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楼主: ltbriar

[07. 1.11 PBS 回應Tony Martin (有關西藏問題) ] 持續更新中...

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 楼主| 发表于 2008-6-2 13:36 | 显示全部楼层

譯注: 翻這個愈來愈覺得是享受, 希望大家也看得享受

【回應原文】
Sarahravensworth
Posted: Sun Jan 14, 2007 3:18 am
M.A.Jones, bravo! You have just hammered the last nail into Mr. Meanwell's coffin (metaphorically speaking, of course!)
Your point about how the Dalai Lama is becoming increasingly politically insignificant is spot on too.
The last three paragraphs that you wrote in your last comment read like breaths of fresh air, and Mr. Meanwell's resorting to tactics similar to Tony Martin's, in implying that you must have some kind of hidden agenda in writing these well researched comments of yours is a sure indication that he is unable to counter your arguments with anything of real substance or meaning.
I look forward to reading more of your comments on this forum.
【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。
中文翻譯
Sarahravensworth貼於: 2007年1月14日, 星期日, 凌晨3:18
M.A. Jones, 太棒了! 你剛把最後一顆釘子敲到「善意」先生的棺木上。(當然只是比喻!)
你那有關達賴喇嘛漸漸變成政治上無足輕重的論調也很到位。
回應的最後三段讀之如清風送爽, 「善意」先生只能運用一如Tony Martin一樣的技倆,影射你寫這些充分研究的文章背後有不可告人之私, 那隻顯示他無法以任何實質或有意義的東西來反駁你的論點。
期待在這論壇讀到你更多偉論。


【回應原文】
M.A. Jones  Posted: Sun Jan 14, 2007 8:13 am
Socratease (I love the name) - thank you for your cautionary advice. I will try my best not to disappoint you, though I think a little light sarcasm is quite acceptable at times, as a way of helping to expose apparent contradictions and hypocrasies.

Speaking of which, I forgot to raise the issue of His Holiness's attitude towards the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq, and on the invasion of Afghanistan.

In September 2003, the Dalai Lama said that the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan may have been justified to win a larger peace, but that it was too soon to judge whether the Iraq war was warranted. "I think history will tell," he said in an interview with The Associated Press, just after he met with President Bush.

"In principle, I always believe non-violence is the right thing, and non-violent method is in the long run more effective," he said, but some wars, including the Korean War and World War II, helped "protect the rest of civilization, democracy." He said he saw a similar result in Afghanistan - "perhaps some kind of liberation."

For somebody who claims to be "half-Marxist and half-Buddhist" and who preaches non-violence, don't you think it's very odd and inherently contradictory for the Dalai Lama to be preaching what is essentially a fundamentally immoral Randian "the means are justified by the ends" approach? Try telling that to the majority of people in Iraq!

A year later, in November 2004, he visited Stanford University where he addressed (for a price of course - tickets didn't come cheaply) a large audience on the subject, which the Stanford Review reported on as follows:

"On the subject of the Iraq war, the Dalai Lama presented a relatively consequentialist view. 'It is still too early to say whether it is right or wrong. I think another few years, then we'll see, then history will show whether this war was really justified, because it brought a good result. So, up until now, I think difficult to say. At least the motivation, to bring democracy, freedom, and that goal is right, a right goal.'"

The American historian Howard Zinn had this to say in response: "I've always admired the Dalai Lama for his advocacy of non-violence and his support of the rights of Tibet against Chinese domination, but I must say I was disappointed to read his comment on the war in Iraq [i.e., 'Wait a few years'], because this is such an obvious, clear-cut moral issue in which massive violence has been used against Iraqis with many thousands of dead."

Adrian Zupp, writing for Thinking Peace, expressed confusion: "So, given his intelligence and enormous sense of compassion, why doesn't the Dalai Lama question the leader of the free world about the downside of globalisation? About 'Star Wars II' and the Bush administration's flagrant disregard of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty? About the unlawful attack on Iraq? Civilian body counts? Why doesn't he even pose such questions rhetorically in the media?"

I agree with Norman Solomon, who rightly points out that by not speaking out against such murderous imperialism amounts to taking a political position. Solomon writes: "Let the great spiritual teachers basking in acclaim today learn how to emulate Martin Luther King Jr., who in 1967 explicitly condemned 'racism,' 'militarism,' and 'economic exploitation' while also having the moral fortitude to denounce the Vietnam War."

Yes, well, His Holiness's wishy-washy stand on such human rights issues doesn't surprise me at all. In fact, it's exactly what I have come to expect from him. The fact that His Holiness prefers to be vague on such issues is because he doesn't want to offend his main financial and political benefactor - the U.S. State Department. It's the same reason why he supports anti-abortion legislation, India's nuclear testing, and why he tried to help convince the world that there was no need to put Chile's Pinochet on trial - all of his positions reflect those of the U.S. State Department. Simple as that.

Yes, he's a real progressive character, this Dalai Lama, and really deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize too, isn't he?

And the whole reason why he is so popular is because he preaches safe vacuous messages - all of his messages are vague and politically safe. As Adrian Zupp points out, "his various books sell very well: The Art of Happiness, a collection of conversations with author Howard C. Cutler, sold more than 1.2 million copies and was on the New York Times bestseller list for nearly two years. People are prepared to pay considerable money to see him in person too. Tickets for his talk at the FleetCenter, titled 「The Global Community and the Need for Universal Responsibility,」 ranged up to $100, and in New York City, his final stop, tickets for his teaching sessions were priced at $400 each ($1200 and $3000 for VIPs and big donors) and all sold out well in advance."

And just exactly what do people get to hear for their money? Hollow and vague New Age advice on the "importance of compassion", about 「reducing destructive emotions,」 about "tolerance", about 「internal disarmament,」 about restraint, and about the role of intelligence in facilitating these things. What I find incomprehensible is why people would part with so much money to hear someone lecture on such needs. One must be tolerant and learn how to disarm your own internal anger - O.K., fine. Who could disagree with that? And who needs to be given such advice anyway?

M.A.Jones  Hangzhou
中文翻譯
M.A. Jones貼於: 2007年1月13日, 星期六, 晚上11:39
Socratease (我喜歡這名字, 註:是蘇格拉底與諷刺的合併) – 謝謝你提醒。我會盡力不讓你失望, 雖然我覺得有時輕輕諷刺不失為更明顯掀開矛盾與虛偽的方法。

講到這裡, 我忘了提活佛上師對非法入侵及佔領伊拉克和入侵阿富汗的態度。

2003年9月, 達賴喇嘛說美國為首的阿富汗戰爭可以用贏取更大和平來合理化, 但伊拉克戰爭是否值得則尚是過早定論。他在見完布希總統後接受美聯社採訪時說: 「我想歷史將有結論。」

「原則上, 我一直相信非暴力是正確的, 非暴力的方法長遠而言更有效。」他說, 但有些戰爭, 包括韓戰及二次大戰, 有助於「保衛了大多數的文明與民主。」他說對他在阿富汗看到相似的作用 - 「或許是某種的解放。」

作為某個自稱是「一半馬克思另一半是佛教徒」而又宣導非暴力的人, 你不覺得達賴喇嘛這樣宣導是很怪又有根本上的自相矛盾, 本質上像基本不道德畸形人的「但求目的, 不擇手段」手法? 跟伊拉克多數人說這些話試試看!

一年後, 2004年的11月, 他訪問史丹福大學並在那裡向一大群聽眾就這題目演講(當然收費啦 – 門費還不便宜), 史丹福學報(Stanford Review)如此報導:

「對伊拉克戰爭, 達賴喇嘛提出一個比較後果主義者的觀點。『現在是對是錯尚屬言之過早。我想數年後, 我們將會知道, 然後歷史將顯示這場戰爭是否因有一個好結果而是值得的。所以到現時為止, 我認為很難說。最少動機上, 引入民主, 自由這個目標是對的, 一個正確的目標。』」

美國史學家侯活.津恩(Howard Zinn)有如下的反應:「我一向欣賞達賴喇嘛非暴力主張以及他對西藏反中國佔領權利的支持, 但我必須說看到他對伊戰的評論(即數年後), 我很失望。因為這是個很清楚明白, 直接了當, 涉及了對伊拉克人廣泛使用暴力導致上千人死亡的道德問題。

為和平想法(Thinking Peace)(註: 一份主張非暴力溝通的網上日報)撰稿的阿德里安.蘇普(Adrian Zupp)表示疑惑: 「以他的智慧及無比的悲憫, 為什麼達賴喇嘛不質疑自由世界的領導人全球化的不利情況? 不質疑《星球大戰二》及布希政府惡劣地漠視反彈道導彈條約? 不質疑非法攻擊伊拉克? 平民死亡數字? 為什麼他連咬文嚼字在媒體上作個樣子都欠奉呢?

我同意諾曼.蘇羅蒙(Norman Solomon)說法, 他正確指出沒有對這些兇狠的帝國主義公開指責就形同政治上選邊站了。蘇羅蒙寫著:「讓今天浸沐於歡呼中偉大的精神導師學習如何向馬丁路德.金博士看齊。金博士在1967年公開譴責「種族主義」,「軍國主義」和「經濟剝削」之外, 也有那道德剛毅去譴責越戰。」

對嘛, 活佛上師在人權問題上的搖擺不定對我來說一點都不奇怪。事實上, 這恰恰是我預期他的表現。活佛上師選擇在這些問題上模糊其辭是因為他不想冒犯他最大的財務及政治的施主 – 美國國務院。也是出自同一理由, 他支持反墮胎法案, 印度核試, 及他試圖協助說服全世界沒有需要把智利皮諾切特送去受審 – 他所有立場都反映了美國國務院的立場。就是那麼簡單。(譯註: 一針見血, 絕倒!)

對呀, 他真是個前進人物, 這個達賴喇嘛, 的確值得來個諾貝爾和平獎嘛, 對不? (譯註: 感覺作者是在反諷揶揄)

他那麼受歡迎的整個原因就是他在宣揚安全空泛的訊息 – 他所有的訊息都是含糊而又政治正確的。就如阿德里安.蘇普指出:「他許多書都很暢銷: 「快樂的藝術」是跟作家侯活. 卡特勒(Howard C. Cutler)談話的文集, 賣了超過120萬本, 在紐約時代暢銷榜上差不多達兩年之久。人們也願意花可觀的錢去見他一面。 他在艦隊中心球館名為「全球社會及普世責任的需要」的演講門劵售價高達$100, 在紐約市, 他的最後一站, 他的授課講座定價是每課$400 (貴賓票和大金主的票價是$1200及$3000), 所有門票都一早售完。」

那麼人們花了錢到底聽到些什麼? 有關「悲憫的重要性」, 有關「減低毀滅性的情緒」,  kb有關「忍耐」, 有關「自我去戾」, 有關自制, 及在這些問題上智慧扮演的角色等空泛又含糊的新世代忠告。我搞不懂的是為什麼有人願意花那麼多錢去聽某人就這些需要的演講。一個人必須忍耐而且學習如何放下你自己內心的憤怒 – 好好, 很好。誰又會對此不同意呢? 又有誰需要別人給這樣的建言呢?
M.A. Jones  杭州

[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-6-2 13:39 编辑 ]
 楼主| 发表于 2008-6-3 12:28 | 显示全部楼层
【回原文】
Sarahravensworth
posted: Sun Jan 14, 2007 9:08 am
hehehe.... spot on again M.A.Jones! As a celebrity, the Dalia Lama not only sells bums on seats at auditoriums - also he has value as an advertizer, so he is often used as a commodity to market other people's books as well by writing introductory forewords, as well as advertizing all kinds of other products like Apple Computers, etc.
I reckon the secret to his business success lies in the application to his philosophical/religious messages of the McDonald's principle.

You see, by making their food as bland as possible,McDonald's is able to maximize the size of its market. Starbuck's does the same. By selling lattes that taste like hot milk, with only a subtle hint of coffee flavor, Starbuck's is able to offend the tastes of no one - well, no one apart from those who actually like real aromatic and flavorsome coffee, that is. But such people are in the minority. It's smart business sense, because the majority of people have bland tastes.

The Dalai Lama applies this same principle to the messages he sells. The more meaningless his messages are, the safer they are. And that's because most people don't like to think. I'm sure there must be a cognitive link between a person's ability to experience and appreciate taste, and a person's ability to be able to think independently and critically.


【原文鏈接】
http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】
本文翻譯僅限
Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。

中文翻譯

Sarahravensworth
貼於: 2007114, 星期, 早上9:08
嘻嘻嘻
,M.A. Jones, 你又打中了!
作為知名人士, 達賴喇嘛不但促銷坐在會堂席位那些屁股他還有打廣告的價值, 所以他就經常被當奇貨用來促銷別人的書籍或是寫寫序言介紹, 及用來為所有其它產品如蘋果電腦打廣告之用。
我估計他經營有術的秘密在於他在他哲學
/宗教宣傳裡運用了麥當奴原理。

大家看
,他們把食品弄得有多平凡就多平凡無味, 麥當奴就能把他們的市場規模擴到極點。星巴克也一樣。把賣的拿鐵弄得像熱奶的味道, 只隱約帶點咖啡味, 星巴克就不會讓誰覺得味道不對勁, 除了那些真正喜歡香濃有勁有味咖啡的人。但這些人是小數。這是很聰明的生意眼, 因為大多數人都口味平平無奇的。

達賴喇嘛在他促銷的訊息裡運用同樣原理。他的訊息愈沒內涵意義就愈是保險。那是因為大多數人都不喜愛思考。我肯定一個人嚐試品味的能力
, 跟一個人獨立精確思考的能力是互相關聯的。


【回
原文】Ambivalent Posted: Sun Jan 14, 2007 10:10 am
M.A.Jones writes: "As for the Dalai Lama himself, he seems to spend more time moving around the planet with the skilled opportunism of a political chameleon, preaching mysticism to Western New Agers rather than participating in traditional Tibetan religious rituals."
So we have here a REAL Karma Chameleon!!!!! Anybody remember Boy George and Culture Club?


The lyrics to that song sure do appear to be written about His Holiness:
If I listen to your lies would you say
I'm a man without conviction
I'm a man who doesn't know
How to sell a contradiction
You come and go
You come and go

Karma karma karma karma karma chameleon
You come and go
You come and go


中文翻譯
Ambivalent貼於: 2007114, 星期, 早上10:10
M.A.Jones 寫著:至於達賴喇嘛本人, 他似乎與其參予傳統西藏宗教儀式, 倒不如多花時間當政治變色龍的投機本事來周遊列國, 跟一些西方新世代宣揚神秘論。
那麼我們有一條真正的羯磨變色龍
!!!!! (:羯磨是梵文音譯, 業的意思) 有沒有人記得喬治男孩和文化俱樂部?

那首歌的歌詞真像在寫活佛上師他:
如果我聽信你的謊話,
你會否說
我是信念不堅定的人
我是一個不懂得
如何去促銷矛盾的人
你來而復去
你來而復去


羯磨 羯磨 羯磨 羯磨 羯磨變色龍
你來而復去
你來而復去


【回
原文】
M.A.Jones  
Posted: Sun Jan 14, 2007 11:26 am
Sarah and Ambivalent - thank you for your comments.

Sarah, I agree that the Dalai Lama is seen as a hot commodity in the marketing world, and that if he were to begin criticising U.S. policy in places like Iraq, that his market value as an advertiser would nose-dive and his popularity suffer. By being non-commital and vague, he avoids upsetting both sides of the political spectrum.

It wasn't my intention to turn this thread into a discussion about the Dalai Lama, and to be fair on the man, he does bring to the world a general message of peace. All I'm arguing really, is that he is notquite the person that he is so often cracked up to be - he certainly doesn't have the political and moral integrity of another Martin Luther King.He's no Ghandi either, and I can certainly think of plenty of other people who I would consider to be far more deserving of an international peace prize than His Holiness.

I think there is indeed ample evidence to show that he is a political chameleon, that he is politically and financially self-serving, but I don't want to over-state my case by arguing that he's the "Ronald McDonald of the philosophy world" or that he is somehow especially bad or evil or stupid. He has on occasions, both in his writings and when giving press conferences, been able to demonstrate quite a reasonable understanding of the interconnectedness of cosmology, neurology, psychology and physics, yet I also recognise so many ideological inconsistencies in his world view - he often puts his foot in it when discussing his thoughts about sexuality and the morality of sexual mores for example, expressing at times contradictory attitudes. He maybe a paradox of a man, but he is only human, after all.

And Ambivalent, I'm not ashamed or embarrassed to say that I once paid good money to see Culture Club perform live in concert, in Sydney it was, back in 1985 if I remember correctly, when I was aged 15. I'm not sure whether it's fair to describe His Holiness as a "karma" chameleon though, but he sure is a political one.

All the best,
M.A.Jones, Hangzhou


中文翻譯
M.A.Jones
貼於: 2007114, 星期, 早上11:26
Sarah Ambivalent – 謝謝你們的回應。

Sarah, 我同意達賴喇嘛在國際市場被視為灸手奇貨, 而如果他開始批評美國在比如說伊拉克的政策時, 他作為一個廣告人的市場價值就會暴瀉而他的受歡迎度也受損。讓自己全無定見及模糊其說, 他避免讓政治光譜兩端陣營不愉快。

我原來沒打算把這連結變為討論達賴喇嘛
,公平地說,他的確為世界帶來和平的一般訊息。我真正爭論的是,他不那麼是他經常被描述示人的那個人他的確沒有那政治及道德操守作為另一個金博士。他亦非聖雄甘地, 而我肯定世界上比活佛上師更值得拿國際和平獎項的人, 比比皆是。

我想那裡真的有相當多證據顯示他是政治變色龍,及在政治上經濟上都是利己的。但我不想誇大我的理據說他是「哲學世界裡的麥當奴叔叔」或他是某程度上太壞或邪惡或愚蠢。有時候,不管是寫作或是開記者會,他還是能夠顯示對宇宙論,神經學,心理學及物理之間關聯的一定理解。可是我也察覺他的世界觀裡有那麼多意識形態不一致的地方比如說, 他討論他對性及性道德觀的品行時,他經常一腳插進去而有時表現自相矛盾的態度。他可能是似是而非的人,但他畢竟也只是個人而已。


還有
Ambivalent, 我毫不以為恥或尷尬的坦白我曾有一次付可觀的錢去看文化俱樂部演唱會。如沒記錯那是1985年在悉尼, 我才十五歲。我不敢肯定稱活佛為羯磨變色龍是否公平, 但毫無疑問, 他是政治變色龍。

祝好

M.A.Jones
杭州


[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-6-3 12:37 编辑 ]
 楼主| 发表于 2008-6-14 11:38 | 显示全部楼层
回應原文
Tibet Response Network Posted:Sun Jan 14, 2007 1:24 pm
Just to say that I will be responding to MA Jones' reply to my posting but I'm in the midst of a very busy day and want to spend some time to try and give a considered and thought-out response.I think the high quality of his post requires that.
I just wanted to say that the reference to reds under beds and Mr. Jones' available time was intended to be ironic. Aussies and Brits, in my experience, understand irony well but it can fall flat with some others.Sorry if that was the case here.
Finally; nope no final nail in my coffin. Might opt for a sky-burial anyway!

David Meanwell

【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。
【中文翻譯】
Tibet Response Network貼於: 2007114, 星期, 下午 1:24
只是說一下我將會回應MA Jones對我貼文的回覆, 但我現在很忙, 而且想花些時間試法給一個深思熟慮的回覆。我覺得他優質回貼值得那麼做。
我只想說引用「草木皆兵」及Jones先生有餘暇時間只是說反話。依我經驗, 澳洲佬跟英國佬很懂反話, 其他人卻不著頭腦。要是後者, 那就抱歉了。
最後, 我棺材沒有最後一夥釘子, 也許我會選擇天葬。

回應原文
M.A.Jones  Posted: Sun Jan 14, 2007 7:37pm
David - I look forward to reading your response, but please take your time, as I too will be snowed under with work for the remainder of the day - probably for the next few days in fact.

Your "reds under the bed" remark I took in good humour, by the way - I wasn't in the slightest bit offended by it. If you read my piece On the nature of Chinese governance and society, you will see that I am in fact a Marxian thinker, of the Frankfurt School variety. This in itself hardly motivates me to defend the CCP though,since I regard China's system of governance not as a communist or socialist one, but rather, I see it as an example of a market-preserving federalism that is paternalistically authoritarian (in keeping with the classic Confucian tradition). I do argue though, that China's new capitalism, for all of its undeniable faults, is a historically progressive one.

I agree that Aussies and Brits share a similar sense of humour - I lived and taught in London for two years myself, back in 1994 and 1995, and I very much felt at home there.

Finally, I should like to say that I too would be more than happy to be given a Sky Burial, though you should keep in mind here David that Sky Burials are used only for the disposing of the corpses of commoners. Stupa burial and cremation are reserved for high lamas like His Holiness who are being honoured in death.
Personally though, I can't think of a more environmentally-friendly form of burial, than a Tibetan Sky Burial.
Best regards,
M.A.Jones, Hangzhou

【中文翻譯】
M.A. Jones
貼於: 2007114, 星期, 晚上7:37
大衛, 我期待看到你的回應, 但請不用急, 因為我今天剩下來時間也是忙得像被大雪覆蓋, 事實上未來幾天也一樣
順帶一句, 你的「草木皆兵」我是以輕鬆幽默態度面對的, 我一點都沒有被觸怒。如何你有看我那篇中國治國和社會性質探討, 你會發現我其實是法蘭克福學派之流的 (譯註: 是新馬克思主義學派的一支, 以他們的批判理論為特色, 可參閱wikipedia的中英文網頁:
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B3%95%E8%98%AD%E5%85%8B%E7%A6%8F%E5%AD%B8%E6%B4%BE]http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B3%95%E8%98%AD%E5%85%8B%E7%A6%8F%E5%AD%B8%E6%B4%BE[/url]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt_School]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frankfurt_School
的馬克思主義思想家的。這本身就很難促使我去為中共辯護, 因為我不認為中國政治制度是共產或是社會主義, 而是被我視為溫和大家長專制獨裁的經濟聯邦制 (古典儒家傳統的延續)。但我會堅持中國的新資本主義, 包括它所有無可否認的過失, 在歷史上是進步的。

我同意澳洲佬跟英國佬有許多互通的幽默感
我自己也在19941995年倫敦生活和教了兩年書, 覺得很像在家的感覺。


最後, 我想說我也很欣賞能天葬, 但大衛你得記著天葬只是平民用來處置屍身而已。浮圖(譯註: Stupa是梵文, 音譯窣堵坡, 中譯浮圖或塔婆, 是埋火化後舍利的墳冢) 和火化才是像活佛這些高級喇嘛死後才有的尊榮的專利。

個人認為沒有比西藏天葬更為環保的葬禮儀式了。祝好M.A.Jones , 杭州

【回應原文】
Tibet Response Network
Posted:Sun Jan 14, 2007 9:05 pm
Dear Mark,
Thanks for your reply - still gathering information for mine. I am a little disconcerted to hear that you taught in London in 94/95 as based on your Culture Club experience you can only have been 14/15 at the time? (And I now realise that the age quoted of 15 in 1995 would make you just 11 when you began work with your current employer of over fifteen years.) Care to clarify - perhaps you meant 25?

I would also mention allegations, of which I am sure you are aware, made against you in the past in other for a that you make posts in other names congratulating yourself for your contributions. Call me a cynic but I feel some of the other postings here do read like that.
There have also been allegations of plagiarism which would at least in part explain your prolific output.

We at Tibet Response like to know who we are debating with, although in this cyber-world this is often hard to ascertain. It seems you are an Australian from Sydney, probably working as an educator in Beijing these last four years or so and a self-confessed "China-lover". Care to add any more detail?

Dixon Green - who may or may not be David Meanwell or vice versa.
_________________
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet

【中文翻譯】
Tibet Response Network
貼於: 2007114, 星期, 晚上9:05親愛的麥克:
謝謝回應 – 還在為我自己的回應搜集資料。聽你說94/95在倫敦教書, 你又說自己文化俱樂部的往事時只有14/15歲, 我有點時空錯亂? (那你報自己在1995年是15歲, 那代表你15年前替現在僱主工作時只有11歲) 麻煩你澄清一下, 也許你是說25歲吧?

我也想說有關一些我相信你也很清楚的過去對你的指稱說你用分身貼文來稱讚自己。說我憤世嫉俗吧, 不過我覺得這裡其他人的貼文讀起來真是那麼回事。
也曾有一些抄襲的指控, 至少部份解釋了你寫作的多產。
我們在西藏反應這裡希望知道我們是跟誰在辯論, 雖然在虛擬網路這通常很難確定。似乎你是來自雪梨的澳洲人, 或許過去四年左右在北京任教, 而且自命是「中國熱愛者」。夠膽提供多些資料嗎?
Dixon Green – 也許是或也許不是 David Meanwell  或反之亦然.

Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet

西藏緊急回應網絡

與藏人為西藏工作

【回應原文】
M.A.Jones
Posted: Sun Jan 14, 2007 10:34 pm
Dear Dixon Green/David Meanwell,
Firstly, I made a typing error in my previous comment (obviously) - I meant to type "1985" not "1995". I have just edited my previous comment by correcting the mistake. I was born in 1969, which makes me now 37.

It is true that I was once accused of plagiarism on another site, roughly two years ago, I might add. The allegation was exaggerated, but I confess partly true. My comments at that time had been strung together quickly, and although I often did identify the titles of the studies I used and the names of the authors, I would often also copy and paste passages without taking the time to place them in quotation marks. I didn't really see the need to, since I was only making blog comments - a poor error of judgement on my part though, I now realise. Nevertheless, those particular comments, like my comments here, were a product of a synthesis. Like most people, I synthesize the views and research findings of others in order to develop assessments of my own.

These days, as you can see from my comments on this forum,I have learnt to take a little more care in the way that I present my views.All of my sources are cited, in that I mention the names of the authors and the titles of their studies or reports, and I have also integrated their passages as quotes. I have drawn from quite a large number of sources, and most of them I derived from the internet, so you are quite free to check them for yourself.

I therefore request that you engage me on the arguments that I present, rather that on how closely I adhere to conventional academic standards of citation when presenting them. Remember, this is only a forum -I'm not writing for publication here.

Why do I take the time to conduct such research and to then write up such lengthy comments? The answer is simple and far more innocent than what you seem to want to suggest. Aside from weekends, I have little day-to-day contact with other native English speakers where I am, and my Chinese language skills are very limited. I therefore use forums like this as away of communicating with others in order to exercise my brain. I enjoy developing a particular line of discourse, and I post them on forums such as this in the hope of being able to test the strengths and weaknesses of my arguments. I am not a member or representative in any way of any political organisation or activist group. It seems as though, in many cases, the more dogmatic and lesser tolerant among forum readers find it easier and necessary to try to look for ways of discrediting those individuals whose positions they don't like or disagree with - especially when they are confronted with evidence that they find difficult to challenge.

The charges of plagiarism I faced two years ago on the other forum in question, were levied at me as part of a wider smear campaign by frustrated and vindictive Tony Martin-types, and my response, I must confess,was to experiment with the use of multiple person as (which I have come to regret I might add, although it was also both a creative and liberating experience in some ways) but I can assure you that I have not done so here, nor do I intend to do so here. I write most of these comments from my Apple laptop at home (using the Safari browser) and sometimes (as I'm doing now) from my office computer on campus (using Windows), and I am located in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province. The Moderator of this forum should therefore be able to verify for you that my two IP addresses are both Hangzhou ones. I have no idea where the other posters that you find suspect are writing from, but I would be very surprised if there is anybody else contributing to this discussion that is also writing from Hangzhou.

You imply, because I wrote under the name of "China Lover" on another site, that I must therefore be somehow biased in my views. If you read my piece On the nature of Chinese governance and society you will be able to see just where exactly I am coming from intellectually - I am a Marxian thinker influenced most strongly by those writers of the Frankfurt School. This hardly makes me a mouthpiece of the CCP then, does it? I don't even consider the Chinese system of government to be a communist or socialist one. Rather, I see it as a market-preserving federalism, albeit, of a paternalistically authoritarian nature (in keeping with the Confucian tradition). You will see, if you read both that piece and my other piece titled Shenzhen Kitsch, that I am also quite critical of China's new capitalism, and of the CCP. I nevertheless see China's new capitalism, for all of its undeniable faults, as being historically progressive.

Also, I have never written or lived in Beijing,though I have been to Beijing a few times on vacation. I have been here in China now for a full five years, not four, throughout which time I have lived in the cities of Huai'an, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and now Hangzhou.

I am employed by the N.S.W. Department of Education and Training, and you can visit the site that I have set up to showcase my students work and read my full profile at the following address: www.zustenglish.blog.comYou can also learn from this site where I am currently working.

If there is anything more that you would like to know about me please don't hesitate to ask. I'll even provide you with my shoe size if you like!

You can also visit my humble little China travel website, at: www.journeysthroughchina.blog.comif you want to see what I look like.

Finally, and in anticipation of your promised response to my arguments on the Tibetan issue, I'd like to say a few things about my actual sources.

