SUMMARY
概要
China now affects every global issue from trade and the economy to climate change and ...
rhapsody 发表于 2010-8-10 21:47 
在rhapsody的基础上进行校对 
SUMMARY
概要
China now affects every global issue from trade and the economy to climate change and nuclear proliferation, as well as every region from Africa to the Middle East. Europe therefore needs to reframe its China policy in global terms. Instead of thinking of their relationship with China in bilateral terms, EU member states need to take into account China’s impact across all of the issues in European foreign policy and in relations with all other countries and regions. Europe needs to co-ordinate its own policy more effectively, preferably at EU level, and to co-operate with other countries to increase its limited leverage over China. In short, Europe needs a global China policy. At the same time, many of the key decisions in China’s foreign policy are now taken by domestic actors who are largely unknown to foreigners. Europe needs to identify and engage with these actors.
如今，中国既能影响经济贸易、气候变化、核武器扩散等各种全球性议题，也能影响包括非洲和中东在内的各地区局势。因此，欧洲需要以全球视角重塑对华政策。在对华关系上，欧盟成员国不应将思维局限于双边模式中，而是要综合考虑中国对欧洲外交政策中各项事务的影响，以及与其他所有国家和地区之间的联系。欧洲各国需要在更有效地协调自身政策（最好是在欧盟的层级上）的同时，与其他国家进行合作，才能给有限的欧洲对华影响力增加分量。简而言之，欧洲需要制定一个全球性的对华政策。此外，中国目前许多重要外交决策是由其国内的执行者作出的，而国外对此缺乏了解。欧洲需要对这些人员增进了解并加强沟通。
In the past, EU member states have struggled to co-ordinate even their own policy toward China, let alone co-operate with other countries. But although China now feels more powerful than ever, especially after the global economic crisis, greater tension between China and both its neighbours and the US offers new opportunities for Europe to form new coalitions and to increase its leverage over China. Europe should also reach out to the new actors in the Chinese system with whom it may share interests. To make this global China policy work, however, Europe will need to focus on a limited number of priorities. In particular, the EU should focus its relationship with China on five issues: trade and investment policy; industry and technology; climate change; nuclear proliferation and Iran; and human rights.
过去，欧盟成员国之间协调对华政策都十分困难，更不用说与欧盟之外的国家合作了。虽然中国比以往任何时候都要强大，在全球经济危机后更是如此，但是，中国与邻国以及与美国之间的紧张局势加剧，给欧洲建立新的同盟，并增加对中国的影响力创造了新的机会。欧洲还应当与可能存在共同利益的中国体制内的新执行者进行接触。为使全球性的对华政策行之有效，欧洲需将注意力集中在有限数量的重点事项上。欧中关系尤其应当聚焦以下五项议题：贸易和投资政策、工业与科技、气候变化、伊朗核扩散及人权问题。【这五个议题在文中多次出现，应该统一下？！】
Introduction
引论
China feels more powerful than ever. Chinese foreign policy experts saw the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 not as a one-off crisis but as a structural change in the global distribution of power. Since then, China has become assertive across a range of foreign policy issues. China has repeatedly snubbed Europeans in response to their support for the Dalai Lama and Tibet. At the same time, it has become even less apologetic about its own human rights violations. China has deepened economic ties with North Korea and put minimal pressure on Pyongyang after it crossed the nuclear threshold and even after it torpedoed a South Korean navy vessel in May. China has also slowed down progress on international efforts to impose new sanctions on Iran while beneftting from a burgeoning economic relationship with Tehran. Finally, at the Copenhagen climate conference– a wake-up call for many in the West in general and in Europe in particular – China used tough tactics to achieve its objective of preventing an agreement on a binding commitment for developing countries (although, in this case, it may have overplayed its hand). In short, China has frustrated hopes for increased global responsibility sharing while pursuing its own economic and strategic interests through international institutions and stalling when such institutions challenge its own positions.
中国现时比以往都要强盛。在中国外交政策专家的眼里，2008年9月雷曼兄弟的破产并不是一次性的危机，而是全球力量分布的一次结构性改变。此后，中国在一系列外交议题上变得强硬起来。中国多次轻视欧洲，以此作为对后者支持达赖喇嘛和西藏【？：隐藏含义是不是“支持藏独”，建议：支持达赖喇嘛和藏独的回应。】的回应。同时，对其人权问题，中国也愈发坦然。中朝经济关系不断深化。而且，中国在朝鲜核问题上施加的压力是最小的。甚至在“天安舰”事件上，中国的态度也是如此。中国还有意放缓国际社会对伊朗进行新一轮制裁的步伐，因为中国可从不断发展的中伊经济关系中得到好处。此外，哥本哈根气候峰会号召西方国家，尤其是欧洲国家，采取气候行动而会中，中国则通过强硬的政策来达到其目的，即阻止签订针对发展中国家的约束性承诺。但中国似乎玩过火了。总之，中国通过国际机制达到其自身的经济、战略利益；而在这些国际机制对其地位构成挑战时又进行阻挠。全球责任理应由世界各国共同承担，但中国却打破了这种期望。
These developments vindicate the findings of ECFR’s Power Audit of EU-China relations, published in April 2009, which argued that Europe’s approach toward China was failing. The report argued that Europe’s policy of “unconditional engagement” with China was based on an assumption that, as China integrated into the global economic system, it would slowly but inexorably converge with European values and interests. But, we argued, rather than becoming a “responsible stakeholder” as the West hoped, China was taking advantage of the policy of “unconditional engagement” to take the benefits of the international system while resisting international requests in key areas. In doing so, it was having the effect of “hollowing out” the international system.
