【2011.6.8 LowyInterpreter】Through Chinese eyes: Gui Yongtao

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Interview with Gui Yongtao, Associate Professor at Peking University's School of International Studies on China-Japan relations by Peter Martin and David Cohen. They are conducting a series of interviews with reader submitted questions on behalf of The Interpreter with Chinese academics and journalists.

Mu Haishi from China asks: Is Japan to blame for the history problem?

I would say yes, from the Chinese perspective. But as a scholar, I would say that you cannot expect people to sincerely believe that they are responsible for crimes committed by their grandfathers. There are two parts, justice, and reconciliation. And this should have been pursed right after the war.

But because of the Cold War, that generation, that should have dealt with this, did not do so. The government has the responsibility to do that, but I would say the Japanese government is too late to do this.

So if you ask, who is blame, the Japanese government is still to blame, but the general public, not really. People say they don't have any knowledge of history, but Americans, or others, are much like that. But with the older generation, because they are conservative, anti-Communist, anti-China, it's more complicated.

Amy King at Oxford University asks: Is the Japanese 'triple disaster' likely to be a game-changer for China-Japan relations?

In terms of Sino-Japanese relations, I don't like to say so, but it's become an opportunity to restore the official relationship. Since last year's ship collision incident, in September, China suspended ministerial-level exchanges with Japan. But this provided an opportunity, and the Chinese leadership has restored its relationship, basically to pre-September last year.

So nationalists think the game should change, they think that, before, we could not say this or do that because we were weak. Now we are stronger and you should talk to us differently. So some may expect that Japan will voluntarily change its way of dealing with China because it is no longer so much stronger. I am personally not of this view, but I have heard some scholars expressing this expectation.

Aidan Dullard asks: Is the decision to send aid to tsunami-affected Japan popular in China? What have been some of the reactions of the so-called 'angry youth' nationalists?

There are a very small number of people on the internet saying we should not give any aid to Japan, because that's our former enemy, and they could use this aid to build weapons. But that's not influential at all, but we are aware of this kind of view. Similarly, South Korea also has similar responses.

This time, not only the government, but also people, seem to be very much active in sending aid. The Global Times, that's a nationalist newspaper, took the lead in advocating aid to Japan. Right after the earthquake, they published a letter signed by a hundred scholars, including me, calling for the public to send aid to Japan. But to tell you the truth, I myself was sort of concerned about the feedback to this sort of aid to Japan. I was concerned that people would criticize my sort of people, saying, 'You see! Peking University professors are doing this, helping Japan!' I'm not concerned about that now, but I was then.

Alex Statman, at Stanford University, asks: At the treaty of Shimonoseki, the Chinese and Japanese negotiators acknowledge that one of the grounds for peace should be that the two nations 'have the same written language'. Is there any sense in which people today might say something similar: that Chinese and Japanese language and culture are still so similar as to form a potential basis for long-term diplomatic friendship or cooperation?

In the 1980s, that was very much a conducive factor, because the Japanese elites had a very good education about Chinese traditional culture. One of China's favorite Japan prime ministers, Ohira, could write poetry in Chinese. When he came to China, he saw the Great Wall, and he was so moved, he wrote a poem about that — in ancient Chinese. But that's that generation, and in that generation your education in traditional culture showed your status, but in the younger generation, I would say not necessarily.

I would say that things have changed. And one extreme is that the last prime minister before one, Aso, he is not young, but he's a fan of manga. You even cannot find any word in Japanese kana in manga, it's pictures. But the problem is that after he became prime minister, he made a mistake in pronouncing a Chinese character in public, a character that even should be recognized by a primary school student. But generally speaking, we still feel, not intentionally, but we still feel some closeness, because when Chinese people or Japanese people go to the other country, they feel comfortable, even if they do not speak a word of the other language, they can go anywhere, just looking at the signs, they can read the menu.

Colin Feehan, from the US, asks: Which would be more destabilizing for Sino-Japanese relations:  heightened nationalism in Japan or in China?

On the Japanese side, it's not necessarily nationalism, but their fear, or uneasiness, about the rising power of China. In the Chinese case, nationalism is general, the public and the elite, and in many cases it can be directed against Japan. And in the Japanese case, only a very small set of political elites, and some commentators and scholars, have strong nationalism. But the public, not really.