The writer who identifies him or herself as the Tibetan Photo Project has, on another thread, raised some valid questions in relation to my use of sources. I do rely very heavily, as he points out, on Western sources, the majority of which are academic research papers.

There is a reason for this: I do not speak the Tibetan language, so I cannot communicate with the vast majority of Tibetans living in Tibet. When I travelled throughout the Kham region for example, back in 2002, I was unable to find one single Tibetan monk who could speak either Mandarin or English, and so was I simply unable to strike up much of a conversation with any of them -either directly, or through my other half, who is Chinese. I was therefore restricted to making visual observations.

All of the academic studies that I have used here were produced by researchers who have spent lengthy periods of time in Tibet and or Dharmasala, and their observations and findings from their discussions with Tibetans are, I think, every bit as valid as those who speak out on behalf of the Tibetan independence movement and its government in exile.

Keep in mind too, that I have drawn from a wide variety of sources - count them all - I certainly have not relied on the findings of one or two studies only.

The Tibetan Photo Project has also raised the question of funding, which is a valid one of course, but unfortunately only one of the studies that I have drawn upon cited its sources of funding. That was the study I discussed at length carried out by Melvyn C. Goldstein, who is Professor and Chairman, Department of Anthropology, and Director of the Center for Research on Tibet at Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, and Cynthia M. Beall, who is Professor of Anthropology at Case Western Reserve University.Their research was carried out over a 16 month period in the Tibet Autonomous Region, and was supported by grants from the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, the Committee on Research and Exploration of the National Geographic Society, and the National Science Foundation. It certainly doesn't appear then, to have been politically or ideologically motivated or biased.

In any case, I could just as easily point the same questions at you David/Dixon. It is, after all, an undeniable fact that the government in exile employs a very good and experienced PR team, and enjoys considerable funding from the U.S. State Department and other commercial enterprises.

Keep in mind here, that I have never denied the fact that serious human rights abuses have occurred in Tibet, nor have I ever argued that they don't continue to occur today. My argument focuses on the bigger picture, which I see as improving, and I also argue that the extent to which human rights abuses have occurred in Tibet in the past have also been exaggerated.

You will of course argue that you have drawn your knowledge from the personal discussions that you have had in English with English-speaking Tibetans in exile. This kind of evidence, while important, is also quite limited though, in that their experiences do not necessary represent those of the majority, and in that they may also have personal grievances which may lead them to exaggerate the extent to which human rights abuses occur.

Such qualitative evidence is therefore insufficient on its own if one wants to gain an accurate view of the broader picture. This is why I am inclined to give more credence to those academic research findings that have been carried out within the TAR, and that have some kind of quantitative strength, as opposed to a purely qualitative one.

You may argue that the sheer number of testimonies given by Tibetans in exile provides such a quantitative view, but I would have to disagree with you on that, simply because such numbers constitute a relatively small percentage of China's overall Tibetan population - both within and outside the TAR. That doesn't mean that their testimonies should be ignored, but it does limit their value if one's objective is to gain a broader picture of how the majority of ethnic Tibetans feel about their lives under Chinese rule.

By all accounts, Tibetans are divided in their attitudes,which are not only complex, but are also in states of constant flux. I do not believe that exaggerating the extent of the human rights abuses that occur in Tibet will in any way lead to improvements. In fact, as I have already argued, it would be far more beneficial if Tibetan lobbyists were to present to the world a more soberly balanced and realistic view of what is happening in today's Tibet - and for reasons that I have already outlined in an earlier comment via a reading of A.Tom Grunfeld and others.

Warmest wishes to you,

M.A.Jones,
Hangzhou

【中文翻譯】

M.A.Jones :
2007114, 星期, 晚上10:34
親愛的 Dixon Green David Meanwell,

首先, 我在之前的回應(明顯地)打錯了字- "1985"打成"1995", 我剛把之前貼文修改了, 我是1969年出生, 今年37歲。

沒錯我曾在另一論壇被指稱抄襲, 我可補充一上, 那大概兩年前的事。那指控是誇大其辭, 但我也承認有部份是真實的。我那次的回應是倉猝組織起來, 雖然我經常說明那些研究的標題及作者名字, 我也時常剪貼引用而沒及加上引號。我那時的確不覺得有那個必要, 因為我只是在寫部落格回應雖然我現在覺得那是我考慮不周。無論如何, 那時的具體回應, 一如我這裡的回應, 都是一個綜合言論結果。跟許多人一樣, 我綜合了他人的看法及研究結果以求發展我自己的判斷。


最近, 你可以從這論壇裡我的回應中看到, 我對自己意見呈現小心了很多。我的資訊來源全標明的, 作者, 研究題目或報告都清楚, 引述也加括。我採用大量的資料, 主要是來自網路, 所以你大可隨時查看。

為什麼我花時間從事這樣研究, 長篇大論為文? 答案很簡單而比你希望暗示的來得單純。除了週末, 我在這裡很少有機會跟英語為母語的人說話, 而我中文能力又有限。故此我利用論壇作為與別人交流以動動腦筋。我喜歡另闢途徑, 我這樣貼文是希望考驗自己論點的優劣。我不是任何政治組織或是活躍份子的一員。似乎許多時候一些比較教條的或是不耐煩的讀者特別當發覺面對難以挑戰的證據時, 想法來攻擊他們不喜的人的公信力是有必要而比較容易的。

兩年前我在別的論壇面對的抄襲指控, 也是像Tony Martin那種失意想報復的人大規模抹黑行動的一部份。我必須承認我的反應是在試驗利用不同多重身份(也許我得指出我後來很後悔, 雖則那在某程度上是有創意及放任的經驗), 而我可以保證在這裡我絕沒這樣做, 也不準備做。我大多數回應是用家裡的蘋果電腦(Safari瀏覽器), 有時(比如現在)是用學校辦公室的電腦(Windows), 而我現在是在浙江省杭州市。這論壇的版主應該可以向你證明我兩個ip地址都是杭州的。我不知你懷疑的其他回應者從那裡回應, 但我很奇怪這論壇回應者中還有來自杭州的。

你暗示因為我在另一論壇上用了「中國熱愛者」一名, 我就必然看法存在某種偏見。如果你看了我那篇論中國統治及社會性質一文, 你就可以知道我智性取向如何我是深受法蘭克福學院學者影響的馬克思主義思想家。這本身就很難讓我成為中共的代言人, 對否? 我根本沒把中國統治系統視為是共產或社會主義的。而是看它作為雖是大家長專制獨裁的經濟聯邦制 (古典儒家傳統的延續)。如果你有看那篇及我另一篇名為深圳庸俗作品, 你就該明白我對中國的新資本主義及共產黨持批判態度。但儘管它無可否認的過失,我還是認為中國新資本主義具歷史性進步的。

還有, 我雖然去過北京旅遊數次, 我從來沒寫過或是在北京生活過。現在我已在中國整整五年, 不是四年, 我在淮安, 上海, 深圳都待過, 如今是在杭州。

我受僱於新南威爾斯教育訓練部, 你可以參閱我為學生功課設的網頁, 內有我詳細資料, 地址如下:
www.zustenglish.blog.com在這裡你可找到我現在工作的地方。

如你還需要其他有關我的情況, 歡迎發問, 你喜歡的話, 我甚至可以告訴你我鞋子的尺碼!

如你想知道我長相如何, 你也可以過訪我小小中國行蹤的網址(譯註: 網址已失效) www.journeysthroughchina.blog.com

最後, 在預期你承諾對我有關西藏問題的回應時, 我想說說我真正的資訊來源。


那位自稱是Tibetan Photo Project的仁兄或仁姐在另一欄裡就我採用的資源提出一些實質的質疑。正如他說, 我的確大量依靠西方資訊, 大部份是學術研究文章。

這是有原因的: 我不懂藏文, 所以我不能跟西藏的廣大藏人交流。比如我在2002年在康區旅行時, 我無法找到一位能說普通話或英語的西藏僧侶, 於是我沒法跟他們交談不管是直接, 或是通過我太太, 一個中國人。所以我只能局限於觀察上。

我這裡用的所有學術研究都是由在西藏及達蘭薩拉長期研究的研究人員做的, 我覺得他們跟西藏人的討論所得的觀察及結論, 跟替藏獨運動及流亡政府代言的言論是同樣效用的。

要記著是, 我是採用許多不同來源你可以數數我肯定沒有只依賴一兩個研究結果而已。

Tibetan Photo Project也提到資金的問題, 當然這也是很實在的, 但遺憾是我引用的研究中只有一個說明它的(研究)資金來源。那是俄亥俄州, 克里夫兰, 华盛顿天主教大学(Case Western  Reserve University)人类学系教授, 西藏研究中心主任梅尔文·戈尔斯坦教授,与该大学人类学教授辛西娅·比尔(CynthiaM.Beal)的研究。他們的研究在西藏自治区進行超过16个月, 获国家科学院与中国学术交流委员会, 美国国家地理协会研究与探险委员会, 和美国国家科学基金支助支持。它明顯地不像有任何政治或意識形態推動或偏見的。

無論如何, 我也同樣可以輕易以同樣的題目來質疑你大衛或迪斯。畢竟不能否認的是流亡政府僱用了一個很優秀有經驗的公關隊伍, 而且從美國國務院及其他商業企業獲得不菲的資金。

請記著是我從來沒有否認西藏有嚴重侵犯人權的事實, 也沒辯論這種事今天不再繼續。我的爭論是聚焦在更廣的層面, 而我看到是在改善中。而我爭論的是西藏過去發生的人權侵犯程度是被誇大的。

你當時會辯稱你所知是來自個人與懂英語的流亡藏人的英語對話得來的。這些證據雖也重要, 卻也是很有限的, 因為那些人的經驗不必然是大部份人的經驗, 而且也因為他們有些個人恩怨而導致他們把侵犯人權事件有所誇大。

單憑這種質量的證據去掌握正確的全面觀點是不足夠的。因此我傾向覺得那些在西藏自治區, 較具量質的學術研究比純質的證據較可信。

你也可反駁流亡藏人幾個純粹的見證也具量方面的視野, 但我必須持相反意見, 因為這些數據對整個中國-包括西藏自治區以內及以外的藏族人口來說, 只能是相對很少的百分比。那不意味他們的例證該被忽略, 但如果我們目的是想知道大部份藏族人對他們在中國管治下的生活感覺時, 造些例證的價值是有限的。

一切資料顯示, 西藏人的態度是分歧, 不但是複雜, 而且是一直在變化中。我不相信誇大西藏境內的人權侵犯事件有利於任何改善。事實上, 一如我之前所論, 若西藏遊說團體向世界呈現今日西藏合理真實的情況, 將更為有利 – 理由就是我在介紹戈倫夫及其他人的文章時所列出那一樣。
M.A.Jones  杭州


[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-6-14 11:41 编辑 ]
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【回应原文】
Sarahravensworth Posted: Mon Jan 15, 2007 6:03 am  
Getting desperate are you David?
Digging up petty specks of dirt on someone's past internet behavior of years ago seems like a pretty poor substitute for real debate.
【原文链接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【声明】本文翻译仅限Anti-CNN使用,谢绝转载。
中文翻译
Sarahravensworth  贴于: 2007年1月15日, 星期一, 上午 6:03
大卫, 你是渐感绝望吗?
挖别人网上陈年琐屑好像是淘汰真正辩论的劣弊哦。


【回应原文】
Nelson 2 Posted: Mon Jan 15, 2007 12:55 pm
Things are getting interesting, now we are starting to see the holy smoke out. Mr. Dixon, you have got what you want to know about Mr. Jones, but his shoe size, and we have heard enough from Mr. Jones what he wants to say, now show us your beef, the “reds under bed” or the rats on the street, spam on net, it doesn’t make any difference, we are only interested in the facts. Trying to attack on someone’s creditability instead answering the questions, making arguments, is the tactic used by criminal defense lawyer, not for political, academic debating in this forum, please do the way people who behind you could be proud of…
中文翻译
Nelson 2  贴于: 2007年1月15日, 星期一, 下午 12:55
愈来愈有趣, 我们现在开始看到冒圣烟了, Dixon先生, 除了Jones先生鞋子尺码外, 你想知的全齐了吧, 而我们也听够了Jones先生想说的了, 该是你亮出你的牛肉, 草木皆兵, 或是过街老鼠, 网路诈骗, 都没分别, 我们只对事实有兴趣。只去攻击别人的公信力而不是回应答辩, 是刑事案辩护律师的伎俩, 而不是这论坛政治学术辩论所为。请让在你背后的人有所自豪吧。


【回应原文】
ChineseHawkeye Posted: Mon Jan 15, 2007 2:12 pm
David Meanwell
It's getting really ugly in your post. Maybe I should put some of accusation here to remind people why Britons are so interested in Tibet and for what purpose.
Britons occupied India and became the No. 1 drug dealer of the whole world (the notorious British East Indian Company). Manchuria (the country occupied China and Mongolia at that time) refused to import goods from Britain, so the British drug dealer smuggled drug into Manchuria for profit. Manchurian gov burned the drug, and the war initiated.
After Britons defeated Manchurians, they also invaded Tibet from India side (India and Tibet are neighbouring to each other) and became the actually controller of the area.
Now we all know why, Uh.

中文翻译
ChineseHawkeye 贴于: 2007年1月15日, 星期一, 下午 2:12
David Meanwell
你的回贴真变难看了。也许我该在此让大家知道为什么英国人对西藏那么有兴趣和他们目的所在。
英国占领印度成了世界第一号毒品拆家(恶名昭彰的英国东印度公司)。满清(当时占有中国及蒙古)拒绝从英国进口, 于是英国毒品拆家走私毒物入满清来赚钱。满清政府烧了毒品, 于是战火燃起。
英国打败了满清, 他们同时由印度入侵西藏(印度与西藏比邻), 成了那地区的实际控制者。
那我们都明白为什么啦。


【回应原文】
M.A. Jones Posted: Mon Jan 15, 2007 6:20 pm
If there is anybody who has been following this debate and who doubts CIA involvment with the Dalai Lama and his exiles, then simply google "Questions Pertaining to Tibet, 1969-1972" and you will find indisputable and totally undeniable evidence to show that they did - the text just mentioned is a primary source - a desclassfied U.S. State Department document showing just that, and it was because of the release of this document that the Dalai Lama himself was forced to admit it. In fact, the Dalai Lama did not even escape from Lhasa on his own free initiative, but was "rescued" by the CIA, and with U.S. air support.

If anybody is looking for a more soberly balanced view of the entire Tibetan issue, I recommend A. Tom Grunfeld's The Making of Modern Tibet above all else.

Another highly interesting study that offers an interesting critique of both the Dalai Lama himself, his Tibetan in Exile Government and the pro-Tibet lobby, is The Shadow of the Dalai Lama. The ENTIRE text of this academic study is available in English free on the internet. It was written by Victor and Victoria Trimondi - the pen names used by Mariana and Herbert Röttgen. Their study was published to wide acclaim in Germany back in 1999 and can be found at:
http://www.iivs.de/~iivs01311/SDLE/Contents.htm

I highly recommend that everyone read this text before furthering their input into this discussion. It shows the Dalia Lama to be more than just the political chemeleon that I earlier argued he was. This study shows him to be an ideological chameleon as well, and a sly self-serving politician and businessman. The study peals away the public face of his Tibetans in Exile Government to reveal a highly undemocratic institution full of faction-fighting and violence - at times even murder!

Let me summarise my overall position on the Tibetan issue, so as to help those of you who are interested in producing a rebuttal. My arguments are as follows:

1. Human rights abuses have and continue to occur in Tibet, but the extent of these abuses has been and continues to be greatly exaggerated by the Tibetan Government in Exile and by its Western supporters in the so-called "pro-Tibet lobby".

2. The human rights conditions and overall living standards of the majority of Tibetans has been and continues to improve under Chinese rule, and this has been the case since the Deng reforms were first introduced.

3. Most ill-feelings towards the Han Chinese and towards Chinese rule reflect the collective memory of the Cultural Revolution experience. The strength of these feelings is now beginning to fade as more and more Tibetans are drawn into the middle class, and their lives made more comfortable. Tibetans are thus becoming increasingly divided on their attitudes towards Chinese rule, and their feelings more complex and open to flux.

4. Tibetan culture is not, contrary to the propaganda of the pro-Tibet lobby, in any danger of disappearing. Quite the opposite in fact - Tibet, over the past few decades, has been and continues to experience a cultural renaissance, spurred on partly by financial grants and encouragement from Beijing, and partly through the initiative of ethnic Tibetans themselves, as they seize on the opportunities that increasing tourism brings to share their cultural life in newly commodified forms.

5. Rather than being "Sinocised" urban Tibet is being Westernised. Tibet's transition from feudalism to modernity has been a painful one, but one that many Tibetans are now embracing as they see the benefits filtering through. Young Tibetans are thus becoming increasingly less interested in religious and independence issues as they discover and embrace more de-sublimated forms of pleasure through shopping, the internet, discos, kareoke bars, and, for the smaller but growing number of wealthier bougeois individuals among them (most of whom are drawn, not surprisingly, from the families of religious tulkas) the joys of both domestic and international travel and study.

6. The traditional political activities of organised Tibetan religious institutions throughout the TAR have been restrained, and continue to be restrained (often brutally) under Chinese governance, but generally speaking lamaism is thriving - not only throughout the TAR, but also throughout greater China (even in Beijing) and internationally too for that matter. Considerable religious freedom then, despite claims to the contrary, exists in Tibet.

7. The Tibetan Government in Exile mislead the world about the true nature of the majority of those Tibetans who journey to Dharmasala each year - most are not refugees, but religious pilgrims. The Tibetan Government in Exile has both financial and political incentives to do so.

8. The Tibetan Government in Exile and its Western supporters in the pro-Tibet lobby are funded mostly by those whose economic and political interests view China's rise as a threat. The U.S. State Department is the major contributor of funds to both the Government in Exile and to the Tibet lobby. Considerable funds are also raised through commercial activities, like international Dalai Lama lecture tours, and through the sale of Buddhist kitsch to Western New Age consumers.

9. Pro-Tibetan lobby groups essentially parade as "non-profit" human rights organisations, registering themselves as charities to encourage businesses and individuals to make tax-deductible donations - which essentially means that they are a drain on the public purse. They also have a vested interest in grossly exaggerating their claims in order to excite the sympathies of the public so that they can attract public donations and political support.

10. That by failing to present a fair and more realistic picture of what is happening in Tibet, both the self-proclaimed Tibetan Government in Exile and their supporters actually cause far more harm than good to the plight of the Tibetan people, especially for those living within the TAR. Their propaganda and support encourages hardliners within the ethnic Tibetan community living within the TAR to promote resistance and separatism, which in turn adds to the anxieties and security concerns of those hardliners within the Chinese ruling elite, who then in turn respond by introducing and enforcing more strictly those public security laws that restrict politico-religious activities - which as I said earlier, often do in fact result in brutal punishments by over-zealous enforcers. Such instances, not surprisingly then, tend to occur in waves, rather than on a regular day to day basis.

11. The main long-term political goal of the former ruling theocratic elite, now based in Dharmasala, is to regain their political control of Tibet. Their international campaign against China therefore, rather ironically, does more harm to their own cause than good, and only decreases their likelihood of ever being able to cut a deal with Beijing. The watered down goal of the Dalai Lama now, is the establishment of self-government for the TAR whilst remaining a part of China - in the same way that Hong Kong operates. Ironically, this is EXACTLY what China originally offered the Tibetan ruling elite, but by rejecting the offer in favour of supporting a separatist movement for full independence, they have now lost out completely. Easily the single biggest political mistake of the Dalai Lama's career - as A. Tom Grunfeld has convincingly pointed out.
All the best,
M.A.Jones  Hangzhou

中文翻译
M.A.Jones   贴于: 2007年1月15日, 星期一, 下午 6:20
假如一直关注这场辩论的人, 对中情局涉入dl喇嘛及他的流亡人士有怀疑的话, 只需要在孤狗输入"Questions Pertaining to Tibet, 1969-1972" (译注: 1969-1972有关西藏的问题), 你就会找到显示他们做了什么铁证如山, 完全不可抵赖的证据 – 上述资料是第一手资料 – 美国国务院解密档案揭露的就是这个。也因为这份文件被解密, dl喇嘛本人也被迫承认事实。事实上, dl喇嘛根本都不是自由意志下从拉萨逃跑, 而是被中情局在美国空军支援下“救”出来的。

谁想阅读对整个西藏问题一个比较清醒平衡观点的话, 我首推戈伦夫(A. Tom Grunfeld)的《现代西藏的诞生》(The Making of Modern Tibet)。

另一个极值一看的研究是对dl喇嘛本身, 他的西藏流亡政府及支持藏独的游说团的评论, 名为dl喇嘛的背影(The Shadow of the Dalai Lama)。这学术研究的全文是以英文写成, 在网上免费观阅。它的作者是Victor and Victoria Trimondi – 是Mariana and Herbert Röttgen的笔名。他们研究在1999年在德国广获好评, 连结如下:
http://www.iivs.de/~iivs01311/SDLE/Contents.htm

我强力推荐大家看过这些资料才再投入这个讨论。它显示dl喇嘛不止是我之前所说的政治变色龙而已, 而是意识形态的变色龙, 和一个狡诈自利的政客及商家。这研究把他的西藏流亡政府的公众脸孔拔掉了皮, 露出一个高度不民主机构, 充满了派系斗争与暴力 – 有时甚至是谋杀! (译注: 好吧, 那就是我下一个任务, 把全书试试翻成中文!)

让我总结我对西藏问题的整体立场, 以方便你们有兴趣的人编制反驳。我的论点如下:

1. 人权侵犯曾经也继续在西藏发生, 但侵犯的程度一直也是持续被西藏流亡政府及西方那些所谓“支持藏独游说团”大幅地夸大。

2. 在中国管治下, 大多数西藏人的人权状况及整体生活水平有所改善, 也持续在改善。从邓小平改革开放以来, 一直如此。

3. 对汉人及中国管治的反感大部份是反映了对文化大革命的集体记忆。这些印象在愈来愈多西藏人晋身入中产阶级, 生活变更安逸时, 愈来愈淡化。于是西藏人对中国管治的态度分歧将渐渐增大, 而他们的感觉愈来愈复杂及容易改变。

4. 与支持藏独游说团的宣传相反, 西藏文化并没有消灭的危险。恰好相反 – 事实上在过去数十年来, 部份由于北京财政支持及鼓励, 部份因藏族人士本身抓住旅游发展的机遇, 以崭新商品化形式来分享推动他们文化生活, 使西藏一直持续出现一个文化复兴的情况。

5. 与其说被“汉化”, 西藏市区正被西化。西藏由封建社会过度到现代化的过程是痛苦的, 但却是许多西藏人如今拥抱的, 因为他们看到其中散发出的好处。年轻西藏人愈来愈对宗教及独立不热衷, 他们从逛街购物, 网路, 廸士高, 卡拉Ok吧发现及拥抱不那么高尚形式的快乐, 而他们中少数, 但却不断增多的富裕小资个体 (不需讶异是他们大部份都来自宗教图嘉家庭) 更享受到国内或海外旅游留学的乐趣。

6. 在中国管治下, 在西藏自治区内, 有组织的西藏宗教机构的传统政治活动受到限制, 而且也一直受制下去(通常是粗暴的)。但一般而言, 喇嘛教不单在西藏自治区内,在中国(甚至在北京)及国际都发展蓬勃。不管怎样反向的指责, 西藏有一定程度的宗教自由。

7. 西藏流亡政府有关每年去达兰萨拉的大部份西藏人的性质上, 误导世界 – 大部份不是难民, 而是宗教朝圣者。西藏流亡政府基于经济及政治动机作此误导。

8. 西藏流亡政府及支持藏独游说团的西方支持者主要是从视中国崛起是威胁他们经济及政治利益的各方获得经费的。美国国务院是对西藏流亡政府及藏独游说团的最大金主。相当资金是通过商业活动, 如dl喇嘛巡回演说, 及向西方新一代消费者推销粗制滥造佛教来收集的。

9. 支持藏独游说团组织主要打扮成“非牟利”人权组织, 登记为慈善机构以鼓励企业及个人作可免税的捐赠 – 主要意味着他们是向公众荷包开刀。他们都有利益理由去夸大他们的指控以博取公众同情, 好能吸引公众捐赠及政治支持。

10. 由于没有呈现西藏现实到底如何的公平及较真实描述, 自称西藏流亡政府及支持藏独游说团其实对特别是在西藏自治区内的西藏人民境况非但无益, 反而有害。他们的宣传及支持鼓励在西藏自治区内的藏族鹰派推动抵抗及分裂活动, 转而增加中国当权者中的鹰派的焦虑及安全的疑虑, 于是让更多严厉限制政治-宗教活动的公安条例出台 – 一如我前述, 会让过度积极的执法者进行严打。毫无疑问, 这些情况是一浪接一浪, 而不是天天发生的。

11. 现在以达兰萨拉为基地的前神权精英的主要长期政治目标就是拿回他们对西藏的政治控制。于是很讽刺地, 他们反华的国际运动对他们的目的是弊多于利的, 只会一直削减他们与北京达成协议的可能性。dl喇嘛如今目标已刷洗成像香港那样留在中国内, 建立西藏自治区自治政府的。可笑的是, 这正是中国原来建议给西藏统治精英的。但他们不此图而去支持全面独立的分裂活动, 现在他们完全输光光。就如戈伦夫很有说服力的点出 – 这很容易成了dl喇嘛一生中最大的一项政治错失。
祝一切好运

M.A.Jones  杭州

[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-6-21 15:33 编辑 ]
 楼主| 发表于 2008-6-25 07:29 | 显示全部楼层
【回應原文】
KCAllen Posted: Mon Jan 15, 2007 8:07 pm  
Really good point - the seemingly benign Tibet movement has also gone out of its way to attach itself to other elements of various anti-China cliques. (FLG, Taiwan independence, and even Nanjing Massacre deniers, to name a few...)
In this case, strength is not in numbers - as I've mentioned before the vast majority of people who have any say in these issues tend not to sway too far from the middle. By clinging on to these groups, a legitimate human rights cause has been compromised. Although with good intentions to begin with seems like the Tibet cause (whatever it is) will continue to be just another footnote in world affairs.
【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。
中文翻譯
KCAllen  貼於: 2007年1月15日, 星期一, 下午 8:07
論點極好 – 看來像良性的西藏運動也已偏離它軌跡, 跟其他反華潮流 (數一兩個: 法輪, 台獨, 甚至否認南京大屠殺的) 混作一氣了。
在這情況下, 數目不代表力量 – 一如我前述, 有權在此事上說話的廣大群眾多半不會偏離中道。跟這夥混到一塊去, 一個具正當性的人權訴求就被折衷捨掉了。雖然開始像是如西藏(不管是什麼訴求) 是懷好意的(譯註: 這位間接幽了那Meanwell一默), 在國際事務上只能變成另一個(不起眼也沒人注意的)註釋。


【回應原文】
M.A. Jones Posted: Mon Jan 15, 2007 8:46 pm
KCAllen - exactly! And I would add by saying that grossly exaggerating the extent of those abuses doesn't help either - that's what compromises the legitimacy of the human rights cause in Tibet more than anything else. I mean, the claims about "cultural genocide" for starters are just plain rubbish - I mean, absolute hyped-up silly nonsense!
Sarah Ravensworth, Nelson2 and ChinaHawkeye - thanks too, for your support on this thread. I appreciate your input.
All the best,
M.A.Jones Hangzhou
中文翻譯
M.A. Jones 貼於: 2007年1月15日, 星期一, 下午 8:46
KCAllen, 對極了! 而我還加一點; 那些侵犯作惡劣的誇大無補於事 – 西藏人權問題的合法性就是不為別的, 單是這樣被取捨了。我意思是, 有關「文化滅種」從開始就是一派胡言 – 我是說, 絕對是極之無聊荒謬!
Sarah Ravensworth, Nelson2 和 ChinaHawkeye – 也謝謝你們對此檣的支持。謝謝你們的留言。祝好

M.A.Jones  杭州

【回應原文】
Sarahravensworth Posted: Tue Jan 16, 2007 8:05 am  
M.A.Jones,
Thanks for providing the 11 point summary of your position on the Tibet issue in your previous comment on this thread. It really helped me to understand where you are coming from more clearly, and it has helped me to tie all of your arguments together.
Also, I really appreciated the last few paragraphs you wrote in your comment on the other thread:

"But cultures have seldom been pure or static; and never less so than now, in what has become a largely post-traditional and increasingly hybrid world. The great issue of the age is not how to preserve cultures intact, but how to ensure that people whose cultures are changing through internal and external pressures have a significant say in defining their own future. As I keep saying, Tibetans are divided over their attitude towards China's governance - most people have very complex and conflicting views that are in constant states of flux. Some are embracing the new modernity already, and while others are keen to, some are also of the opinion that they are threatened by it....
.....Beijing's paternalism more often than not assumes what's best for its citizens. My point is that Tibetan separatists in exile and their pro-Tibet lobbyists in the affluent West are more often than not just as equally presumptuous. They do not speak for the majority of Tibetans any more than do the politicians in Beijing."

