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发表于 2009-7-17 23:53
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How Many Jews?
In this introductory chapter, we quickly review the principal problems that arise when demographic questions are asked. We then indicate, how demographic problems are resolved in this book, but indicate that the specific task of resolution must be deferred until later in the book.
The problems inherent in a demographic study are formidable. First, all sources of post-war primary data are private Jewish or Communist sources (exclu-
Nation Europa, vol. 23 (Oct. 1973), 50; vol. 25 (Aug. 1975), 39. The Ginsburg beating incident is well known and is mentioned by App, 20.
sively the latter in the all important cases of Russia and Poland). Second, it ap¬pears that one can get whatever results desired by consulting the appropriately se¬lected pre-war and post-war sources. Consider world Jewish population. The 1939 study of Arthur Ruppin, Professor of Jewish Sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, gave 16,717,000 Jews in the world in 1938.20 Because Ruppin (who passed away in 1943) was considered the foremost expert on such matters, on ac¬count of many writings on the subject over a period of many years, the estimates of other pre-war sources tend to agree with him. Thus, the American Jewish Committee estimate for 1933, which appears in the 1940 World Almanac, was 15,315,359. The World Almanac figure for 1945 is 15,192,089 (page 367); no source is given, but the figure is apparently based on some sort of religious cen¬sus. The 1946 World Almanac revised this to 15,753,638, a figure which was re¬tained in the editions of 1947 (page 748), 1948 (page 572), and 1949 (page 289). The 1948 World Almanac (page 249) also gives the American Jewish Committee estimate for 1938 (sic), 15,688,259 while the 1949 World Almanac (page 204) re¬ports new figures from the American Jewish Committee, which were developed in 1947-1948: 16,643,120 in 1939 and 11,266,600 in 1947.
However, New York Times military expert Hanson Baldwin, in an article writ¬ten in 1948 dealing with the then forthcoming Arab-Jewish war on the basis of in¬formation available at the UN and other places, gave a figure of 15 to 18 million world Jewish population as well as figures for such things as Jews in Palestine, Jews in the Middle East, Arabs in Palestine, total Arabs, total Moslems, etc.21
Such a sketch illustrates some of the simpler uncertainties that exist in a de¬mography study. To carry the matter further, the 11-12 million postwar world Jewish population figure, which it is necessary to claim in order to maintain the extermination thesis, is very vulnerable on two points. The first is the set of statis¬tics offered for the U.S., and the second is the set offered for Eastern Europe. Both, especially the latter, are subject to insuperable uncertainties. Let us first consider the United States. Census figures for the total U.S. population are:22
Table 1: U.S. total population
YEAR
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
POPULATION
105,710,620 122,775,046 131,669,275 150,697,361 179,300,000
while U.S. Jewish population figures, as given by the Jewish Statistical Bureau (subsidiary of either the American Jewish Conference or the Synagogue of Amer¬ica), H. S. Linfield, Director, are:23
20
Ruppin, 30-33.
21
New York Times (Feb. 22, 1948), 4.
22
World Almanac (1931), 192; (1942), 588; (1952), 394; (1962), 251.
23
World Almanac (1931), 197; (1942), 593; (1952), 437; (1962), 258.
Table 2: U.S. Jewish population
YEAR
JEWISH POPULATION
1917
3,388,951
1927 4,228,029
1937 4,770,647
1949 5,000,000
1961 5,530,000
It is important to note that all of the U.S. Jewish population figures are given by the same source (Linfield).
The indicated growth of U.S. Jewish population, 1917-1937, is 40.8%, while the growth of total U.S. population, 1920-1940, is 24.6%. This contrast is gener¬ally reasonable, since in the period under consideration Jewish immigration was fairly heavy. However, Jewish immigration into the U.S. raises some problems of its own. The American Jewish yearbook gave a net Jewish immigration for the years 1938-1943 and 1946-1949 (inclusive) of 232,191.24 Figures for 1944 and 1945 do not seem to be available. It was in those two years, incidentally, that an indeterminate number of Jews were admitted to the U.S. “outside of the regular immigration procedure.” It was claimed that there were only 1,000 such Jews quartered at a camp near Oswego, New York, and that they were not eligible for admission to the U.S. This was supposed to be a U.S. contribution to relieving the problems of refugees, but the whole episode seems most strange and suspicious.25
Rather than attempt to settle the problem of the extent of Jewish immigration, suppose one allows the Jewish population a growth rate in 1937-1957 at least equal to that of the U.S. Jewish population of 1917-1937, as seems at least rea¬sonable in view of various facts, e.g., the reasons which sent 1.5 million Jews to Palestine during the World War II and aftermath period appear to motivate immi¬gration to the U.S. just as well, and no national or racial immigration quotas were applicable to Jews as such. In such a case, there should be at least 6,678,000 Jews in the U.S. in 1957, not the 5,300,000 that are indicated. There are about 1,400,000 Jews missing from the interpolated figures for 1957, and we consider this a conservative figure for the reason given. The period 1937-1957 was one of Jewish movement on an unprecedented scale.
