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转自网贴翻译论坛
原文连接：http://www.thehistoryforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=71&t=29668
China had historically been a place of great scientific advancement and is well known for having beaten Europe to a great many innovations and discoveries. However, by at least the sixteenth century China's scientific and technological advancement had entered a period of prolonged stagnation, one which allowed Europe to overtake China in the sciences.
历史上，中国的科技水平曾一度走在世界前列，并被公认为在创新与发明方面遥遥领先于欧洲。然而至少自十六世纪起，中国的科技水平陷入了长时间的停滞。而正是这段停滞，给了欧洲在科技领域反超中国的机会。
The Needham question asks why China suddenly fell behind Europe in the sciences. Joseph Needham himself argued that it was the rising negative political and cultural impact of Confucianism and Taoism which stifled advancement, perhaps similar to the European Dark Ages. While perhaps partially accurate, this argument seems insufficient on its own to fully explain the phenomenon.
李约瑟难题正是在在探讨这样一个问题：为什么近代中国在科技领域会突然落后于西方呢？李约瑟本人认为，正是道家学说和儒家思想在文化和政治上不断上涨的消极影响，遏制了科技进步，这种情况或许类似于欧洲中世纪的情形。这种观点虽然在某些方面是准确的，但还是不足以完完全全地解释这种现象。
“李约瑟难题”：“如果我的中国朋友们在智力上和我完全一样，那为什么像伽利略、托里拆利、斯蒂文、牛顿这样的伟大人物都是欧洲人，而不是中国人或印度人呢？为什么近代科学和科学革命只产生在欧洲呢？……为什么直到中世纪中国还比欧洲先进，后来却会让欧洲人着了先鞭呢？怎么会产生这样的转变呢？”
One interesting case I've heard put forward is that the Chinese language itself played a prohibitive role in terms of scientific advancement beyond a certain point. While the Chinese were advanced enough to invent the printing press many years ahead of Europe, the Chinese language lacked an alphabet or system of writing which could be easily codified into a mass-producible typeset. As a result, printing remained an exclusive and expensive practice in China.
我听说过一个有趣的观点：是中国的语言本身扮演了阻止科技的进步的角色，并使后者在达到了一个瓶颈后就止步不前。虽然中国先进到足以发明印刷术，并能多年领先于欧洲,汉语仍然不是字母文字,也不是可以应用于大批量排版的书写系统。其结果是，在中国，印刷仍然是一种高级和昂贵的实践。
This contrasts dramatically with the European case, where the easy availability of printing for the emerging educated middle classes after the renaissance period allowed for the rapid spread of ideas and knowledge, and was essential for the move towards a modern scientific community and the widening of education programmes.
这与欧洲的情形截然相反。文艺复兴时期后，印刷的简便易行使各种知识能够在受教育的新兴中产阶级中快速传播,而这正是进入现代科学社会、扩大教育项目所必须的条件。
This idea reminded me of a similar but seemingly unrelated problem encountered by the Chinese relating to their written language: the difficulty of learning to read and write it with any fluency. The problem was seen as so severe that in efforts to boost literacy the young People's Republic took the drastic step of changing their written character system to the Simplified Chinese we students of the language are thankful for today.
这个想法使我想起一个与这个问题类似，不过看上去毫不相关的由中国人提出的关于他们书写系统的问题:学习中文的书写和阅读十分艰难，且难以流利。这个问题被看得很严重,以至于中华人民共和国出于降低文盲率的考虑，大刀阔斧地将他们的书面文字体系改为简体中文。这一点让今天我们这帮外语学生非常感激。
Do people think that the added difficulties in learning to read and write (which probably restricted literacy on class lines more dramatically than in Europe post-Reformation) is a potential significant contributing factor to the Chinese scientific and technological stagnation of the last few centuries?