EXACTLY what I have been thinking and wanting to say. All too often we Westerners try to project our OWN images onto the peoples of the developing world, and we are so sheltered and inward-looking that we simply assume that our images of what other countries should be like corresponds with what the locals themselves want. Not all Tibetans think and act the same, and so we shouldn't allow anybody, exiles included, to get away with claiming that they represent the ideas and aspirations of the great majority.
中文翻譯
Sarahravensworth 貼於: 2007年1月16日, 星期二, 上午 8:05
M.A.Jones,
謝謝你為此欄有關西藏問題從前的看法的11點總結, 真的幫助我更清楚你的想法從何而來,貫穿了你的論點。

同時我也很欣賞你在另一欄的意見:
「但是處於大部份已變成是「後傳統」及愈來愈混合的世界裡, 文化很少是純粹或靜態的; 過去現在都如此。這代最大的問題不在於如何把文化原風不動的保存, 而是確保那些因內在或外在壓力而正在變改中的文化, 它的族群能對界定自己未來有更大的自主權。就像我一直說的, 西藏人對中國管治的態度都存在著分歧 – 大部份人都有複雜又矛盾的看法, 而且看法不停在變改中。有人已擁抱新現代化, 有人是很期貨, 也有人覺得自己是受到威脅…
…北京大家長作風往往都是假設對人民是最好的抉擇。我的論點是西藏分離份子及他們在西方大國的藏獨遊說團也往往不也一樣如此假設。他們不會比北京的政治人物能代表大多數西藏人。」

這完全是我一直在想和想說出來的。我們西方人太多時候以自己想法投射到發展中國家的人們身上, 而且我們慣於被庇護及自我中心, 使我們簡單假設自己對他國的印象就一定該與當地人的需要印合。西藏人不是人人都同一樣想法及做法的, 所以我們不應容許任何人, 包括流亡人士, 隨便聲稱他們代表了大多數人的意見和夢想。


【回應原文】
S.Ogden Posted: Tue Jan 16, 2007 4:28 pm
Well done, M.A. Jones! A remarkably coherent and incisive commentary on the Tibet issue. Australia's N.S.W. Department of Education and Training should be very pleased with you as an employee. China is lucky to have you as a teacher, and PBS is very fortunate to have had you participate in such an extended manner on this very important issue, which is usually misrepresented to the public. Tibet has become such a political issue that most commentators, not excluding academicians and journalists, lead with their emotional ideological commitments rather than with the facts and reality.
I would just add to your many sources one author that should not be overlooked: Donald S. Lopez, Jr., who is an authority on Tibetan Buddhism and has written about it extensively. Best, S. Ogden
中文翻譯
S.Ogden 貼於: 2007年1月16日, 星期二, 下午 4:26
幹得好, M.A. Jones! 對西藏問題一個極嚴謹貫徹又敏锐的評論。澳洲新南威爾教育培訓部該很高興有你這樣的職員。中國萬幸有你這樣的教員, 而PBS很榮幸有你參與這重要議題的廣泛討論。西藏這樣的政治問題讓許多評論者, 包括學者與傳媒, 都發揮自己意識情緒言論而不是憑事實與實際出發。
我只想在你那許多資訊來源中加上另一位不容忽視的作者: 唐納德•洛佩茲(Donald S. Lopez, Jr.), 藏傳佛教的權威, 而且對此有甚多著作。祝好

Ogden
 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-8 09:14 | 显示全部楼层
【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。

【回應原文】
Tibet Response Network Tue Jan 16, 2007 7:26 pm  
Actually, it wasn't me who posted regarding the information on Mark's past - it was our campaigns co-ordinator Dixon. But no, we're not getting desperate. Bear in mind that these are simply a few exchanges, albeit very interesting ones, on an open forum. As an active human rights ngo it takes a great deal more than a few postings here to get us rattled!
Dixon also mentioned to me that Sarah only ever posts in response to, or to express support for, MA Jones. So come on Sarah, don't be shy; tell us a little more about yourself.

David
_________________
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet

中文翻譯
Tibet Response Network  貼於: 2007年1月16日, 星期二, 下午 7:26
其實有關Mark過去資料那帖不是我貼的, 是我們運動聯絡人Dixon。但不, 我們並不是絕望。雖然很有穀, 但記著這只不過是公開論壇的一些交流而已。作為一個活躍的人權非政府組織, 數個回應諉斷不能把我們弄垮的!
Dixon也提到Sarah從來只發帖回應或支持MA Jones, 所以, Sarah, 別害羞, 也給我們說說你自己。


David
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet

西藏緊急回應網絡 – 與藏人為西藏工作

【回應原文】
Tibet Response Network Tue Jan 16, 2007 7:36 pm  
Over the last couple of days I've been giving thought to how I should respond to Mark's recent comments in this forum. Perhaps first it would be helpful to say where I'm coming from. I am the director of a small campaigning human rights organisation, Four Directions UK. The Tibet Response Network is a recent initiative of ours, although we have been in existence for over 25 years. As such, my interest is in people and their basic rights and, in this instance, the particular rights of Tibetans. Whilst it is not totally irrelevant to consider what is going on in Dharamsala and the exile community in general, any amount of discussion of the Dalai Lama and his position on such issues as Iraq does not change the fundamental issues regarding human rights in Tibet. I would summarise these as:

i) China has no right to govern in Tibet under the current and historic terms of international law.

ii) Not withstanding (i), the Tibetans have a basic human right to secede from China if that is the will of the majority of Tibetans in Tibet.

iii) The rule of law does not prevail in China, and Tibetans, in common with other citizens of what is now called China, are subject to arbitrary arrest, detention without trial and subsequent long-term imprisonment or even death.

iv) The Chinese police and military continue to use torture on prisoners, contrary to international law and the human rights act. It is unconscionable that they not be held to account for this by the wider community. Protestations that things are getting better is no defence and no reason to allow the present situation in Tibet and China to continue without protest and action within international law. To do anything other is similar to saying, "yes you still beat my wife but now you only do it once a week instead of twice so we'll keep quiet aobut it".

I saw His Holiness speak in London on "A Human Approach to World Peace". His talk was not "new agey" in any way. I also believe that he had good reason to speak against the cult of Dorge Shugden ( he did not "prohibit" it). However, as Mark rightly said, the world does not revolve around the Dalai Lama. So let me turn to the subject of Tibetan refugees. The United Nations indicate that about 2,000 to 3,000 refugees arrive in Nepal from Tibet each year. These are refugees, not pilgrims. It is believed that up to four times as many Tibetans try to leave the country each year but 75% of them are turned back, detained or, in some instances, shot.

Mark argues that the success of the international campaign for Tibet has led to a proportional deterioration in cultural conditions for Tibetans in Tibet (Grunfeld) and that publicity from outside Tibet encourages hard-line separatists and thus leads to further crackdowns by the Chinese authorities. Based on that argument it was fine for everyone to remain silent in pre-war Germany as Hitler's police and troops went around smashing up Jewish businesses and beating up and imprisoning his political rivals. On the contrary, I would argue that the advances in human rights within China and Tibet have largely only come about as a result of campaigns and publicity outside China.

To conclude, I would mention a TV programme I have just finished watching on the BBC. This was a live, chaired discussion about whether or not Scotland should secede from the United Kingdom - today is the three hundredth anniversary of the Act of Union. A number of people, politicians, writers, actors, artists, businessmen and others, were able to forthrightly express their views one way or the other. They and all voters in Scotland will be able to do so again at the ballot boxes in May. When Tibetans can take part in such debates in Tibet, and vote in free elections, I shall cease campaigning for Tibet. But not until then.

David Meanwell
_________________
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet

中文翻譯
Tibet Response Network  貼於: 2007年1月16日, 星期二, 下午 7:36
過去數日來我一直在想該怎回應Mark最近在這的討論。先自我介紹也許有幫助吧。我是「英國四方」, 一個小人權運動組織的主任。西藏緊急回應網絡是我們最近有的創意, 雖然我們組織已有25年以上的歷史了。故此, 我主要對人及他們的基本權利, 比如西藏人的權利, 感興趣。當然討論達蘭薩拉及流亡群社群一般情況並非離譜, 但論及達賴喇嘛及他對如伊拉克的看法等等, 卻是不會改變西藏人權的基本問題的。我把它們總結如下:

i) 在現在及歷史上的國際法條款, 中國是無權管治西藏的 (譯註: 你們英國不也在沒有任何國際法之下 – 一切不平等條約已在民國成立後被國民政府宣佈廢止! 可你們不也管了99年了嗎? 英國佬是最最最沒資格跟中國說國際法, 知道不?)

ii) 撇開(i), 如果那是大多數西藏的西藏人的意願(譯註: 又犯毛病不是? 其他小數民族跟漢族居民就沒人權了啦? 還有那是什麼樣的意願? 是獨立個人意志的, 還是受宗教牽扯的假意願?), 西藏人有脫離中國的基本人權。

iii) 中國現今不是法治, 西藏人與如今稱為中國的人民一樣, 都是遭受強行逮捕, 未經審詢被拘留, 及繼後長期監禁, 甚至是死刑。

iv) 中國公安及軍方一直對囚犯使用嚴刑, 與國際法及人權公約相違。其他社會對此不予追究是不合理的。聲稱情況在好轉不足以反駁, 而也沒理由任由西藏及中國情況一直下去而不採取抗議及國際法容許的行動。除此之外的任何行為不啻在說:「對, 你打我老婆, 但現在你已由每週兩次減為一次了, 那我們就不說什麼了。」(譯著: 把老婆改成是你爸爸跟你爺爺怎樣?也許這麼一改, 就是打死了你也改變成感激你有遺產可發財了吧?)

我看到活佛他在倫敦演講「以人道方法爭取世界和平」。他的演說完全不「新時代」。我也相信他有很好理由反對雄登崇拜(他沒有「禁止」(譯註: 他沒有, 但西藏流亡政府的旨令算不算? 他是不是該組織的最高領導? “In 21 March, 1996,* he stated publicly, “It has become fairly clear that Dolgyal is a spirit of the dark forces.” 這就好像布希宣佈伊拉克, 北韓, 伊朗為「邪惡軸心」一樣, 加上他的宗教如君王的地位, 這還用他親口公佈不許信, 否則… 而且那些要求流亡藏人宣誓不信才獲新的黃色身分證, 又是什麼回事? 流亡藏人就是要靠那點津貼, 他們根本難靠自己工作來維持生計。) 但Mark也說得對, 世界並不繞著達賴喇嘛轉(譯註: 他怎不用點他的大能呢?還是轉世的呢!) 讓我轉到西藏難民的問題上。聯合國指每年有2,000至3,000名難民從西藏到尼泊爾。這是難民, 不是朝聖者。(譯註: 那就好像你署名Meanwell, 可誰知你真Meanwell, 還是假Meanwhile?) 估計每年有四倍那麼多西藏人想離開, 但他們之中75%或是折回, 被拘或有時候被槍殺。

Mark爭辯說西藏國際運動成功導致西藏裡的藏人文化情況轉劣 (Grunfeld) , 同時西藏以外的宣傳鼓勵激烈分離主義者, 而導致中國政府進一步打壓。以此論則當希特勒的警方及軍隊在戰前到處搗毀猶太人生意, 毆打囚禁他政敵時, 大家噤若寒蟬是件好事。相反我則堅持正是中國境外的運動及宣傳才使中國及西藏的人權能有改善。

總之, 我說一個我剛看完的BBC電視節目。這是個直播的座談會討論蘇格蘭應否自大英帝國分離 – 今天是聯合法案的300週年。(譯註: 你們愛分家自己再分300多小塊也沒人阻你, 不見得你買鴉片巧取豪奪, 我們也要學你變毒販當害人精, 對吧?) 若干人, 政治人物, 作家, 演員, 藝術家, 商人及其他人, 都能直接表達不同意見。他們與蘇格蘭的所有選民可以在五月再以投票方式表達意願。什麼時候西藏人才能在西藏參與這樣的辯論及自由選舉, 我就終止我的西藏運動, 但在此以前絕不罷手。(譯註: 可以更簡單些, 先嘗試讓流亡西藏人來為雄登事件來投票討論吧, 而不是由達賴一個說了算, 更不是由藏青會來包攬內閣, 搞政治血腥暗殺活動!)


David
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet
西藏緊急回應網絡 – 與藏人為西藏工作

【回應原文】
M.A. Jones Posted: Tue Jan 16, 2007 8:24 pm
Dear S. Ogden - thank you most sincerely for your thoughtful comments. I very much appreciate your input, and will be certain to look up the works of Donald S. Lopez Jr.

I actually mentioned the piece you wrote on The Role of Elections in Representing the Chinese People and Advancing Democracy, published in the In Depth: Democracy page listed under the Episodes section of this site, as a way of introducing my piece on On the Nature of Chinese Governance and Society - which I have posted on this forum. My impressions of China's village elections seem to very closely mirror yours, if I have understood you correctly.

I'd certainly be interested in your critical comments on my other arguments concerning the nature of China's present day governance and society, if you manage to find the time and the energy to read through it (it's quite lengthy, I admit). I'm still very much in the process of developing my arguments, and although I think we share very similar views on China's system of village level democracy, I suspect that you won't agree with all of my other arguments.

All of the comments that have been left in response to my piece so far seem to be misplaced, in that none of them really relate to any of the topics that I discuss.

I think you'll find that the analysis I have developed on the nature of China's present day governance and society is not as coherent as the one I have presented here on the Tibetan issue, which is why I'm keen to have it critically dissected by others.

Warmest regards,
M.A.Jones  Hangzhou
中文翻譯
M.A. Jones 貼於: 2007年1月16日, 星期二, 下午 8:24
親愛的S. Ogden, 很感謝你貼心的回應。我很欣賞你的回應, 也肯定以Donald S. Lopez Jr. 的文字自我期許。

事實上, 我在這論壇貼的文章「論中國管治及社會性質」是提到在這站Episodes內「細析:民主」(In Depth: Democracy)刊出你的文章「選舉對代表中國人民及民主進展的作用」(The Role of Elections in Representing the Chinese People and Advancing Democracy)作為楔子引入正文的。如我理解正確的話, 我對中國農村選舉的看法似乎跟您很相似。

如果您有時間把它看完的話(我承認那文確有點長), 您對我其他有關現在中國管治性質的論點的批評, 我當然很感興趣。我還在逐漸發展自己論點的過程, 雖然我們在中國農村民主體系上意見接近, 但我懷疑你完全同意我所有觀點的。

到目前為止, 回貼的回應似乎都與我的文章沒有交集, 它們完全沒有真正討論我說的那些方面。

我想您會發覺我對中國現在管治及社會性質的分析是沒有我在西藏問題上呈現的論點來得完整及緊密的, 所以我才那麼希望別人能對它嚴格剖析。

摯誠祝福

M.A.Jones  杭州

【回應原文】
M.A. Jones Posted: Tue Jan 16, 2007 8:41 pm
Dear David Meanwell - I have no idea who Sarah Ravensworth is. I have never met her before, so she is not a close friend of mine here to barrack in my support like some kind of cheerleader, if that's what you're trying to imply.

While I certainly do appreciate her input into this discussion (along with the five or so others who have also weighed in on this debate in my favour) I do not regard this exchange of views as a competition or a sport.

I appreciate the thoughtful response that you just finished posting a short time ago, and I will take your arguments into careful consideration by chewing over them throughout the next day or so, so please be patient with me. You have raised some valid points that are worthy of a detailed response, but I have a busy schedule over the next few days, so it will take me some time before I can write one up.

All I will say for now, is that I have already addressed the fact that the United Nations recognises the thousands of Tibetans who trek into India via Nepal each year as refugees. My argument is that the vast majority of these people are pilgrims, and that they are wrongly classified by the UN as refugees. Numerous Indian academics and politicians, as I have already mentioned, know this and are beginning to complain about it, but India is too concerned about the international backlash they might face should they dare to make too strong of an issue of this. India also enjoys the support of the Dalai Lama on issues such as nuclear testing and armament practices. You have not produced any quantitative evidence to show that the majority of these "refugees" are genuine. If you go back over my comments, you will see that I have produced both quantitative and qualitative evidence to support my assertion that the overwhelming majority are merely pilgrims.

I will address your other points later.
Best regards for now,
M.A.Jones  Hangzhou
中文翻譯
M.A. Jones  貼於: 2007年1月16日, 星期二, 下午 8:41
親愛的 David Meanwell先生:  我不知道Sarah Ravensworth是什麼人, 我從來沒跟她見面, 所以她不是我朋友來當啦啦隊替我押陣助威的, 如果那是你弦外之音的話。

雖然我很謝謝她參與討論(還有另外在這討論中為我辯論為數約五位的其他朋友), 我沒把這意見交流視為競爭或是競賽。

感謝你不久前的用心回應, 我會把你的論點在未來一兩天內仔細考慮. 所以請耐心稍候。你提出一些有價值的論點值得詳細回應, 但我這兩天比較忙, 所以得費點時間才能寫好。

目前我能說的是, 我已就聯合國承認每年從西藏至尼泊爾數千名西藏人是難民一事發表過意見了。我論點是這裡面大部份是朝聖者, 而他們是被聯合國錯誤劃分成難民的。如我所言, 無數印度學者及政治人物都明白此事, 而他們也開始提出異議。只是印度很怕如果他們敢把這事捅大後, 他們可能面對的國際反彈。同時印度也從達賴喇嘛支持核試及軍事演習中受惠。你沒有提供任何顯示這些「難民」大部份屬實的數字證據。如果你重看我寫的, 你就該知道我是提供了量化及質化方面證明支持我指大部份只是朝聖者的論述。

我稍後會回應你其他數點。 暫時如此, 祝好

M.A.Jones  Hangzhou
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-12 10:06 | 显示全部楼层
【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。

【回應原文】
Tibet Response Network Wed Jan 17, 2007 7:06 am
On the matter of Tibetan refugees.

The legal definition of a refugee is:
"Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion."

Whilst it is no doubt true that a number of Tibetans arrive in India, via Nepal, for the express aim of pilgrimage they are listed as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and granted asylum by India on the basis that they are unable to return to China for fear of persecution (and see below regarding policy in Nepal).

It is estimated that there are currently around 140,000 refugees divided roughly as follows:
India: 110,000
Nepal: 20,000
United States: 4,000
Switzerland: 3,000
Canada: 1,000
Other countries: 2,000

Almost half of all Tibetan refugees today are under 25 and some of these arrive seeking job opportunities. However, many are relatively young children sent by their parents to receive a Tibetan education unavailable to them at home and, it can be argued, a freer and more prosperous future. Although over 80,000 Tibetans followed the Dalai Lama into exile in 1959/60, many of these have since died and around 15,000 of the current refugee population are over sixty. (Various sources including Buckey "Bradt Travel Guide to Tibet", Farber, "Tibetan Buddhist Life" and UNHCR.)

It is also worth mentioning that, according to the UNHCR, the Nepalese government stopped granting legal refugee status to Tibetans who had arrived from Tibet after December 1989 onwards. The Nepalese government, the UNHCR and the Tibetan government in exile expect Tibetans who have arrived in Nepal to continue through to India after a stay at the UNHCR reception centre in Kathmandu.

Nepal's legislation on immigration makes no distinction between foreigners and asylum seekers, nor does it make any specific provision for refugees. Both foreigners and asylum seekers arriving in Nepal are considered illegal immigrants if they fail to comply with Article 3 (1) of the Nepalese Immigration Act (1992), which states: "No foreigner is allowed to enter or stay in the Kingdom of Nepal without a visa". It is rare for Tibetans entering Nepal to have a visa or any legal papers.

It has become increasingly difficult for Tibetans from central Tibet, particularly Lhasa, to obtain passports in recent years, although it is still possible for them to do so if they have good connections with well-placed officials or are able to afford bribes to pass onto a "middleman" who can obtain access to officials. A Tibetan from Lhasa who is now in exile told the Tibet Information Network (TIN): "All applicants for passports and visas are screened for their background and present loyalty to China. Moreover, participation and support for the Tibetan cause is the deciding factor; one family member [with a record] is sufficient to create problems for the entire family." (Source: TIN 02/02/2002).

You might also be interested in a paper "Prevalence of mental disorders and torture among Tibetan refugees: A systematic review " (Various) located at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1308816

It concluded:
"Our review indicates that the prevalence of serious mental health disorders within this population is elevated. The reported incidence of torture and imprisonment is a possible contributor to the illnesses. Non-government organisations and international communities should be aware of the human rights abuses being levied upon this vulnerable population and the mental health outcomes that may be associated with it."

David Meanwell
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet  

中文翻譯
Tibet Response Network 貼於: 2007年1月17日, 星期三, 上午 7:06
有關西藏難民的問題上
難民的法律定義是:  

「任何在自己國家以外, 或如是無國籍人士, 在他最後居住地的國家, 而無法或不願意回去, 及因種族, 宗教, 國籍, 個別社會團體屬員身份或政見而受迫害或有證據顯示存在受迫害的恐懼, 無法或不願接受該國家的保護的人。」(譯註: 這就已經錯了, 跟最後居住沒關係, 而是涉及他有沒有居留權的問題。還有要是根據這定義, 那差不多所有非法通緝犯也有難民資格了!)

毫無疑問經尼泊爾抵印度的一些西藏人目的真是朝聖, 但聯合國難民專員公署(UNHCR) 基於他們因恐懼受迫害(見以下尼泊爾有關政策)而把他們定為難民, 由印度予以庇護的。(譯註: 荒謬, 這是DIY製造難民! 那是首先犯錯, 然後託詞恐懼被追究, 於是就成難民! 如果這道理是通的話, 那騙子也可以說, 他因擔心被揭發所以從第二次開始, 他都不逼不得已的繼續欺騙!)

估計目前約有14萬難民, 可如下劃分:
印度: 110,000
尼泊爾: 20,000
美國: 4,000 (譯註: 包括達賴兩個哥哥, 這些西方國家境內難民, 根本都是貴族後代)
瑞士: 3,000
加拿大: 1,000
其它國家: 2,000

今天全部西藏難民中大概有一半是25歲以下, 而有些是到來尋找工作機會的。但是, 許多都是較小幼童被父母送來接受他們在家裡接受不到的西藏教育, 也可以說, 是較自由和較好前途。雖然在1959/60年間有超過8萬西藏人追隨達賴喇嘛流亡, 這些人有許多已過世, 目前難民人口中約有15,000人是超過60歲的。(根據不同資料來源, 包括 (Michael) Buckley 的西藏旅遊指南(Bradt Travel Guide to Tibet), (Don) Farber的西藏佛教生活 (Tibetan Buddhist Life) 及聯合國難民專員公署(UNHCR) 。

值得一提是根據聯合國難民專員公署, 尼泊爾政府停止給予在1989年12月以後自西藏抵達的藏人合法難民身份。尼泊爾政府, 聯合國難民專員公署及西藏流亡政府預期抵尼泊爾的西藏人在聯合國難民專員公署位於加德滿都的接待中心逗留稍息後便繼續前往印度。(譯註: 好嘛, 確保難民「貨源不絕供應」,  不然, 80,000人現在死剩15,000, 不開難民源, 按人頭接受美國接濟, 如何能批出個上幾百萬的撥款? 美國的窮人不翻轉國會搶錢才怪!)

尼泊爾移民法律沒有區分外國人及尋求庇護者, 也沒有對難民有特殊立法。尼泊爾(1992)移民法第三章(1)規定: 「任何外國人沒有簽證則不許入境尼泊爾或停留。」凡不符合此規定抵達尼泊爾的外國人或尋求庇護者一律被視為非法移民。從進入尼泊爾境的西藏人很少有簽證或任何法律文件。

西藏中部, 特別是拉薩的西藏人愈來愈難獲發護照, 雖然他們跟負責官員有良好關係或是有錢能通過「中間人」賄賂官員仍能辦到手。一位來自拉薩如今流亡的西藏人告訴西藏資訊網 (Tibet Information Network (TIN)) : 「所有護照及簽證申請人都經過背景及目前對中國忠誠度的篩濾, (有否)參與及支持西藏獨立是決定因素; 家庭成員中有一人[有紀錄]就足以為全家人構成麻煩。」 (來源: TIN 2002年2月2日)

你也許有興趣看一下一篇名為「對西藏難民中盛行精神失常及折磨的系統分析」, 有(多處)連結:
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1308816

它結論為:
「我們分析顯示在此人群中盛行嚴重精神失常有升高跡象。所報稱的折磨及囚禁是疾病的可能原因。非政府組織及國際社會應關切對這弱勢族群的人權侵犯, 以及相關的精神健康問題。」

David Meanwell
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet  
西藏緊急回應網絡 – 與藏人為西藏工作

【回應原文】
M.A. Jones Posted: Wed Jan 17, 2007 7:48 am
Dear David,

I shall now like to respond to the arguments you raised in your previous comment.

1. You assert that "China has no right to govern in Tibet under the current and historic terms of international law."
On what legal authority are you basing this argument on?

As far as I am aware, every single nation on earth formally recognises Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. And do you want to know something else - this has always been the case, even long before Beijing decided to invade and occupy Tibet in 1951. In 1942, the U.S. State Department for example, formally notified the Chinese government that it had at no time raised any doubt about the Chinese sovereignty claim over Tibet.

The attitude of the United States remains unchanged. A report prepared for Congress in 1994 even expressed a very explicit anti-Dharmasala position:

"Historically, the United States has acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Since at least 1966, U.S. policy has explicitly recognized the Tibetan Autonomous Region...as part of the People's Republic of China. This long-standing policy is consistent with the view of the entire international community, including all China's neighbours: no country recognizes Tibet as a sovereign state. Because we do not recognize Tibet as an independent state, the United States does not conduct diplomatic relations with the self-styled 'Tibetan government-in-exile.'"

Indeed, Tibetans have always required Chinese passports to enter the U.S. - always, both before and since the occupation of 1951.

Allow me to be lazy (I don't have very much time on my hands at present) by quoting at length a passage from Wikipedia:

"Not a single sovereign state, including India, has extended recognition to the Tibetan Government-in-exile in the more than two decades of its existence. This lack of legal recognition of independence has forced even some strong supporters of the refugees to admit that "even today international legal experts sympathetic to the Dalai Lama's cause find it difficult to argue that Tibet ever technically established its independence of the Chinese Empire, imperial, or republican."

So the position held by the United States is exactly the same as the position held by literally every other country on earth. So I ask you again David - on what legal arguments do you base your assertion that China has no rights under international law to exercise sovereignty over Tibet?

And please don't waste my time by citing the findings of the self-proclaimed "International Commission of Jurists" which is essentially a non-government human rights organisation representing the political agenda of the Tibet lobby. Their legal assertions hold little weight among the world's experts in international law.

The fact that every nation on earth recognises China's sovereignty over Tibet in itself legitimises China's claim of sovereignty. Surely nobody can really argue against that?

The only country that, historically, has ever challenged China's soveriegn claims to Tibet was Britain, and that was back in late 1903 when Britain invaded Tibet in an attempt to force it into accepting trade relations. The British finally managed to seize Lhasa in August 1904 and forced the Tibetans to sign a Convention to open up trade. They refused to remove their troops from Tibet until an indemnity was paid.

The Chinese protested the invasion and occupation of Tibet, and the British, eager to avoid a wider conflict, then agreed to negotiate the situation with the Qing Court. The resultant 1906 Anglo-Chinese Convention, as Professor Melvyn Goldstein has pointed out, "reaffirmed the Chinese overlord position in Tibet and restricted the British role primarily to commercial affairs."

Further more, "the invasion of Tibet and the Lhasa Convention of 1904 dramatically altered Chinese policy toward Tibet. Until then, the Qing Dynasty had evinced no interest in directly administering Tibet. The British thrusts now suggested to Beijing that unless it took prompt action its position as overlord in Tibet might be lost and Tibet could fall under the British sphere of influence. The Qing Dynasty, although enfeebled and on the brink of collapse, responded with surprising vigor. Beijing got the British troops to leave Tibetan soil quickly by itself paying the 2.5 million rupee indemnity to Britain, and began to take a more active role in day-to-day affairs in Tibet. Britain's casual invasion of Tibet, therefore, stimulated China to protect what it felt were its national interests in Tibet by beginning a program to integrate Tibet culturally, economically, and politically more closely with the rest of China." (see Goldstein, Tibet, China and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question, 1995).

Let's move on to address your second argument. You say that, even if China does have a legal right of soveriegnty over Tibet, "the Tibetans have a basic human right to secede from China if that is the will of the majority of Tibetans in Tibet."

Perhaps? But quite clearly the majority of Tibetans in Tibet do not want to secede from China, do they? Just because the majority of Tibetans feel ambivalent towards China's governance, isn't to say that the majority want full independence. Even the Dalai Lama himself is no longer calling for independence. The fair majority would most likely appreciate the introduction of a system of self-governance, but this is far more likely to evolve in a climate of stability, don't you think? The instability and divisiveness caused by the separatist movement merely acts as a fetter on the TAR's economic and social development, and of the liberalisation this brings, thereby delaying the development of those conditions favourable enough to allow for the introduction of a system of Tibetan self-government.