On the other hand, we can adopt an equally conservative approach and assume that the 4,770,647 Jews of 1937 grew in 1937-1957 at the same rate as the U.S. population in 1940-1960. Under this assumption, these should have become 6,500,000 Jews in the U.S. in 1957. If one adds the reasonable figure of 300,000 more due to immigration, we have 6,800,000 in 1957. Thus, by either method of extrapolation the figures offered for post-war U.S. Jewish population are at least approximately 1.5 million short for 1957.
The specific major fault of the U.S. Jewish population figures is the inexplica¬bly small claimed growth from 1937 to 1949 despite record Jewish movement and
24
World Almanac (1952), 438.
25
US-WRB (1945), 64-69; New York Times (June 10, 1944), 1; (June 13, 1944), 1; (Aug. 10, 1944), 5; (Oct. 24, 1944), 14; (Oct. 25, 1944), 13; Myer, 108-123.
a very open U.S. immigration policy.
Eastern Europe, however, presents the core of the demographic problem. In order to avoid very serious confusion, one must first recognize that there have been extensive border changes in Eastern Europe in the course of the twentieth century. A map of Europe on the eve of World War I (1914) is given as Fig. 1. A map for January 1938 showing, essentially, Europe organized according to the Treaty of Versailles, before Hitler began territorial acquisitions, is given in Fig. 2, and Fig. 4 shows the post-war map of Europe. The principal border change at the end of World War II was the moving westward of the Soviet border, annexing the three Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) and parts of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Prussia. Poland was compensated with the re¬mainder of East Prussia and what used to be considered eastern Germany; the ef¬fect was to move Poland bodily westward.
Pre-war (1938) Jewish population estimates for Eastern Europe were offered by H. S. Linfield and the American Jewish Committee in the 1948 (sic) World Almanac (page 249). Post-war (1948) figures are published in the 1949 World Almanac (page 204).
Table 3: Eastern European Jewish population (est.)
COUNTRY 1938 1948
Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania USSR 48,398 444,567 3,113,900 900,000 3,273,047 46,500 180,000 105,000 430,000 2,032,500
TOTALS 7,779,912 2,794,000
The claimed Jewish loss for Eastern Europe is thus 4,985,912. The figure for the USSR includes, in both cases, the three Baltic countries and the Jews of Soviet Asia. The pre-war figures are in all cases in close agreement with the figures that Ruppin published shortly before the war. To the extent that the extermination leg¬end is based on population statistics, it is based precisely on these statistics or their equivalents.
The trouble is that such figures are absolutely meaningless. There is no way a Western observer can check the plausibility, let alone the accuracy, of such fig¬ures. He must either be willing to accept Jewish or Communist (mainly the latter) claims on Jewish population for Eastern Europe, or he must reject any number of¬fered as lacking satisfactory authority.
It is possible to reinforce our objection on this all important point and simulta¬neously deal with a reservation that the reader may have; it would appear exces¬sively brazen to claim the virtual disappearance of Polish Jewry, if such had not been essentially or approximately the case or if something like that had not hap¬pened. This seems a valid reservation, but one must recall that much of the terri¬tory that was considered Polish in 1939 was Soviet by 1945. It was possible for Polish Jewry to virtually disappear, if, during the 1939-1941 Russian occupation of Eastern Poland, the Soviets had dispersed large numbers of Polish Jews into the Soviet Union and if, during 1941-1944, the Germans had concentrated Polish Jews eastwards, with the Soviet Union ultimately absorbing many of these Jews into its territory, with those who did not wish to remain in the Soviet Union emi¬grating, mainly to Palestine and the U.S., but also to some extent to the new Po¬land and other lands. This, in fact, is what happened to the Jews who had resided in Poland before the war.