人们是否认为中文的读写困难（这可能远比欧洲的古语在传播文化方面更受限制），是一种潜在的、有可能导致过去几个世纪的科技停滞再次上演的重要因素？
Which explanations of the Needham paradox do posters favour? Do you feel there are other significant contributing factors which are routinely ignored?
大家觉得哪一种对李约瑟悖论的解释比较好？或者说，还有其它的重要的促成因素常常被人们所忽视掉？
评论翻译
Smilin' dave
Couldn't it be argued that the diversity of languages in Europe would act as an equally significant barrier to the spread of ideas?
这样说的话，那么欧洲语言的多样化不也是非常不利于思想的传播吗？
In support of a cultural explanation:
- There was no development of a simplified mass language because there was no 'need'. The more complicated language probably served the elites well enough, and the peasantry would have gotten no value from it. There really wasn't much of a middle class right up until the collapse of imperial China.
在文化层面上解释，就是——中国没有发展出一种简化了的群众语言，其原因是根本没这种“需要”。较为复杂的语言对精英阶层来说是很不错的，不过农民们则难以领会其中的奥义。而直到中华帝国的崩溃，中国都没有形成庞大的中产阶级。
- While a number of ideas/concepts occurred in China first, it was often only in Europe that these things reached full potential. Gunpowder in the classic example.
如果一个想法或是概念在中国被首先提出，它常常是到了欧洲才能被发挥出全部的潜能。火药就是个典型的例子。
Yu-Hsing Chen（回ls）
What is the definition of middle class here?
There is also a misconception of using the late 19th century Qing as a biometer for the entire Ming / Qing era. ignoring the obvious problems that was plauging it at the time (like how it's entire fertile and cultured region in the south was completely overran by the Taiping rebellion)
中产阶级的定义是什么？
有一种误区是，人们常用19世纪晚期的清朝来代表整个明清时期，却忽视了一个明显的问题：当时的清朝正处在国力衰弱，疲敝动乱的情况下（中国的整个南方地区土地肥沃，文化发达，但在当时却陷入了太平天国起义的动乱当中）
As far as I can see, based on the fact that most sources points to the better days of Ming / Qing era typically having several MILLION people at most given time who's passed the lowest level of the imperial exam (call the children's exam) . this exclude kids who are still learning, and women who aren't allow to take the test. and the guys who since quit their studies or aren't actually learned enough (since the exam is not just about literacy, it is testing on Confucian text) . (We are abosalutely sure of figures of guys passing the next level, the county test, typically hovering in the 500-600K range nation wide.)
在我看来，原因是这样的：大部分资料都显示出，在明朝和清朝的典型治世中，国家拥有上百万在特定时间通过了最低水平科举考试（也叫孩子们的考试）（童生？）的人才。这批人中不包括还在上学的学生和女人，也不包括已经肄业和没有学到家的男人（因为考试不仅仅是考验识字水平，还考儒家经典）。（我们明确的地知道在全国范围内,更高一级考试——乡试的通过人数在500-600K的范围内浮动）
Many scholar now believe that at it's height in the Song dynasty, the actual literacy rate in the Song was somewhere close to 25-30%, while even in the Ming/Qing it was probably 15-20% or so (this is based on it's better days, and not when everything is going to hell for them), from everything I hear of Europe at the time, I have doubts that there is really much separation if not being the other way around.
许多学者认为，科举制在宋代达到了顶点，当时实际的识字率大约是25-30%，而在明清时期也不过是15%-20%左右（这还是在明清的盛世时期的数据，而不是国家衰败的时期）；反观同时期的欧洲，我怀疑如果没有其他的什么事情发生，欧洲应该还没有统一。
Yu-Hsing Chen
As for the Needhamquestion, there are a couple of aspects IMHO.
A. the need:
After the collapse of the western Roman empire, Europe was never united again, thus there was a constant pressure on almost all states of potential war, yet such was not the case in China, where each major dynasty typically sees at least a hundred year of near total peace.