Your third argument holds little weight with me too. The "rule of law" cannot simply be implanted into a developing country as large and as complex as China. It's something which has to evolve over time, and its evolution requires both cultural and socio-economic requisites. Needless to say, the "rule of law" is indeed evolving in China, and at an impressive rate too I might add, as the American-based lawyers who run the very excellent China Law Blog have been doing a great job at documenting over the past twelve months or so.

If the Tibetans were to be given self-government today, you can bet your life that their theocratic rulers would also subject their citizens "to arbitrary arrest, detention without trial and subsequent long-term imprisonment or even death." Indeed, the way Tibetans were treated by their lama theocrats prior to the 1951 invasion was horrendous, and human rights abuses there were far far far worse than they've ever been since - according to all serious historians of Tibet, that is. Even if you want to dispute the assertion that they were worse prior to 1951, you cannot deny that human rights abuses were just as serious and as widespread back then (and I'm talking right up until the final days before the 1951 invasion too, by the way!)

The chances of successfully implanting the "rule of law" or a parliamentary "democracy" in present day Tibet (should it suddenly be granted self-government) are about the same as are the chances of being able to succeed in introducing these kinds of institutions to a country like Iraq. Or to Iran, or Afghanistan, etc.

"Modern democracy," as Samuel Huntington points out, "is a product of Western civilization. It is rooted in social pluralism, the class system, civil society, the credo of rule-of-law, the experience of a system of personal political representation, the separation between spiritual and secular authority, and the insistence on individualism. All these cultural traits can be found in the traditions of Western Europe, and began to appear there more than a thousand years ago."

All of these things, however, are very new to China, and have only just begun to develop there over the past 15 to 20 years. Development is uneven too, and the economic and social benefits of China's new capitalism are only just now really starting to "trickle down" to Tibet.

In your fourth argument you very slyly seek to misrepresent my position on the Tibet human rights issue, which is most disingenuous of you. I have never argued that human rights abuses in Tibet shouldn't be documented and drawn to international attention, or that criticisms of China's abuses shouldn't be voiced on the international stage. I have already, more than once on this forum, made that perfectly clear. I have never suggested that the world ought to remain silent on the human rights abuses that take place in Tibet, or anywhere else in the world for that matter.

My argument is that the extent of these abuses shouldn't be exaggerated - that it is important to present a fair and soberly balanced assessment of the present human rights situation in Tibet. My charge is that the self-proclaimed Tibetan Government in Exile and its supporters in the Tibet lobby do just that - that they exaggerate the seriousness and extent of human rights abuses (sometimes grossly) and that in doing so they compromise the legitimacy of the Tibetan human rights issue, and that the political agenda they push consequently worsens the plight of Tibetans by creating the conditions in which Chinese hardliners can succeed.

You have presented nothing here to convinced me otherwise.

Your point about the nature of the "refugees" to India I have already covered, in not one but three separate postings already made on this thread. I suggest you go back and read over them more carefully. As I said, if you want to convincingly counter my claim that the vast majority of Tibetans who trek into India each year are pilgrims and not refugees, then you need to support your position with some solid empirically verifiable evidence. Quoting the personal testimonies of a few hundred or even thousand genuine refugees will not be sufficient enough to show that genuine refugees make up the majority, or that their experiences are widespread within the TAR. The fact that 60% plus of all those Tibetans who trek into India each year under the guise of being refugees are aged 25 or under, and that few of them make the trek with their parents or even other family members, speaks volumes in itself. More than 20% are aged under 13.

(To be continued, 這位老兄下筆千言, 只好分開來貼)

[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-7-12 10:13 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-12 10:09 | 显示全部楼层
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。
(Continued, 接上文)

You yourself, in your last comment, quoted a source acknowledging that "almost half of all Tibetan refugees today are under 25 and some of these arrive seeking job opportunities. However, many are relatively young children sent by their parents to receive a Tibetan education unavailable to them at home and, it can be argued, a freer and more prosperous future."

Yep! Exactly! This is precisely my point, and it's exactly what cctang said too.

Actually, this quote comes from a secondary source, and so I'm not sure what year the figures are for. The figures I used earlier, which come from the Government in Exile's own studies, published in the Tibet Bulletin, are for the year 2004, and show that 60.21% of its "refugees" are aged under 25, and that one in five of all "refugees" that year were aged 13 or under - though obviously the percentages will vary a little from year to year. This particular writer says that "some" arrive seeking job opportunities, while "many" are sent by their parents to receive an education. This makes them economic refugees at best, not political refugees - some may say illegal visitors! Many more are simply pilgrims who illegally enter Nepal, as the qualitative evidence that I have drawn upon quite clearly shows. And many of them, when interviewed, express their intentions of returning to the TAR once they've been blessed or "educated". They have not ventured into India for "fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group or political opinion" then have they? They have other motivations.

Many Tibetans who trek into India are genuine refugees, I know. I have never suggested otherwise. In fact, I have already quite explicitly acknowledged this. But the majority are not. For the Tibetan Government in Exile to go on pretending that the 1,500-3,000 Tibetans who arrive on their doorstep each year are mostly escaping political and religious persecution is dishonest.

David, you point out that "Nepal's legislation on immigration makes no distinction between foreigners and asylum seekers, nor does it make any specific provision for refugees. Both foreigners and asylum seekers arriving in Nepal are considered illegal immigrants if they fail to comply with Article 3 (1) of the Nepalese Immigration Act (1992), which states: 'No foreigner is allowed to enter or stay in the Kingdom of Nepal without a visa'. It is rare for Tibetans entering Nepal to have a visa or any legal papers."

EXACTLY!!!! This only goes to help further prove my point.

You mention the fact that "over 80,000 Tibetans followed the Dalai Lama into exile in 1959/60." Yes, this was the largest wave, and many of these were indeed genuine political refugees. But the situation in Tibet now is very different from the way it was back then. In fact, the human rights situation at this time was considerably worse throughout many other parts of China than it was in Tibet. The same can be said right up until the late 60s to early 70s.

Finally, let me say that it seems a little silly to be comparing today's Scotland with a country like China, which is a developing country. Economic development, naturally, is uneven, and China's western regions (like that of the TAR) have quite a long way to go before they catch up with the more urbanised east (according to the United Nation's Human Development Brief, Shanghai's level of development for example is now comparable to that of Portugal, while places like Shaanxi rank as low as 158 out of the 177 countries indexed.) As I keep saying, there are cultural, economic and educational requisites for the flowering of institutions such as parliamentary democracy and the "rule of law", and so I'm afraid that affluent Westerners like yourself will just have to exercise a little more understanding and patience.

David, if you ever find the time to read through the first part of my piece On the nature of Chinese governance and society, you will appreciate where I'm coming from when I levy the charge of ethnocentrism at you, for when it comes to your ideas and attitudes about democracy and the "rule of law", you seem all too readily inclined to make what I see as being universalising abstractions - which as recent history has shown, can be very dangerous and costly.

That said, I have enjoyed having this discussion with you, and I appreciate the time and effort that you have taken to engage with me in debate. I think it's very honourable and virtuous of you to want to campaign for the improvement of human rights in Tibet - I know I say that at the risk of sounding patronising, but I say so with sincerity. But I think that it is morally wrong and counter-productive to exaggerate the extent of such abuses, especially to the point of hyping up claims to even include charges of "cultural genocide" - when the very opposite (a cultural renaissance) is in fact occuring.

Warmest regards,
M.A.Jones  Hangzhou

【中文翻譯】
M.A. Jones  貼於: 2007年1月17日, 星期三, 上午 7:48
親愛的大衛

我現在就回應你之前回應的論點

1. 你說「在現在及歷史上的國際法條款, 中國是無權管治西藏的」
你是根據那個司法機構作此論的呢?

以我理解, 世界每個國家都正式承認中國對西藏的主權。而你想知道嗎 – 甚至在北京決定在1951年進軍西藏前就一直就如此, 。舉例說, 1942年美國國務院就正式告知中國政府它就中國對西藏的主權從無異議。

美國的態度一直沒變。1994年為國會準備的報告書裡還明確一個很清楚的反達蘭薩拉的立場:
「歷史上, 美國承認中國對西藏的主權。至少自1966年, 美國政策是承認西藏自治區…是中華人民共和國的一部份。 這長久以來的政策是與包括中國鄰國在內的整個國際社會的看法是一致的: 沒有國家承認西藏是主權獨立國家。因為我們不承認西藏是獨立國家, 故此美國跟自稱西藏流亡政府沒有任何外交關係。」

的確, 西藏人一直都被要求持中國護照進境美國 – 在1951年被佔的前或後, 一直如此。

容我偷懶一下(我現在也真沒太多時間)引述 Wikipedia的一大段:

「包括印度在內, 沒有一個主權國在西藏流亡政府存在超過廿年多來承認它。這缺乏合法承認的獨立甚至迫使一些強烈支持難民的人士也承認: 「就是今天同情達賴喇嘛訴求的國際法律專家也感到很難申辯西藏技術性確立它曾從中國獨立, 不管是帝國中國或是共和中國。

所以美國的立場是跟世上基本所有其他國家是完全相同的。所以我再次問你大衛 – 你是基於什麼法律論點來說中國是無權在根據國際法來行使對西藏的主權?

還有請不要引述一些自稱「國際法學家委員會」的發現來浪費我時間, (譯註: 罵得太好了, 就是一撥在西方的lobby團, 給自己掛個動聽權威名稱, 就真認為國際法就是他們說了算! 台獨的情況也是一樣, 炒什麼民族自決, 可民族自決是指殖民地, 日本已把台灣交還原國, 不存在殖民地問題, 於是又扯什麼舊金山條約)那主要是一個代表西藏遊說團政治議題的非官方人權組織。他們的法律言論在國際法專家裡是沒有份量的。

世界每個國家都承認中國對西藏的主權, 這事實的本身就裁定了中國主權的合法性。肯定沒人能對此還能拗的吧?

歷史上唯一曾挑戰中國對西藏主權的是英國, 然而那是在1903年末英國入侵西藏企圖迫使它接受貿易關係的時候。英國最後在1904年8月成功攻佔拉薩, 及迫西藏人簽署開放貿易的和約。他們拒絕在沒獲賠償前把軍隊自拉薩撤退。

中國對侵略及佔據西藏提出抗議, 而英國為避免擴大衝突, 同意與清廷談判。最後達成1906的英中協定, 一如梅尔文•戈尔斯坦教授指出: 「重新確認中國對西藏的宗主國地位, 並把英國的角色限制為主要在商業事宜上。」

還有, 「入侵西藏及其後1904年的拉薩協議大大改變了中國對藏政策。在此以前, 清朝表明沒有興趣直接管治西藏。英國插入提醒了北京除非它立即就其宗主國地位有所行動, 否則很可能失去西藏, 西藏因此會落入英國人控制範圍。清朝雖然衰弱及在崩潰邊緣, 出乎意表猛烈反應。北京支付英國250萬盧比以求英軍自行迅速離西藏境, 而開始積極參與西藏的日常事務。英國偶然入侵西藏, 於是刺激中國捍衛它自覺是在西藏的國家利益, 而開始有計劃把西藏在文化, 經濟及政治上與中國其他地方結合起來。(參考戈尔斯坦, 西藏, 中國及美國: 西藏問題的反映, 1995)

讓我們繼續回應你第二點。你說, 就算中國對西藏有合法主權, 「如果那是大多數西藏的西藏人的意願, 西藏人有脫離中國的基本人權。」

也許? 但很清楚在西藏的大部份西藏人並不想脫離中國,  對吧? 單純因為大部份西藏人對中國管治不滿, 並不能說成大部份人想全面獨立。就是達賴喇嘛自己也不再喊獨立。大部份人最可能希望有個自治的制度, 但這必須在穩定局勢下演變才有可能的, 你同意不? 分離主義者製造的不安不和只會縛死自治區的經濟及社會發展, 以及由此可能帶來的自由化, 於是延誤有利條件能發展至理想程序以容許締造西藏自治政府。

你第三點對我也是無足輕重的。「法治」不能簡單地移植到像中國這大而複雜的發展中國家的。這是需要時間慢慢演進, 同時是需要文化及社會經濟條件的。

不必多說, 「法治」正在中國演進當中, 而且我必須加一句, 速度可觀, 由美國一些律師經營很出色的中國法律博客China Law Blog在過去約12個月就把一切都成功記錄下來。

如果今天讓西藏人有自治政府, 你可以賭上性命他們神權統治者也一樣會被人民「強行逮捕, 未經審詢被拘留, 及繼後長期監禁, 甚至是死刑」的。確實的, 1951以前西藏人被他們喇嘛神權統治者如何對待是駭人, 根據所有嚴謹的西藏歷史學家 – 當時的人權侵犯情況是比其後的情況惡劣太多太多。就算你想反駁1951年前是否更差, 你也不能否認當時人權侵犯是同樣的嚴重及普遍 (還有, 我是講直至1951年入侵前那最後數天為止!)

(如果突然獲許有自治政府)在今天西藏, 把「法治」或國會式「民主」成功移植的機率就跟把這些設計引入像伊拉克, 或伊朗或阿富汗等的機率差不多。

「現代民主」就如山姆•亨廷顿(Samuel Huntington)指出: 「是西方文明的產物。它是紮根在社會多元化, 階級制度, 公民社會, 法治信條, 個人政治表述體系的體驗, 精神及俗世權力的分離, 及對個體主義的堅持。這些文化特性都能在西歐傳統中發現, 而且存在超過一千年以上。」

但這一切對中國而言都很新鮮, 而且只在過去15到20年才開始發展。發展也不平均, 中國新資本主義的經濟及社會效益才剛剛開始「點滴」輸入西藏。

在你第四點裡, 你很狡猾的歪曲了我對西藏人權的立場, 你真是太不誠實了。我從來沒有說西藏侵犯人權的事實不應被記錄及讓世界正視, 或是不應在國際場合為批評中國侵犯人權發聲。我已多次在這論壇裡清楚明白表達過。我從來沒有表示世界應該對西藏或其他地方的人權侵犯事件緘默。

我的論點是侵犯人權的程度不應被誇大 – 而把現在西藏人權狀況公平認真平衡地評估是很重要。我指責的是自命為西藏流亡政府及它在西藏遊說團中的支持者就是那樣 – 把侵犯人權 (有時很不堪入目的)誇大它我嚴重性及範圍, 正因這樣做, 他們犧牲了西藏人權問題上的正當性, 於是他們推出的政治議題因此為中國強硬派創造條件讓他們得逞, 而使西藏人處境更加艱難。

你完全沒提出能說服我的東西。

有關你提出「難民」性質的論點我早已不止一次而是在本欄三個不同帖子裡論述過。我建議你回去重新仔細閱讀。像我說, 你想有力駁倒我指每年跋涉去印度的大部份西藏人是朝聖非難民的說法的話, 你必須以實則能驗證的經驗證據來支持自己論點才行。引述數百甚至上千真實難民的個人聲明是不足以顯示這些真實難民構成那大部份, 或他們的經驗在自治區裡屬普遍現象。單從每年跋涉往印度自稱難民的西藏人中, 有超過60%是在25歲以下, 同時又甚少有父母或其他親屬同行, 這本身就大大說明一切。何況其中超過20%還是年齡在13歲以下的。

你自己也在最後一次回應中引用一個來源承認「今天全部西藏難民中大概有一半是25歲以下, 而有些是到來尋找工作機會的。但是, 許多都是較小幼童被父母送來接受他們在家裡接受不到的西藏教育, 也可以說, 是較自由和較好前途。」

對呀! 正是如此! 這正就是我的論點, 也正是cctang所說的。

事實上, 這引述來自一個第二手來源, 所以我不確定那些數字是那一年的。我先前引用的資料是來自流亡政府自己的研究, 刊登在西藏公報是有關2004年的, 顯示它「難民」中有60.21%是低於25歲, 而在該年的所有「難民」中, 每五名就有一名是年齡在13歲或以下的。這位作者說「有些」前來找尋工作, 而「許多」是被他們父母遣來接受教育。這就使他們頂多成為經濟難民而不是政治難民了 – 有些甚至可叫作非法遊客! 有更多只是非法進尼泊爾境的朝聖者, 就像我曾引用的質性證據清楚顯示的 (譯註: 要選天下最牛朝聖人士, 非西藏人莫屬, 什麼國界, 出入境手續, 全白搭, 愛怎行就怎行, 難民是免死金牌, 丹書鐵券!) 他們當中許多人被訪時表示他們一旦受加持或「開示」後就打算返回西藏自治區的。他們到印度並非為了「因種族, 宗教, 國籍, 個別社會團體屬員身份或政見而恐怕受迫害」, 對吧? 他們沒有其他動機。

我知道許多遠赴印度的西藏人是真正的難民。我從來沒有質疑這點。事實上, 我已就此很清楚表示過。但大部份人不是。西藏流亡政府持續假裝每年到達那1,500-3,000名西藏人主要是為了躲避政治及宗教迫害是不誠實的。

大衛, 你指出「尼泊爾移民法律沒有區分外國人及尋求庇護者, 也沒有對難民有特殊立法。尼泊爾(1992)移民法第三章(1)規定: 「任何外國人沒有簽證則不許入境尼泊爾或停留。」凡不符合此規定抵達尼泊爾的外國人或尋求庇護者一律被視為非法移民。從進入尼泊爾境的西藏人很少有簽證或任何法律文件。」

正是如此!!!!  這只進一步幫助證明我的論調。

你說「在1959/60年間有超過8萬西藏人追隨達賴喇嘛流亡」。對, 這是最大的一波, 而這些人中許多的確是政治難民。但西藏現在情況跟當年大大不同了。其實, 現在中國其他地方的人權狀況比西藏更壞。60年代末至70年代初, 情況也是這樣的。

最後, 讓我說似乎把今天蘇格蘭與中國這樣一個發展中國家相比是很笨拙的。經濟發展很自然是不平均, 而中國西部(像西藏自治區那樣)還有很長的路才能趕上較都市化的東方(根據聯合國人類發展簡報, 舉例來說上海發展水平是跟葡萄牙相近, 而像陝西這些地區在177個列出的國家中, 排名是158那麼低而已) 就像我一直講的, 國會式民主及「法治」這些機制開花結果是需要具備文化, 經濟及教育條件的。我想像你那樣生活富足的西方人恐怕必須有更多了解和耐性了。

大衛, 如果你有時間把我有關中國管治性質及社會一文看完, 你會了解我為什麼說你是我族中心主義, 因為你對民主及「法治」的想法及態度都太容易傾向我看來是以偏蓋全抽象化 – 這一如近代史顯示, 是可能很危險及代價高昂的。

說了那麼多, 我很高興跟你討論這些, 也很謝謝你費時間及精神跟我辯論。我認為你想為改善西藏人權而投身運動是很崇高及道德的 – 我知道我這樣有被說是在摸頭的危險, 但我是誠懇說這話的。但我覺得把人權侵犯如此誇大, 特別甚至是當事實正好相反時, 作出包括「文化滅種」等指控在道德上是錯的, 而且是反效果的。

祝好

M.A.Jones  杭州

[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-7-12 10:18 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-19 15:20 | 显示全部楼层
【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。

【回應原文】
Sarahravensworth Posted: Wed Jan 17, 2007 6:19 pm   
David and Dixon,

The reason that nearly all of my comments are written in response to M.A.Jones's comments is because I have a strong interest in this debate and the topic of Tibet, and M.A.Jones is the one who is most articulating my views. I have also left comments responding to your comments not just his, but I agree with his views, not yours. Is that O.K. with you David? and Dixon? I am allowed to write comments in response to the Tibet debate only, or do I also need to write comments responding to every other thread on this forum as well?

I do not know M.A.Jones, I know little about him, and no, I am not Chinese, and I do not live in China either. Or Australia.

Which country am I from and write from? I'm not telling you. If I wanted to reveal my personal details on this site I would have left information on my profile.

M.A.Jones,
Thank you for clarifying your stance on the soveriegnty issue. I have been wondering where you stand on that, since you have avoided getting into that debate up until now. And bravo again!

中文翻譯
Sarahravensworth 貼於: 2007年1月17日, 星期三, 下午 6:19
David and Dixon,

我回應差不多全是就M.A. Jones的言論而發的原因是我對這西藏問題的辯論很有興趣, 而M.A.Jones是最能清楚表達我觀點的。我也有對你的言論回應, 不單是他的, 但我贊同他的論點而不是你的。你有問題嗎, David? 還有 Dixon? 我獲准只對西藏辯論回應, 還是我必須對這論壇每一個欄都要寫點回應才行?
我不認識M.A.Jones, 對他所知甚少, 而且不, 我不是中國人, 我也不住在中國, 或是澳洲。
我來自什麼國家, 從那裡回應? 我不會告訴你。如果我想在這網站透露個人資料的話, 我就會在個人版面寫上。

M.A.Jones,
謝謝說明你就主權的立場。我就在猜這問題上你看法怎樣, 因為直至現在你都在辯論中迴避說明那點。而再為你喝采!


【回應原文】
Tibet Response Network Posted: Wed Jan 17, 2007 7:03 pm
Dear Mark,

Thank you for your response.

It is not true to say that every nation on earth recognises Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Significantly, the United Kingdom does not and has repeatedly reaffirmed this position. For example:

Para 97 of the Tenth Report of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (22/11/2000): "The United Kingdom is the only country which does not recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, though it does not recognise Tibet as independent. Since 1943, "successive British Governments have regarded Tibet as autonomous while recognising the special position of the Chinese there."

In a meeting in 2001 the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated, for the record "The UK is the only country that does not recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Equally however we do not recognise Tibet as being independent and neither does any other country although we believe that the Tibetans should have a greater say in running their own affairs". More recently see "House of Commons Hansard Debates" for 28 Jun 2005 (pt 39).

However, the legality of any claim by Tibet to independence does not rest on the question of recognition or otherwise by other nations. Based upon history, particularly between 1901 and 1959, we (Tibet Response) believe that a cogent legal argument can be presented for the legitimacy of a Tibetan claim to independence.

I'm sure it won't surprise you to learn that I do not share your contempt for the International Commission of Jurists. I also find it somewhat ironic that you should lecture me about wasting your time by referring to them when you post quotes from Wikipedia, hardly a reliable source in that anyone can go online and edit its content.

I cannot see how you can support your comment "but quite clearly the majority of Tibetans in Tibet do not want to secede from China". In fact, it is far from clear what they want as they do not enjoy the right to freely express such aspirations, assuming they have them. Until they do we cannot know either way.

You go on to say "If the Tibetans were to be given self-government today, you can bet your life that their theocratic rulers would also subject their citizens to arbitrary arrest, detention without trial and subsequent long-term imprisonment or even death." Forgive me for being blunt here, but that comment is complete nonsense.

On what basis do you contend that were Tibet to become independent it would be ruled by "theocratic rulers"? Further, you offer no evidence that the human rights abuses in Tibet were "far worse" prior to the 1950 invasion than since. I know of no "serious historian of Tibet" who has made such an unequivocal contention; yes many are critical of the feudal system of Tibet but I can find no reference to abuses at, say, the level of those perpetrated during the Cultural Revolution or the 1959 crackdown.

I am not pretending that Tibet was Shangri La prior to invasion but reforms were being made up to 1950 and, for example, no one went hungry - in direct contrast to the situation during the "Great Leap Forward".

I did not seek to misrepresent your position on the Tibet human rights issue, slyly or otherwise. You simply cannot have it both ways. Either Tibet support and human rights groups are wrong to speak out because their actions cause Chinese clampdowns (as you alleged) or their criticisms should be freely voiced.

Your argument that the Tibetan Government in Exile and the Tibet lobby "exaggerate the seriousness and extent of human rights abuses (sometimes grossly) and that in doing so they compromise the legitimacy of the Tibetan human rights issue" is preposterous. The documentation to support contentions of serious human rights abuses throughout China, from 1950 to the present, is large and readily available.

Your comment "I suggest you go back and read over them more carefully" is patronising. Nor do I need to be lectured regarding human rights and the reporting of refugees and how I should "support my position". Yes, pilgrims visit Nepal and then travel on to Tibet. Pilgrims visit sacred sites and return home. Refugees do not. You are correct when you say few of the younger exiles make the trek with their parents or other family members. This in itself speaks volumes; these children are not despatched as religious pilgrims but as refugees sent into exile by their parents.

You say it is the Tibetan Government in Exile who "pretend" there are up to 3,000 refugees a year escaping to India. In fact these figures are supported by the UN and given further credence by the granting of refugee status to these Tibetans by the Indian government. That Tibetans arriving in Nepal have no papers or visas can as easily be taken as indicative of their refugee status as of proving your point that they are "pilgrims". I repeat my previous assertion; pilgrims return home, refugees do not.

Finally, I used the example of Scotland as something for us all to aspire to for China and Tibet. I agree that we need to exercise understanding and patience but whilst doing so we also need to continue to "speak truth to power".
Like you I am enjoying our open debate.

Regards,
David Meanwell
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet

中文翻譯
Tibet Response Network貼於: 2007年1月17日, 星期三, 下午 7:03
親愛的Mark,
謝謝你的回應。
稱每個國家都承認中國對西藏的主權的說法並不真確。明顯地, 英國就沒有而且不斷重申這立場。例如: 外交事務特別委員會(22/11/2000)第10次報告第79段: 「英國是唯一不承認中國對西藏的主權, 雖然它不承認西藏是獨立的。自1943年, “繼任英國政府一直視西藏為自治區, 但承認中國在那裡的特殊地位。”

英國外交及聯邦辦事處在2001年一次會議中聲明備案“英國是唯一不承認中國對西藏的主權。但與此同時我們不承認西藏是獨立的, 其他國家也不承認, 雖然我們相信西藏人對處理他們自己事務上應有更大自主”。更近期者參考2005年6月28日 “下議院辯論紀錄”(第39點)。

但是西藏獨立訴求的合法性並不取決於其他國家的承認與否。根據歷史, 特別在1901至1959年間, 我們(Tibet Response)相信存在西藏獨立訴求合法性的有力法理依據。

我肯定你不會奇怪我對你藐視國際法學家委員會並不苟同。同時我對你跟我說教不要引用他們來浪費你時間, 自己卻引用人人都可以上網修改內容, 完全不可靠的Wikipedia覺得很諷刺。

我無法看到你憑什麼說「但很清楚在西藏的大部份西藏人並不想脫離中國」。事實上, 他們願望明白不過, 因為假設他們有這樣願望時, 他們都沒那自由表達出來。在那之前, 我們根本無法知道他們怎想的。

你接著說「如果今天讓西藏人有自治政府, 你可以賭上性命他們神權統治者也一樣會被人民「強行逮捕, 未經審詢被拘留, 及繼後長期監禁, 甚至是死刑」的。」恕我直言, 那點完全荒謬。

你憑什麼斷言西藏獲獨立後它將由「神權統治者」管治? 還有, 你沒提供證據證明西藏侵犯人權事件在1950年入侵之前比之後是「惡劣太多太多」。我就沒看到有「嚴謹的西藏歷史學家」曾作如此不含糊的議論。沒錯許多人對西藏封建制度批判, 但我找不到有, 比如像文革或1959年鎮壓的那樣侵犯程度。

我不是假設西藏在被佔前是香格里拉, 但改革到1950年一直在進行中, 比如, 當時沒人挨餓 – 跟大躍進時情況明顯不同。

我沒有狡猾或以其他方式企圖對你就西藏人權問題上的立場作誤導。你根本不能玩上下其手。要嘛西藏支持者或人權組織嗆聲是錯的, 因為那導致(如你所稱)中國壓制, 要嘛他們應能自由發表批評。

你指西藏流亡政府及它在西藏遊說團「把侵犯人權 (有時很不堪入目的)誇大它我嚴重性及範圍, 正因這樣做, 他們犧牲了西藏人權問題上的正當性」的論點是前後顛倒的。證明自1950年至今中國普遍出現人權侵犯情況的文件比比皆是。

你說「我建議你回去重新仔細閱讀」是狂妄的, 我也無需你教我有關人權及難民報告, 及我應如何「來支持自己論點」。沒錯, 朝聖者去尼泊爾然後就去西藏。朝聖者去過聖地就回家。難民卻不。你說得對年輕的流亡者很少有父母或親友陪同。這本身就比數目更道出事實; 這些兒童不是被父母送來朝聖而是來流亡的。

你說是西藏流亡政府“假裝”每年到達那1,500-3,000名難民逃到印度。事實上這些數字聯合國也認可, 同時印度政府更進一步承認而給予這些西藏人難民身份的。那些抵尼泊爾沒有文件或護照的西藏人也很容易像你用來證明他們是朝聖者, 同樣被用來顯明他們是難民。我重申我前面所說: 朝聖者最後回家, 難民卻不。

最後, 我用蘇格蘭的例子作為我們對中國及西藏的願景。我同意我們必須了解及有耐心, 但在同時我們也需要繼續「向強權說出事實」。

跟你一樣, 我很高興能公開辯論。祝好

David Meanwell
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet
西藏緊急回應網絡 – 與藏人為西藏工作

[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-7-19 15:22 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-20 04:03 | 显示全部楼层
【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。

【回应原文】
M.A. Jones Posted: Thu Jan 18, 2007 4:13 am
Dear David,

Thanks again for your thought-provoking response to my arguments.