这些事态发展证明了欧洲对外关系委员会《欧中关系实力审核》报告结论的正确性。该报告发表于2009年4月；报告称，欧洲对华政策正走向失败。报告认为，欧洲对华的“无条件交往”政策基于这样一个假设，即在中国成为全球经济体系的一部分时，它必将逐步与欧洲拥有共同的价值观和利益。然而，我们认为，中国并非如西方国家期望的那样，成为“负责任的利害共担者”；而是一面利用“无条件交往”政策之便获取国际体系带来的好处，另一面又在关键问题上拒绝国际社会的要求。这样的做法，相当于是使国际体系“空洞化”。
In the report, we also argued that divisions between EU member states have weakened Europe collectively and each member state individually when they have faced diffculties in their bilateral relations with China. We showed how Europe was divided along two fault lines within Europe: firstly, a divide between free traders and protectionists; and, secondly, a divide between those who were more interested in applying political conditionality and those who were more accommodationist. Since the publication of the report, these divisions have led to a series of further embarrassing failures by member states. For example, China has successively isolated the governments of Denmark, France and Germany because of their support for the Dalai Lama. Conversely, China did not reward the UK for moving to recognise China’s sovereignty over Tibet in 2008. Instead, China made a point of ignoring repeated pleas by the UK government and executed Akmal Shaikh, a British citizen who was mentally ill, in December 2009.
在报告中，我们提到，欧盟成员国间的分裂削弱了整个欧洲的实力；而在与中国的双边关系中，各成员国也遇到各自的难题。我们阐述了欧盟是如何被两道鸿沟分割的：一是自由贸易主义者与贸易保护主义者之间的分歧；二是倾向于附有政治条件限制的人与主张通融妥协的人之间的分歧。自报告发布以来，这些分裂的情形导致了成员国里边一连串更为令人难堪的失败结果。例如，中国接连孤立丹麦、法国及德国政府，原因在于这些国家支持达赖喇嘛。反过来，英国在2008年转而承认中国对西藏的主权，却没有因此从中国那里得到好处。2009年12月，中国反而是执意驳回了英国政府以及英国人阿克毛•沙伊赫的再三请求，后者患有精神疾病却被判处死刑【？：最终判处患有精神疾病的沙伊赫死刑。】。
The lack of European unity is compounded by the inconsistencies that exist between different dialogues and agreements in different sectors at the EU level, and between trade and economic policy on the one hand and foreign policy and governance issues on the other. To make matters even worse, the EU has often changed its positions on China (including at EU-China summits) and has thus struggled to use even the limited leverage it has. China, meanwhile, has been consistent in demanding that the EU lift the arms embargo imposed in 1989, grant China market economy status, and limit contacts with Taiwanese and Tibetan leaders. In the report, we recommended moving from unconditional engagement to a policy that we called “reciprocal engagement” – in other words, a shift from a foreign policy predicated on an assumption of shared values and naturally converging interests to a relationship in which bargaining and trade-offs would become the norm.
欧洲内部不够统一，而欧盟层级上各领域不同磋商和协议所体现的不一致，还有经济贸易政策与外交政策及治理议题这两方面所表现的不协调，都使得这个问题变得更严重。【？：欧洲内部的不够统一主要是，欧盟在各领域的对话和协议上；在经贸、对外政策及内部治理问题上存在分歧。】然而这还不是最糟的，更甚的是【？：然而，更糟的是】欧盟手里有的筹码本就有限，在对华态度上还经常改变（在欧中峰会时也是如此），这样的话运用起来就更加困难。与此同时，中国始终坚持要求欧洲取消1989年起实行的对华武器禁运，承认中国市场经济地位，并减少与台湾及西藏领导人的联系。我们在报告中建议欧盟摒弃过去对华的“无条件交往”政策，转而采取我们所谓的“互惠性交往”政策。换言之，是从一种基于欧中共同价值观和利益的假设而制定的外交政策，转变为这样一种欧中关系——讨价还价和权衡取舍将成为这种双边关系的常态。
This policy brief, which is intended to launch ECFR’s China programme, explains in more detail what the key elements of such an approach should be. It argues that Europe needs to reframe its China policy in global terms. Instead of thinking of its relationship with China in bilateral and traditional foreign policy terms, Europe needs to take into account China’s impact across a range of policy issues and in relations with all other countries and regions. The brief argues that Europe needs to co-ordinate its own policy more effectively and to co-operate with other countries to increase its limited leverage over China. Finally, it shows how Europe might begin to develop such a global China policy in five priority areas: trade and investment policy; industry and technology; climate change; nuclear proliferation and Iran; and human rights.
本政策简报旨在推动欧洲对外关系委员会的中国项目，并通过更多的细节，解释这种政策的关键因素应该是什么。简报提到，欧洲应该重新制定一个全球性的对华政策。欧洲不应只以双边和传统的外交政策视角来看待对华关系，而应从一系列政策问题，以及中国与别国和地区关系的角度来考虑其影响。简报认为，欧洲各国需要更有效地协调自身政策的同时，并与其他国家进行合作以提升本来其有限的对华影响力。最后，简报阐述了欧盟如何在下述五个关键议题上着手推行这种全球性的对华政策：贸易和投资政策、工业与科技、气候变化、伊朗与核扩散，以及人权问题。
A new China?
一个全新的中国？
China has undoubtedly become economically more powerful in the last 12 months, at least in the short term. Its sound budgetary situation at the beginning of the global economic crisis enabled it to launch a stimulus-and-loan package, which, at around two trillion dollars including bank loans, is on a par with the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing or the European Central Bank’s provision of bank liquidity. Thanks to its competitive costs, China’s exports have suffered less than those of its competitors: its exports of goods and services decreased by 10.6 percent while global exports without China decreased by 16 percent. There is no doubt that China’s policies since late 2008 have created a giant infrastructure, lending and real-estate bubble in the domestic economy. But China’s currency reserves and near-zero interest rates for the US dollar mean that even when this bubble bursts it is likely to create an international defationary effect rather than a catastrophe for China’s economy. China has increased the uses of its reserves for direct investment abroad, has taken a share of new currency swap agreements (as yet untested) in Asia, but remains far more cautious than is generally believed in undertaking new financial responsibilities.