对于Needham的问题，我个人有一点拙见，以下是我的两点意见：
一、出于需要
西罗马帝国解体后，欧洲就再没统一过，因而对每个国家来说都有潜在的战争威胁。而在中国就不是这样，中国的各大王朝至少都维持了百年的整体和平。
Military technology develope due to military need, that much is a no-brainer, yet for example, in the reign of Wanli emperor in late 16th century China, typically seen as one of the more troubled times of the Ming, the Ming dynasty fought a total of 6 notable wars in his 50ish year rule. and of these only 3 were really serious (the Imjin war against the Japanese, the war to finally subdue the Mongols in his early reign, and the war against the rising Manchus that would end up replacing the Ming in his late years) while 3 were meh (a major military garrison rebellion , one of the 9 garrison in the north rebelled, a local chieften in the South took over a portion of modern day Sichuan in the 1590s, and a border war against the Burmese that was kinda a joke given the huge disaparity in military competence of the two side at the time)
军事技术的发展取决于军事需要，这是个很简单的道理。以万历年间的中国为例，16世纪后期的中国通常被认为处在明朝的困难时期。而在万历皇帝50年的在位时期内，中国共打了6场著名的战争，其中只有3场是至关重要的（对日Imjin战争、早年征服蒙古的战争、以及在其晚年对抗新兴的满族的战争——后者最终取代明朝统治了中国），另外3场规模较小（一场是对付军事要塞的叛乱——明朝北部9大军事要塞之一发生了叛乱事件；一场是在对付南部的一位当地首领，这位首领在16世纪90年代曾掌控过四川的部分地区；还有一场是对缅甸的边境战争，由于两方的军事实力差距太大，这场战争几乎是用来搞笑的）
We're talking about a Dynasty who's realm is roughly the size of Western Europe, yet in a 50 year span that's considered rough, they had 3 sort of major war and 3 smaller war.
我们所谈论的是一个版图和整个欧洲差不多大小的帝国，而在大概50年间，他们打了三场类型的大规模战争和3个规模较小的战争。
Military technology often push the bonderies of human technology, and in China the need simply wasn't consistently there. you might say they did TOO good of a job in bashing in the head of all their competitor . by the Qing era there was even a backward trend as the Qing was keen on keeping their nomadic core at the heart of their military. so it is quite arguable that by the Opium war in 1839, the Qing army was infact significantly technologically inferior to the Ming army of 1639.
军事技术往往推动着人类科技的发展，只不过在中国，这种对军事技术的需求并没有一以贯之的保持下来。你或许会认为他们在迎头痛击敌人这种事儿上做得有点太好了 ——几乎好过头了。接替明朝的清朝热衷于保持自己的游牧民族特色，并且一直让八旗军担任军事力量的核心，而这种做法无疑是一种倒退和退步。因此在1839年鸦片战争开战之前，清朝军队在技术上很可能连1639年的明朝军队都远远不如。
B. the key break through: the series of events that lead to the west discovering the Americas and new trade rout was one of the key reason that it surged forward . one could say that China reached a pinnical of the old world's restriction and stayed there. but when Europe discovered a new world they moved ahead into a new set of rules. something China was simply completely left out of.
二、关键的突破：西方人通过一连串的事件发现了美洲并并开辟了贸易的新航路，这正是西方迅猛发展的一个关键原因。人们或许会说中国曾在旧世界建立了一套准则和规范，并在自己的势力范围内坚持这套规则。但是当欧洲发现了新世界，并且建立起了新的游戏规则时，中国的那一套就被抛到一边了。
The need to look for a new trade rout had much to do with the closing of the old, which had much to do with the Mongol invasion and the subsequent rise of the Ottoman empire. the closing of the old trade rout killed the old traditional commerical power like the Italian states (and more over, the middle east. hence the decline of the middle east is also explained) and in the desperation to find a new rout the European forced the limits of the knowledge and technology, and was rewarded greatly.