I stand corrected on the earlier claim that every single country on earth recognises China's sovereignty over Tibet. One country doesn't, which is, as you say, Britain. But Britain's position on the issue is quite vague. And why is Britain the only country on earth that refuses to recognise China's sovereignty over Tibet? Could it have anything to do with the fact that Britain had withdrawn its recognition in 1903 as a way of justifying its invasion of Tibet, and that to recognise it now would be to admit past errors of judgement? One can't help but to be cynical.

At any rate, Britain is completely isolated on this issue internationally, and may very well overcome its recalcitrance at some point in the not-too-distant future.

The fact remains however, that every single country on earth but one, recognises China's sovereignty over Tibet, and this alone lends legal legitimacy to China's sovereign claim under international law. You may not like to admit that, but it's a fact. Ask any lawyer who specialises in international law.

The one quote that I used from Wikipedia was taken from a primary source, otherwise I wouldn't have quoted Wikipedia. The statement by the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office that you quote can also to be found on Wikipedia - had you cited Wikipedia as the secondary source of your quote, I simply would have checked Wikipedia to find out where that statement originally came from. I expect the same thoroughness from you - not a cheap shot levied against me for citing Wikipedia.

You say that "the legality of any claim by Tibet to independence does not rest on the question of recognition or otherwise by other nations" and that "based upon history, particularly between 1901 and 1959, we (Tibet Response) believe that a cogent legal argument can be presented for the legitimacy of a Tibetan claim to independence." Details please? What do the claims of Tibetan separatists to the right for independence rest upon? You provide absolutely no details. If they are the justifications offered up by the London-based human rights organisation calling themselves the International Commission of Jurists then I already have my response prepared.

The fact is David, that not all Tibetans desire full independence, and not all Tibetans even desire the return of the Dalai Lama for that matter. True, the majority probably do desire the return of the Dalai Lama, and the fair majority probabaly would like a system of self-governance, but it's highly questionable as to whether or not the majority want full independence. Without solid empirically verifiable evidence of a quantitative nature, Tibetan lobbyists like yourself cannot assert with any confidence or authority that the majority do. Yet how many times have I heard Tibetan lobbyists voicing claims that "all" Tibetans want independence?

I take your point that nobody can say for sure either way without a referendum, but why should Beijing encourage separatists by holding such a referendum? China's sovereign claims to Tibet are large geopolitically inspired, and always have been. Let us deal here with the realities of realpolitik, shall we? The Dalai Lama himself even is no longer calling for independence!

You want to pretend also that should Tibet ever be given its independence, that a theocratic elite would not emerge to seize political dominance. Are you really that naive David? Who do you think runs the Tibetan Government in Exile? The majority are tulkas (the religious elite) of course. Most ethnic Tibetans who hold positions of political power within the TAR are also tulkas, as are most of the educated, worldly and wealthy. Just exactly who do you think are the likely ones to fill the political vacuum shoud Tibet be granted either self-governance or full-independence? Mostly educated and privileged exiles, right? Tulkas mostly, in other words.

You say that you have found no references to serious human rights abuses in Tibet prior to 1951 that compare with those abuses that occured during the Great Leap Forward. I suggest you widen your reading then, to include those studies produced by academic historians. Leigh Feigon's book, Demystifying Tibet would be a good place to start.

Torture and cruelty were far more widespread and systematically carried out under the governance of the lama theocracy - and I'm talking right up to the very last days before the Chinese invasion and occupation. As Leigh Feigon, Michael Parenti, Mariana and Herbert Röttgen and many other scholars and historians have pointed out, the sexual magic practices which lie at the centre of lamaism "are based upon a fundamental misogyny. The social misery of the masses in old Tibet was shocking and repulsive, the authority of the priestly state was absolute and extended over life and death." And the legal system was especially cruel: “Bizarre mutilations like blindings, the cutting off of limbs or tearing out of tongues, deliberately allowing people to freeze to death, the pillory, shackling, yoking, lifelong imprisonment in damp pits all count as common punishments up until the 20th century, even after the 13th Dalai Lama had introduced a number of moderations.” Every major monastery in fact, "had a dungeon where tortures comparable to those used in Europe’s Middle Ages persisted until very recently, and these monasteries were often decorated by human body parts," as A.Tom Grunfeld has noted in his book on The Making of Modern Tibet.

In 1959, Anna Louise Strong visited an exhibition of torture equipment that had been used by the Tibetan monastic overlords. "There were handcuffs of all sizes, including small ones for children, and instruments for cutting off noses and ears, gouging out eyes, and breaking off hands. There were instruments for slicing off kneecaps and heels, or hamstringing legs. There were hot brands, whips, and special implements for disemboweling." The exhibition presented "photographs and testimonies of victims who had been blinded or crippled or suffered amputations for thievery. There was the shepherd whose master owed him a reimbursement in yuan and wheat but refused to pay. So he took one of the master's cows; for this he had his hands severed. Another herdsman, who opposed having his wife taken from him by his lord, had his hands broken off. There were pictures of Communist activists with noses and upper lips cut off, and a woman who was raped and then had her nose sliced away." (see Anna Louise Strong, Tibetan Interviews, 1959.)

When Stuart and Roma Gelder visited Tibet in the early 1960s, they interviewed a former serf, Tsereh Wang Tuei, who had stolen two sheep belonging to a monastery. For this he had both his eyes gouged out and his hand mutilated beyond use. He explains that he no longer is a Buddhist: "When a holy lama told them to blind me I thought there was no good in religion." (see Stuart and Roma Gelder, The Timely Rain: Travels in New Tibet, 1964)

You say that nobody went hungry in pre-1951 Tibet. You're wrong. By all accounts, Tibet had many thousands of beggars, and you also overlook, rather conveniently, the fact that significant numbers of Tibetans welcomed the Chinese intervention as "liberation." One 24-year old runaway serf for example, told Anna Louise Strong that he welcomed the Chinese intervention, claiming that "under serfdom he was subjected to incessant toil, hunger, and cold. After his third failed escape, he was merciless beaten by the landlord's men until blood poured from his nose and mouth. They then poured alcohol and caustic soda on his wounds to increase the pain." (see Anna Louise Strong, Tibet Interviews, 1959.)

I'm not arguing that Tibet would be likely to return to this exact same level of law enforcement should it gain self-governance or independence, but I do think it highly likely that if the Tibetans were to be given self-government today, that its citizens would inevitably end up being subject to arbitrary arrests, detention without trial and subsequent long-term imprisonments, and that's because European-style Enlightenment values have yet to take a hold among today's Tibetans, though such values are likely to over time as Tibet develops its economy and modernises - though I'm speaking generations here!

Your next point merely goes to show that you still have not read me carefully enough. "You simply cannot have it both ways," you say. "Either Tibet support and human rights groups are wrong to speak out because their actions cause Chinese clampdowns (as you alleged) or their criticisms should be freely voiced."

Let me repeat my argument one more time: human rights organisations and individuals are right to speak out about human rights abuses wherever they occur, and they are right to voice criticisms internationally to shame those governments responsible for carrying out or endorsing or allowing such abuses. That is my position, and it has been my position all along.

It is also my position that human rights organisations should not exaggerate the extent of abuses because to do so compromises the legitimacy of human rights issues, and invites, consequently, backlashes from the governments of those nation states under fire - thereby creating the political conditions in which hardliners can come to the fore.

To me this is just plain common sense, and I see no inherent contradictions in my position: speak out and voice criticisms but don't exaggerate. Simple honesty is always the best policy, and so yes, if you are in the business of exaggerating human rights abuses in China then you should indeed be lectured.

David, you say that "the documentation to support contentions of serious human rights abuses throughout China, from 1950 to the present, is large and readily available."

Well, I agree. But the fact remains that (a) the human rights situation in China has been steadily improving in most areas over the last 20 years, and (b) the extent to which human rights abuses occur throughout China today - including within the TAR - are exaggerated by the Tibetan lobby (sometimes grossly, as with their claims of "cultural genocide".)

Your claim that "children are dispatched as refugees and sent into exile by their parents" sounds very dubious to me. Where is your qualitative evidence to support this claim? Or is it merely an assumption?

More likely David, most of those children who are sent to India are sent there to study. Most of the qualitative evidence that I have seen, some of which I quoted in my earlier comments on this thread, show this to be the case.

You say that the granting of refugee status by the Indian government and the UN to the thousands of Tibetans entering India each year verifies their authenticity as real refugees. But as I keep pointing out, a growing number of Indian politicians and academic researchers are challenging this, and India's motives for granting refugee status to Tibetans are clear - they enjoy important diplomatic support from the Dalai Lama in exchange for their recognition - support which includes, among other things, the public endorsement by the Dalia Lama of their nuclear testing and nuclear armament program.

Those Tibetans that do decide to stay and to apply for refugee status know very well the kinds of things they need to say in order to be classified a "refugee". Let us not kid ourselves about that either.

Once again, I repeat my position: some are genuine refugees, most are not.

Not having a visa, by the way, is in no way whatsoever indicative of their refugee status. It simply means that they either do not qualify for a visa, or that they know that they have little chance of being granted a visa should they try applying for one. They rely instead, on paying smugglers to journey them illegally across national borders.

David, you say that you are, like me, "enjoying our open debate." Throwing the word "open" into the sentence was less than subtle, but yes, I take your point. But keep in mind that I am participating in this debate from China, and that there are, if I am not mistaken, some on this site who are Chinese and who are also contributing to this discussion from within China - and just as freely as you are. Indeed, the issues we are discussing openly here on this forum are also discussed and debated quite openly on many Chinese-based forums, like the China Daily online forums for example.

Finally, you say that you agree with me that understanding and patience need to be exercised, and that "whilst doing so we also need to continue to 'speak truth to power'."

Well, I'm glad that we can agree on something at least. The question though is what is "truth"? And can "truth" ever be exaggerated?

All the best, M.A.Jones   Hangzhou

中文翻译
M.A. Jones贴于: 2007年1月18日, 星期四, 上午 4:13
亲爱的大卫

再次感谢你对我论点的刺激思考回应。
在此我修改之前每个国家都正式承认中国对西藏的主权的说法。一个国家没有, 那是如你说的, 英国。但英国在此问题上的立场很暧昧。同时为什么英国会是世界上唯一的国家拒绝承认中国对西藏的主权呢? 会否是因为英国在1903年撤回它的承认以便为自己入侵西藏能出师有名, 如今要是承认了就等于承认过去判断错误? 对此不能不让人齿冷的。

无论如何, 英国这问题上是在国际完全孤立, 而且很可能在不太久的将来改变其不入流的顽强。

事实剩下来就是全世界除了一国外都承认中国对西藏的主权, 而单是这样就足以让中国主权在国际法上具合法性。你也许不愿意承认, 但那是事实。请教任何一位专攻国际法的律师吧。

我引用那Wikipedia的资料是只有一个单一来源, 要不我就不会引用Wikipedi了。你引用的英国外交及联邦办事处声明也可以在Wikipedia找到 – 假如你作第二手资料引用了Wikipedia的话, 我也只需要查Wikipedia找出声明的原始来源就成了。我是期许你会如此慎密 – 而不是这样俗的来贬斥我引用Wikipedia的。




[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-7-20 04:14 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-20 04:27 | 显示全部楼层
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中文翻译
M.A. Jones贴于: 2007年1月18日, 星期四, 上午 4:13
亲爱的大卫

再次感谢你对我论点的刺激思考回应。
在此我修改之前每个国家都正式承认中国对西藏的主权的说法。一个国家没有, 那是如你说的, 英国。但英国在此问题上的立场很暧昧。同时为什么英国会是世界上唯一的国家拒绝承认中国对西藏的主权呢? 会否是因为英国在1903年撤回它的承认以便为自己入侵西藏能出师有名, 如今要是承认了就等于承认过去判断错误? 对此不能不让人齿冷的。

无论如何, 英国这问题上是在国际完全孤立, 而且很可能在不太久的将来改变其不入流的顽强。

事实剩下来就是全世界除了一国外都承认中国对西藏的主权, 而单是这样就足以让中国主权在国际法上具合法性。你也许不愿意承认, 但那是事实。请教任何一位专攻国际法的律师吧。

我引用那Wikipedia的资料是只有一个单一来源, 要不我就不会引用Wikipedi了。你引用的英国外交及联邦办事处声明也可以在Wikipedia找到 – 假如你作第二手资料引用了Wikipedia的话, 我也只需要查Wikipedia找出声明的原始来源就成了。我是期许你会如此慎密 – 而不是这样俗的来贬斥我引用Wikipedia的。

你称“西藏 獨 立诉求的合法性并不取决于其他国家的承认与否”, 还有“根据历史, 特别在1901至1959年间, 我们相信存在西藏 獨 立诉求合法性的有力法理依据”。来点详细的好吗? 西藏 分 离主义者的独立权利诉求有何根据? 你完全没有提供详细。如果是位自称国际法学家委员会的伦敦人权组织提供的理据的话, 那我的回应已准备好了。

大卫, 实际上并非所有西藏人都希望完全独立, 甚至并非所有西藏人都希望达赖喇嘛为了那原因而回去。没错, 大部份人也许希望达赖喇嘛回去, 而大概有相当多人希望一个自治的制度, 但是否大部份人想完全独立则甚为可疑的。没有确凿可查证的经验数据证明之前, 像你那样的西藏游说团不可能有信心或权威去断言大部份人那么想。可是有多少次我听西藏游说团大声疾呼声称“所有”西藏人希望独立?

我接受你说在没有公投前无人能知道他们取向的那点, 但为什么北京应鼓励分离者举行那种公投呢? 中国对西藏的主权主要是地缘因素引发, 而且一直如此。让我们在这里面对现实政治的现实, 成不? 达赖喇嘛本人都不再要求独立啦!

你还是想假想如果西藏有朝获许独立, 神权精英不会冒出来夺政治权。你不是那么天真吧, 大卫? 你想是谁在西藏流亡政府里当家? 大部份当然是图嘉(tulkas 宗教精英)。在西藏自治区里居要位掌权, 跟大多数俗家有钱的受教育的西藏人, 也是图嘉。要是西藏获许自治或是完全独立, 你想谁最大可能填补那政治真空呢? 当然是受教育及有特权的流亡人士, 对不? 换言之, 主要就是图嘉。

你说你找不到1951年前西藏严重侵犯人权比大跃进时更甚的引述, 我建议你扩大阅读范围, 包括一些历史学家的研究, 利.费贡(Leigh Feigon)的书解密西藏应该是很好的开始。

在喇叭神权统治下的折磨及残暴远为普遍及系统化 - 我说的是算到到中国入侵及占领之前几天。正如利.费贡, 迈克尔•帕伦蒂,卢根夫妇及其他许多学者及历史学家都曾指出, 喇嘛教核心的性幻做法“主要是建立在贬抑女性。群众在旧西藏社会的悲惨情况是骇人及可憎的,僧侣王国的权力是至高无上而且覆盖着生与死的。”而且法律制度尤其残忍:“离奇的残刑如剜眼, 断肢或拔舌, 故意让人冻死,手枷, 桎梏,负轭, 在潮湿地窖终身监禁,甚至是达赖13世加以缓和后, 这些直至20世纪全都属于惯有刑罚。”事实上每座寺院“直至最近一直都有地窖作像欧洲中古时代那些刑罚, 而这些寺院过去经常以人体部份来作装饰”谭.戈伦夫在他《现代西藏的诞生》一书中如是说。

1959年,安娜.路易丝.斯特朗参观一些被西藏寺院恶霸曾用过的刑具展览(译注:斯特朗为美国著名左派作家,记者http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anna_Louise_Strong 以下译文, 我不知你们, 我边译边起鸡皮疙瘩) “那里有不同尺码包括一些小的用于儿童的手镣,及用来切鼻子耳朵, 剜眼及断手的工具。还有工具是用来削去膝盖和脚踝,或是断腿筋的。那里有烙具,鞭笞及除去内脏的特殊工具。”展览中陈列“照片及因偷盗而被弄瞎或殃残或截肢的受害者证词。有个牧人因主人不肯还他代支的钱和麦子, 于是他拿走主人一头牛而因此双手被切断。另一牧人因反对主人拿走他的妻子而双手被打断。还有照片是共产党活跃份子的鼻子和上唇被切下来, 和一个女人被强暴而且之后鼻子被割下来。”(参考安娜.路易丝.斯特朗,西藏采访,1959)

1960年代早期, 斯图尔特和罗玛.盖尔德(Stuart & Roma Gelder)去西藏时, 他们采访了一名叫Tsereh Wang Tuei的前农奴。他偷了寺院两头羊因而被剜去双眼, 手也致残得废掉。他解释他已不再是佛教徒:“当一个喇嘛下令弄瞎我时, 我想宗教一点都不好。”(参考斯图尔特&罗玛.盖尔德, 及时雨:新西藏之行, 1964)

你说1951年前没人挨饿, 你错了。不管你怎算, 西藏当年有数以千计的乞丐, 而你也蛮爽快的忽略掉有相当多西藏人欢迎视中国干预为“解放”。一名24岁逃走的农奴告诉安娜.路易丝.斯特朗他欢迎中国干预,声称“在农奴制度下, 他一直不断苦干, 饥寒交迫。第三次逃跑失败后,他被地主的人打到鼻子跟咀巴鲜血直流。然后他们在他伤口倒上酒精及烧硷来增加他的痛楚。”(参考安娜.路易丝.斯特朗,西藏采访,1959)

我不是在说西藏一旦获自治或独立就会回到这一模一样的执法水平, 但我相信如果今天西藏获自治, 它的人民最终很可能面对强行逮捕, 未经审询被拘留, 及继后长期监禁, 而那是因为欧洲式的启蒙价值尚有待在今天西藏人扎根, 虽然这些价值观会随西藏经济现代化发展(建立), 虽然我此言只是从广义而论。

你接下来那点只证明你依然没够仔细看我写什么。你说:“你根本不能玩上下其手。要嘛西藏支持者或人权组织呛声是错的, 因为那导致(如你所称)中国压制, 要嘛他们应能自由发表批评。”

让我再次重申我的论点: 人权组织及个人在出现侵犯事件时发声是对的, 他们发表世界性评论羞辱那些为执行或附和或纵容侵犯的政府是对的。那就是我的一贯立场。

但我也认为人权组织不应夸大侵犯程度, 因为那就牺牲了人权质疑的正确性, 而随之让那些被抨击的政府国家能够还击, 而于是制造了强硬派能上场的政治机会。

对我而言, 这是明白不过的普通常识, 我看不出我立场有何自相矛盾之处: 发声批评, 可是不要夸大。简单如实永远是最佳策略, 所以没错, 你要是在夸大中国的人权侵犯情况, 那你就真该被好好的教训。

大卫, 你说“证明自1950年至今中国普遍出现人权侵犯情况的文件比比皆是。”

这个, 我同意。但事实还是不容否定(a) 中国大部份地区的人权状况在过去廿年来持续改进中, 而且(b) 今天包括西藏自治区的中国境内, 人权侵犯程度是被西藏游说团所夸大的(有时很不堪地, 比如说成“文化灭种”)

你那“儿童被父母送来流亡”的说法听来很可疑。你有质量的证据何在? 又或这只是一个假设?

大卫, 较有可能的是那些被遣去印度的儿童是为求学而去的。我看过这方面质量证据, 有些我已引述过, 显示这才是真正情况。

你说印度政府及联合国给予上千名每年进入印度的西藏人难民身份就是证明他们是真难民。但如我一直指出, 愈来愈多印度政治人物及学者都提出异议, 印度给予西藏人难民身份的动机很明白 - 他们从达赖喇嘛那里获取重要外交支持来作认可难民的交换 – 支持有很多, 其中包括达赖喇嘛为他们的核试及核武计划军事演习的公开背书。

那么决定留下及申请难民身份的西藏人都很清楚他们该说些什么才会被列作“难民”。我们就不要在此自欺了。

再次, 我重申立场: 有些是真难民, 大部份不是。

再者, 没有签证不管怎样都不能显示他们属难民。它只代表他们不符合获签证的条件, 或他们知道自己要是申请也很少机会获发签证。他们于是就靠付钱给偷渡集团带他们非法越过边界。

大卫, 你说跟我一样“很高兴能公开辩论”。里面加了“公开”, 意思有点怪怪, 不过, 我同意你说法。但要记着是我是从中国这里参加辩论, 而且要是没错, 这论坛有些参与者是中国人及从中国参与的 – 我们都跟你一样畅所欲言。确实, 我们在此公开讨论的问题也是在许多中国论坛上很公开地交流辩论的, 比如中国日报线上论坛就是了。

最后, 你说同意我观点我们必须了解及有耐心, 而且“同时我们也需要继续“向强权说出事实”

很欣慰我们至少能同意一些事情。但问题是什么是“事实”呢? 而且“事实”能否被夸大呢?
祝一切好

M.A.Jones   杭州


【回應原文】
Ambivalent  Posted: Thu  Jan 18, 2007 6:49 amI just want to congratulate both David Meanwell and M.A.Jones, a great effort guys!!!! It's good to be able to read your exchanges, your fleshing out of ideas and arguments, and following this debate has helped me to clarify my own ideas about Tibet. As I've already made pretty clear in earlier remarks, I agree more with the position held by M.A.Jones, but I am very concerned about his tastes in music. Did you REALLY pay money to see Culture Club in concert? Oh dear!

中文翻译
Ambivalent贴于: 2007年1月18日, 星期四, 上午 6:49
我只想恭喜David Meanwell 及 M.A.Jones, 你们都很用功!!!!看到你们的交流是好事, 你们互相抛出想法及论点, 而看这辩论帮助我厘清自己对西藏一些想法。正如我之前表示, 我比较认同M.A. Jones的立场, 不过我很担心他对音乐的品味。你真付钱去看文化俱乐部演唱会? 噢, 真是的!


[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-7-20 10:50 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-28 03:11 | 显示全部楼层
文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。

【回應原文】
Tibet Response Network Thu Jan 18, 2007 8:09 pm
Dear Mark,

Thank you for your detailed response to my reply.
Of course, you are right when you say that Britain's position is quite vague; another description I've heard applied is "not very helpful". I believe there are some other countries who have not pronounced either way on the Tibet / China "issue" although I cannot produce any evidence of that at present. I am certain that the UK's position is historically based but rather than remaining policy because to do otherwise would be to admit to past errors, I think it owes more to a significant pro-Tibet lobby in the UK parliament.

You ask for details of our historical argument for the legitimacy of a Tibetan claim and then put in another dig at the International Commission of Jurists (who are based in Geneva, not London by the way; "Justice" is a branch of the ICJ and is based in London). I'd be interested in what it is that you have particularly against this organisation as it may shed further light on where our differences lie within this debate.

This, as you can appreciate, is a huge subject. The PRC claims that Tibet has been part of China since the 13th century and there are well documented arguments against this contention available on the Internet. I indicated that we believe a cogent case for Tibetan right to self governance can be put forward based on more recent history. Very briefly then; from 1911 until the arrival of Chinese troops in Tibet in 1950, Tibet exercised effective control over its territory and engaged in international relations. The last Qing Emperor had garrisoned troops in Tibet, but the Tibetans formally expelled them in 1911, an clear assertion of sovereignty. The new Chinese Republic conceded the independence of Tibet and invited Tibet to join the new Republic, thereby acknowledging that Tibet was not as such a part of the Republic. The Dalai Lama telegraphed the President that the Tibetans "are quite capable of preserving their existence intact and there is no occasion for the President to worry himself at this distance or to be discomposed". Nonetheless, the President of China unilaterally declared Tibet a province of China.

Between 1918 and 1931 Tibet and China exchanged charges of border violations and open fighting broke out in 1931 and resulted in Tibetan territorial gains. The fighting ended in a truce in November 1931, under which Tibet retained control of all areas it occupied and China paid Tibet an indemnity. The parties subsequently amended the agreement in 1932 and 1933 however, to re-institute the boundaries previously agreed to in 1918.

Tibetan representatives attended Chinese Parliamentary sessions in 1946 and 1948, but they were there to observe, not to take part. The leader of the Tibetan delegation expressly affirmed that they had not recognised or signed the new Chinese constitution adopted by the Chinese assemblies. On the contrary, the Tibetan delegates attended these 'Constitutional Assemblies' for the purpose of presenting to the Chinese Government Tibet's proposals for their future relations.

I fully accept that not all Tibetans desire full independence, and that not all Tibetans desire the return of the Dalai Lama although, as you say, the majority probably (I'd say certainly) do. I do not assert that the majority of Tibetans want full independence, maybe they do and maybe they don't. And I am not naive enough to believe that, even if they do, they are likely to achieve it in the near future.

Clearly you have problems regarding the Government in Exile in general and with "the religious elite" in particular. Unlike you, I see some very healthy signs of new order and emerging democracy within the exile community and the government. Given a gradual transition to some level of self-government, possibly short of full independence, I believe that a balanced, open democracy would emerge within Tibet.

I have read Lee Feigon's book, Demystifying Tibet ; it sits on the shelf in my office and is beside me as I type this. I have to repeat that I find no statement saying that abuses in pre-PRC Tibet were worse than those which followed the invasion. I have already said that Tibet was no Shangri-La. Yes there was torture, imprisonment in terrible conditions, maiming and death. But I repeat, these were not at the volume of those which followed. The average Tibetan had more to be scared of in Communist occupied Tibet than they did in the Lamaist state. Can you show me where Feigon says otherwise?

You catalogue a number of instances of torture, etc. perpetrated within lamaist Tibet. I still say worse followed from 1950 and can find no historian who has ever made this comparison and found the opposite to be true. However, this has limited relevance to my basic position; contraventions of human rights continue in Tibet today. We cannot change the past but we can change the future.

The fact that Tibet had many thousands of beggars does not equate with them being hungry; within the culture of Tibet, and many other eastern countries, begging was an honoured profession and the giving of alms a meritous deed. And yes, numbers of Tibetans no doubt did welcome their "liberation". I'd hazard that pretty much all of them changed their minds before the passage of ten years, however.

I fully agree that human rights organisations should not exaggerate the extent of abuses. We agree also that groups and individuals should speak out and voice criticisms but not exaggerate. I hope that I am prone to such exaggeration.

Another point of agreement between us is that most children sent to India go there to study. Where we differ is as to whether or not they are refugees. I believe that they are and clearly, up until now, the Indian government do also. I certainly cannot see how you can call a child who has to leave their family and country in secret and treks across dangerous mountains (dangerous not least because they might be shot in them) to stay for years in India a "pilgrim".

Finally, I would be interested to learn on what you base your contention that the Dalai Lama endorses India's nuclear programme? As recently as 1 November 2006, speaking in Hiroshima, His Holiness called for the abolition of all nuclear weapons.

Regards,
David Meanwell
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet

中文翻譯
Tibet Response Network 貼於: 2007年1月18日, 星期四, 晚上 8:09

親愛的Mark

感謝你的詳細回應。
當然, 你說英國立場模糊是說對的; 我聽過另一些描述是「不太有幫助」。雖然我此刻無法提證, 可我相信還有一些國家在西藏/中國「問題」上是沒有對那邊傾斜的。我肯定英國態度是基於歷史, 不便因要承認過去錯誤而有所改變, 故我認為它需要在英國國會有更強的支持西藏的遊說運作。

你問及我們在西藏主權合法性的歷史理據詳情, 那就請你在國際法學家委員會那裡深耕吧(順告, 他們是在日內瓦, 不是在倫敦, “公義”是ICJ的一支, 他們是駐倫敦的。) 我很感興建你有什麼具體對此機構不滿之處, 因為它可能啟示我們辯論分歧的原因。

你也該體認到這是個大題目。中華人民共和國聲稱西藏自13世紀就是中國的一部份, 而在網路有大量很完整的反駁資料在案。我指出我們相信較近的歷史能為西藏有權自治提出令人信服的基礎依據。簡單些吧, 從1911年直至1950年中國軍隊入藏, 西藏對它的領土有效管治及處理對外關係。清代最後一位皇帝曾在西藏駐軍, 但1911年西藏人正式驅逐了他們, 一個很清楚的宣示主權。新民國承認西藏的獨立, 同時邀請西藏加入新民國, 於是承認了西藏之前並不是民國的一部份。達賴喇嘛發電報給總統說西藏人「有能力維持他們情勢不變, 總統不必憂心於千里之外或是煩惱。」但中國總統單方面宣稱西藏是中國的一個省。(譯註:“在1911年10月武昌起义后,不到两个月中,中国内地的18个省中有14个省宣告独立。这些独立是对清廷而言,是拒绝清廷统治,为了争取一个有利于自己的中央,而并不是要脱离中国。” 詳細資料請參閱[url=http://209.85.141.104/search?q=cache:RBCky_wUt1AJ:www.tibet-china.com/knowledge/20 ... %B8%BD%E7%B5%B1&;hl=zh-TW&ct=clnk&cd=1]http://209.85.141.104/search?q=cache:RBCky_wUt1AJ:www.tibet-china.com/knowledge/20 ... %B8%BD%E7%B5%B1&;hl=zh-TW&ct=clnk&cd=1[/url])

在1918至1931年間, 西藏及中國互相指責對方越過邊境並於1931年發生戰鬥, 結果西藏小獲疆土勝利。戰鬥於1931年11月停火, 西藏保有所佔土地控制而中國給西藏賠款。但雙方其後於1932及1933年修訂協議, 把邊界還原到從前1918年的原狀。(譯註: 我在網上只查到 “1931年11月,中國國民黨在南京召開第四次全國代表大會。西藏地方參加會議”。大家可以從此了解, 老外他們得到是什麼樣的“歷史事實”)

西藏代表參加了1946及1948年中國國民大會, 但是以觀察員身份而非代表身份出席的。西藏代表團首席清楚確定他們不承認或簽署國民大會通過的新憲法。相反, 西藏代表參加國民大會是為了向中國政府遞交未來關係的建議書。(譯註: 真有趣, 建議書遞一次不夠, 還得遞兩次? 是否第一次裡面錯字連篇, 被老師退回去重新抄好改正?)