在过去的12个月里，至少从短期的效应来看，中国在经济上已毫无疑问地变得更为强大【中国经济的确变得更加强大】。在全球经济危机初期，该国具备的充足预算状况使其能在全球经济危机之初推出刺激和贷款计划，该计划包括银行贷款在内规模达2万亿美元，相当于美国联邦储备新增的货币发行量，或是欧洲中央银行对银行流动性的供应。由于其极具竞争力的成本，中国出口所遭受的损失比它的竞争对手小： 其货物和服务出口减少了10.6%，而同期除去中国的全球出口量则下降了16%。自2008年后期开始，中国的（经济刺激）政策无疑造成了国内经济中巨大的基建、借贷和房地产泡沫。但中国庞大的外汇储备和对美元几乎零利率的水平意味着即使泡沫破灭，也可能只造成国际性的通货紧缩，而不是中国的经济灾难。中国将更多的货币储备用在了海外直接投资，并且在亚洲一些新的货币互换协议（未经检验）中占有了一定份额，但在承担新的金融责任方面，它仍保持着审慎的态度，比人们通常所想的还要谨慎得多。
As China has become economically more powerful, we are seeing a newly assertive approach in a range of spheres: economic, diplomatic, military, and that of human rights. Although China regularly reaffirms the importance it attaches to Europe, the process of moving toward a partnership and co-operation agreement between the EU and China has stalled. Even the new US administration, which made an unprecedented attempt to engage with China and accommodate its strategic interests and requirements, has been increasingly frustrated by China’s reluctance to co-operate on issues of importance to the US such as North Korea and Iran. Meanwhile, China is steadily expanding its relationships with developing countries, including Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Sudan and Turkmenistan. Its share of direct investment abroad is rapidly involving major commodity producers, especially in western Africa, and its state firms are also financing infrastructure projects such as high-speed rail in Saudi Arabia. China has also become more loudly protective of its sovereignty. It has always been sensitive about US arms sales to Taiwan, but now openly threatens to sanction US frms involved in arms sales in the same way that it previously threatened European companies.
而当中国在经济上变得更强大，我们在一系列领域——经济、外交、军事和人权之中也见识到该国新显露出来的强硬姿态【我们在经济、外交、军事和人权等领域，也见识到了中国新显露出来的强硬姿态。】。尽管中国一贯重申它如何重视欧洲，但欧中建立伙伴关系和签署合作协议的进程已陷于停滞。虽然美国新政府史无前例地尝试与中国接洽，还在战略利益和要求方面做出了妥协，但在美国关注的重要议题上，如朝鲜和伊朗问题，中国不愿合作的态度让美方越来越感到沮丧。同时，中国正稳步扩大它与发展中国家的关系，包括伊朗、缅甸、朝鲜、苏丹和土库曼斯坦。其对外直接投资份额正快速地渗透到大宗商品生产商，尤其是在西非。其国有企业也在为诸如沙特阿拉伯的高速铁路等基础设施项目提供资金【？：中国对外直接投资迅速渗透到主要的商品生产商，尤其是在西非。同时，中国的国有企业也为诸如沙特阿拉伯的高速铁路等基础设施项目提供资金。】。中国在保护【维护？】其主权方面也变得更加高调。中国对于美国对台军售一直非常敏感，但现在它敢于公开威胁要制裁美国涉嫌军售的企业，正如之前威胁欧洲的企业那样。
【大宗商品（Bulk Stock)是指可进入流通领域，但非零售环节，具有商品属性用于工农业生产与消费使用的大批量买卖的物质商品。在金融投资市场，大宗商品指同质化、可交易、被广泛作为工业基础原材料的商品，如原油、有色金属、农产品、铁矿石、煤炭等。包括3个类别，即能源商品、基础原材料和农副产品。】
China has also raised its own military profile without, however, co-operating with the West or accommodating its close neighbours – for example, India, Japan and Taiwan – on strategic issues. China has had double-digit growth in military expenditure for all but one of the past 30 years. This means that although military parity with the United States is a long way off, China may be able to put pressure on other countries. In January 2010, China succeeded in the diffcult feat of intercepting a ballistic missile during its fnal atmospheric re-entry phase – the latest development in an unbroken and accelerating trend toward military modernisation. It now challenges US ships that enter its maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) while its own ships enter its neighbours’ EEZs. It is also becoming increasingly ready to assert its jurisdiction over the north-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, and has expanded military bases along the border with India. (It is worth remembering, however, that China has only used signifcant force abroad twice in the last 60 years – during the short war with India in 1962 and the equally short campaign against Vietnam in 1979.)
中国还提高了自己在军事上的姿态，在战略问题上既不与西方合作，也不迁就其近邻（例如印度、日本和台湾）。过去30年里中国的军费增长幅度只有一年没上两位数，这意味着尽管中国的军事地位仍比美国差一大截，但亦足以给其他国家施加压力。2010年1月，中国成功地完成了在大气层外拦截弹道导弹的高难度任务──这是该国不断加速迈向军事现代化的最新进展。如今，中国查问进入自己海上专属经济区的美国船只，自己的船只却进入了邻国的专属经济区。中国还渐趋于宣称自己对印度东北部阿鲁那恰尔邦[注：即所谓的藏南地区]拥有管辖权【中国宣称自己对印度东北部阿鲁纳恰尔邦拥有管辖权的声音越来越大。】，并且扩大了同印度接壤的边境上的军事基地【并且扩大了中印边境的军事基地。】。（值得一提的是，在过去的60年里，中国只有两次对外大动干戈──1962年与印度的短暂战争，以及同样短暂的1979年对越南战争）。
China has also become more open in rejecting western human rights standards and is, on occasion, now even willing to show disregard for its own law. For example, in January 2010, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman responded to a question about the whereabouts of a well-known dissident, Gao Zhisheng, who had been missing for almost a year, by saying that “he is where he should be”. (After briefy reappearing under police control after more than a year, Mr.Gao disappeared again.) This disregard represents a signifcant change and may create splits within China’s political elite and in public opinion. China has also become more aggressive toward foreign critics. For example, in 2009 it boycotted the Danish government, which for decades had pursued a dual strategy of positive co-operation on the one hand and criticism of China over human rights and its treatment of the Dalai Lama on the other.