由于蒙古的入侵和奥斯曼帝国的崛起阻碍了旧路线的贸易流通，欧洲人亟需开辟一条新的航路。由于旧路线的废弃，一些曾经的商业中心也随之衰落——比如说意大利（还有中东的许多地方，日后中东的衰落也证实了这一点）。在仅拥有有限的知识和技术的前提下，欧洲人最终在绝境中发现了一条新贸易路线，并获得了巨大的成功。
Smilin' dave
（回复“中产阶级是什么？”）
Generally speaking its an economic/societal thing. I would suggest a metric of a class that has not insignificant property holdings (be that land, a business concern or whatever). In modern terms this might be a little vague. However distinction is even more pronounced in a relatively feudal system as existed in China, where the upper class and it's chosen servants (which is essentially what the scholars were for) are defined in large part by title.
一般来说是一个经济或社会上的概念。我认为这是一个阶级，这个阶级并不占有无关紧要的财产（比如土地，商业关系或是其他什么的）。如果用现代术语来解释的话可能有点含糊。不过在中国的封建体制中在这种系统中，由于他们所拥有的权力，上层阶级和他们所选的仆人（后者一般都是学者）与他人的差别要显著得多。
The peasant on the other hand had no property of value (if they held land, it was too small to be effective) and certainly no official title. So China's middle class seems to have consisted of landlords, and later on a thin layer of urban professionals.
另一方面，农民没有真正值钱的个人财产（即使他们有自己的耕地，土地的面积也太小，起不了多大用），也没有官方的正式权力。因此中国的中产阶级似乎是由一群地主所组成，而后来可能还有居住在城市中的专业人员。
Yu-Hsing Chen
(回ls)
Except that you miss the point of relative social mobility here. the scholars' title is not a father to son thing, but one that is based on the imperial exam.
There is a mountain of evidence that the vast majority of scholars who pass the exams came from families of only relatively notable wealth (aka, small land owners) , or at least weren't direct decendents of other officals . (there is a small degree of title inheritency, but it is without a doubt that the majority of influential officials did not rise through this route)
除此之外，你遗漏了一点：中国的社会阶级是有流动性的。学者们的权力不是世袭的，而是来自科举考试。
大量的证据表明，绝大多数通过考试的学者只不过来自稍微优裕一点的家庭(又叫做小地主)，或者至少不是其他大官的直系后裔（确实有一些权位是世袭的，但毋庸置疑的是，大多数官员走的都不是这条道儿）。
The term "peasants" gets thrown around so much that many draw the same conclusion that Chinese peasants = European medieva l peasants, aka serfs who have almost no legal rights, no true property, and almost no chance of changing their social status . which is the complete opposite of what the majority of Chinese farmers were actually like. (for example, the single biggest order of busniess for local officals of the time is to settle local legal disputes, usually between different farmers. this includes everything from marriage to property to all sorts of random stuff.)
“农民”（peasant）这个术语被到处滥用，以至于很多人得出了这样的结论：中国农民=欧洲中世纪农民，就如同那些毫无法律权利的农奴，没有个人财产，也几乎没有改变其社会地位的机会。这和中国大多数农民的情况完全相反。（比如，地方官员在经济问题上下达的最高命令常常是为了解决当地农民之间的法律纠纷，这些纠纷从婚姻问题到财产归属应有尽有）
I can easily throw you just about every notable offical from the Song to Qing, which is consisted almost entirely of such examples (barring some Qing dynasty cases where they were Manchurian noblemans)
But let's just start with one very easy one, the Song era offical Oyang Xiu, who became a fairly influential offical in his own right (he was the governor of the capital city), but was probably more remembered for his cultural importance. he is widly famous for being recorded that he was raised by a single mother, and that he actually learned to write on sand, as the single mother couldn't afford any pens and paper when he was a child
我可以很容易地把从宋朝到清朝的著名官员拿出来作为反驳你的例子，他们都符合我上述所说的情况（不过清朝有一些例外，它的一些官员是满族贵族）
让我先举个容易点的例子吧。宋朝的官员Oyang Xiu（猜猜他是谁？）是一位非常有影响力的大官（他曾是宋朝首都的地方长官），不过其在文化上的贡献更为人所津津乐道。他由单身母亲独自带大的故事广为人知，在他小时候，由于他的母亲付不起纸笔的钱，他靠在沙子上划拉汉字学会了书写。
While he is obviously on the rather extreme side of a poor guy making it. it's quite common for guys with little to no background becomming officals in China, something that can change the fortune of his entire clan for the next couple of generation usually. which is also why most villages hoard together resources to hire teacher to teach their brighter kids how to read and write with the hope of them earning fame and fortune through this system.
