【外交学者APAC 2020】FLASHPOINT ASIA（亚洲焦点）

連長

Taiwan Strait
原文链接：http://apac2020.the-diplomat.com/flashpoint-asia/taiwan-strait/


Tensions with Beijing have declined dramatically since Ma Ying-jeou took office as Taiwan’s president. That situation is a refreshing contrast to the one that existed under his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian. China and Taiwan have established direct air and sea links, mainland tourists are coming to the island in robust numbers, and a wide range of economic ties are growing at a brisk rate. Political relations have also improved as the two sides have engaged in direct negotiations for the first time in a decade and both Beijing and Taipei have made conciliatory diplomatic gestures.

Yet, it’s important not to overstate the improvement in the security environment.

Most notably, China has continued to increase the number of missiles that it deploys across the strait from Taiwan. Moreover, from China’s perspective, the current thaw became possible only because of the conciliatory posture that Ma and the KMT adopted. If Ma and his party can’t sustain their political dominance, it’s uncertain how long the improvement in cross-straits ties will last.

There are already signs of domestic trouble for the KMT — Ma’s popularity has sagged badly as a result of the severe economic recession and his government’s bungling of the rescue and relief effort following Typhoon Morakot. The December local elections also were a disappointment for the KMT and saw a modest revival, at least, for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party.

Even if the DPP doesn’t regain the presidency in 2012, there’s little reason to be optimistic over a possible peaceful outcome to the Taiwan problem in the long term. Although a majority of Taiwanese did not support the previous DPP administration’s provocative policies toward Beijing, it is equally apparent that there’s little support for reunification with the mainland. Yet reunification remains China’s ultimate goal. That suggests a nasty collision in the future. Taiwan is unlikely ever to agree to reunification, and China is unlikely to indefinitely tolerate an upstart de facto independent island 100 miles off its own shores, especially as China’s economic and military power continues to grow.

Thanks to Ma Ying-jeou, the day of reckoning regarding the status of Taiwan has been postponed. But it hasn’t been eliminated.

台湾海峡两岸关系的缓解与不安 （中文版）
原文链接：点击直达
自马英九就任总统后，台湾与中国之间的紧绷关係缓解许多，与前总统陈水扁执政时期形成强烈对比，中国与台湾目前已开放海空直航，中国观光客亦大批前往台湾，经济往来亦迅速拉近距离；政治互动也因为两岸十年来首次直接会谈而改善，双方均愿意各让一步。

但外界不应依此高估安全局势变化。

例如中国持续增加瞄准台湾的导弹数量，且在中国眼中，两岸关係目前之所以融冰，是因为马英九与国民党政府愿意让步，若现任政府无法持续掌控国内政局，两岸关係回春能维持多久犹为未知数。

然而国民党在台湾内部已出现执政危机，由于经济严重衰退，再加上莫拉克颱风后救灾不力，马英九的民意支持率重挫，国民党在12月刚结束的三合一县市长选举也遭逢挫败，民进党则小幅回升。

纵然民进党于2012年总统大选再度败阵，长期而言，台湾问题也不太可能轻易和平收场，虽然多数台湾民众不支持前任民进党政府挑衅中国政府的政策，但也很少人支持与中国统一，不过中国仍将统一视为最终目标，故未来可能出现严重磨擦，台湾不太可能同意统一，尤其中国经济与军事力不断增长，也不太可能永久容忍领土百英里外，其实有块实质独立的岛屿。

因为马英九的缘故，台湾地位问题摊牌日延后，但问题并未消失。

作者：

Ted Galen Carpenter
头衔：Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies
电邮: tcarpenter@cato.org
简介：卡本特（Ted Galen Carpenter）为卡托研究所国防与外交政策研究副总裁，共执笔八本国际议题着作，包括《America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan》（2006年Palgrave Macmillan出版）
详细介绍：http://www.cato.org/people/ted-galen-carpenter

連長

The Spratly Islands
原文链接：http://apac2020.the-diplomat.com/flashpoint-asia/the-spratly-islands/


Although there hasn’t been a significant clash over the disputed Spratly Islands archipelago since 1988, the area’s strategic and logistical importance, as well as its rich hydrocarbon reserves, suggest it will remain a potential flashpoint over the next decade.

The most important regional trend in the Asia-Pacific is China’s rise as a naval power, a development inextricably linked to Beijing’s formidable economic growth and global ambitions. China has signalled clearly its determination to become the regional hegemon in the South China Sea, and the 2009 military parade in Beijing demonstrated it is speeding up efforts to acquire amphibious vehicles that will enable it to extend its military reach to the disputed islands in the South and East China Seas.