中国也越来越公开地拒绝西方的人权标准，并且现在某些时候甚至可以罔顾自己的法律【觉得要改，一时想不到，呵呵】。例如，2010年1月，中国外交部一个发言人在回应关于一位当时失踪了差不多一年的、著名的不同政见者——高志晟的下落时【一名中国外交部发言人回应关于当时失踪近一年的异见者高智晟的下落时，答道：“”】，回答道：“他在他应该在的地方”（在失踪超过一年以后，高智晟在警察监控下短暂现身，然后再次失踪）。这种漠视体现了一种值得注意的变化，并可能使中国政治精英和公众舆论之间产生裂痕。中国在对待外国批评方面也变得更加咄咄逼人。例如，2009年，中国抵制丹麦政府，因为后者几十年来一直推行双面战略，一方面积极与中国合作，另一方面又批评中国的人权及其对待达赖喇嘛的态度。
As a result of these events, there has been a shift in expert analysis and media opinion in Europe – and, in fact, throughout the West – on relations with China. In a remarkably short space of time, complacency has been replaced to a large extent by anxiety. Even business seems less sanguine about the Chinese market. Google’s threat to leave China unless the security of its users is ensured suggests companies are no longer prepared to do business in China at any price. Accusations about unfair competition, dumping and monetary manipulation have also been getting louder. In fact, fuelled by indignation, many analysts are now calling for the West to take a more confrontational stance toward China. However, these calls for a strategic challenge are as unrealistic as the earlier consensus on unconditional engagement. The West and China are simply too interdependent for us to replace blind engagement with blind confrontation.
这一连串事件导致了欧洲——以至整个西方世界的（实际上）——专家分析和媒体观点都发生了转变【因此，在对中关系问题上，这一连串世界导致欧洲，甚至整个西方世界的专家及媒体观点都发生改变。】。在很短的时间内【很快】，自满在很大程度上已被焦虑所取代。甚至商业上对中国市场的看法也不那么乐观了。谷歌威胁离开中国——除非用户的安全得到保障，这说明公司不再愿意不惜任何代价在中国做生意【？：谷歌威胁退出中国，除非其用户安全得到保障。这暗示谷歌不愿再在中国开展任何业务。】。对不公平竞争、倾销和操纵货币的谴责声势也变得越来越大【在不正当竞争、倾销及操纵货币问题上，对中谴责的声势也越来越大。】。实际上，很多受愤怒情绪驱使的分析家，现在都呼吁西方对中国采取更具对抗性的姿态。然而，这些要求战略挑战的呼吁就像以前在“无条件交往”上的共识一样不切实际。【？：与以前的“无条件交往”政策一样，这些要求发出战略挑战的呼吁也不切实际。】西方和中国相互依赖的程度很高，这就使得我们不能用盲目对抗来取代盲目合作。
Moreover, the dramatic shift in perceptions of China refects a change of mood among the West’s opinion leaders rather than a sudden aggressive turn in Chinese policy. In fact, there appear to be several trends occurring simultaneously in China. For example, there were some signs of a more moderate trend in Chinese policy recently. Chinese offcials met again with the Dalai Lama’s representatives in Beijing. After an acute phase of political repression, governance is also improving in Xinjiang. Several semi-offcial spokesmen have also recently suggested that China may make further key concessions on global issues, for example by re-evaluating the currency and co-operating with the US on sanctions against Iran. But these developments were followed by signs of Chinese intransigence. For example, China has reaffirmed the monetary peg to the dollar despite calls for revaluation, and there is even a possibility that the renminbi will be pushed lower.
再者，对华观点的急剧转变反映了西方的舆论领袖们的情绪变化，而非中国的政策出现了突如其来的攻击性转向。实际上，在中国，似乎同时出现了几种趋势。例如，最近中国的政策出现了一些趋于缓和的迹象。中国官员在北京和达赖喇嘛的代表们商谈。在激烈的政治镇压后，对新疆的治理也正在改善。几个准官方的发言人最近建议中国在全球问题上应该做进一步的关键性让步。例如，重新估值货币以及与美国合作制裁伊朗。但这些事态的背后也伴随着中国不妥协的迹象。比如，中国无视人民币升值的呼吁，已经重申了钉紧美元的货币政策，而且还可能把人民币汇率压得更低。
These apparently contradictory developments suggest that there are genuine differences within the Chinese political elite. In particular, there are signs of a high-level debate between exponents of a more nationalist policy and advocates of international co-operation. Chinese foreign policy appears to be in flux, influenced by several factors including the transition to a new leadership in 2012. However, the state of relations among top leaders has never been as well protected from outside scrutiny since the founding years of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese diplomats to whom the West has access tend to explain, mitigate or deny. Meanwhile, many of the key decisions in China’s foreign policy are now taken by domestic actors within the army, major state companies and the party who are largely unknown to foreigners. Understanding these new actors and their interests is a prerequisite for an effective foreign policy toward China.
这些表面上矛盾的事态发展暗示了中国政治精英中确实存在分歧。尤其是有迹象显示，高层中存在着民族主义政策拥护者与国际合作倡导者之间的争议。受到包括2012年新领导层过渡在内的若干因素影响，中国外交政策显得起起伏伏。不过，自中华人民共和国建国起，最高层领导人之间的关系一直未能很好地避免受到外界的审视。西方可以接触到的中国外交官们往往只会闪烁其词、轻描淡写或直接否认。同时，现时中国外交的很多关键决策是其国内军队、大国营企业还有党内的执行者作出的，而国外对于这些人物都不甚了解。了解这些新角色及其兴趣是制定一套有效的对华外交政策的先决条件。
China’s increasing leverage
中国日益增大的影响力
Alongside the changes that have taken place within China, its position in the world has also shifted as a result of global shifts. China is currently reaping the benefits of several converging factors: a long period of favourable demography and steady macro-economic policies; its classification as a developing country when it is actually the world’s first trading nation and second-largest economy; and its skilful and pragmatic diplomacy, which has combined lip service to global integration and international institutions with lavish care for bilateral relations. The strategy of divide-and-rule is far from new. In fact, China has played foreigners off against each other at least since the Qing emperor Qianlong fought the last Mongol empire. Similarly, the nationalist Chiang Kai-shek advocated pushing back the West by “playing barbarian against barbarian”. Republican China led – and in 1942 finally won – a struggle to end all Western extra-territorial privileges. In fact, whether it was strong or weak and whether it had allies or was strategically isolated, China has consistently had a hyper-realist strategic culture. What has changed is simply that its leverage has kept increasing.