显然，他是当时社会中极度贫困的那类人之一。这类人通常在自己的仕途上并没有什么背景可以依靠。而在中国，这种东西有可能大大影响一个家族的年轻一代，甚至改变整个家族的命运。这也就是为什么很多村庄会筹集财物，以聘请教书先生教他们比较聪明的孩子们读书识字，并期盼他们能够利用这个体制赚取钱财和声名的原因。
The social mobility is a very key reason on the stability of the later Chinese dynasties, because almost anyone can potentially become high ranking officals. the officals most likely come from common backgrounds, and will go back to common backgrounds when he retires, thus the entire society ties together tightly and the class distinction and struggle become much less noticable.
社会阶层的流动性是后来中国王朝维护其社会稳定的关键因素，因为几乎每个人都有可能成为位高权重的大官。这些官员很有可能来自同样的背景，而在他退休的时候也很有可能回到同样的背景中去，因此整个社会的联系十分紧密，而阶级差别和阶级斗争也被大大地减弱了。
If you even pass the basic county level exam, your considered a Xiu Tsai, aka into the "scholar" level. which give you the right to speak to all but the highest level officals on even grounds (aka, you don't need to bow to him, he can't arrest you without extremely strong evidence. ) and there were tons of Xiu Tsai running around China during the era, at the least 1 out of 100 man was a certified Xiu Tsai (or more) and those prospecting to join that class is several times that.
如果你通过了基本的县一级考试，你就会被称为“秀才”，可以说已经达到了“学者”的标准。这时你有权与最高等级的官员在同等的地位上说话（也就是说，你不需要向他鞠躬，而他没有确凿的证据也不能逮捕你）。每100人中至少有1个人拥有“秀才”资格，而想要加入这一阶层的人比这还要多上好几倍。
Many of those Xiu Tsai would never rise to higher levels, and they worked in things like scribes or tutors or story tellers, hardly a "elite" class by any standard. stories of old Xiu Tsais who couldn't go up to the next level needing to borrow rice and money from their much less learned neighbor (and thus often earning their scorns ) are one of the most common themes to late Ming to Qing dynasty era novels.
很多秀才一直没有晋升，他们后来成为了教师，说书人，而且不论从哪种程度上说，能进入“精英”阶层的都是凤毛麟角。在明末清初的小说中，年迈的穷秀才向没什么文化的邻居借米和钱财是个屡见不鲜的题材。
Smilin' dave
Social mobility doesn't necessarily undermine class distinctions if the movement between 'layers' results in someone changing their social background. After all the US has an upper class and basically no system of title (none if you consider elected office as a different category). As I understand it the poorest could only afford the education to pass the exams by seeking sponsorship from a wealthy family for example, which ties our 'peasant' to an upper class group from day one.
如果社会“阶层”可以相互转化，并能够改变一个人的社会背景，那么“社会流动性”并不需要消除阶级差异。毕竟美国也是有上层阶级的，并且基本上没有权力系统（如果你把选举政府官员排除在外的话，那么确实没有）。我认为，最穷的人必须要向富裕的家庭寻求资助，以完成学业并通过考试，而从接受帮助的哪一天起，这些“农民”就已经与上层阶级联系起来了。
Is it also no correct that those who passed the exams didn't always find employment within the system? While they would experience some social boost from their status, such persons would enjoy no economic advantage, which brings us back to the need for significant property to be considered middle class.