While Beijing has worked formally with ASEAN countries to resolve the dispute and create a ‘code of conduct’ for the sea, it has also consistently acted to assert its authority over the maritime region. Since sovereignty over the archipelago (in its entirety) is claimed not only by China, but by Taiwan and Vietnam (with Malaysia and Brunei also claiming some parts), China’s ambitions and naval build-up worry other regional players.

As a result, the most dangerous scenario in the next decade is one in which the United States and its Asian and Oceania allies feel obliged to prevent China from dominating the strategic sea lane that links the Malaccan Strait to the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. The sea lane is used by more than half of the world’s super tanker traffic, and Japan is particularly dependent upon the Middle Eastern oil which is carried through the area. As a consequence, even if current estimates of the Spratly’s oil reserves (17 to 30 billion tonnes of oil and natural gas) prove to have been exaggerated, the region’s importance in terms of energy security will remain for the foreseeable future. It’s unsurprising, then, that recent US-China security talks have focused on expanding military cooperation in order to mitigate such a danger.

作者：

Federico Bordonaro
国籍:意大利
头衔：Political/Economic Officer at Canadian Embassy
生日: July 1st, 1972 in Rome, Italy
电邮: comments@federicobordonaro.com
简介：Federico Bordonaro is a professor of geopolitics at the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units COESPU in Italy.
详细介绍：http://www.linkedin.com/in/federicobordonaro

連長

North Korea
原文链接：http://apac2020.the-diplomat.com/flashpoint-asia/north-korea-2/


From time to time the question arises of whether North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il is crazy or clever. Regardless, it can be safely said that he’s a survivor. For, contrary to the expectations of many US experts, the DPRK has not collapsed from the willful mismanagement of an increasingly discredited command economy. Even until recently, it has been able to demand and receive subsidies in the form of grain and fuel oil from the United States and South Korea (ROK). However, these payments were made with the expectation that Kim Jong-il’s regime would eventually divest itself of its primitive but functioning nuclear infrastructure through the Six Party talks that involved all of the geo-strategic players of Northeast Asia: China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and the United States.

But this process has now all but broken down, with the regime deciding sometime during the winter of 2008-09 that it could tear up this multi-lateral denuclearization process in favor of an aggressive effort to gain US and regional acquiescence of the DPRK’s status as an enduring nuclear-armed state. Dramatic action occurred during the winter and spring of 2009 that included the partially successful launch of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle and the detonation of a second nuclear device. There was also much speculation that the North Korean regime was in deep crisis due to mounting evidence of Kim Jong-il’s declining health. These events combined were severe enough to prompt the new US administration to make an explicit, extended deterrent pledge to South Korea– any use of nuclear weapons by the DPRK might well result in a US nuclear response.

Throughout this period, Beijing has played an ambiguous role. As the main source of economic assistance and trade, China has considerable leverage over North Korea. But the Chinese leadership also appears uninterested in bringing down a North Korean regime through economic pressure. It rightfully fears that any collapse of North Korea will result in massive refugee flows into northeast China and/or dramatically increases the risks of an outright second Korean War. Further, much of the Chinese leadership appears unwilling to see a united Korea emerge on its geo-strategic doorstep–even if that new Korean regime is willing to radically reduce its military ties with the United States.

In typical North Korean negotiating fashion, this crisis period was followed by a new round of mixed signals suggesting a possible return to the Six Party talks… but only if sufficient political and economic considerations were offered. Not surprisingly, the United States and South Korea have not shown much enthusiasm for agreeing to such a deal again. The US has initiated a new round of bilateral discussions with the DPRK to ‘jump start’ a resumption of the Six Party talks without making any promises of renewed economic assistance. The South Korean government of President Lee Myung Bak has taken a similar ‘hard-line’ approach (unlike those of the two previous South Korean regimes, with their now obviously futile attempt at a ‘Sunshine Policy’ of economic and political appeasement.)

Furthermore, US and ROK national security ties have been reinforced with the US commitment to maintaining a robust military presence in South Korea, even after the latter’s national high command takes over formal command of all US and ROK forces by 2012. This transition reflects the two nations’ confidence in the evolving military balance between North and South Korea–the ‘conventional’ military balance has tilted decisively in favor of the ROK and its US ally. Only the threat of missile delivered weapons of mass destruction, artillery and missile strikes against Seoul or the use of Special Forces remain credible DPRK threats. Furthermore, this process will facilitate the reconfiguration of the US forces into two permanent garrisons south of Seoul.