But there is a stream of nationalist or a conservative hard-line, just like the Americans have in Washington DC. It's sometimes very influential, depending on circumstances. If the conservative elites can utilize these events to flare up nationalism, the general public will follow that direction. But one year after, they simply return to the center.

But that's probably short-term, so generally I would say Chinese nationalism.

Amy King at Oxford University asks: Lowy's Linda Jacobsen recently co-authored a SIPRI study on the changing nature of foreign policy in China. One of the points made in this study was that the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPCCC is often more influential on 'controversial' foreign policy issues, such as those relating to Japan (as well as North Korea, Myanmar and the US). I am intrigued to know whether Professor Gui can gauge just how influential the PSC is on matters relating to Japan, and whether the PSC typically holds more conservative views than the Foreign Ministry or the Hu/Wen leadership on the Japan issue in particular?

We have this problem, when something became politics, or politicised, it goes to the Politburo. Let me use this a slightly simplistic way of picturing decision-making: If the foreign ministry is handling it, it is professional. But if it is politicised, it goes to the Politburo, which has a more party line and conservative point of view than the diplomats. With Japan, it can so easily become a political issue, because it involves Chinese public opinion and it could cause social unrest.

So in this case, it's the Politburo, and the problem is that Politburo members, none of them are experts on foreign affairs. If you look at their backgrounds, they have guys in charge of economic affairs, in charge of ideology, in charge of legal affairs, in charge of party discipline, these kinds of things. So they look at foreign affairs not from a professional diplomat's point of view, but from a politician's point of view. They judge things from their own benefits and loss, so from the outside that makes Chinese policy toward Japan not political, but conservative, because it's safe to be against Japan. Why should they risk their own political benefit or career for this? So that's not necessarily unique to Sino-Japanese relations, but also happens with US relations, for example.

'Student at a Beijing university' asks: During the Diaoyu Islands dispute last year, the Chinese Government argued with the Japanese Government and cancelled many trades from China to Japan. However, the Chinese Government did not allow media to say anything about their reaction to Japan, which made Chinese people think the Government was weak. Could you explain more about the Chinese Government's behavior?

That's also a problem, when China deals with this issue. Let's frame it in this way: the Chinese foreign ministry wants to calm down this issue. They have many, many agreements and negotiations with their Japanese counterparts on how to handle this issue without a final solution. But you can imagine, probably someone from the Chinese military wants a more hard-line position, because it could be a justification for their military build-up.

But the Chinese Government is not actually controlling this issue. There is this 'Safeguarding Diaoyu islands movement'. Historically it's in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The current Taiwanese prime minister is a leader of this movement — he wrote his dissertation on this issue. But Taiwan cannot risk their relationship with Japan. So Hong Kong became the base for this movement. But Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997. So when Hong Kong activists wanted to go to those islands, they were stopped by the Hong Kong authorities, and of course this is Beijing's will. And the netizens know this, and they know that it is Chinese Government that is pressing down on these activists. And this is the problem.

The Lowy Institute's Andrew Carr asks:  What role does a strengthening Russia play in shaping China-Japan relations? Is China worried about Russia and Japan one day aligning against it?

In last year's ship collision, Russia came to China's help. At the critical moment, when Japan, Korea, and the United States were allied against China, the Russian prime minister decided also to step on the disputed north islands, and China was not isolated. This put Japan in a very awkward position.  It cannot risk a deterioration with both Russia and China. There are some incidents between China and Russia, some much more serious than this collision, but China never responds in this way, because Russia is very important for us, vis-à-vis influence with the US. So China is concerned that Russia and Japan unite against China? I would say no, that is not a possibility.

John Chanks, from Canada, asks: What does Japan have to do in order to convince China that she genuinely wants to coexist with China peacefully; it has renounced military adventurism and it will never bring harm to China and Chinese?

I would say the history issue and the Diaoyu islands. Japan would deal with these issues in a cooperative and friendly way. I'm not pessimistic — it takes time. One positive factor is that the older conservatives in Japan are passing away. The younger generation has more flexible views about the war because their knowledge of it is limited and not personal, so they don't link their views to their own ideological views. If Japan shows some gestures, the most important thing is coherence. In the past, liberals took conciliatory steps, but conservatives counter-attacked the next day and made the actions look insincere.

China also always has this expectation that Japan would have an independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States. We always say, 'you say you are a great power, but you always follow the US'. So politically speaking, history is the most important, but strategically thinking, Japan's independence could convince some people.

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