那些通过了考试的人并不在体系内找工作——这种说法是不是也有点问题？他们的身份或许能带给他们一些帮助，但是他们没有经济特权。他们会想要大量
The same example could be applied to Russian peasants, both pre and post serfdom. Even a serf might have some notional 'property', but they probably didn't completely own it.
同样的例子也可以应用到俄罗斯农民身上，无论是改革前的农奴还是改革后的。即使农奴也有一些概念上的“财产”，不过他们或许不能完全拥有它。
Again, nepotism or patronage doesn't undermine class definitions.
So to re-emphasise my points
- None of this proves that there was an apparent need for a commonly used language. Indeed the scholars were in part being tested for their ability to use the language of the elite.
- None of this proves the existence of a significant middle class as emerged in Europe.
All of what you are saying is quite interesting, and probably true. However, it doesn't undermine my position in this discussion.
我再说一遍，裙带关系和赞助不会破坏阶级差异。
因此重申一遍我的观点“
1．没有证据证明当时的人们确实需要一种各阶层通用的语言。甚至科举考试所检测的也是学者们对精英语言的应用能力
2．没有证据证明当时的中国像欧洲一样存在着明显的中产阶级。
你所说的都很有意思，而且很可能是正确的。但是，这不会动摇我的观点。
Yu-Hsing Chen
（回复ls关于秀才找工作的部分）
There are some exception to the rule where some guys just somehow managed to learn through extraoridnary means, (such as Oyang Xiu's example there) for the most part though, the actual cost of learning was not actually that far beyond the reach of the average Chinese families, which is the key issue here. as the books were in common supply (which goes back to the printing part, as books were widely avalible and all but the most remote village most likely could pool together resource to buy some, and it was hardly just some sort of exquist collection reserved for the rich )
也有一些学子通过其他手段完成学业的例子（比如说Oyang Xiu）。大多数时候，完成学业实际所需的费用并没高到中国一般家庭绝对无法支付的地步，而这才是问题的关键。书籍可以被广泛供应（这要归功于印刷术，它使书籍成为了唾手可得的东西。一些偏远乡村或许会因为贫穷而集资购买书籍。书籍绝不仅仅是一种提供给富人的高档藏品）.
The most common method is that the individual communities would try to put together a private school where they will let those deem on the relatively bright side learn. As already noted, there was really no shortage of teachers. (if not an over supply, which meant the cost of hiring teacher was actually very low ) . truly wealthy families (bigger landlords. merchant familes) often just hire their own tutors. these private schools were called ShiXu (私塾) and were still pretty common even up to around the 1930s.
最普遍的方法是：某个社区试着建立一座学校，并且让那些较聪颖的孩子进去读书。就像我上面已经指出的，所谓的师资力量短缺事实上是不存在的（如果一直聘请老师的话。而这也说明聘用教书先生的费用其实很低）。实际上，真正的豪族（大地主、富商）都有他们自己的专属教师。这些私人学校被称为“私塾”，并且知道20世纪30年代左右，这种传统还依旧盛行。
The final incarnation of the imperial exam essentially had 4 level (the details are obviously more complicated but for simplicity sake here..) the Childrens' exam, the County level exam (after this your considered a scholar), the provincial exam (after this your considered an official), and the Capital exam.
发展到后期，科举考试分为4级（细说的话太繁杂了，所以我简单讲讲。。。）：县试（the Childrens' exam），乡试（the County level exam）（通过即为学者），会试(the provincial exam)（通过则为官员）,还有最后的殿试。
The patronage aspect I have referred to usually isn't the learning part, it's the cost of travel, many of those Chinese provinces were bigger than a large European states. simply travelling to the provincial capital (not to meantion you need to stay there for awhile, both for the test and waiting the results) is actually a significantly heavier burden than learning itself. hence why you see why some popular late Ming/Qing stories usually revolving around the poor Xiu Tsais passing out on the street due to hunger (as his funds ran out), only to be saved by a beautiful young lady who generously helped him, unaware of his status. only for the Xiu Tsai to come back awhile later announcing that he's now a future official and would like to marry the girl etc, it's the Chinese version of the frog prince really.