Whatever may be said about Soviet Jewish policy after, say, 1950, it is clear that the earlier policies had not been anti-Jewish and had encouraged the absorp¬tion of Jews into the Soviet Union. It is known that many Polish Jews were ab¬sorbed during and immediately after the war, but of course numbers are difficult to arrive at. Reitlinger considers this problem and settles on a figure of 700,000, without giving reasons why the correct figure might not be much higher. He then notes that the evidence that he employs of extermination of Jews in Russia (documents alleged to be German) indicates about the same number of Soviet Jews exterminated, from which he correctly infers that, in the period 1939-1946, the Soviet Jewish population may have actually increased.26 This important con¬cession, coming from the author of The Final Solution, shows that our unwilling¬ness to accept the Communist figures need not be regarded as motivated merely by the necessities of our thesis. The figures are inarguably untrustworthy. It is claimed by the Soviets that their Jewish population declined by 38%, despite the acquisition of territory containing many Jews. Since the USSR is one of the lands where “Jew” is a legally recognized nationality, the Soviets do indeed possess ac¬curate figures on the number of Jews they have but have chosen (in Reitlinger’s opinion, if you choose not to accept this author’s) to claim an utterly mythical Jewish population loss of 38%.
Likewise with the value to be attached to the remainder of the figures offered.
The most relevant research by a demographer appears to be that of Leszek A. Kosinski of the University of Alberta (Geographical Review, Vol. 59, 1969, pp. 308-402 and Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 11, 1969, pp. 357-373), who has studied the changes in the entire ethnic structure of East Central Europe (i.e. ex¬cluding Germany and Russia) over the period 1930-1960. He explains the extreme difficulties with basic statistics:
“The criteria used in compilation differ from country to country and are
not always precise. In principle, two types are used: objective criteria, such as
language, cultural affiliation, and religious denomination, and subjective cri¬
teria, based on the declaration of the persons themselves. Each type has vir¬
tues and deficiencies. Objective criteria define nationality only indirectly and
are difficult to apply in marginal cases (for example, bilingual persons).
The same criticism applies even more to subjective criteria. External pres¬
sure and opportunism can influence the results, especially where national con¬
sciousness is not fully developed or where an honest answer can bring unde¬
sirable consequences. Official data are not always reliable, then, even when
they are not forged, as has also occurred. However, criticism of the official
Reitlinger, 534, 542-544.
data cannot be applied in the same degree to all the countries, and reliability is very much a function of national policy.”
Jews are of course one of the groups Kosinski is interested in, and he presents various figures, generally comparable to those given above, for numbers of pre¬war Jews. However, his post-war data are so useless from this point of view that he does not even attempt to offer specific post-war numbers for Jews, although he offers post-war figures for other groups, e.g. gypsies, giving numbers less signifi¬cant, statistically, than the numbers of Jews who, according to the extermination mythologists, survived in Eastern Europe. It is true that he accepts the extermina¬tion legend in a general way and presents a bar graph showing a catastrophic de¬crease in the Jewish populations of Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslova¬kia. He also remarks that the combined war-caused population losses for Yugo¬slavs, Jews, Poles and east Germans was about 12.5-14 million, not breaking the total down, and referring the reader to the statistical summary Population Changes in Europe Since 1939 by Gregory (Grzegorz) Frumkin, whose figures for Jews come from the American Jewish Congress, the Zionist Organization of America, and the Centre de Documentation juive contemporaine (Center for Con¬temporary Jewish Documentation) in Paris.
However, the point is that Kosinski arrives at no figures for Jews, as he obvi¬ously should not, given the problems he has noted. The ethnic population figures from Communist Hungary are based on language, and the figures from Commu¬nist Poland, Communist Czechoslovakia, and Communist Romania are based on “nationality,” whatever that means in the various cases. Naturally, he apologizes for his use of “official statistics, imperfect as these may be.” We will return to demographic problems, especially those which involve the Polish Jews, in Chap¬ter 7.