The North Korean regime continues to blow hot and cold with moments of pledged reason alternating with shrill military threats. At the present time, the most worrisome military flash point appears along the contested sea boundaries that extend from the western coast of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The most recent naval clash between ROK and DPRK naval forces occurred in the autumn of 2009, just when the US administration was taking a number of diplomatic initiatives to resume a negotiating with Pyongyang.

All of these recent events are sure to leave an outside observer with a profound sense of unease. We may at the same time be witnessing the end of the Kim Jong-il regime due to terminal illness, something that could well lead to a succession crisis that could turn bloody and very dangerous. On the other hand, Kim Jong-il may surprise us all by living longer while still attempting to secure US and regional acquiescence of North Korean nuclear armed missile arsenal. In this case, an agreement to dismantle the North Korean nuclear arsenal and infrastructure may be out of reach with or without Kim Jong-il, with the rest of the world left ‘hoping for the best, but preparing for the worst.’

Put simply, the United States and its East Asian allies and diplomatic partners may simply have to wait for the North Korean regime to quietly come to an end without igniting a regional conflict that would be called the second Korean War. Hope and continued enhanced military preparedness may not be a very satisfactory strategy, but it may the best of some very worse alternatives.

作者：
Peter A. Wilson
简介：Peter A. Wilson is a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation. The views expressed in this essay are not those of RAND or its clients.

連長

Kashmir
原文链接：http://apac2020.the-diplomat.com/flashpoint-asia/kashmir/


Kashmir has been a source of strife between India and Pakistan since the two countries came into being in 1947. Major clashes occurred in 1947-48, 1965 and 1999, when Pakistani forces crossed the border, prompting a violent response from India. In the 1971 war, Pakistan lost its eastern wing, but Kashmir was a major conflict zone then also. Both countries, meanwhile, conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and declared themselves to be nuclear states.

Since 2003, a ceasefire has held along the Line of Control that divides the Indian and Pakistani-held parts of Kashmir. But this has not deterred Pakistan from using subversion, militancy and terrorism to pursue an intransigent foreign policy in Kashmir. Cross-border insurgency and terrorism mounted by Pakistan since 1989 has undermined the security situation, although such activity has dropped considerably recently due to Pakistan’s preoccupation with the militancy within its own
borders.

However, the peace process between India and Pakistan, including its emphasis on Kashmir-related issues, has been on hold since the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 were traced back to Pakistan. The eventual revival of the peace process and greater connectivity by enlarging the movement of people and trade across the Line of Control would go a long way toward diminishing the prevailing crisis.

Still, realistically speaking the militancy will not subside until New Delhi comes to some sort of arrangement with the alienated groups in Kashmir. There are no definite signs this will take place, although efforts have been made by New Delhi to stimulate a dialogue with the leaders of such groups. These negotiations have not made much progress since the groups’ demands for independence are wholly unacceptable to India. Moreover, prominent negotiators have often been killed by extremists, further dampening any initiatives. It seems for the time being that Pakistan will always find fertile ground in Kashmir to mount subterranean cross-border operations.

Looking further ahead, a new security threat focusing on Kashmir is forming, tied to the retreat of the Himalayan glaciers. These glaciers are the source for the snow-fed rivers of the Indus basin and their flow through Kashmir into Pakistan are a lifeline. But the volume of water provided by the Indus rivers seems to be falling — steadily but inexorably — meaning any failure to find a way of cooperating on the issue could worsen Indo-Pakistan relations. This dispute may even reach crisis proportions by 2020.

作者：

P·R·Chari
头衔:Special Invitee
电邮 : prchari@vsnl.net
研究方向：Indian defence and security issues
简介：P.R.Chari is a research professor at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi.
详细介绍：http://www.ipcs.org/staff-profile/p-r-chari-81.html

連長

China-India-Burma
原文链接：http://apac2020.the-diplomat.com/flashpoint-asia/china-india-burma/


The prospect of geo-strategic rivalry between India and China appears to be on an upward trajectory despite their increasing trade ties, with several sources of short and longer term tension evident.

First, there’s China’s expanding military and economic alliance with Pakistan. Second, is the Chinese claim that the Arunachal Pradesh region of northeast India is Southern Tibet. Third, there’s the emergence of the so-called ‘string of pearls’ strategy, with China developing closer military and economic ties with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Burma. And finally, there’s China’s rising dependence on Middle Eastern oil and gas that has prompted an ever larger Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. And much of this Chinese expansion is prompted by powerful international and domestic economic imperatives.