我所指的赞助一般都不包括学费，它指的是旅费，中国的许多省比欧洲的一个国都大。仅仅去省会参加考试（你需要花上一段时间，不仅要在那儿考试，还要等待发榜）对于学子所在的家庭来说就是一笔沉重的负担，远大于学习本身。因此你就会明白为嘛在明朝末年/清朝末年的流行小说中，主角常常是个因饥饿倒在路边的秀才（之所以饿倒是因为他的钱花光了），然后必然会有个美艳的年轻小姐慷慨解囊，并且让他意识到了自己的身份。最后男主角归来时必然会宣布他已得到了官职即将走马上任，同时向当时那位小姐求婚，等等等等。这真是中国版的青蛙王子啊。
Once your past the provincial level of test, your almost surely guarnteed a government position of some sort (and if you didn't that's usually when dynasties were ready to go to hell), the final level of exam, taken in the capital itself, is more or less only relavant to your later developments. aka guys who pass the final level (the final level's passing rate is actually pretty high.) are more likely to end up being promoted faster than those who did not.
一旦你通过会试，你基本上一定会拿到一个政府职位（如果你没有拿到，那通常只能是在王朝衰微的时候）。最后的一场考试在首都举办，它多多少少都会和你以后的命运挂钩。换句话说，通过最后一场考试的人（最后一场考试的通过率实际上相当的高），其晋升速度可能远远高于那些没有通过的人。
However, the most difficult part is indeed passing the provincial level part. and those that are stuck inbetween that are what your referring to, those we have the title of a scholar but very little actual economic benifits (the states do sponsor some of them with a scholarship of sort, but the majority don't get that). But they're also just potentially one stroke of the pen away from being an offical.
然而，最困难的部分其实是会试。你所指的的那些人其实是被卡在这一阶考试的人，他们空有学者的头衔，却没有多少经济上的利益（美国用奖学金之类的东西赞助学者，不过也只有很少的人能够得到它）。因此他们也有可能放弃仕途，转而谋求其他职业。
I am more specifically trying to compare the later dynasties of China (10th century onward) to the pre - industrial Europe. the key thing remains that China was stuck in that era . while Europe moved foward. but if we compare that era to most of the comparable European eras, there is signifcant evidence that points to the Chinese system being better for the common people, relative wealth is obviously a subject of debate. but potential social movement is almost certainly higher. and due to the system that allows that, literacy rate was most likely wider spread (which goes back to the original topic, Chinese literacy rate in the the later 19th century to mid 20th century was terrible compare to industrialized Europe, but what evidence is there that this was the case before that? everything I have read suggest that in most pre industrial European area literacy rate was far south of the 20-30% that later Chinese dynasties usually can sustain.), and class distinction and struggle were significantly less.
我试图更具体地将后期的中国王朝（约10世纪）和工业革命前的欧洲进行比较。我发现，关键的问题在于，中国在那个时期发展停滞了，而欧洲却迈步向前。不过，如果我们将那个时期的中国和处于可与之相提并论的时期的欧洲相比，有大量的证据可以证明，中国显然拥有对普通民众而言更好的体制。相对财富显然是个重要议题，但是潜在的社会运动的影响确实更大。由于体制允许，中国的识字率更高（这又回到最初的话题了，中国的识字率在19世纪后期至20世纪中期这段时期内，比起欧洲来说简直糟透了，不过有什么证据证明这是导致科技发展缓慢的原因呢？就我读到的东西来看，欧洲工业革命前，南部的识字率是20-30%，这与中国后期大多数的王朝相同。而且中国的阶级差距和阶级斗争还少得多。
The European middle class your referring to did not actually come into serious existence until the industrial revolution (one could argue that the North American colonist reach that point earlier though. on the merits of their land grabbing). by that point and beyond anyone would surely agree that the Chinese were left behind by a mile and only by the last couple of decades have even begun to catch up. that does not actually undermine many of the merits of the later Chinese social system relative to what was going on in most of Europe until probably the early half of the 18th century at the earliest.