随着中国内部发生改变，其国家地位亦发生变化。造成这一结果的背景是全球的大变化。中国当前集中从若干要素攫取利益：长期良好的人口形势以及稳定的宏观经济政策；享受着发展中国家的身份，但事实上已是世界上第一贸易大国及第二大经济体；还有其巧妙务实的外交政策——一边口头承诺迎合全球一体化和国际机构，一边在双边关系上显示出慷慨大度。分而治之的策略早已不是什么新鲜事物。事实上，中国早在清朝乾隆时期，就已经利用外国人之间相互争斗打败了最后的蒙古帝国。同样，国民党的蒋介石提倡用“以夷制夷”战略来击退西方。中华民国引领了一场结束所有西方治外特权的抗争，并在1942年最终取得胜利。实际上，无论是强是弱，无论是拥有盟友还是在战略上受到孤立，中国一贯推行的是一套超级现实主义的战略文化。而发生改变的地方，仅仅是其影响力在不断增大。【or: 唯一变化的是，中国影响力在不断增强。】
In the past, when China had less leverage than it does now, it made several long-term international concessions. It signed arms-control agreements between 1992 and 1998 and took steps to join the World Trade Organization between 1999 and 2001. During the same period, China also formed a new security concept that highlighted mutual trust and shared interests. Within three years, from 1996 to 1998, it also established partnerships with all of its key partners, including a “long-term and stable constructive partnership” with the EU that was agreed in April 1998. China also considered confidence-building measures with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 and proceeded to build up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with a first meeting in 1996.
过去，当中国的影响力比现在弱时，它在国际上作出了若干项长期的妥协措施。中国在1992年到1998年间签署了一系列军控协议，并且在1999到2001年期间有步骤地加入了世界贸易组织。同期，中国还树立了新的安全理念，强调相互信任并分享利益【互信互利】。从1996年到1998年的3年里，它与所有的重要伙伴建立了合作关系，包括1998年4月与欧盟签署建立“长期和稳定的建设性伙伴关系”的协议。中国还在1997年考虑与东南亚国家联盟（东盟）建立互信机制，继而建立了上海合作组织（第一次会议于1996年举行）。
These steps toward integration into the international system prompted optimism that China as a joiner and learner would soon become a contributor and eventually a “responsible stakeholder”. But as China’s leverage has increased during the last decade, it has become more and more reluctant to sign new agreements that would have integrated it further into the international system. What was thought in the late 1990s to be a floor for further Chinese engagement in several key areas has, in fact, turned out to be a ceiling. A particularly good example is climate change policy, in which China has consistently rejected legally binding agreements since the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. In that sense, its attitude at the Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009 should have been no surprise.
这些融入国际体系的进展情况引发了一种乐观想法【？：中国进一步融入国际体系带来了乐观的观点】，即身为加入者【参与者】和学习者的中国将很快成为一个贡献者，并最终成为一个“负责任的利害共担者”。但随着【由于】中国的影响力在过去十年里已然增加，它却越来越不愿意签署新协议，从而进一步融入国际体系。对于中国在几个关键领域参与的深入程度而言，那些在20世纪90年代后期曾被认为是处于最低起点的事情，结果却变成了最高限度。【这个不知道什么意思，需要修改，暂时没想出来。】一个尤为典型的例子是气候变化政策。中国自从1997年的《京都议定书》以来一直拒绝具有法律约束力的协议。从这个意义上说，该国在2009年12月哥本哈根气候大会上的态度也就不足为奇了。
China’s forward-looking diplomacy has become increasingly focused on sub-regional or even bilateral rather than multilateral agreements. China’s relations with South-East Asia are the best illustration of this. In 2001 – the year it joined the WTO – China offered an innovative free trade pact to ASEAN. In 2002, it signed a (non-binding) declaration of conduct with ASEAN states to resolve peacefully maritime issues. In 2003, it signed the (also non-binding) ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, which commits signatories to the peaceful resolution of disputes. These days, however, China holds only bilateral negotiations to deal with the delimitation of maritime borders in the South China Sea. China abides by the terms of treaties it has already signed, but it is no longer willing to undertake new legal commitments.
中国前瞻性的外交越来越集中在次区域范畴，或者甚至是双边而不是多边协议。中国与东南亚的关系是这方面最好的例证。2001年，即中国入世（当）年，中国向东盟提供了【提出】一项创新的自由贸易协定。2002年，它【中国】签署了一项与东盟国家和平解决海事问题的（不具有约束力的）声明。2003年，中国签署了同样不具约束力的东盟友好合作条约，各签约国承诺和平解决争端。然而，这段时间以来，中国只通过双边谈判的方式来解决南中国海[注：中国大陆称南海]的海上边界划定问题。中国遵守它已签署条约的各项条款，但不再愿意承担新的法律责任。
China has taken the same approach to negotiations about nuclear proliferation issues. It took part in four-party talks on North Korea in New York between 1997 and 2000, and set up the six-party talks in 2003, but it has never gone beyond its limited role as a facilitator, let alone put pressure on North Korea. China has also made it clear that it is unwilling to contemplate any binding commitment to international sanctions, apart from narrowly defined sanctions against targeted individuals. As a result, resolutions 1718 and 1874 on North Korea and resolutions 1737 and 1803 on Iran have been far less effective than they could have been. There is little evidence that China will change its approach. The most one can realistically hope for is negative consent at the UN in cases in which China does not think its own “core interests” are at stake. For example, China made it clear to the US as early as October 2002 that it would not veto the use of force against Iraq.
中国在核扩散谈判议题上采取了同样的方式。1997年到2000年期间，它在纽约参加了朝鲜问题四方谈判，并在2003年建立了六方会谈，但从来没有超出推动者的角色范畴，更不用说对朝鲜施加压力。中国还清楚地表明【明确表示】，它不愿考虑任何具有约束力的国际制裁条款，除了只针对特定个体进行的偏狭制裁以外。因此，（联合国）1718号和1874号对朝鲜以及1737号和1803号对伊朗决议的执行远比应有的低效。没有任何迹象表明中国会改变它的姿态。实际上，只有在那些中国认为不会危及自身“核心利益”的联合国决议上，人们才能指望得到中国消极的赞成【？】。例如，中国早在2002年就对美国清楚表明，它不会投票否决对伊拉克使用武力。【例如，早在2002年，中国就对美国明确表示，在对伊拉克动用武力的问题上，中国不会投否决票。】
China and the international system
中国与国际体系
China’s strategy should not be seen as a revisionist challenge to the international system and its rules. In fact, China often acts as an upholder of existing international law and sovereignty. At the same time, however, it builds negative coalitions to restrain any new international norm-building. Furthermore, it builds these coalitions on the basis of tactics rather than principle. For example, in October 2009, China and India signed a climate pact to defect any pressure on the two countries to set legally binding emissions targets. One month later, China unilaterally announced its own target on emission reductions, leaving a surprised India without its own face-saving proposal. China appeared to be making a contribution to action on climate change while it had, in fact, with India’s help, already blocked any binding agreement.