China has embarked upon massive investment in various transportation projects including the construction of modern roads, rail and pipelines for both gas and petroleum as part of its ‘Go West’ strategy. This is a conscious effort to radically upgrade the transportation infrastructure in western China to further enhance regional economies and to further encourage the movement of Han peoples, even at the expense of the local populations, including specifically the Tibetans and Uyghurs. A noteworthy part of this investment strategy is the building of energy and transportation links with the major energy producers in Central Asia, specifically Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Although not directly related to Sino-India relations, this major geo-strategic and geo-economic move will likely aggravate tensions over time with the Russian Federation, a close military-technological ally of India.

All of this investment activity can be explained as merely China’s quest for western economic development and national energy supply diversification. However, unfortunately for India, this investment will transform the geo-military environment of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. With better roads and rail systems, China will have a dramatically enhanced capacity to project military power into the region. In fact, one might say that the product of civil engineering may be as significant as the information revolution in changing the geo-economic and geo-strategic features of the globe.

Recently, much of the public commentary surrounding China’s expansion efforts has focused on China’s increased economic and military investment in Pakistan. Noteworthy projects include the construction of a modern port at Gwadar along Pakistan’s southwest coast. The port is to be connected to a modernized road and rail net through Pakistan on to a modernized Karakoram Highway leading to western China. Military-to-military ties with Pakistan have also expanded, such as with the start of a co-production of modern fighter aircraft such as the JH-17 and contemporary main battle tanks. China’s reach and influence into Pakistan, especially through its military, may radically expand if only as a strategically defensive response to ensure that Pakistan does not degenerate into a nuclear-armed radical Islamic ‘crazy state.’

And still, over to the east, India’s attention is now turning to China’s major and sustained military and economic investment in Burma.

中国、印度、缅甸 （中文版）
原文链接：点击直达
种种长短期迹象均显示，中国与印度虽然贸易量日增，两国地缘战略对立关係也不断提高。
第一，中国与巴基斯坦持续加强军事与经济联盟，第二，中国宣称印度东北部的阿鲁纳恰尔邦（Arunachal Pradesh）其实是西藏南部领土，第三，中国採取所谓的「珍珠鍊」战略，提高与孟加拉、斯里兰卡及缅甸的军事和经济联繫，第四，由于中国日益仰赖中东地区石油及天然气，使中国也增加佈署在印度洋上的军力。这些扩张行为都建基于强大的国内外经济动力之上。
在「西进政策」之下，中国大举投资兴建各种运输交通工程，包括现代化道路、铁路及油气管线等，积极希望大幅提升中国北部的运输基础建设品质，不仅强化区域经济，也鼓励汉人移居，甚至不惜牺牲当地藏人和维吾尔人的利益。这项投资策略特别之处在于兴建能源与运输管道，串连哈萨克及土库曼等中亚重要能源生产国，儘管此事与中印互动并无直接关係，这项行为具有重要地缘战略与地缘经济意义，长期而言可能与俄罗斯造成关係紧绷，而俄国向来在军事和科技上与印度合作密切。
对中国而言，这些投资活动或许只是西部经济发展策略，或是国家能源供应多元化策略，但对印度而言，这将扭转南亚与印度洋的地缘军事局势，中国改善铁公路系统后，将大幅增进施展军力的机会，在全球地缘经济与地缘战略方面，土木工程可能与资讯革命具有同样的改变力量。
近期多数人评论中国扩张行动时，都聚焦于中国增加在巴基斯坦的经济及军事投资，例如在巴国西南岸瓜达尔（Gwadar）地区兴建现代化港口，连结至贯穿巴国的铁公路网，再接上中国西部的「中巴友谊公路」（Karakoram Highway）。中巴两国的军事合作亦日益密切，例如共同生产JH-17等现代战斗机及现代军用坦克等，中国不断扩大在巴国的军事及各种影响力，也具有战略国防考量，并避免巴国衰退为握有核武的伊斯兰极端「疯狂国家」。
再向东看，印度也很关心中国在缅甸的军事及经济投资。
中国希望以缅甸做为前往印度洋的门户，并彷照巴基斯坦模式，在缅甸投资兴建运输网连结至中国南部，北京政府已于昆明至中缅边界建造多线道公路，也计画将道路延伸至瓦城（Mandalay）及缅甸其他交通要地；纵贯南北的伊洛瓦底江亦经过疏浚及改善工程，以开发大规模船运量；缅甸军政府向来偏执又充满民族主义，经过长期谈判后，中国终于说服军政府，从缅甸西南岸Switte天然气矿场建立油气管线，一路通往昆明。这些投资是为发展中国东南部经济，并开发另一条运输路线，绕过局势不稳定的麻六甲海峡，印度政府及军方自然意识到这项地缘经济趋势，如上所述，地缘经济变化可能牵动大幅地缘战略或地缘军事改变，中国人民解放军近期便举行大规模军事演习，以展示军方能如何利用全国各地的铁公路网络。
印度因应策略则是与缅甸军政府拓展关係，包括提供军事援助等，并积极推动印度东北部交通建设现代化，如此看来，中国宣称阿鲁纳恰尔邦为国土，亦是为制衡印度加强与缅甸往来，毕竟在地缘政治领域，「偏执总会带来敌人」，这并非意指大规模军事冲突势必发生，但局势在缅甸确实朝此一方向发展。在未来五至十年内，中印两国将各自增强在亚洲发挥军力的机会，只要稍具想像力，便可预见在不久的将来，双方可能爆发严重政治军事危机，例如由于印度或美国直接或间接干预，致使缅甸军政府出现剧变，但问题是，缅甸的地缘战略与地缘经济意义极高，中国会坐视这种不利自身的局面发生吗？