在工业革命前，欧洲的中产阶级实际上并没有成形（有人可能会说，北美的殖民者通过抢掠土地早已达到了这一标准）。以这种观点来看，中国肯定早已经被他们远远抛在了后面，而直到近几十年才追赶了上来。实际上，相对于18世纪乃至更晚时期的欧洲，中国体制的功绩是无法被抹杀的。
Smilin' dave
Actually the middle class in much of Europe first achieve prominence in agriculture, not industry. The most natural example was the emergence of the wool trade, which created a more merchantile aspect and lead to a craze for raising sheep. To a lesser extent you have wine cultivators in France. This shift lead to practices like enclosure, which in turn reflected the end of feudal land management.
实际上很多欧洲中产阶级最先搞出突出成就的领域是农业而非工业。最典型的例子就是羊毛贸易的出现，它导致了一场对养羊的狂热。在法国，也有一些制造葡萄酒的。这些转变导致了圈地运动的出现，从而反映了封建土地管理的结束。
Yu-Hsing Chen
THe main point in this is that there is simply little evidence in the Chinese dynasties having a lower literacy rate than Western Europe as a whole. at least until public eduction really became relatively wide spread. it was more likely to have been the other way around. due to Chinese dynasties providing high incentives for it's civilians to go into learning.
重点是几乎没有证据可以证明中国王朝的识字率曾经低于西欧过——至少在公共教育普及之前。这很有可能要归因于中国王朝官员的高官厚禄，它曾一度刺激中国的人民学习文化知识。
I'm am no expert on European history , but from some tibits I pick up here and there, using say.. England (which was almost surely at the forefront of Europe in most aspects from the early 1700s onward) in 1830s there were roughly 25% of children enrolled in sunday schools in England. so add on top of that the nobilities and we come to to the conclusion that at that point the litearcy rate in England
(the best in Europe most likely) was what? in the 30-40% range ? just a little better than say.. the Song dynasty in about 700-800 years earlier.
我不是欧洲历史的专家，不过按照我在各处零零散散看到的一些资料上说的，英格兰（在18世纪早期，英格兰在大多数方面都走在欧洲的前列）在19世纪30年代大约只有25%的孩子就读于周日学校。再加上贵族们，当时英格兰的识字率大概能达到多少？30-40%?不如说宋朝在700-800年前就达到了这一水准。
The point is, China's stagnation seem to have been little influenced by literacy rates. which was actually very high by pre-industrial standards. it was a combination of many other things, and IMHO the single largest aspect remains that because it's economic zone of influence simply remained the same and even shrank. (as the old trade routs closed down to them after the Mongolian invasion). their economic level simply never was able to reach the point that would offer them to jump onto the next level... until the Qing dynasty in the mid 1800s. and by then that was probably more of a curse than a blessing to be suddenly exposed to a whole new world .
关键是，识字率对中国科技发展停滞的影响其实非常有限。在工业化前，中国的识字率已经达到了很高的水准。导致发展停滞的原因有很多，而我个人认为最重要的方面依旧是这个，因为它所能影响到的经济领域并无变化，甚至还缩水了（在蒙古入侵后旧贸易线路就被关闭了）。他们的经济水平根本不足以让他们直接跳到下一层次。。。直到19世纪中叶的清朝。而到了那时，人们对突然发现的新大陆可能更多的是咒骂，而非祝福。 |
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狗仔卡
发表于 2011-5-15 16:15
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