对国际体系和国际规则而言，中国的战略并不构成修正主义威胁。事实上，中国对现存的国际法和国家主权往往是表示拥护和支持的。但与此同时，中国也和一些国家组成反对同盟以遏制国际新准则的建立。更何况中国的这种对外合作不是以原则，而是以战略为基础的。比如说，中国与印度在2009年10月签订气候协议时约定，两国将拒绝设定任何有法律约束力的减排目标；可是一个月后，中国就单方面宣布了自己的减排目标，这让毫无准备的印度大吃一惊，根本拿不出减排方案来挽回面子。表面上看，中国是在为遏制气候变化做贡献，但实际上，中国早已借助印度，阻止了具备约束力协议的达成。
China has become very skilful at building these coalitions. It lobbies and entices partners; rewards those who co-operate and threatens those who do not; forms coalitions around issues such as sovereignty and trade; and occasionally brushes off, intimidates or isolates reticent partners. It claims in public that it is acting on principle, but in reality these principles are largely a formal and quasi-ritual form of public diplomacy. China always presents what in reality is offensive as defensive and castigates opponents as either troublemakers or consensus- or rule-breakers. As a result, China’s partners are often reluctant even to admit publicly that they have fallen out with China. For example, the US envoy to China defended the success of President Obama’s visit to China in November 2009, even after it became clear that it was a failure, and has recently accused his own administration of “trampling on China’s core interests”. Similarly, the EU presented the EU-China summit in Nanjing in December 2009 as a success even though it had not achieved any tangible result. Such is China’s skill that to have a public row with it becomes a sign of one’s own failure.
中国实现类似合作的技巧十分娴熟：围绕诸如主权与贸易等问题组建各式各样的同盟；游说和引诱合作者，对配合者予以酬谢，对不配合者施以威胁；如合作对象有所保留，有时就对其施以漠视、威胁或孤立。中国对外宣称自己是恪守原则的国家，但事实上，这些公开的外交原则通常只是走过场而已。中国习惯于以攻为守，将反对者斥为“麻烦制造者”或是“规则（共识）破坏者”。因此，中国的合作对象通常甚至【？】不愿公开承认与中国意见不合。例如，尽管2009年11月奥巴马的访华之旅明显以失败告终，但美国驻华大使却始终坚称访问获得了成功，而此人最近还指责自己的政府“践踏了中国的核心利益”[注：洪博培在2010年5月接受其家乡盐湖城媒体采访时说了这番话，参见：http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/hom ... ship-think.html.csp]。【……。而最近，该驻华大使却指责自己的政府“践踏了中国和核心利益”。（注解，我认为可以省略。如果有100%的evidence证明是出自“盐湖城采访”那就没关系。会阅读这份文件的人，应该也很清楚这件事。不一定要注明。呵呵~）】与此类似【同样，】，尽管2009年12月在南京召开的欧中峰会没有任何实质性结果，但欧盟还是宣布峰会获得了成功。中国的本领就在于此：如果你和我们公开争吵，那么一定是你的错。
China is, of course, not the only scheming actor in the international system. Neither does it exhibit openly hegemonic tendencies – except of course in its (growing) neighbourhood where its “core interests” seem to be expanding. Indifference, passivity, abstention and defensive behaviour remain the preferred tools of China’s international action, albeit based on greater knowledge from better diplomats and analysts than at any previous time in its history. Nevertheless, China is ready to form alliances with states that seek to limit the reach of the international system in any given area. It has co-operated with India and to a lesser extent the US to prevent binding international agreements on climate change, with Russia to scupper international sanctions against countries such as Iran, and with emerging or developing countries to protect national sovereignty on issues that range from trade to human rights.
当然，中国既不是国际体系中唯一的阴谋家，也没公然显示出霸权主义的倾向。然而，对其邻国而言则例外，中国在那里的“核心利益”似乎在扩张。尽管中国现时的外交官和分析家比其历史上任何时期都更有学问，但在国际活动中，中国仍然以中立、被动、弃权和自保为主要的应对方式。不过，中国乐于与其他国家组成同盟，以限制国际体系在各个领域中的影响力。中国与印度进行过合作（也和美国进行过较小范围的合作），以防止达成具有约束力的气候变化国际性协议；与俄罗斯合作，阻止对伊朗等国家进行国际制裁；与新兴或发展中国家合作，在贸易和人权等一系列问题上保护国家主权。
In the short term, China is likely to continue to block new international commitments and expand its influence on the margins of the international system. Other traditionally internationalist states meet the costs of maintaining peace, of insuring the financial system and of preserving the environment, while China derives the benefit. For example, carbon trading has become a cash machine for Chinese companies. Similarly, NATO forces protect the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan. China has also so far limited its participation in anti-piracy efforts to helping its own citizens. The stability of the international fnancial system may well become another case of widely diverging contributions. China’s external capital flows largely go through offshore markets, a persistent anomaly which is a bigger issue when these flows become huge. In the frst quarter of 2010, while observers were hoping for the decline of China’s foreign-trade surplus, a total inflow of 95 billion dollars came more from inward capital flows than from the current account surplus: in effect, a non-convertible currency is serving as a magnet for capital.