雖然我完全接受你說的不是所有西藏人都希望完全獨立, 而且不是所有西藏人都希望達賴喇嘛回去, 但(我肯定說)大多數會這麼希望。我並沒有斷言大多數西藏人想完全獨立, 也許他們想, 也許不想。我也不會幼稚相信, 即使他們想, 他們能在不久將來達到目的。

很明顯你對流亡政府, 特別是「宗教精英」有所不滿。跟你不同, 我在流亡社群及政府裡看到新秩序及民主萌芽的非常健康的跡象。在一個漸次過度到某種自治政府, 也許沒法完全獨立, 我相信會有一個平衡開放的民主在西藏出現的。

我看過利•费贡的解密西藏一; 它就在我辦公室的書架上, 如今在我打字時就在旁邊。我得重覆說我沒能找到一句說中共佔西藏前的侵犯是比入侵之後更差的。我也說了西藏不是香格里拉。但折磨, 極惡劣的囚禁情況, 致殘及死亡。我重覆, 過去那些不是如後來者那樣的大量。一般西藏人懼怕中共佔領下的西藏遠甚於喇嘛統治時(譯註: 你自己想當然而已吧!) 不然, 你說說费贡在那裡說不同的情形?

你編列了一串西藏喇嘛時期犯的酷刑。我仍舊說1950年以後更糟, 而找不到任何歷史家曾經對此有所比較證明相反情況才是真實的。但這對我基本立場也沒多大影響; 今天人權侵犯在西藏仍繼續著。往者已難改變, 但來者卻可追。

西藏有上千乞丐的事實不等於他們是挨餓; 在西藏及東方國家的文化, 行乞是件光榮的職業, 讓施者能行善舉。也對, 有些西藏人歡迎他們的「解放」。不過, 我打賭他們差不多在十年未過就全都改變主意了。(譯註: 你就吹吧, 一切都想當然的自編自作, 把托缽跟行乞混為一談, 一竅不通在扮代表。)

我完全贊同人權組織不應誇大侵犯的事實。我們也同意組織及個人應說出真相及批評, 但不應誇大。我希望我傾向這樣的誇張行為。(譯註: 呵呵, 這就叫鬼拍後腦梢, 不打自招了! 似乎此人不像是英國人, 許多字都拼錯, 如此簡單的負負得正的文法, 居然會弄錯!)

我們共通的另一點是大多數去印度的兒童是為了去求學。所不同的是, 他們是否是難民。我相信他們是, 而且很清楚地, 印度政府至今也相信是。顯然我看不出一名要偷偷離開家庭國家, 越過險惡山嶺(不但是山勢而且很可能在那裡被射殺)去印度生活數年的兒童, 你如何能稱之為「朝聖者」。(譯註: 笨蛋, 那不叫朝聖者, 而是經濟偷渡客! 唸書是為了生活前途, 所以是為了經濟, 而不是被政治壓迫, 而且是被達賴那些免費教育利誘, 於是也是因為經濟原因。)

最後, 我很有興趣知道你基於什麼說達賴喇嘛為印度核計劃背書? 就是最近2006年11月1日在廣島, 活佛他呼籲取消所有核武。(譯註: 這有啥? 只證明達賴是個一時說一套, 前後不一的人罷了)

祝好

David Meanwell
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet  

西藏緊急回應網絡 – 與藏人為西藏工作

【回應原文】
M.A. Jones Posted: Thu Jan 18, 2007 9:00 pm
Dear David,

My teaching responsibilities are now over for this semester, and right now I'm in the middle of packing so that I can return to Shenzhen. I have a flight to catch later in the day, and it's unlkely that I'll be able to find the time to search all of my references so that I can respond adequately until some time in the middle of next week. So please be patient.

My copy of Feigon's book is in Shenzhen, so I'll be able to refer to it in more detail next week. But Feigon is by no means the only writer that I referred to. There are some historians who live in the West of Tibetan ethnicity whose works I shall also quote from when I write you up my reply later next week.

Until then, all the best,
M.A.Jones  Hangzhou

中文翻譯
M.A. Jones  貼於: 2007年1月18日, 星期四, 晚上 9:00
親愛的大衛
在這裡我這學期的教學告一段落, 如今我在整理行裝回深圳。今天稍後我得搭機, 所以不太可能有時間翻查我所有參考資料, 恐怕要待下週中才能有空充分回應了。請候。

我那本费贡的書在深圳, 下週才能詳細翻閱。但•费贡可不是我提及的唯一作者。還有一些在西方生活的藏族歷史家, 我下週回覆時就能給你引述了。

下週見, 祝好

M.A.Jones  杭州


【回應原文】
Sarahravensworth Posted: Mon Jan 22, 2007 1:13 am  
David and Dixon,

You said "I certainly cannot see how you can call a child who has to leave their family and country in secret and treks across dangerous mountains (dangerous not least because they might be shot in them) to stay for years in India a "pilgrim"."

But M.A.Jones is not saying these children are "pilgrims", at least that's not my understanding of what he has written. He says many people are pilgrims, others are there for an education.

His argument I think is that when people cross national borders illegally into India through Nepal to make religious pilgrims or to enter schools in Dharmasala, that these people are not fleeing from torture and human reghts abuses, etc. They have other motives. If they decide to stay after arriving and then decide that the best way to do this is to apply for refugee status, then good luck to them. But his point is that they are not fleeing because of persecution - in some cases he says they are (and this normally occurs in waves he says)- but the majority are not fleeing persecution, but are seeking religious blessings or an education.

中文翻譯
Sarahravensworth 貼於: 2007年1月22日, 星期一, 凌晨 1:13
David and Dixon,
你說「顯然我看不出一名要偷偷離開家庭國家, 越過險惡山嶺(不但是山勢而且很可能在那裡被射殺)去印度生活數年的兒童, 你如何能稱之為「朝聖者」。」
但M.A.Jones沒有說這些兒童是「朝聖者」, 至少那不是我理解他所寫的。他說許多人是「朝聖者」, 其他是去求學。

我想他的論點是當人民經尼泊爾非法越境到印度朝聖或是到達蘭薩拉求學, 這些人並非是為逃避折磨及人權侵犯等等。他們有其他動機。如果他們決定抵步後留下, 及決定因此申請難民是最佳途徑, 那祝他們好運。但他的論點是他們不是為躲避迫害而竄逃的 – 有些地方他說他們是 (他說一般是一波波的) – 但大部份人不是躲避迫害, 而是尋求宗教加持或教育。


[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-8-1 09:32 编辑 ]
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【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
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【回應原文】
M.A. Jones Posted: Thu Jan 25, 2007 12:51 am
Dear David - I have now settled back into Shenzhen, where I will stay for the next few weeks, and so I am now in a position to be able to respond to your last comment in the detail that it deserves. Thanks for being so patient with me.

Let me begin by addressing your argument that “from 1911 until the arrival of Chinese troops in Tibet in 1950, Tibet exercised effective control over its territory and engaged in international relations.”

You are overstating your case here a little I think. For starters, you say that “the last Qing Emperor had garrisoned troops in Tibet”, but that the Tibetans “formally expelled them in 1911.” This alone is factually incorrect – a clever distortion of the historical facts by those sympathetic to the Tibetan independence cause. You say that you have read Feigon’s book, so you should know that the account that he provides differs from the one you have just given here – and Feigon himself of course, as you would know, is himself quite biased in the way that he presents information in favour of the Tibetan independence movement. Nevertheless, he does provide a reasonably honest account in most areas, and every history book that I have read on this particular historical matter corresponds to the account provided by Feigon, which reads like this:

The Tibetans did not rise up and expel Chinese troops in an aggressive “assertion of sovereignty” as you have claimed. Rather, in 1911, a rebellion overthrew the Qing dynasty and established a Chinese republic. The Chinese-Manchu army in Tibet consequently “dissolved”. (Feigon, p.114) It was not “expelled”, although this was the case in eastern Tibet (in the areas that are now a part of Yunnan and Sichuan provinces). The Khampas won back some territory against the Chinese warlord who competed with them for territory, using weapons supplied to them by the Russians, incidentally. But fighting over control of Khamdo had been taking place on and off for centuries, and in the same way that warlords throughout the rest of China were always fighting with one another over territorial control.

In 1912 the new President of China, Yuan Shikai, as you said, issued a proclamation claiming Tibet to be an integral part of China.

But you then go on to claim that this same new Chinese Republic “conceded the independence of Tibet and invited Tibet to join the new Republic, thereby acknowledging that Tibet was not as such a part of the Republic.”

This too is factually incorrect. As Feigon and so many others have pointed out, “after the establishment of the Chinese republic, China divided into separate warlord states. Chinese unity was so tenuous that the government feared that granting autonomy to Tibet or any other part of China might set off a chain reaction that would imperil the republic.” (Feigon, p.116) The new Chinese republic did not concede independence to Tibet, as you claim. It merely issued the so-called Manchu-Mongol-Uigur-Tibetan Articles of Favourable Treatment, which guaranteed the four non-Han peoples equality with the Han, and thus a degree of self-government. This is a far cry from granting them independence.

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama did, soon after returning from exile, refer to Tibet as a “small, religious, and independent nation” which he said had driven the Chinese out (an interesting spin of his, since the Tibetans hadn’t driven the Chinese out at all – as I said, the Chinese forces stationed in Tibet had dissolved as a consequence of the Qing overthrow, although the Dalai Lama did seize on this opportunity to formally expel the Residential Commissioner and his entourage.) Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama didn’t enjoy very much support for his assertions of Tibetan independence, not even from among his fellow Tibetans. As Feigon points out, when the Dalai Lama then went on to attempt to regulate some of the monasteries, “the Panchen Lama, the monks of the Drepung monastery, and other prominent members of the religious aristocracy refused to cooperate”, siding instead with the Chinese. (Feigon, p.117)

David, you then try to argue that because border violations occurred between China and Tibet which resulted in Tibet retaining “control of all areas it occupied” and with China having to pay Tibet an indemnity,” that this somehow constitutes evidence of Tibetan independence. None of this implies Tibetan independence.

You are, I assume, referring here to the dividing of Tibet into two zones: Outer and Inner Tibet. Outer Tibet, under the agreement, was to enjoy self-governance, whilst Inner Tibet (now a part of Yunnan and Sichuan and Qinghai provinces) was to be governed by the Chinese. This division was actually proposed by the British, who were out to turn Tibet into a de facto British protectorate in order to prevent Tibet from developing closer ties with Russia. (Feigon, pp.118-119)

The fighting you referred to that took place in the early 1930s once again occurred in the Khamdo region, and you neglect to mention the fact that most of this conflict was sparked by the rivalry that existed among Tibetans themselves. The Beri and Dargyas monasteries fell into conflict in 1931, and some of the Khampas (those of the Beri monastery) sought the support of the Chinese warlord Liu Wenhui, whereas the local Tibetan regiment came to the support of the Dargyas monastery. The Chinese troops fighting on behalf of the Beri monastery had managed to push the Tibetans back as far west as the Yangzi River.

The relationship between Tibet and China looks messy throughout this period, I know, but that’s because both were in turmoil dew largely to the impacts of foreign influence – China was fractured everywhere, and it wasn’t unified until Mao came to power. When we talk of conflict in this region with the “Chinese” we are very often referring to conflicts that occurred between Tibetan factions, where one faction was supported by a Chinese warlord. Such conflicts had little to do with the Chinese republican rulers.

Nevertheless, the fact is David, that even during this messy period, China exercised sovereignty over Tibet, and at no time did China ever give up its sovereign claims. Never. Period.

What matters more today though, as I keep trying to emphasise, is the fact that every single country on earth (except for Britain) recognises China's sovereignty over Tibet, and not one single country (including Britain) recognises Tibet as an independent nation.

This alone legitimises China’s claim to sovereignty over Tibet in international law. Once again, if you doubt me, ask any professional lawyer who specialises in international law. Even during the period that you are referring to, between 1911 and 1950, most of the world, including all of China’s neighbours, regarded China as having sovereignty over Tibet – even the United States, as I pointed out in an earlier comment, remember.

Let us move on now to your next line of contention. You claim to “see some very healthy signs of new order and emerging democracy within the exile community and the government.” Details please? What evidence can you provide to support this?

“Given a gradual transition to some level of self-government, possibly short of full independence,” you say, “I believe that a balanced, open democracy would emerge within Tibet.”

I think you are being way too optimistic and naïve here. As I argued in my earlier comment, there are requisites to the successful dormation of institutions like democracy and the rule of law, and Tibet is seriously lacking in all such requisites – far more so than the rest of China.

As a matter of fact, I have good reason to believe that Tibet, should it today be granted full independence or even self-governance, would very quickly resort back to being an undemocratic theocracy.

Ask yourself this simple question David: what headway has secularisation so far made in twenty-first century Tibet?

Writing back in 2002 for the New Left Review, Wang Lixiong pointed out that only “a tiny minority - mainly younger urban people with higher education - view the Dalai Lama in a more detached way, as a human being rather than as a god, and embody the attractions of Western liberalism and capitalist prosperity rather than reincarnated divinity. But within the TAR, those with college education comprised only 0.57 per cent of the population in 1990. The overwhelming majority of Tibetans are peasants, nomads and poorly educated town-dwellers who have never heard of the Nobel Prize or Hollywood. They worship the Dalai Lama with the same awe as they do the gods whom they would never be lucky enough to meet. It is common enough in Tibet today to see a crowd form and bow down to worship a little boy, merely because he is a reincarnated Buddha.”

Under the Dalai Lama’s government, 92 per cent of the budget was devoted to religious expenditure, and as Wang notes, “even today, according to some estimates, the Tibetans pay about a third of their annual income to the monasteries. This is money that will not be transformed into productive investment nor used to improve the people’s lives.”

Indeed, “the Deng era renounced the class line, restored traditional Tibetan religion, and re-engaged the upper classes in a ‘united front.’” Melvyn Goldstein and Cynthia Beall have also discussed this at length – the old religious aristocracy had already, by the late 1980s, been largely restored to economic power in the TAR, though not to complete autonomous political power of course. Goldstein and Beall spent sixteen months living in Tibet documenting this very phenomenon, pointing out that “all the former wealthy theocratic households are [again] among those with the largest herds and most secure income. On the other hand, all of today’s poor are from households that were very poor in the old society.” (see Melvyn Goldstein and Cynthia Beall, “The Impact of China’s Reform Policy on the Nomads of Western Tibet’” Asian Survey, vol. 29, no. 6, 1989, pp. 637–8, 640–1.)

David, you argue that while I can “catalogue a number of instances of torture, etc. perpetrated within Lamaist Tibet” that “worse followed from 1950.” This is debatable, though what you also need to remember is the fact that many of the abuses that occurred between 1950 and 1979 were carried out by Tibetans themselves. The Government in Exile and the pro-Tibetan lobby in the West are continuously accusing the CCP of having instigated a policy of “cultural genocide” during this period, which of course they define as constituting a serious violation of human rights. But the vast bulk of the destruction that occurred in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution was carried out not by Han Chinese but by hundreds of thousands of Tibetans themselves. So the obvious question then, is why? Why did so many Tibetans destroy their own monasteries?

It is worth quoting Wang Lixiong at length here, from his essay titled “Reflections on Tibet”, published in New Left Review, March-April, 2002:

“The Dalai camp and Western public opinion have always attributed all of this destruction to Han Red Guards coming in from China proper, after the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966. The truth is that, because of poor transportation and the huge distances involved, only a limited number of Han Red Guards actually reached Tibet. Even if some of them did participate in pulling down the temples, their action could only have been symbolic. Hundreds of shrines were scattered in villages, pastures and on rugged mountainsides: no one would have been capable of destroying them without the participation of the local people. Furthermore, most of the Red Guards who did reach the TAR were Tibetan students, returning from universities elsewhere. The fact that they often retained their organizations’ original names - Capital Red Guards, for instance - is one reason for the confusion over this. With the gradual return of these Tibetan Red Guards - who often combined their revolutionary work with visits to their families - the sparks of the Cultural Revolution spread across villages and pastures over the entire Tibetan plateau; followed by the rampage of destruction. It is true that tension at the time was so high that no one dared voice any dissent; nevertheless, the rulers alone could not have created the sort of social atmosphere that then prevailed without the participation of the masses, who sometimes played a leading role. The authorities in Tibet often tried to restrain radical actions, with the PLA, for example, consistently supporting the more conservative factions against the rebels. Temples and monasteries survived best in the central cities and areas where the authorities could still exercise some control. In contrast, the Gandan Monastery, some 60 kilometres outside Lhasa and one of the three major centres of the Yellow Hat sect, was reduced to ruins....

....To point out that it was largely the Tibetans themselves who destroyed the monasteries and temples is not to exonerate the Han; but it does raise broader questions, beyond the issue of responsibility. Why did the Tibetans, who for centuries had regarded religion as the centre of their lives, smash the Buddhist statues with their own hands? How did they dare pull down the temples and use the timbers for their own homes? Why did they ravage the religious artefacts so recklessly, and why were they not afraid of retribution when they denounced the deities at the tops of their voices and abused the lamas they had so long obeyed? Surely these actions are evidence that, once they realised they could control their own fate, the Tibetan peasantry, in an unequivocally liberating gesture, cast off the spectre of the afterlife that had hung over them for so long and forcefully asserted that they would rather be men in this life than souls in the next.”

The Tibetan historian in exile, Tsering Shakya, agrees, saying that “it is true that Tibetans played an active part in the Cultural Revolution,” but rightly points out that “the destruction of religious sites in Eastern Tibet - outside the TAR - had begun before the Cultural Revolution, as far back as 1956, under the guise of suppressing local uprisings in Gansu, Qinghai, Yunnan and Sichuan.” (see “Blood in the Snows”, also published in New Left Review). Nevertheless, most of the destruction that took place within the TAR occurred at the hands of the Tibetan peasantry.

Wang Lixiong, along with the American historian A.Tom Grunfeld, depict the traditional society of Tibet as dark and corrupt, with the common people living on the brink of a precipice. This was also the perception of the CCP. “Yet,” says Tsering Shakya, “their response to the situation when, in 1959, they seized the reins for themselves, was to plunge Tibet into depths of misery it had never known before. The economic and living conditions of the people plummeted sharply between 1960 and 1979; in many areas people were forced to live on a single meal a day. It was not until the 1980s that living conditions began to improve, under the new leadership of Hu Yaobang.”

Wang Lixiong certainly doesn’t dispute this. “The organisation of the People’s Communes killed off any enthusiasm for production,” he says. “In conjunction with the political assaults of the Cultural Revolution this led to a stagnation of living standards, especially among the farmers and herdsmen. Although the suffering could be temporarily concealed by the high revolutionary energy of the time and by the introduction of other benefits, such as medical care and social promotion, according to the 1980 figures half a million of the already impoverished Tibetans - over a quarter of the population - were worse off after the mutual-aid groups were communized, and about 200,000 were rendered destitute.”

Tsering Shakya is right then in saying that living conditions plummeted during these years, but as Wang, Sautman, Grunfeld and others have all pointed out, the same can be said for the rest of China. The policies of the Great Leap Forward were not intended to decrease living standards, but to raise them. They proved to be disastrous, true, and the people of Tibet continue to harbour a great deal of resentment over what happened during those years, but Tibet is no longer the same place it was back then. Neither is the rest of China for that matter.

Today, Tibetan cadres not only comprise the statistical majority but also control most of the leading government positions within the TAR, including the crucial departments of finance, public security and justice. In fact, as Wang points out, “by 1989, Tibetans accounted for 66.6 per cent of total cadres in the TAR, 72 per cent at provincial level and 68.4 per cent at prefectural level. All ‘number one’ administrative leaders at provincial and prefectural levels are Tibetans, as are the Party Secretaries in 63 out of the 75 counties.”

Living standards have also improved significantly since 1980, as Tsering Shakya rather reluctantly admits. “In 1979 the average income of Tibetan farmers and herdsmen was 147 RMB; in 1990 it was 484 RMB and in 1994, 903.29 RMB. In 1992, the TAR’s total agriculture output was up 69.8 per cent from 1978—and 460 per cent up from its 1952 level. In the cities the improvement was even greater. (see Tibetan Population in Contemporary China, p.342 and the 1995 Yearbook of Tibetan Statistics, p.178)

Indeed, as Wang points out, “annual economic growth in Tibet was over 10 per cent between 1991 and 1999 - higher than in China proper. Per capita income for farmers and herders has grown by 9.3 per cent per year, for urban residents by 19.6 per cent. These are not just empty figures. On a visit to Tibet in 2000, rising living standards were visible everywhere, in rural areas as well as the towns, with a lot of new construction taking place. Material conditions are currently comparable with those of inland - not coastal - China. Tibet is more prosperous now than ever before in its history.”

As Sautman, Grunfeld, Parenti, Wang and others have all pointed out, religious practices in both the TAR and the Tibetan areas of the neighbouring provinces have now been revived to a level comparable to pre-1959 – “barring,” says Wang, “only the restoration of the old monastic economy and ‘unity of monastery and state’”. The number of monks and nuns, notes Wang, “increased to 46,000 - 2 per cent of the Tibetan population - by 1994. Temples were under construction everywhere. The decision of the Second Tibetan Work Forum of 1984 to ‘gradually restore about 200 temples by the end of the eighties’ was vastly exceeded, with 1,480 temples and monasteries reopened by 1992, and over 300 more by 1994. A considerable part of the capital involved came from local government, while the TAR authorities allocated 260 million RMB for rebuilding between 1980 and 1992. The provincial governments in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai also contributed a sizeable amount of money to religious projects in their Tibetan areas. The central government disbursed over 53 million RMB for the renovation of the Potala Palace, as well as 64 million RMB and 614 kilos of gold to construct a tomb pagoda for the Tenth Panchen Lama.”

(To be continued)
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-28 03:22 | 显示全部楼层
(Continued)

David, I agree with you that human rights contraventions in Tibet continue to occur today – my argument though, remember, is that the extent of these abuses have been exaggerated by the Government in Exile and its supporters, sometimes grossly, and that human rights conditions are improving, especially on the macro socio-economic front (which you cannot divorce from the issue of human rights).

David, you say that you "fully agree that human rights organisations should not exaggerate the extent of abuses. We agree also that groups and individuals should speak out and voice criticisms but not exaggerate. I hope that I am [not] prone to such exaggeration."

I appreciate the fact that we share these common points of agreement, but, with all due respect, it would seem as though the organisations you work for do indeed exaggerate the extent of human rights abuses in Tibet.

David, you are the co-ordinator of the Tibet Urgent Response Network, Four Directions UK & Friends of Tibet UK, are you not? Anybody visiting any of the websites promoting these groups can see for themselves just how far exaggerated the claims of human rights abuses in Tibet are. On one site I came across, promoting Friends of Tibet, a fundraising event in the form of a photographic exhibition was being advertised: "The photographs narrate how a peaceful, spiritual country was overtaken by military invasion, colonial occupation, atheist campaigns and a flood of conquering colonists who are now diluting the culture and dominating the landscape. A nation in danger of assimilation in their own homeland, surviving in exile in India," read the advertisment.

Now look David, anybody who has been to Tibet in the last ten years, and who is capable of measuring what they see objectively, will know that such claims are utter rubbish. Pre-1950 Tibet was hardly a "peaceful, spiritual country" for starters. This is an outrageous distortion of the historical facts. The Lamaist system of government came into being through bloody struggles: the early lamas assassinated the last Tibetan king, Lang Darma, in the 10th century. Then they fought centuries of civil wars, complete with mutual massacres of whole monasteries. "The former ruling class, now based in Dharmasala, denies there was ever a class struggle in old Tibet, but the mountains of Tibet were filled with bandit runaways, and each estate had its armed fighters, and there are well documented uprisings among Tibetan serfs in 1908, 1918, 1931, and the 1940s. In one famous uprising, 150 families of serfs of northern Tibet's Thridug county rose up in 1918, led by a woman, Hor Lhamo. They killed the county head, under the slogan: 'Down with officials! Abolish all ulag forced labor!'" (see Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet; Grunfeld, "Tibet: Myths and Realities," New China, Fall 1975, and R. Hicks, Hidden Tibet - The Land and Its People, 1988.)

The claims of "cultural genocide", as I have already argued elsewhere on this thread, are just plain wrong. In fact, Tibet over the past few decades has been experiencing a cultural renaissance! Goldstein and Beall argue that all of Tibet's traditions are well intact in the countryside among herdsman and barely farmers, and the claim that "a flood of conquering colonists" are now "diluting the culture and dominating the landscape" is preposterous!

If we consider the Tibet Autonomous Region only, then according to the last population census, conducted in 2000, “there were 2,616,300 people in Tibet, with Tibetans totalling 2,411,100 or 92.2% of the current regional population. The census also revealed that the Tibetan's average lifespan has increased to 68 due to the improving standard of living and access to medical services.” In 1950 the average lifespan was only 35, and “infant mortality has dropped from 43% in 1950 to 0.661% in 2000.”

As Barry Sautman, who is Associate Professor of Social Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology points out in his study on Tibet and the (Mis-)Representation of Cultural Genocide, “the state sponsored transfer [of Han Chinese] to Tibet is on a small scale. From 1994 to 2001 the PRC organised only a few thousand people to go to Tibet as cadres. Most serve only 3 years and then return to China. Those who move on their own to the Tibet Autonomous Region usually return to China in a few years. They come for a while, find the cities of Tibet too expensive, and then return to China. Some of the 72,000 Chinese who maintain their hukou [household registration] in Tibet don't really live there. Pensions are higher if your household is registered in Tibet.”

These facts are supported by articles in the Columbia Journal of Asian Law and by an Australian Chinese demographer in Asian Ethnicity in 2000, and show that the claims of ethnic swamping in Tibet are misleading. "What I think these articles show,” says Barry Sautman, “is that there is no evidence of significant population losses over the whole period from the 1950s to the present.

There are few Han living outside of the main urban centres David, and as Wang Lixiong has quite rightly pointed out, because the Han are "concentrated in the towns and along the main roads" they have a "more visible presence than the statistics justify."

There are two types of Han living in the TAR: those who have been drawn there by the magnet of money-making (prostitutes, cobblers, tailors, clock-repairers, vegetable farmers, grocers and even Chinese beggars, who can also make a living in Lhasa.) The second type of newcomer, as Wang points out, "is the tourist or adventurer, mainly from the Han elite - people such as journalists, writers, painters, photographers, students, and not a few officials, ostensibly on missions, but actually on travel jaunts. These Han differ from earlier cadres in that they don’t look to local political power for protection - nor do they get near the core of Tibetan society. They retain their outsider identities; few intend to stay. The first type are similar to the ‘floating population’ in the big PRC cities, and will leave when conditions cease to be profitable. The second group come and go anyway. But both bring secularisation and commercialisation to Tibetan society; the blow they represent to the traditional order is not to be underestimated."

So Tibet's major urban centres are now a little more commercialised and cosmopolitan. So what? Welcome to the modern world, Tibet! Such diversity is surely, by all objective measures, historically progressive. As the author writing for the China Development Brief very correctly points out in my opinion, Beijing's Western Development Strategy is indeed likely to have various impacts on ethnic minority cultures in Tibet, "just as 'the market' has impacted, with unevenly distributed costs and benefits on every corner of the globe. But cultures have seldom been pure or static; and never less so than now, in what has become a largely post-traditional and increasingly hybrid world. The great issue of the age is not how to preserve cultures intact, but how to ensure that people whose cultures are changing through internal and external pressures have a significant say in defining their own future." As I keep saying, Tibetans are divided over their attitude towards China's governance - most people have very complex and conflicting views that are in constant states of flux. Some are embracing the new modernity already, and while others are keen to, some are also of the opinion that they are threatened by it.