We must also remember that the problem of counting Jews in Western coun¬tries contains enormous difficulties on account of the lack of any legal, racial, or religious basis for defining a “Jew.” As an example, the statistics available to Reitlinger indicate to him that early in World War II there were 300,000 Jews in France, including refugee German Jews.27
The Nazis, on the other hand, thought that there were 865,000, and I see no motivation for deliberate inflation of this figure; other figures used by the Nazis were not wildly inflated compared to the figures of other sources.28 I should add that I really have no idea how many Jews there are in the U.S. I can consult the World Almanac, which will tell me that there are about 6,000,000, but I cannot see how that figure was arrived at and have little confidence in it. As far as I know, the correct figure could as easily be 9,000,000. There must be at least 4,000,000 in the New York area alone.
To summarize what has been said with respect to Jewish population statistics: the problem of compiling such statistics is formidable even without political inter¬ference or pressure. Moreover, in the demographic argument for a five or six mil¬lion drop in world Jewish population, the sources and authorities for the figures
27
Reitlinger, 327. 28 NG-2586-G in NMT, vol. 13, 212.
used are Communist and Jewish and thus, by the nature of the problem we are ex¬amining, must be considered essentially useless. In addition, the post-war figures for the United States are demonstrably too low by a significant amount.
One should not form the impression that it is essential to my argument that any demographic conclusions seemed to be reached above be accepted by the reader. It has only been shown what sorts of problems arise if one attempts a too direct demographic approach; it is not possible to settle anything in such a manner. In the final analysis, the difficulty is that the figures available amount to nothing more than statements, from Jewish and Communist sources, that millions of Jews were killed. Such claims are to be expected, but they must certainly not deter us from looking deeper. We will take up the demographic problem later in the book, however, because the nature of the situation is such that reasonably useful demo¬graphic conclusions are possible once it is understood what, in general, happened to the Jews.
Rassinier’s demographic study, in fact, does not really even attempt to settle the problem, strictly speaking. His basic approach is to analyze the inferences that have been drawn from two different sets of data, that of the Centre de Documen¬tation juive contemporaine and that of Hilberg, both of whom infer from their data five to six million Jewish victims of the Nazis. Rassinier’s conclusion is that the former can only claim 1,485,292 victims form its data and the latter 896,892.29 Rassinier accepts the reality of about a million Jewish victims of Nazi policies, while rejecting the claims of extermination. For example, it is known that some East European peoples took advantage of general political-military conditions to persecute Jews. Also, many Jews who were deported from their homes no doubt perished as a result of generally chaotic conditions, which accompanied the latter part of the war.
Believing that the task is not possible, I will offer here no definite estimate of Jewish losses. However, I have no strong reason to quarrel with Rassinier’s esti¬mate.30
Our Method, Argument, and Conclusion
As stated, the “material” approach will be extended here and, in addition, a “historical-political” approach will be “introduced.” This is just a fancy way of saying that we will grasp that there are two political powers involved in the prob¬lem, not just one. That is to say, we have a tale of extermination, and we should inquire into the circumstance of its generation. Clearly, there are two states in¬volved in the problem. Germany had an anti-Jewish policy involving, in many cases, deportations of Jews from their homes and countries of citizenship. That is
29
Rassinier (1964), 220.
30
Editor’s note: compare in this regard Walter N. Sanning, The Dissolution of the Eastern Euro¬pean Jewry, and Germar Rudolf, “Holocaust victims: A Statistical Analysis”, in Rudolf (ed.), Dissecting the Holocaust, pp. 181-213.
certain. The wartime policy of Washington was to claim extermination, and the post-war policy was to hold trials, at which there was generated the only evidence that we have today that these wartime claims had any foundation. That is also cer¬tain. The policies of both states are necessarily of interest, and if there is any re¬spect, in which this book may be breaking fundamentally new ground on the problem, it is in its insistence in seeing Washington as an active agent in the gen¬eration of the story. Thus, we are interested not only in what Hitler, Himmler, Göring, Goebbels, and Heydrich were doing during the war in regard to these matters, but also what Roosevelt, Hull, Morgenthau, and the New York Times and associated media were doing during the war, and what the various tribunals con¬trolled or dominated by Washington did after the war. This is not only a fair but, more importantly, an illuminating historical approach.
The conclusion is that Washington constructed a frame-up on the Jewish ex¬termination charge. Once this is recognized, the true nature of German Jewish policy will be seen. |
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