短期内，中国可能会继续阻碍新国际协约的达成，并在国际体系的边缘地带扩大自身的影响。在其他传统的国际主义国家为维护和平、维持金融体系稳定、保护环境而付出代价的时候，中国却坐享其成。比如说，许多中国企业依靠碳排放交易赚得盆丰钵满。类似的【同样】，阿富汗艾娜克铜矿[注：中国中冶集团－江西铜业联合体在阿富汗投资开发的项目，当时为世界上尚未开发的第二大铜矿，参见：http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2009-07/10/content_11688070.htm]【读者自己会去搜索。】受到的是北约部队的保护。而中国为给予国民方便【便利】，有意对盗版打击不力，至今都是如此。另外，在维持国际金融体系稳定方面，各国做出的贡献差别很大。中国大部分的外部资本流动是通过离岸市场实现的，这种做法不合常规。而且资本流动量越大，造成的问题也就越大。在2010年第一季度，尽管观察家期望中国的外贸顺差额有所下降，但中国仍收获了950亿美元的顺差。这笔顺差多来自资本内流，而非来自经常项目的盈余。也就是说，人民币的不可兑换性是中国吸引资金的源泉。
In the longer term, however, we seem to be moving toward a completely scaled-down model of the international system based on nation states and a system of rules that functions merely as a way to prevent interference between them. At best, this is a norm-free order, in which only infringements on sovereignty justify international involvement. At worst, it could be a world defined by anarchy. While Chinese military spending is rising quickly, the Chinese contribution to actual enforcement of the international order is minimal, and it is therefore unlikely to replace the US in enforcing the UN system. Therefore, as Europeans and Americans debate their different values, they would do well to take notice that China is tempted by a normless foreign policy – the 21st century equivalent of what the historian Akira Iriye has termed the “ideal-less” foreign policy of Japan in the 1920s.
而从长期来看，国际体系的规模似乎将趋于缩小，国家间的相互干预将受到一系列规则的限制，各国自行其是的空间会越来越大。这种趋势发展到最后，结果可能是国际规则的消失，即除非一个国家的主权受到了侵犯，否则国际力量将无权对该国进行干预。这还是最乐观的估计。最坏的结果是陷入无政府状态。中国在迅速增加军费开支的同时，对维护国际秩序所做出的贡献却微乎其微。因此，中国不大可能会取代美国在执行联合国任务中的地位。而欧美在为各自的价值观念进行争论的同时，也应当注意，中国倾向于“无规则”的对外政策，这种政策类似于日本在20世纪20年代实行的，被历史学家入江昭称为“缺失完美理想”的外交政策。
For this reason, China is becoming a huge test for EU foreign policy, which has been predicated on the principle of global norms and values. China’s policy choices no longer affect only its neighbourhood but every issue from trade and the global economy to climate change and nuclear proliferation, as well as every region from Africa to the Middle East. EU member states therefore need to take into account China’s impact across a range of policy issues and in relations with other countries and regions. Therefore, instead of thinking of its relationship with China in bilateral terms, Europe thus needs to reframe its policy on China in global terms. In other words, Europe needs a global China policy.
由于欧盟的外交政策建立在全球性的规则和价值观之上，因此，中国对欧盟的外交政策构成了巨大考验。中国选择什么样的政策，将不仅仅影响其邻国，而且会影响包括贸易、全球经济、气候变化和核扩散在内的各项议题，也会影响包括非洲和中东在内的世界各个地区。因此，欧盟成员国需要综合考虑中国对各种政策问题，以及对所有其他国家和地区的影响。在对华关系上，欧盟不应将思维局限于双边模式中，而是要以全球性视角重新制定对华政策。也就是说，欧洲需要制定一个全球性的对华政策。
New opportunities
新的机遇
Given China’s instrumental approach to the international system and its increasing leverage, the challenge is to identify what China needs that it cannot provide on its own. Firstly, despite its instrumental approach to multilateral institutions, China needs the international system itself. International monetary standards, the trading system, security and access to resources are all essential to China’s development. One could also argue that, in the longer term, international agreements to control climate change and preserve water resources will also be important to China. Secondly, China needs tangible assets such as raw materials including oil, technology, access to markets, and security at home and abroad, including security for China’s financial assets. It is particularly vulnerable in Africa, where its assets are growing at a spectacular rate but it has little leverage in terms of hard security. Thirdly, China may have intangible needs such as international recognition. Just as the tributary system was once a key source of the Chinese celestial bureaucracy’s self-esteem, so today’s regime relies to some extent on international recognition as a sign of legitimacy to its own people.
鉴于中国具有接近国际体系的有效途径，及其日益增大的影响力，欧盟面临的挑战是确定中国需要什么自身无法提供的东西。首先，尽管有接近多边机构的有效途径，中国本身仍需要国际体系。国际货币标准、贸易体系、安全保障和资源开发，对中国的发展都至关重要。还可以说，从长远来看，控制气候变化和保护水资源的国际协定对中国也很重要。其次，中国需要包括石油在内的原材料等有形资产、技术、市场准入，以及国内和国外的安全保障，包括中国金融资产的安全保障。尤其是在非常脆弱的非洲，中国的资产在那里以惊人的速度增长，但几乎没有安全可言。第三，中国在无形的事物方面也可能存在需求，比如需要得到国际上的认可。正如朝贡制度曾经是中国天朝自我陶醉的重要来源那样，今天的政权在某种程度上也是依靠国际认可作为统治人民合法性的一个标志。
Europe’s basic problem is that it lacks leverage over China. It is neither part of China’s neighbourhood nor does it have the strategic leverage of the US. Europe does have two specific levers: China wants to be granted market status and it wants the EU to lift its arms embargo. However, Europe should think carefully before making these two concessions, both of which, after all, can be made only once. Moreover, they could have wider [url=]repercussion[/url][ 1] s – for example, lifting the arms embargo without tangible progress on human rights might demonstrate to China and the rest of the world that the EU was willing to compromise on its values for a price or in the face of intransigence. But, in any case, however these two levers are used, they will not be enough on their own. Europe must therefore think about how it can increase its limited leverage over China.