作者：
Peter A. Wilson
头衔：兰德公司资深国防研究分析师

連長

Arunachal Pradesh
原文链接:http://apac2020.the-diplomat.com/flashpoint-asia/arunachal-pradesh/


Arunachal Pradesh (which means ‘land of dawn-lit mountains’) is a scenic region located in the north-eastern corner of India. But with a border with Tibet in the north and Burma in the east, it has in recent months become a growing source of tension between the region’s two rising powers.

The dispute between India and China over the state’s legal status goes back to the creation of the so-called McMahon Line, which was drawn up as a border between the two countries by the British Administrator, Sir Henry McMahon, around 1913-1914, during the Simla Conference.

The Chinese government rejected the legitimacy of the McMahon Line in 1947 and, in August 1959, Chinese troops crossed the McMahon Line into Arunachal Pradesh. They withdrew from the state in 1961. But in 1962, China opened military fronts in Ladakh, while its troops also crossed over the McMahon Line, resulting in the Sino-Indian war.

China’s historical explanation for its border disputes with neighbours has generally been based on its claim that its territories were taken away by stronger neighbouring governments or imperialist occupiers at a time when its own government was either extremely weak or too subservient to dissent.

But it’s ironic that China’s dispute came in this case with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru–a good friend of China who championed resolving all disputes through peaceful means. China’s military takeover of Tibet in 1950 and India’s decision to grant asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959, meanwhile, further complicated the situation.

After the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the border dispute between the two could not be resolved because China wanted either acceptance of the status quo (i.e. acceptance of the current control of territories by both sides as official borders), or a swap of territories. However, having been defeated by China in the 1962 war, and with no inclination to swap disputed territories with its neighbours, India would not agree to either proposal–giving up parts of its claimed territory would have caused considerable internal acrimony and unrest and been met with charges of appeasement.

The Dalai Lama’s continued asylum in India has also remained a sore point between the two countries, especially since he came to global prominence after winning the Nobel Peace prize in 1989.

Rightly or wrongly, the Chinese perspective has been that India and Western nations were using the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan issue to put pressure on Beijing. Needless to say, given that country’s bitter memories of humiliation at the hands of foreigners, national sovereignty remains an issue on which China’s rulers have demonstrated no interest in negotiating. India has said that granting the Dalai Lama asylum was a humanitarian gesture rather than an attempt to humiliate China, an explanation China has never really accepted.

As a consequence, the chances of resolving the legal status of Arunachal Pradesh are slim-to-none. As recently as October 2009, the war of words between the two countries escalated, with China unsuccessfully attempting to block a $2.9 billion developmental loan by the Asian Development Bank to Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that it’s an internationally disputed territory. In retaliation, India objected to China’s developmental loans to the Pakistan-administered Kashmir on similar grounds.

Considering the enormous stakes the two share over cooperation in a variety of fields such as energy, software development and various consumer-related projects, the two would be well advised to set aside the border dispute and focus on fields where they see eye-to-eye.

作者：

Ehsan Ahrari
简介：Ehsan Ahrari is Professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). The views expressed are his own.
详细介绍http://www.apcss.org/core/BIOS/AHRARI/ahrari.htm

連長

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