Beijing's paternalism more often than not assumes what's best for its citizens. My point is that Tibetan separatists in exile and their pro-Tibet lobbyists in the affluent West are more often than not just as equally presumptuous. They do not speak for the majority of Tibetans any more than do the politicians in Beijing.

My charge against the so-called "pro-Tibet lobby" is that they push an essentially masturbatory discourse that festishises a virtual Tibet as its object of desire, whilst projecting oedipal fears onto a rival Han who are consequently demonised in waves of hyperbolic spasms.

The assertion that the Han are "flooding" Tibet is factually incorrect, just as Pauline Hanson's claim that Australia in the late 1990s was being "swamped" by Asians was also factually wrong. Hyberbolic silliness! Asian Australians make up only about 6% of the total population. Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party and the Tibetan Government in Exile and their supporters have much in common - they both distort the truth to suit their own political agendas, and they both push discourses that are fundamentally reactionary and inherently racist.

As I keep arguing, it is important to speak out against human rights abuses, wherever and whenever they occur. But exaggerating abuses merely compromises the legitimacy of the human rights cause, and in Tibet's case, it encourages seperatists, thereby further provoking those hardliners who are charged with overseeing the region's public security into initiating tougher crackdowns.

I will not respond to your second last point, because I have noticed that Sarah Ravensworth has already done that for me, in her comment above.

Finally, you ask me on what I base my contention that the Dalai Lama supports India's nuclear program. As the British journalist Christopher Hitchens reported in an article titled "His Material Highness", published in Salon back in July 1998, "The Dalai Lama has come out in support of the thermonuclear tests recently conducted by the Indian state, and has done so in the very language of the chauvinist parties who now control that state's affairs. The 'developed' countries, he says, must realise that India is a major contender and should not concern themselves with its internal affairs. This is a perfectly realpolitik statement, so crass and banal and opportunist that it would not deserve any comment if it came from another source."

David, it is in fact a well documented fact that on the day after the second round of Indian tests, the Dalai Lama immediately held a press conference and made a statement in which he urged the international community not to comment on India's actions. He said the country had a right to develop nuclear weapons and that it was "not democratic" for the international community to criticise India. If he has changed his position since, then good. But the fact that he came out in support of India's nuclear program back in 1998 speaks volumes. The man is a political chameleon, as I keep saying.

Warmest regards,
M.A.Jones  Shenzhen
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发表于 2008-7-28 15:49 | 显示全部楼层
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-28 16:20 | 显示全部楼层
中文翻译
M.A. Jones 贴于: 2007年1月25日, 星期四, 凌晨 12:51
亲爱的大卫
我已回深圳, 大概在深圳逗留数周, 故此有时间好好回应你的最后评论, 谢谢耐心等候。

让我首先回应你“从1911年直至1950年中国军队入藏, 西藏对它的领土有效管治及处理对外关系”这点。

我想你把情况稍夸大了。首先, 你说“清代最后一位皇帝曾在西藏驻军”, 但西藏人“于1911年正式推翻了他们”。单是这点就与事实完全不符 – 同情西藏独立诉求者很聪明地把历史扭曲。你说你看了费贡的书, 那你该知道他的说法与你在这里写的是不同的 – 而如你所知, 当然地费贡在呈现有利于西藏独立的资讯时, 他自己是很偏颇的。纵然如此, 他在多数地方仍然提供合理诚实的陈述, 而我看有关这方面史实的每一部历史书都与费贡写的相符, 是这样的:

西藏人没有起来及如你说那般
悍然地驅走了中国军队“清楚的宣示主权”。而是在1911年, 革命推翻了满清王朝而成立了民国。在西藏的中国满州军随后“解散”(见费贡, 第114页)。那不是“赶走”, 虽然在西藏东部(也就是如今云南及四川省的部份地区)。康巴人用俄人提供的军火, 从跟他们抢地盘的中国军阀手中夺回一些土地。可是对康巴地区的争夺统治是几世纪一直存在的, 就跟中国其他地区军阀互相争地盘情况一样。

一如你言, 1912年中国新总统袁世凯颁布宣言, 称西藏为中国的一部份。

但你却接着说是这同一个的新共和国“承认西藏的独立, 同时邀请西 藏加入新民国, 于是承认了西藏之前并不是民国的一部份。”

这也是于事实不符的。费贡及许多其他人都指出过:“在民国成立后, 中国分裂成军阀割据。中国统一局面是如此脆弱, 政府担心给予西藏或其他地区自治时, 会有一发不可收拾的连锁效应而使共和毁灭。”(见费贡, 第116页)。新民国没有如你称的承认西 藏独立。它只是颁布了所谓合汉、满、蒙、回、藏诸族为一人的宣言(译注: 即孙中山的总统就职宣言书), 确保四个汉族以外的民族与汉族有平等地位, 于是是某程度上的自治政府。这离给他们独立是差天共地的。

十三世达赖喇嘛在结束流亡回藏后, 是曾指西藏是一个中国已被驱离“小宗教性独立国家”(他很聪明用字, 因为如我所言, 西 藏人根本就没有把中国人驱离 , 中国驻藏军队是随着满清被推翻而解散的, 虽然达赖喇嘛趁势把驻藏大臣及随从正式驱逐)。尽管如此, 就连是在西藏人民之中, 达赖喇嘛也没法就他声言的西藏 独立上获得多大的支持。费贡指出, 当达赖喇嘛试图管理一些寺院时, “班禅喇嘛, 哲蚌寺的僧侣, 及其他宗教贵族中的显要都拒绝合作”而站到中国一方。 (见费贡, 第117页)。(译注: 这就是“名不正则言不顺, 言不顺则事不成”)

大卫, 你于是尝试辩解因为中国西藏边界问题让西藏“保有所占土地控制而中国给西藏赔款”, 而这构成西藏独 立的某种证明。这一切都不能证明西 藏 独立的。

我估计你在这是指西 藏分为两部份: 外藏及内藏。根据协调, 外藏获自治, 而内藏(现今属云南, 四川及青海几省)则由中国管治。这种区分其实是由英国人建议, 以期把西 藏变成实则的英国保护区以防止西藏跟俄国发展得更密切。(见费贡, 第118-119页)。

你所说发生在1930年代初的战斗再次在康都地区出现, 而你忽略不提这些冲突多是藏人之间的对抗引发的。1931年白利土司和大金寺发生冲突, 一些康巴人(白利那边的人, 译注: 应为白利土司, 不是寺院 , 见http://baike.baidu.com/view/1101171.html) 向中国军阀刘文辉求助, 而当地藏军则支援大金寺。代表白利的中国军成功把藏 军压往西面至甘孜河一带。

这时期西藏 跟中国的关系看来一团糟, 我知道, 但那是因为双方主要因为外国影响打击而处于动荡之中 – 中国到处分裂, 一直到毛泽东掌权才统一。当我们说这地区跟“中国”的矛盾, 我们多是指西藏阵营之间的冲突, 而其中一方是获中国军阀支持的。这样的冲突跟中国共和国的管治者根本没关连。

无论如何, 大卫, 就是在这乱成一片的时候, 事实是中国仍有对西藏的主权, 而中国从来没有放弃他的主权。从来没有, 划下句号。

与今天有关的是, 如我一直强调, 是(除英国外)每一国家都承认中国对西藏的主权这事实, 而没有一个国家(包括英国在内)承认西藏是独立国家。

单这样在国际法上就已给予中国对西 藏的主权的合法性。再一次, 假如你还质疑我的话, 请找任何专攻国际法的专业律师。就算是你所引的那段时期, 1911至1950, 记着: 世界大部份国家, 包括所有中国的邻国, 包括美国, 都如我较早前指出的, 全都承认中国对西藏有主权的。

让我们转到你另一质疑。你说“在流亡社群及政府里看到新秩序及民主萌芽的非常健康的迹象。”请提供具体详细好吗? 你有何证明能提出来支持这说法?

你说「在一个渐次过度到某种自治政府, 也许没法完全独立, 我相信会有一个平衡开放的民主在西藏出现的。」

我想你这里是过份乐观和天真了。正如我较早所说的, 民主及法治这些机制成功建起是需要具备条件的, 而西 藏比中国其他地方更严重缺乏所有这些条件。(译注: 要是不缺乏, 也不会自晚清至今一直被喇嘛蒙着, 而喇嘛们也不会一直被老外蒙着!)

其实, 我有很好理由相信如果今天它获完全独 立或甚至自治, 它会很快回到一个不民主的神权体制。

大卫, 问自己一个简单的问题吧, 世俗在21世纪西藏到现在有些什么发展?

王力雄2002年为《新左翼评论》撰稿时指出“只有一小撮 – 主要城市受较高教育较年轻的人 –较疏离地以人而非神来看待达赖喇嘛, 比较接受西方自由思想及资本主义发展而非转世神学。可是在西藏自治区内, 大学教育人口在1990年只占总人口的0.57%。西藏人口大多数是不知诺贝尔奖或荷里活为何物的农民, 牧民及教育较低的都市人口。他们有幸遇上就会把达赖喇嘛当神来拜。今天西藏仍很普遍能看到一群人聚集向一名小男孩跪拜, 只因为他是转世活佛。”

在达赖喇嘛的政府里, 预算的92%是用于宗教支出, 而如王力雄所写“就是今天, 根据一些估算, 西藏人把他们每年收入约三分之一给了寺院。这些钱是不会转化为生产投资或是用于改善人民生活的。”

的确, “邓小平时代放弃了阶级斗争路线,重建传统西藏宗教, 上层人士重新成为“统战”对象(译注:网上中文本虽名为“西 藏问题的文化反思”较英文本只多出文化二字, 内容有些出入,故只参考而不全引用, 此处是以英文本为主http://www.mitbbs.com/article/XiZang/22247548_3.html (中文本) http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2380 (英文本))。梅尔文.戈尔斯坦及辛西娅.比尔也在这方面作大篇幅讨论 - 至1980年代末, 原来宗教显贵已重新在西 藏自治区掌有经济势力, 虽然不足以完全有自治的政治权力。戈尔斯坦及比尔在西藏生活了16个月对这现象作记录, 指出“所有从前神权富户又[再]成最多牲畜,有最丰厚收入的人家之一。另一方面, 今年的穷人来自旧社会中的贫穷家庭。”(见梅尔文.戈尔斯坦及辛西娅.比尔, 中国改革政策对西 藏西部牧民的影响 , 亚洲研究, 卷29,第6期, 1989, 637-8, 630-1页)。

大卫, 你反驳说我“编列了一串西藏喇嘛时期犯的酷刑”可“1950年以后更糟”。这是可以争论的, 但你也必须牢记的是在1950至1979年之间发生的侵犯事件中, 许多是由藏人他们自己所为的。流亡政府及西方支持西藏的游说团不断指责中国共产党在这时期内发起“文化灭种”政策, 按照他们的定义是构成严重侵犯人权。但在文化大革命时期在西藏发生的大部份破坏事件并不是汉人所为, 而是成千上百的西藏人自己。于是, 明显应问的是, 为什么如此? 为什么有那么多西藏人破坏他们自己的寺院?

这里值得长篇引用王力雄的发表在2002年3-4月号《新左翼评论》的“西 藏问题的反思”
(译注: 紫色部份为本次翻译)

“ 达赖阵营和西方舆论一向把砸庙行为归于自1966年始的文革期间从 中国内地进入西 藏的汉族红卫兵。然而事实是由于西藏的遥远和交通不便,汉族红卫兵当时只有很少数量进入西藏,他们中间即使有人参加砸庙,也只能是象征性 的。而西藏数千座寺庙遍布农村牧场和丛山峻岭,没有当地人参与 根本没有力量进行摧毁。当时进藏的红卫兵大多是在内地学习的藏 族学生。他们返回西 藏往往保持着例如 “首都红卫兵”等称呼,那可能也是后来把问题搞模糊的原因之一。随着那些藏族红卫兵逐步返回家乡- 往往革命与亲相结合 - 文革的火种撒到整个西藏高原的农村牧场,遍布各地的砸庙随之开始。当时确实存在高压氛围,没有人敢发表不同意见。然而一种社会氛围并非仅仅由执政者造成, 还必须有群众的配合。有时后者的主导作用更大。当时的西 藏政权其实常常想阻止过激行为,例如西藏的解放军就 一直支持群众中比较保守的一方来对抗更激进的“造反派”。事实表明,凡是在当局尚能控制的中心城市和地区, 寺庙都得到相对较好的保护,而相反地同为西藏黄教三大寺之一的甘丹寺,只因为离拉萨有六十公里距离,就被毁 坏得只剩一片废墟。

这里说西藏寺庙主要是被藏人所砸,目的不在于为汉人开脱。在我看来,这是超越责任 提出更广泛思考的问题,除了需要正视历史事实以外,还应该从中得到更多的思考 (译注: 英文本无此句) 。为什么千百年把宗教视为生命中心的西藏人会亲自动手砸碎佛像?为什么他们敢于从寺庙拆下木料去盖自己的房子?为什么寺庙里艺术品被他们毫不在乎地毁坏?又是为什么他们曾在那时大声地否定神灵、虐待 自己长久惟命是从的喇嘛活佛而不怕遭到报应?在那些行动中,可以看到一旦藏人认识到自己能够把握命运,就会 以彻底解放的姿态抛弃千百年压在头顶的“来世”,他们本来是更愿意做现世的人而非来世的魂的。”

西藏流亡历史学家茨仁夏加也同意:“的确西藏人是在文化大 革命中扮演主动地位”, 他也不偏不倚的指出“西藏 东部 – 西 藏 自治区以外 – 的砸庙是在文革之前, 甚至远至1956年就以镇压甘、青、云、川当地叛乱之名早已展开的事。(见也是《新左翼评论》上发表的“血染的雪域”)。无论如何, 在西藏自治区内发生的大多数砸庙是出自西藏农民之手。

王力雄, 跟美国历史学家谭.戈伦夫一样, 把西 藏传统社会描述为黑暗和腐败的, 老百姓生活在绝境边缘。这也是中国共产党的看法。茨仁夏加说:“但是1959年, 他们对时局的反应是为自己夺权, 让西藏陷入从未有过的痛苦深渊。1960至1979年间, 人民经济及生活情况直线下降, 在许多地方人民被迫一天只吃一顿活着。一直到1980年代在胡耀邦领导下, 生活情况才开始改善。”(译注: 这基本是贫穷地区的情况, 不是西藏一角独然。苦日子汉人也一样熬, 不要写成全国大好, 只有西藏一天吃一顿!)

王力雄自然没有反倒。他说:“人民公社的组织握杀了任何生产的积极性。加上文革的政治攻击, 生活水平处于停顿, 特别是就农民及牧民而言。虽然艰苦能被当时运动能量及其他如医疗及社会补助短期上舒缓, 根据1980年数字, 约50万已是贫穷的西藏人 – 超过四分之一的人口 – 在合作社公社化后生活更艰难, 而约有廿万人是赤贫的。”

茨仁夏加说那些年生活情况直线下降是对的, 但王力雄, 沙巴利, 戈伦夫及其他人却都指出中国其他地区也是一模一样。大跃进的政策目的不是有意降低生活, 而是想提高生活的。没错, 政策最后证明是灾难性, 而西藏人一直对当年的怨恨隐埋心底。可是西藏已不是当年的西藏, 中国其他地方也今非昔比。今天, 西藏干部不但是统计数字上的大多数, 而且掌控西藏自治区里的政府主管职位, 包括重要的财政, 公安及司法部门。事实上, 王力雄就指出:“在1989年, 藏 干占自治区干部人口的66.6%, 省级干部的72%, 地方干部的68.4%。西藏所有省级及地方的“一把手”行政长官都是西藏人, 75个县的党书记中, 63人是西藏人。”

茨仁夏加不情愿地承认生活水平自1980年起也大有改善。“1979年西藏农民及牧民平均所得为147元人民币, 到1990年它达484元, 1994年, 903.29元。在1992年西 藏自治区农业总产量比1978年增加了69.8%, 比1952年水平更是增加了460%。城市的改变更加大。(见现代中国之西藏人口, 第342页及西藏统计1995年年报, 第178页)。

正如王氏所言, “自1991至1999年, 每年西藏经济增长是超过10% - 比中国主要地区为高。农民牧民的人均收入每年提高9.3%, 城市人口则是19.6%。这些不是空数字。2000年去西藏所见, 生活水平是处处在提升, 郊区市区都一样, 有许多新建筑。物质情况现是可以跟中国内地-不是沿海-相比。西藏比它历史中的过去更繁荣。”

沙巴利, 戈伦扶, 帕兰提, 王力雄跟其他人都全指出, 西藏自治区及邻近省份的藏 族地区的宗教事业已回复到能跟1959年前相比的水平 – 王氏说:“只差恢复旧的寺院经济及 “寺院跟国家合一”” 。他也记载, 僧尼数目“在1994年增至46,000人 – 西藏人口的2%。到处寺院都在修建中。远超1984年第二届西藏工作会“到80年代末逐步修复约200座寺院”决定的目标。1992年共有1,480寺院重开, 到1994年又多添300座。大部份资金都来自当地政府, 而西藏官方拨款2.6亿人民币用于1980至1992之间的重建工作。川,云,甘, 青等省政府也为他们藏 族区投入可观资金用于宗教项目上。中央政府则为重修布达拉宫投入了5千3百万人民币, 另外6千4百万人民币及614公斤黄金为十世班禅喇嘛建造佛塔。


[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-8-1 09:34 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-7-29 08:26 | 显示全部楼层
(续上)

大卫, 我同意你说人权侵犯事件在今天西藏依仍发生 – 但我论点却是必须谨记它们是被流亡政府及支持者所夸大, 有时甚至不堪看, 而人权情况是在改善中, 特别在宏观社会经济层面上(这是你无法与人权问题切割的)。

大卫, 你说你“完全赞同人权组织不应夸大侵犯的事实。我们也同意组织及个人应说出真相及批评, 但不应夸大。我希望我[没有]倾向这样的夸张行为。”

我理解我们有共通点这事实, 但, 斟酌各方面情况, 似乎你工作那些组织是在夸大了西藏侵犯人权事件的程度的。

大卫, 你是西藏紧急反应网络, 英国四方及英国西 藏之友的联络人是吗? 任何人浏览这些机构宣传的网页都能亲眼看到对西藏人权事件的夸大到底有多大。我在一个宣传西藏之友的网站看到一个宣传照片展览筹款活动, 广告如下:“照片描述一个和平, 灵性的国家如何被军事入侵, 殖民占据, 无神运动及殖民者泛滥以稀释这里的文化及占有土地。一个国家面临在自己乡土上被瓦解, 流亡在印度以求生存。”

大卫你该看看, 在过去十年到过西藏, 凡是能客观审视他们所见的任何人都知道这些言语全是垃圾。首先, 1950年前的西藏就不是什么“和平, 灵性的国家”。这是令人震怒的历史歪曲。喇嘛政府制度是透过血腥斗争而成的: 早期的喇嘛在10世纪暗杀了最后一位藏王朗达玛。然后他们陷入数世纪的内战, 整座整座的寺院被血洗屠杀。“从前的统治阶层, 如今以达兰萨拉为基地, 否认旧西藏曾有过阶级斗争, 但西藏山岭满是窜逃的土匪, 每个庄园都有自己的武装护院, 有许多文献记录了1908, 1918, 1931及1940年代西藏农奴的反抗动乱。在其中一次著名的动乱中, 西藏北部尺牍宗嘎塔部落150多户群众在一名荷拉姆(Hor Lhamo)的女人为首反抗。在“打倒官员, 废除所有强制劳动(ulag)!”口号下, 他们杀死宗本。(见戈伦夫, 《现代西藏的诞生》, 新中国, 1975年秋, 及希克斯(R. Hicks), 隐藏的西藏 – 其土其民, 1988) 就如我在本栏反驳“文化灭种”是完全错误的指责。事实上, 西藏在过去几十年来一直在文化复兴中! 戈尔斯坦及比尔就反驳在乡下牧民及基层农民中, 西藏一切传统都保存不变。说成“殖民者泛滥”正在“稀释这里的文化及占有土地”是荒谬的话!

如果我们只考虑西藏自治区, 那根据最近一次2000年的人口普查“西藏人口共2,616,300人, 其中92.2%或2,411,100 人是藏人。普查也显示西藏人平均寿命由于生活及医疗服务改善提高至68岁。”1950年时平均寿命只有35岁, 而“婴儿死亡率由1950年的43%下降至2000年的0.661%”

香港科技大学社会科学副教授沙巴利在他的西藏及文化灭族的(失)实陈述Tibet and the (Mis-)Representation of Cultural Genocide研究中指出““政府支助[汉人]入藏是小规模。从1994至2001年, 中国只安排了数千人到西藏任干部。多数人只逗留三年然后就回中国(内陆)。那些自己迁移到西 藏自治区的通常几年后就回中国(内陆)。他们来一会, 发觉西 藏城市都很贵,然后就回中国(内陆)。72,000名中国人当中有些仍然保存他们在西藏的户口却不真正在那里居住的。户口登记在西藏, 退休金会高一些。”

哥伦比亚亚洲法律期刊及澳洲一位华裔人口统计学家2000年于亚洲种族渊源所发表的论文也都支持这一事实, 证明种族淹没的指控是误导的。沙伯力说“我想这些论文显示的是缺乏证据证明从1950年代迄今整段期间有重大人口消失。”

大卫, 在主要城市以外是绝少汉人居住的, 如王力雄就很精确的指出, 因为汉人“集中在城市, 通衢大道旁”他们“看起来好像比统计数字为多”。

西藏自治区的汉人有两种: 一是被赚钱磁吸过去的(娼妓, 鞋匠, 裁缝, 修钟表, 菜贩, 甚至是中国乞丐, 都能在拉萨谋生)。第二类是如王力雄指的“是旅客或是冒险者, 主要是汉人精英份子 – 好像记者, 作家, 画家, 摄影家, 学生和不少的官员, 表面是公干, 实施是去旅游。这些汉人有别于从前的干部是他们并不依靠政治权力作为护身符 – 他们也不接近西藏社会中心圈子。他们保存自己外来者的身份, 极少打算落地生根。第一类是跟中国大城市中的“流动人口”相似, 环境不利则掉头走人。第二类本来就是来来去去的。但两类人都为西藏社会带来世俗化及商业化, 他们所代表对传统的冲击是不能低估的。”

所以如今西藏主要城市是有点商业化及都会化了, 可那又怎样? 西藏, 欢迎踏入现代世界! 不管从那个客观角度, 这些多样化是必然的历史进步。我认为中国发展简报的作者很正确地指出, 北京的西方化发展策略的确为西藏小数民族带来许多影响, 在世界不同角落有分布不匀的成本与利益。

“文化很少是纯粹或静态的; 过去现在都如此。这代最大的问题不在于如何把文化原风不动的保存, 而是确保那些因内在或外在压力而正在变改中的文化, 它的族群能对界定自己未来有更大的自主权。”就像我一直说的, 西藏人对中国管治的态度都存在着分歧 – 大部份人都有复杂又矛盾的看法, 而且看法不停在变改中。有人已拥抱新现代化, 有人是很期货, 也有人觉得自己是受到威胁。

北京大家长作风往往都是假设对人民是最好的抉择。我的论点是西藏分离份子及他们在西方大国的藏独游说团也往往不也一样如此假设。他们不会比北京的政治人物能代表大多数西藏人。”

我谴责那些所谓的“藏 独游说团”是他们盲目地把一个虚幻的西藏作为欲望目标推到一个基本上是自慰性的歧途上, 把恋母情结的恐惧投射到汉族假想敌, 寻而一波又一波痉挛发作地将他们妖魔化。(译注: 说得好, 汉人不是个个大慈大悲救苦救难观世音, 也不会如此无聊的跟一个不少的小数民族老是过不去。)

称汉人正在西藏“泛滥”的指责是完全不符合事实的, 跟宝琳.韩森在1990年末说澳洲被亚洲人“淹没”的说法一样没有事实根据。夸大又无聊! 亚裔澳洲人只占总人口的6%左右。宝琳.韩森的一国党与西藏流亡政府及他们的支持者有许多共通点 – 他们都是扭曲真相来迎合自己的政治议题, 而他们同样是走着基本上反动而隐藏种族主义的歪道。

我一直申明的是: 人权组织及个人在出现侵犯事件时发声很重要, 但夸大侵犯程度只会牺牲了人权质疑的正确性, 而在西藏情况, 它鼓励了分离主义者, 而进一步刺激强硬派能以为了地区安全而引进更严厉的压制手段。

你倒数第二点我就不回应了, 因为Sarah Ravensworth 已在她回应里替我说了。

最后, 你问我基于什么说达赖喇嘛为印度核计划背书? 英国记者克里斯多弗.息金斯(Christopher Hitchens)在1998年7月在沙龙(Salon)刊登的“物质至高无上的他”中说:“达赖喇嘛曾站出来支持最近印度进行的热核试验, 而且是用上如今控制国家事务的沙文主义政党的语言。他说, “发达”国家必须了解印度是主要竞争者而不应干涉它的内政。这绝对是完全的现实政治宣言, 既愚钝又迂腐及投机的, 要是来自另一来源也就真的不值一评。”(译注: 弦外之音是你达赖自贬身价了)

大卫, 这其实是在印度第二轮试验后翌日就广为记载的事, 达赖喇嘛随即举行了记者会及作出敦促国际社会不要对印度的行动作批评。他说该国有权利发展核武, 而且国际社会批评印度是“不民主”的。如果他之后有改变立场, 那很好。但他在1998年跳出来支持印度核计划就一鸣“警”人了。那个人是政治变色龙, 我一直都那么说的。

祝好

M.A.Jones 深圳

[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-8-1 04:37 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-8-1 04:27 | 显示全部楼层
【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。

【回應原文】
VM Posted: Thu Jan 25, 2007 3:21 pm
Tibet, Tibet, what a rich source of discourse for all of us, who are not Tibetans or live in Tibet!

Once upon a time, there was a village, not a big one, but there were enough families living there with each holding somewhat different ideals. The one family who lived on the highest point of the village had always been in the mind of other villagers because they each envied something about the family - perhaps the parents' authority, the physically strong children, or their herds... The family was believed to have their own house rules, which made the children endure hardships and sometimes were forced to absorb the parents' belief and serve as hard labor. And other villagers were said to have heard the children crying often.

As time passed by, the other villagers' started to speculate what was going on with that family, each conceiving their own reasoning and possible ways to 'help' the crying children. Some people thought, 'The parents must be abusing the children. Let's go and find out. If it's true, we shall lock up the parents and adopt the children.' A group of people echoed and got ready to join a moral cause. Among them, some genuinely wanted to help the helpless children, but some once were foes with the parents, some really just wanted to steal some fat sheep, some attempted to seize the house, some wanted to train the children to protect their village since the house was on the border, and some hoped that the children one day would become their own house and field labor...

So nobody knows exactly how some villagers took over the house, drove away one parent and made the other one subject to them, or how they freed the children, so was it claimed. Afterwards, some children who loved their parents secretly grieved, while others seem to be happily living with their adopting parents and relatives. Those villagers who had not been able to get anything out of this whole event were jealous and therefore pointing fingers towards adopting parents, accusing them taking over the children and their house by violence and the children were really more miserable now than before. Some were enouraging the children to escape and live on their own. Perhaps some of these accusers were truly sympathetic towards what the children have gone through, while others vehemently voicing their concerns towards the children were simply trying to divert any attention from their own family problems or make themselves seem noble...

Up until now, who really knows which children are truely happy with their life now and which ones longing for their natural parents in their heart and what they use to be able to (or their parents had taught them to) worship... This story is just one of those that have happened and are still happening in other villages on earth. The point is that people tend to / choose to pay more attention to one story than others for whatever reasons they claim to be the important (to themselves, perhaps in most cases). Who do I side with? Well, I put a pinch of salt in everyone's argument/stories, therefore, I strictly speaking do not side with anyone in particular. All I really would like to see if that whichever house the children are living in right now they feel that they are happy. If I were one of them, why should I let other people tell me that I am, or I am not, happy with MY life? After all, happiness, like most abstract concepts, are all relatively speaking, right?

I know, silly analogy here, but you get the idea of what I'm trying to express  

中文翻譯
VM贴于: 2007年1月25日, 星期四, 下午  3:21
西藏, 西藏, 给我们这些不是西藏人或住在西藏的外人多么丰富的歪楼话题!