欧盟的根本问题是缺乏对中国的影响力。它既不是中国的邻居，也没有美国的战略优势。欧盟确有两张专属的牌：一是，中国想要获得市场经济地位的承认；另外，中国还希望欧盟解除武器禁运。但是，欧盟在做出这两项让步之前必须深思熟虑，毕竟两张牌都只能够打一次。此外，这两项让步可能产生更广泛的影响。【而且，这两项让步可能更大的后果。】例如，在中国没有明确改进人权状况之下解除武器禁运，可能等于告诉中国和全世界，为了某个代价或是面临对方的强硬姿态时，欧盟愿意妥协自己的价值观。但是，在任何情况下，无论怎么使用这两个杠杆，它们的作用都不够大。因此，欧盟必须考虑如何能增加其对中国有限的影响力。
Although China appears to be more powerful than ever after the global economic crisis, the new situation in which China finds itself does in fact make it vulnerable in several respects. Firstly, there is greater tension between China and the US. China’s blunt response to the Obama administration’s unprecedented offer of strategic co-operation – symbolised by the treatment of President Obama at Copenhagen – makes a G2 duopoly less likely, at least for the time being. This could create an opportunity for greater transatlantic co-operation on policy toward China (although the US could also decide that reaching an understanding with China takes precedence over consultation with its allies). At the moment, the main barrier to this kind of transatlantic co-operation is not the US but Europe’s own inability to act decisively, as ECFR showed in its power audit of EU-US relations.
尽管全球经济危机后，中国似乎比以往任何时候都更强大，但中国所处的新形势中亦有几处暗藏危险的地方。首先，中国和美国的关系更为紧张。奥巴马政府史无前例地邀请中国参加战略合作，但中国毫不客气的回应——具体的例子就是在哥本哈根会议上中国对奥巴马总统的态度——使得两国携手垄断共进不太可能，至少在现阶段是这样。【？：奥巴马政府史无前例地邀请中国参与战略合作，但中国毫不客气的回应使得G2的构想泡汤。其中具体时间即是哥本哈根会议上中国对奥巴马总统的态度。】这为大西洋两岸的众多国家开展更广泛的合作来制定对话政策，创造了一个机会（尽管美国也可能决定与中国达成谅解比跟盟国协商更重要）。目前，跨大西洋合作的主要障碍，不是美国，而是欧洲自身无力采取果断行动，正如欧洲对外关系委员会在《欧美关系实力审核》中显示出来的那样。
Secondly, China’s relationship with its neighbours is also becoming more strained. China increasingly drives the agenda in the region by pressing issues or by letting them persist. Whether with India, Japan or Taiwan, the ball is now in Beijing’s court – a major reversal from the Cold War era when China faced a range of diffcult partners in its own neighbourhood. But this also means that China is coming under increasing pressure to use its new strategic freedom and to start signalling what its long-term options are. Otherwise, it risks creating a new coalition of countries anxious or frustrated by the opacity of Chinese intentions. China’s systematic assertion of its sovereignty and its “core interests” looks very different to its partners now that it has become a rich and far-reaching state than it did when it was weak.
其次，中国与其邻国的关系也变得越发紧张。中国在该地区越来越多地【进一步】推动议事日程，或在一些问题上施压，或是让这些问题持续发酵。无论是与印度、日本还是台湾打交道，主动权现在都是在北京当局这边。这和冷战时期中国面对一堆难以应付的邻国的情况正好相反。但这也意味着，中国运用其新的战略自由以及展示其长期选择所受到的压力会越来越大。此外，不了解中国的意图而感到焦虑和懊恼的那些国家，将可能组建一个新的国家联盟。这是中国面临的一个潜在风险。鉴于跟过去弱势的时候相比，现在的中国已成为一个富有而影响深远的国家。因而中国对其主权和“核心利益”有预谋的声明和主张，在其邻国眼里看来亦有着非常不同的意味。
This situation may create new opportunities for Europe. After the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU is in some ways in a stronger position than it was two years ago. China’s difficulties with the US and with its allies may increase Europe’s own direct leverage with China, which cannot afford conflict on too many fronts. At the same time, the strained relations between the US and China creates opportunities for discreet co-ordination of policy with Washington. Even for the US, the exertion of purely bilateral pressure on China – especially on multiple issues – has become harder. There may also be some scope for greater co-operation with Europe’s allies in Asia – for example, by extending free-trade partnerships and by developing strategic relationships with countries such as India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea.
这种形势可能会为欧洲制造新的机遇【这种形势或许会给欧洲带来新的机遇】。《里斯本条约》得到正式批准以及欧盟对外行动署（EEAS）创建之后，欧盟在某些方面占据了比两年前更有利的地位。中美矛盾，以及中国与其盟友的矛盾，可能会增加欧洲对中国的直接影响力，而且中国也不能承受跟太多国家对抗。与此同时，美国和中国之间的紧张关系，也给欧盟和美国创造了谨慎的政策协调的机会。美国对中国施加纯粹的双边压力——尤其是在多重议题上——已变得更加困难。欧盟与其亚洲盟友之间也可能有更多的合作， 例如延长自由贸易伙伴待遇【扩大自由贸易伙伴关系】；与印度、印度尼西亚、日本和韩国等国家发展战略关系。
The key to a global China policy is therefore to work with other countries to assemble coalitions to increase Europe’s leverage over China. A good illustration of how this might work is recent international co-operation to put pressure on China to disengage from Iran. China’s shift was prompted not so much by anything the US or Europe did but by the actions of other countries, in particular Russia’s change of policy on sanctions and the growing involvement in the negotiations of the Gulf States – especially Saudi Arabia, on which China is already heavily dependent for energy imports and will be to an even greater degree in the future. In other words, Europe’s best chance of getting China to move may often be through others.
因此全球性对华政策的关键在于与其他国家合作，结成同盟以增加欧盟对中国的影响力。一个很好的例证是最近给中国施压，以迫使中国甩掉伊朗的国际合作。中国态度的转变并非由美国或欧洲促成，而是由于其他国家的行动，特别是俄罗斯改变了对于制裁（伊朗）的方针，以及海湾国家越来越多地参与谈判——尤其是跟沙特阿拉伯，中国在能源进口上严重依赖沙特，而且将来的依赖程度只会更大。换言之，欧洲想要促使中国行动，最佳途径往往可能是通过别国。
[ 1]If an action or event has repercussions, it causes unpleasant things to happen some time after the original action or event. |
楼主: rhapsody
狗仔卡
发表于 2010-7-25 13:44
显身卡
楼主
发表于 2010-7-26 21:40
