欧盟—中国峰会没有得出任何实质性结果,但是欧盟还是宣布峰会获得了成功。中国的本领就在于此:如果你与中国出现了公开不合,那么一定是你的错。
China is, of course, not the only scheming actor in theinternational system. Neither does it exhibit openly hegemonic tendencies –except of course in its (growing) neighbourhood where its “core interests” seem to be expanding. Indifference,passivity,
abstention and defensivebehaviour remain the preferred tools of China’s internationalaction, albeit based on greater knowledge from better diplomats andanalysts than at any previous time in its history. Nevertheless, Chinais ready to form alliances with states that seek to limit the reachof the international system in any given area. It has co-operated with India and to a lesser extent the US to prevent binding internationalagreements on climate change, with Russiato scupper international sanctions against countries such as Iran, and withemerging or developing countries to protect national sovereignty on issues thatrange from trade to human rights.
当然,中国既不是国际体系中唯一的阴谋家,也没有公开地展示霸权主义倾向。不过,中国在邻国中的“核心利益”似乎越来越多。虽然中国现在的外交官和分析家比以往历史上任何时期都更有才干,但是在国际活动中,中国仍然以中立、被动、弃权和自我保护为主要的应对方式。可即便如此,中国还是愿意与其他国家合作,来限制国际制度在各种领域中的权限。中国与印度和美国进行过合作(与美国的合作范围较小),以防止达成有关气候变化的国际性协议;与俄罗斯合作,反对对伊朗等国家进行国际制裁;中国还与新兴或发展中国家合作,在从贸易到人权等各个问题上保护国家主权。
In the short term, China is likelyto continue to block newinternational commitments and expand its influence onthe margins of the international system. Other traditionally internationaliststates meet the costs of maintaining peace, of insuring the financial system and of preserving theenvironment, while Chinaderives the beneft. For example,carbon trading has become a cashmachine for Chinesecompanies. Similarly, NATO forces protect the Aynakcopper mine in Afghanistan.Chinahas also so far limited its participation in anti-piracy efforts to helping itsown citizens. The stability of the international fnancial system maywellbecome another case of widely diverging contributions.China’s external capitalfows largely go through offshore markets, a persistentanomaly which is a bigger issue when these fows become huge. In the frstquarter of 2010, while observers were hoping for the decline of China’sforeign-trade surplus, a total infow of 95 billion dollars came more frominward capital flows than from the current account surplus: in effect, anon-convertible currency is serving as a magnet for capital.
在短期内,中国可能会继续阻碍新国际协约的达成,并通过蚕食国际体系,以扩大自身的影响。在其他传统的国际主义国家为维护和平、维持金融系统稳定、保护环境而付出的时候,中国却坐享其利。比如说,许多中国企业依靠碳排放交易赚得盆丰钵满;中国投资的阿富汗艾娜克铜矿受的是北约部队的保护;中国为给国内民众开方便之门而有意对盗版打击不力。另外,在维持国际金融系统稳定方面,各国做出的贡献差别很大。中国大部分的外部资本流动都是通过离岸市场实现的,这种做法不合常规。而且资本流动量越大,造成的问题也就越大。在2010年第一季度,尽管观察家期望中国的外贸顺差额能有所下降,但中国仍收获了950亿美元的顺差。这笔顺差多来自资本内流,而非来自经常项目顺差。也就是说,人民币的不可兑换性是中国吸引资金的源泉。
In the longer term, however, we seem to be moving toward acompletely scaled-down model of the international system based on nation statesand a system of rules that functions merely as a way toprevent interference between them. At best, this is anorm-free order, in which only infringements on sovereignty justifyinternational involvement. At worst, it could be a world defned by anarchy.
从长期来说,国际体系的规模似乎将会缩小,国家间的相互干预将受到一系列规则的限制,各国自行其是的空间会越来越大。这种趋势发展到最后,结果可能是国际规则的消失,即除非一个国家的主权受到了侵犯,否则国际力量将无权对该国进行干预。这还是最乐观的估计。最坏的结果是全世界都会陷入的无政府混乱状态。
While Chinese military spending is rising quickly, the Chinese contribution toactual enforcement of the internationalorder is minimal, and it is therefore unlikely to replacethe US inenforcing the UN system. Therefore, as Europeans and Americans debate theirdifferent values, they would do well to take notice that China is tempted by anormless foreign policy – the 21st century equivalent of what thehistorian Akira Iriye has termed the “ideal-less” foreign policy of Japanin the 1920s. For this reason, Chinais becoming a huge test for EU foreign policy, which has been predicated on theprinciple of global norms and values.
中国在迅速增加军费开支的同时,对维护国际秩序所做出的贡献却微乎其微,因此中国不大可能会取代美国在执行联合国任务中的地位。因此,欧美在为各自的价值观念进行争论的同时,也应当注意,中国倾向于“无规则”的对外政策,这种政策类似于日本在20世纪20年代实行的,被历史学家入江昭称为“缺失完美理想”的外交政策。由于欧盟的外交政策建立在全球性的规则和价值观之上,因此,中国对欧盟的外交政策形成了巨大考验。
China’spolicy choices no longer affect only its neighbourhoodbut every issue from trade and the global economy to climate changeand nuclear proliferation, as well as every region from Africa to the Middle East. EU member states therefore need totake into account China’simpact across a range of policy issues and in relationswith other countries and regions. Therefore, instead of thinking ofits relationship with Chinain bilateral terms, Europe thus needs to reframe its policy on Chinain global terms. In other words, Europe needs a global China policy.
中国选择什么样的政策,将不仅仅影响其邻国,而且会影响包括贸易、全球经济、气候变化和核扩散问题在内的各个领域,以及包括非洲和中东在内的世界各个地区。因此,欧盟成员国需要综合考虑中国对各种政策问题,以及对所有其他国家和地区的影响。在对华关系上,欧盟不应将思维局限于双边模式中,而是要以全球性视角重新制定对华政策。也就是说,欧洲需要制定一个全球性的对华政策。 |