从前有个小村庄, 不大, 可足够所有住那里的每一户人家有自己与众不同的理想。那户住在村子最高处的人家是其他人念念不忘的, 因为这户有每户人各自羡慕的地方 – 或是家长权威, 孩子超强, 或他们的牲口… 大家相信那家一定有特别的家规, 让孩子特别能吃苦, 有时被迫吸收父母的信念, 当苦工。其他村民被传时常听到他家孩子的哭声。

光阴似箭, 其他村民开始揣测那家子到底怎样了, 每个人都有自己理据及“帮助”那些哭泣孩子的可能办法。有些人想“那父母肯定虐待孩子。我们去调查去。如果是真的, 我们就把父母关起来, 把孩子领养”有些人附和,  准备妥当参与这道义之师。他们当中有些是真心想帮孩子的, 但有些却是父母的仇家, 有些只想趁机摸几只肥羊, 有些想霸占屋子, 有些想培训孩子成庄勇护卫村庄, 因那家是位在位区上, 然后有些希望孩子们有朝一日成他们自己家的佣工佃农。

总之没人真正知道一些村民如何抢了那屋子, 把父母之一赶走, 让另一人归顺他们, 或是他们如何据称是解放了孩子。其后,  一些爱父母的孩子偷偷在哭, 其余的似乎跟养父母及亲戚开心地过活。那些没有从中得益的村民很妒忌, 于是对养父母指手划脚, 指责他们以暴力接收了孩子和房屋, 孩子们比从前更悲惨。有些人鼓励孩子逃跑, 自力更新。也许这些指责者中有些是真心怜恤孩子遭遇的, 其他大声疾呼只不过是为了转移他们自家问题或是装扮自己高尚情操。

到目前为止, 谁晓得那些孩子对目前生活真正满意, 又是那一些心里盼望亲父母和崇拜父母(或是被父母训练如此)… 这故事只是地球上其他村落曾经发生, 又仍在发生的类似故事之一。重点是人们倾向/选择以他们所称的重要理由(往往是对他们自己而言而己)对某一故事比其他故事用心在意。我站在那一方? 这个嘛, 我在每个人的论点/故事都放一撮盐, 所以严格来说我不站谁的一方。我想看到的是不管孩子现在住那一家里, 他们都开心快乐。要是我是他们中的一个, 我干嘛要别人来告诉我, 我是谁或我不是谁, 对我的生命是否满意? 算到底, 跟其他抽象概念, 快乐是相对而言的, 对不?

我知道, 这比喻不怎样, 但你们该知道我想说什么。


【回应原文】
Tibetan Photo Project Posted: Thu Jan 25, 2007 4:10 pm  
Regarding Michael Parenti as a souce this information should also be considered as part of the mix
http://www.answers.com/topic/michael-parenti
http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/7/23_4.html
http://www.swans.com/library/art9/letter26.html
http://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/article.php?id=424

In the discussion of Tibet, lot of Political philosophers are often passed off as "Tibetan historians" in discussions.

So just a couple of notes:

Just a few notes on some of those quoted as "Historians"
Wang Lixiong who, rather than being a collector of data and sifting for the truth works at a University in Hong Kong has been noted for being published in the politial magazine New Left rather than scholarly historical reviews. Referring to the New Left as a "Respected publication is misleading at best with all respect to legitimate historical journals... New Left be well be "respected" for making a political argument but its "respect" is not as scholarly historical research.

As for Michael Parenti, again, what we see on close inspection is the prioriety of selling of a political philosophy http://www.answers.com/topic/michael-parenti

Again, research the researchers, their political agenda, philosophy and funding.

Political Philosophers such as Parenti with political sympathies squarely behind China rather than achedemic historical researchers are not exactly the best guardians or reporters or researchers of history.

The idea of Political Philosophers writing history is actually more of a case of the victors being allowed to write the history as they want it to be. Under any circumstances, many of Parenti's sources are at least questionable when it comes to defining Tibet.

Also, so far, in all the effort made to diminish Tibet, the come up notably short on viewing any Tibetan history from any Tibetan perspective. It is of course wrong to eliminate the Tibetan perspective if we are defining thier history.

Additional Tibetan Resources
For anyone doing historical research on Tibet, One stop is the Tibet Museum in McLeod Ganj.

Another Tibetan Resource is the Tibet Museum in McLeod Ganj. I also suggest a visit to the Tibetan Works and Archives set up in partnership with the government of India to preserve actual Tibetan texts and works. This is located in Dharamsala.

No one is going to claim these resources to be unbiased, but they are Tibetan resources preserving and writing and recording the history of their own culture http://www.tibet.com/ltwa.html
http://www.tibet.com

中文翻译
Tibetan Photo Project贴于: 2007年1月25日, 星期四, 下午 4:10
有关引述迈可.帕兰提作为资讯来源的话, 也应同时考虑这些参考:
http://www.answers.com/topic/michael-parenti
http://www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/7/23_4.html
http://www.swans.com/library/art9/letter26.html
http://www.studentsforafreetibet.org/article.php?id=424

讨论西藏时, 许多政治哲学家往往在讨论中被冠以“西藏历史学家”而混淆了。故聊作注述:

那些被引为“历史学家”之中
王力雄, 除了在香港一家大学对真正的工作资料作搜集筛选外, 他的文章是在政治杂志《新左翼评论》而不是历史学术学报上发表的。把《新左翼评论》形容为“有名”刊物对真正的历史学报而言是误导性的。《新左翼评论》也许在政论上有盛名, 但它的“盛名”绝对不是学术历史研究方面。

至于迈可.帕兰提也是, 仔细研究只是推出政治哲学著作而已 http://www.answers.com/topic/michael-parenti

再度强调, 研究那些研究者, 他们的政治议题, 哲学和资助来源。

像帕兰提这些政治哲学家, 在政治上完全同情站在中国一方而不是作学术研究的, 并不是历史的最佳守护者, 报导者或研究者。

让政治哲学家来写历史就基本是成王败寇由胜利一方为所欲为。不管什么情况, 帕兰提在西藏问题采用的许多来源都至少是可议的。

而且, 一直以来在一切消灭西藏的行动上, 明显就是缺乏任何从西藏人角度去看西藏历史。(译注: 当一个民族连文字记载及文字应用都出现严重不足, 多靠口口相传, 那样的历史又有多少客观真相可取性呢?)

西藏资料补充
有兴趣于西藏历史研究的, 应去看McLeod Ganj的西藏博物馆。(译注: McLeod Ganj是位于达兰萨拉郊区, 那就跟去大英博物馆去研究颐和园差异。http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McLeod_Ganj)

另一西藏资料是西藏博物馆, 在 McLeod Ganj那里 (译注: 成了, 剪是王麻子剪刀的剪, 刀是王麻子剪刀的刀!) 我也建议去看在西藏博物馆跟印度政府为保存真正西藏文字及器物而合办的西藏器物及收藏。(译注: 真宝,  为旅游局拉生意来了)

没人说这些资料完全没有偏差, 但他们是西藏人保存, 笔下记录他们的文化。(译注:  是不是该在西藏人前, 加”流亡”两字, 才是正确做法? 还好, 不敢说没偏差, 那既然如此, 不就说明为什么没有人愿意用藏人的观点去解释西藏历史了吗? 还好意思说出来, 真是的.)

http://www.tibet.com/ltwa.html
http://www.tibet.com

[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-8-1 10:06 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-8-1 10:32 | 显示全部楼层
【原文链接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【声明】本文翻译仅限Anti-CNN使用,谢绝转载。

【回应原文】
Tibet Response Network Posted: Thu Jan 25, 2007 7:27 pm  
Dear Mark,

Thank you for replying to my most recent posting. I wonder if you're aware of a "truism", popular amongst police detectives, that "too much information gets in the way of the truth". The sheer size of your posts, liberally sprinkled with long quotations from various historians and others, almost overwhelms me. Your arguments, however, do not.

You have quoted from several Chinese authors which rather emphasizes the sad fact that history is usually written by the victors. Perhaps I could direct you to "Tibetan Nation" by Warren Smith, Jr. I quote; "In April (1912) the Chinese garrison in Lhasa surrendered to the Tibetans..... Chinese troops were eventually removed from Tibet, via India at the end of 1912. In January 1913 the Dalai Lama finally returned to Lhasa. Tibet was free of the Chinese for the first time since 1720." (Page 181.) ".

Contrary to your assertion, I did not imply or write that the Tibetans rose up and expelled the Chinese troops aggressively. I chose my words very carefully when I said "formally expelled". Put another way, it was done according to formal concepts and in a ceremonial manner. Photographic evidence of these events is readily available.

The Chinese Republic asked that Tibet join the new Republic, a de facto recognition of the fact that Tibet was at that time a separate entity or nation. I could go on, rebutting your various assertions and allegations regarding historic Tibet, what happened with the Chinese, etc. however, rather than produce further quotations, I'd suggest a reading of Chapter 13 of "Tibetan Nation; "The Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Quest for Independence.

I'm impressed that you can access the Friends of Tibet and Four Directions Websites from China, very few people can. I do not have any problem with the words advertising the photo exhibition to which you refer. They seem far more reasonable than Mr. Wang's recycled Chinese propaganda. Believing that Tibetans regard the Dalai Lama as a god shows a complete and total lack of understanding of Buddhism in general and of Tibetan Buddhism in particular. Nor do Tibetan Buddhists worship the Dalai Lama, they venerate him.

As for Christopher Hitchens, well as a neo-conservative ex-Trotskyist he is hardly the most objective of observers, is he?

Do Tibetans want self-government or greater autonomy? Until and unless there are free elections in Tibet we will never know for sure. Were they to achieve self-government, and I fear the only way they may ever achieve this is if they turn to violence, it would be up to them what type of government that was.

The Chinese government represses Tibetans, imprisons and tortures young nuns for shouting "Free Tibet" and shoots pilgrims crossing into Nepal. Sorry, Mark, but give me the Dalai Lama any day.

David Meanwell
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet

中文翻译
Tibet Response Network贴于: 2007年1月25日, 星期四, 晚上 7:27

亲爱的Mark,

感谢你最近的回应, 我不知你是否知道在警探之间常见的“老生常谈”:“资讯过多往往掩盖了真象。”你那长篇大论, 随意的引上多位历史学家及其他人的一大段, 几乎压倒我了, 不过你的论点却没有压倒我。

你引用几位中国学者(译注: 我昏了吗? 我好像看到只有王力雄一个来自中国的! 而且连王力雄的立论是挂羊头卖狗肉亲藏独的都不知道, 自己人踩自己人了解!)只强化了历史通常是由胜利一方写的悲哀事实(译注: 感到是拾上一贴那人余唾)。也许我该引导你参考华伦.史密斯(Warren Smith, Jr.)的西藏民族; “ (1912年) 四月中国在拉萨守军向西藏投降…中国军最后在1912年底经印度从西藏撤走1913年 1月达赖喇嘛终于回到拉萨。西藏从1720年以来首次脱离中国而自由。”(第181页)

跟你所说相反, 我没有暗示或写过西藏人起来悍然赶走中国军。我用字小心地说“正式驱逐”。换言之, 那是根据正式概念, 以仪式方式进行的。到处有照片为证。(译注: 领教了你们CNN式的照片, 恐怕又是张冠李戴, 只不过这些却比较难找到人证来指出吧!)

中华民国邀请西藏加入新共和国,  事实承认西藏当时为分立主体。我可以继续反驳你对西藏历史的种种武断及空臆之词, 我建议你参考西藏民族, 十三世达赖喇嘛及独立诉求。

我很讶异你能从中国连接上西藏之友及四方网站, 甚少人能办到。你说那照片展览的广告词, 我不觉有何问题。它们比王先生反哺中国文宣更为合理。相信西藏人把达赖喇嘛看为神是完全对佛教缺乏普遍认识, 特别是不了解藏传佛教所致。西藏佛教徒也不崇拜达赖喇嘛, 他们是尊敬他 (译注: 但venerate跟worship 基本上是同义词, http://encarta.msn.com/thesaurus_/venerate%2520.html)

至于克里斯多弗.息金斯, 作为新保守主义或是前托派, 他都不能算是最客观的观察家, 是吧?

西藏人是希望自治政府或是更大自治? 直至也除非西藏有自由选举, 我们都无法肯定。他们要是要达到自治, 我恐怕唯一方法就是诉诸暴力, 然后他们决定什么方式的政府。

中国政府压制西藏人, 因高叫“自由西藏”而囚禁及折磨年轻女尼, 射杀去尼泊尔的朝圣者 (译注: 适合情况时, 就不再说那些不是朝圣者而是难民啦?) 对不起, Mark, 那天都好给我达赖喇嘛吧。

祝好,

David Meanwell
Tibet Urgent Response Network - working with Tibetans for Tibet
西藏紧急回应网络 – 与藏人为西藏工作

【回应原文】
anchor Posted: Thu Jan 25, 2007 8:08 pm  
Tibet Response Network wrote:
You have quoted from several Chinese authors which rather emphasises the sad fact that history is usually written by the victors. Perhaps I could direct you to "Tibetan Nation" by Warren Smith, Jr. I quote; "In April (1912) the Chinese garrison in Lhasa surrendered to the Tibetans..... Chinese troops were eventually removed from Tibet, via India at the end of 1912. In January 1913 the Dalai Lama finally returned to Lhasa. Tibet was free of the Chinese for the first time since 1720." (Page 181.) ".

I am not sure if you see the bigger historic picture in 1911-12. The Chinese troops in the quotes were Imperial Qing troops. Year 1911 marked the end of Imperial China, when the nation rose up and overthrew the Qing Dynasty. Qing troops quickly surrendered to or were destroyed by revolutionary forces in Southern and Southwestern China. Many provinces at the time claimed independence from Beijing. The question is whether claiming independence from a government the same as claiming independence from a state.
Tibet Response Network wrote:
Contrary to your assertion, I did not imply or write that the Tibetans rose up and expelled the Chinese troops aggressively. I chose my words very carefully when I said "formally expelled". Put another way, it was done according to formal concepts and in a ceremonial manner. Photographic evidence of these events is readily available.

Again, you may have misunderstood history. The last Qing emperor abdicated in 1912, all Qing troops were ordered to surrender to provincial authorities and disband. Therefore, the surrender and disbandment of the Imperial Qing garrison in Tibet only indicates the fall of the Qing dynasty. From that point on, China entered the Republic era.

Tibet Response Network wrote:
The Chinese Republic asked that Tibet join the new Republic, a de facto recognition of the fact that Tibet was at that time a separate entity or nation.

In 1912, the Chinese Republic government in Beijing has absolutely no power beyond the city limit. China was literally divided into many de facto independent states of various sizes. Beijing also invited Marshal Zhang of Manchuria, General Cai of Yunnan, and various other warlords to join the New Republic. The result was a twenty year civil war in China's hinterland.

Tibet Response Network wrote:
The Chinese government represses Tibetans, imprisons and tortures young nuns for shouting "Free Tibet" and shoots pilgrims crossing into Nepal. Sorry, Mark, but give me the Dalai Lama any day.

How would Dalai Lama rule Tibet if Tibet does gain independence? Curious to know if the Tibetan Exile have any plans, however, hypothetical.

中文翻译
anchor贴于: 2007年1月25日, 星期四,  晚上 8:08
Tibet Response Network 写:
你引用几位中国学者只强化了历史通常是由胜利一方写的悲哀事实。也许我该引导你参考华伦史密斯(Warren Smith, Jr.)的西藏民族; “ (1912年) 四月中国在拉萨守军向西藏投降…中国军最后在1912年底经印度从西藏撤走1913年 1月达赖喇嘛终于回到拉萨。西藏从1720年以来首次脱离中国而自由。”(第181页).

我不确定你是否看到1911-12的历史大环境。所引述的中国军队是清朝的军队。当全国起义推翻满清时, 1911年标志着中国王朝的终结。清军不是迅速投降就是被南及西南方的革命军消灭。许多省份当时都纷纷宣告脱离中央独立。问题是宣告脱离一个政府独立是否等于宣告脱离一个国家独立。

Tibet Response Network写:
跟你所说相反, 我没有暗示或写过西藏人起来悍然赶走中国军。我用字小心地说“正式驱逐”。换言之, 那是根据正式概念, 以仪式方式进行的。到处有照片为证。

你又再次误解了历史。清朝最后一个皇帝在1912年逊位, 所有清军被命令向省政府投降及解散。所以, 西藏的清军投降及解散只显示了清王朝的崩溃。从那时候开始, 中国进入共和时代。

Tibet Response Network写:
中华民国邀请西藏加入新共和国,  事实承认西藏当时为分立主体。

1912年, 中国在北京的国民政府完全政令出不了北京城。中国如字义的事实上分裂成多个大小不等的独立军阀国。北京同时也邀请了东北的张大帅, 云南的蔡将军, 及其他许多军阀参与新共和。结果是中国大地陷入二十余年的内战。

Tibet Response Network写:
中国政府压制西藏人, 因高叫“自由西藏”而囚禁及折磨年轻女尼, 射杀去尼泊尔的朝圣者对不起, Mark, 那天都好给我达赖喇嘛吧。

如果西藏真的独立, 达赖喇嘛会如何统治西藏? (译注: 他离开前不就是那个谱了, 看看他如何对付雄登的, 有改善吗? 有的只是在老外面前扮慈悲可怜吧. 给他诺贝尔, 不如给他一个奥斯卡更贴切!)很好奇想知道流亡西藏人民有什么计划, 就算是纸上谈兵虚拟的。


[ 本帖最后由 ltbriar 于 2008-8-2 02:49 编辑 ]
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 楼主| 发表于 2008-8-2 04:38 | 显示全部楼层
【原文鏈接】http://discussions.pbs.org/viewtopic.pbs?p=496511#496511
【聲明】本文翻譯僅限Anti-CNN使用,謝絕轉載。

【回应原文】
M.A.Jones Posted: Fri Jan 26, 2007 12:01 am
Dear David Meanwell,

Thanks again for your response. You begin by accusing me of relying on "several Chinese authors" in an attempt to cast doubt over the credibility of my sources, and therefore of my arguments. The fact is, I have used only one Chinese author - Wang Lixiong, whose article was published not in China but in the UK, in the highly respected New Left Review. I also drew upon an article written by a Tibetan historian in exile, published in the same journal, pointing out where the two differ, and where the two are in agreement.

All of your objections to my reading of history have already been answered for me by Anchor - "The last Qing emperor abdicated in 1912, all Qing troops were ordered to surrender to provincial authorities and disband. Therefore, the surrender and disbandment of the Imperial Qing garrison in Tibet only indicates the fall of the Qing dynasty. From that point on, China entered the Republic era" - and - "In 1912, the Chinese Republic government in Beijing has absolutely no power beyond the city limit. China was literally divided into many de facto independent states of various sizes. Beijing also invited Marshal Zhang of Manchuria, General Cai of Yunnan, and various other warlords to join the New Republic."

Thanks Anchor - you just saved me considerable time in re-phrasing what I had earlier in my previous comment already pointed out.

Again, Chinese authorities in the TAR do indeed imprison and torture those who it perceives to be public security threats - and such people very often are members of the religious community like nuns. This is inexcusable and such human rights violations need to be challenged. But this does not take away the fact that the human rights situation in Tibet is improving, and that the extent of such abuses are exaggerated by the Government in Exile and their Western supporters in the pro-Tibet lobby.

David, you will not sway me from this position unless you can produce empirically verifiable evidence of a quantitative nature that shows otherwise.

So far in this debate you have produced nothing - not a single bit of evidence to support any of your challenges. Where is your evidence to show that the Government in Exile is in any way democratic, as you claim it to be? Even if it is reasonably democratic and open, why, exactly, do you think it could reproduce such conditions within the TAR should the people of the TAR be granted either complete independence or merely self-government? As I said, and I can't emphasise this point enough, there are many requisites required for the successful introduction and development of democracy and the rule of law - and Tibet has none of these requisites. Not a single one! You haven't addressed any of the arguments I raised in my last comment relating this issue, have you?

Finally, I referred to Christopher Hitchens in a very limited way - I merely quoted him reporting on what the Dalai Lama had said quite openly in a press conference, and I pointed out that the Dalai Lama's support of India's nuclear program back in 1998 had been very widely reported throughout the world. Hitchens was by no means the only journalist to cover this story. I wasn't relying on Hitchens as a source of news in any way then, was I? And I certainly was drawing on him for analysis of any sort. Your objection to me quoting him then seems petty.

I, on the other hand, have very good reason to criticise you on your reliance on sources sympathetic to the pro-Tibet lobby cause. Whereas I draw upon a mixture of sources (Tibetan historians in exile included) you are far more selective, it would seem. Warren Smith Jr.'s study that you refer to was severely picked apart by historian A. Tom Grunfeld in a review he wrote published in the China Review International, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 1998, and it was also picked apart by Barry Sautman in his review. Warren Smith Jr. is hardly an objective observer either, is he? For starters, he works for the Tibet Service of Radio Free Asia - which is funded by the U.S. State Department through the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as from financiers like George Soros. (see: Heather Cottin, "George Soros, Imperial Wizard," CovertAction Quarterly no. 74, Fall 2002).

Finally, a word about internet censorship here on the mainland: most censorship here is voluntary, and so much depends on the internet provider. For example, while I was living in Hangzhou, I could quite easily access sites like Wikipedia and fourdirections.org.uk, etc. on my office computer on campus, but the firewall used by the server that provided my connection at home in my apartment had them blocked. Here in Shenzhen I'm forced to use internet bars, but likewise it's a case of hit and miss. The wireless connection I used for my laptop at Illy's Cafe yesterday allowed me to access fourdirections.org.uk but today I'm writing from an internet bar ten minutes away up the road, near to the Hong Kong checkpoint, and it's blocked.

Dear Tibetan Photo Project,

Because Barry Sautman teaches at the University of Hong Kong Science and Technology doesn't make him a CCP stooge - that's ridiculous! He is very often quite critical of CCP policy in fact, and he writes predominantly for a Western academic audience, his research findings are published mostly in American academic journals, and he is no doubt well aware that his work will be subject to rigorous academic scrutiny.

Secondly, the criticisms of Parenti that you link to are shallow and ill-informed, written as incoherent and thoughtless rants by pro-Tibetan lobbyists and Tibetan youths in exile from the comfort and isolation of their North American bedrooms. Parenti by contrast draws his information largely from studies carried out by professional historians like A. Tom Grunfeld and Melvyn Goldstein and Cynthia Beall - and at any rate, he is hardly the only secondary source that I refer to when presenting my arguments, is he?

Where do you draw your information from, I wonder?

You have yet to provide me with any empirically verifiable evidence of a quantitative nature to challenge any of my arguments or to support any of your assertions. Not once.

All you seem to do is to provide links to pro-Tibet lobby websites, none of which contain any such evidence either. Add up the total number of threads that you have posted on this forum, open them all up, and what you will find are little more than advertisements in the form of links, designed to direct readers to yours, and other pro-Tibet lobby websites. What you have offered here so far then, amounts to little more than spam quite frankly.

And the youtube video that you link to I am treating as a joke.

M.A.Jones, Shenzhen

中文翻譯
M.A.Jones贴于: 2007年1月26日, 星期五, 凌晨 12:01
親愛的 David Meanwell,

再次感謝你回應。你一開始就指我「引用几位中国学者」來試圖對我的資料來源的公信質疑, 從而質疑我的論點。事實上, 我只引用了一位中國作者 – 王力雄, 他的文章不是在中國而是在英國很高評價的《新左翼评论》上發表的。我也引用了同樣在同一刊物上發表的另一位流亡的藏裔歷史學家的論述, 指出了兩人不同之處, 以及他們意見相同的地方。

你對我閱讀歷史理解的一切反駁, Anchor已代我一一回應了 - 「清朝最后一个皇帝在1912年逊位, 所有清军被命令向省政府投降及解散。所以, 西藏的清军投降及解散只显示了清王朝的崩溃。从那时候开始, 中国进入共和时代。」- 及 - 「1912年, 中国在北京的国民政府完全政令出不了北京城。中国如字义的事实上分裂成多个大小不等的独立军阀国。北京同时也邀请了东北的张大帅, 云南的蔡将军, 及其他许多军阀参与新共和」

Anchor, 謝謝 – 你幫我省了不少時間去把我之前早已指出的事情, 重新組織來再說一遍。

再說一次, 西藏自治區的中國官方的確囚禁及對那些它認為有危害公安威脅者施刑 – 這些人通常是女尼是屬於宗教團體的。這是不容辯解而這些人權侵犯須受到挑戰。但這不能抹煞西藏人權情況是在改善中, 而侵犯程度是被流亡政府及他們在藏獨遊說團的西方支持者所誇大的。

大衛, 除非你能拿出量質的可驗證證據來證明相反的情況, 你是不能讓我這立場動搖的。

這辯論中至今你沒有提供一絲一毫證據去支持你那些挑戰。你證明流亡政府如何像你聲稱的民主的證據在那? 就算他們有合理民主開放, 那麼, 你就真的認為在西藏自治區人民如果能獨立或只有自治政府時, 它能夠把這些情況在西藏依樣葫蘆呢? 如我所言, 而我也不能更再三強調了, 成功引進發展民主及法治是需要具备条件的 – 而西藏無一具備, 一無所有! 我在這點所提的論點, 你是一條都沒有回應, 對吧?

最後, 我只是有限地引用克里斯多弗.息金斯(Christopher Hitchens) – 我只引述了他對達賴喇嘛在記者會上很公開的談話的報導而已, 而我指出達賴喇嘛支持印度核計劃在1998年時是很廣泛在全世界被報導的。息金斯絕對不是報導此事的唯一記者。無論如何, 我並不是靠息金斯作為新聞的依據, 對吧? 我絕對是在分析之中用上他而已, 而你反對我引用他的話頗為小器了。

可是, 我卻有理由批評你依靠迴護藏獨陣營的資料來源。我是採用了各方面的資訊(包括流亡西藏史學家), 而你卻是很有選擇性的。似乎你引华伦.史密斯的研究在史學家戈倫夫於中國研究書評1998年春第5卷第1期刊登的文章中受到嚴厲指出謬誤。 沙巴利也在他的評論中批評。此外, 华伦.史密斯根本就不是客觀觀察家, 是吧? 為不熟悉的人介紹一下, 他是受僱於美國國務院透過美國國家民主基金會(National Endowment for Democracy), 及像乔治.索罗斯(George Soros)等贊助人支助的自由亞洲電台藏語廣播服務的。 (見: 希瑟. 科婷(Heather Cottin) 「乔治.索罗斯, 帝國鬼才」秘密行動季刊 Covert Action Quarterly 第 74期, 2002秋季)。

最後, 談談大陸網路審查問題: 主要的審查是自動的, 而且大部份視乎網路供應商。舉例說, 我在杭州居住時, 我很容易在學校我辦公室的電腦連上像Wikipedia, fourdirections.org.uk等網站, 但是我家那大廈伺服器的防火牆卻把它們封掉。如今在深圳我被迫用網吧的, 可也是同樣看情況時有時無。昨天在伊利咖啡色我筆記本用的無線連接就可以連上fourdirections.org.uk, 今天我在距它10分鐘路程, 較近香港邊區的另一家網吧, 卻是被封掉。

親愛的 Tibetan Photo Project,

因沙巴利任教於香港科技大學不能把他變成共產黨的傀儡 – 那是很荒謬的! 事實上他經常批評共黨政策, 而他主要是為西方學術界讀者寫作的, 他的研究結果主要是刊登在美國學術刊物上, 而且他也毫不懷疑他的著述是受到學術界最嚴苛的檢驗。

其次, 你那批評帕蘭提的連接都像那些藏獨遊說團及流亡藏青坐在北美舒適的睡房中閉門造車, 语无伦次, 不假思索, 慷慨激昂, 一樣的很膚淺而且資訊錯誤。相反地, 帕蘭提的資料大部份是採用由專業史學家如戈倫夫, 梅尔文.戈尔斯坦及辛西娅.比尔等的研究成果 – 不管怎樣, 他完全不是我在議論中引用的唯一二手資料來源, 對吧?

我奇怪你又是從那裡找來的資料呢?

你還得向我提出量質的可驗證證據來挑戰我的論點, 或是支持你所指稱的, 你卻一次都沒有。

你做的似乎就是提供一串藏獨網站的連接, 其中無一有任何證據。把你在這論壇的所有欄目打開, 能找到的不過就是以連接形式的在打廣告, 用意是把讀者引去你及其他藏獨網站那裡。那麼你在這裡的貢獻坦白說就形同網路垃圾。

你貼上那youtube影音連接, 我當是笑話而已。


M.A.Jones, 深圳

【回应原文】
sarahravensworth Posted: Fri Jan 26, 2007 2:03 am
It's just like newyorker pointed out in another thread, it is Tibet Photo Project who is biased and who has a fixed and narrow mind.

M.A.Jones says that his argument against the so-called "pro-Tibet lobby" is that they:

"push an essentially masturbatory discourse that festishises a virtual Tibet as its object of desire, whilst projecting Oedipal fears onto a rival Han who are consequently demonised in waves of hyperbolic spasms."

What a hoot! This sentence had me in stitches. Explains all the emotion they bring to this debate.

中文翻譯
sarahravensworth贴于: 2007年1月26日, 星期五, 凌晨 2:03
就像newyorker 在另一欄指出, Tibet Photo Project才是有偏見, 定見而且思想狹隘的。

M.A.Jones 說他些所谓的“藏独游说团”是他们

「把一个虚幻的西藏作为欲望目标推到一个基本上是自慰性的歧途上, 把恋母情结的恐惧投射到汉族假想敌, 寻而一波又一波痉挛发作地将他们妖魔化。」

真損透了, 這句讓我大笑。完全把他們引入討論中的所有情緒解釋得淋漓盡致。
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