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发表于 2009-3-26 00:00
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本帖最后由 I'm_zhcn 于 2009-3-26 01:11 编辑
No. 650
Diaspora, identity, and habitus
Responding to celebrations of diaspora and of border crossings as metaphors of emancipation,
transgression, and subversion, critical geographers have suggested rethinking diaspora as being `without guarantees', to borrow from Hall (1986). That is, a diasporic condition may indeed be subversive or transgressive, but it is not necessarily so. Furthermore, diasporic identities and communities are always multiple and contested (Mitchell, 1997; Nagar, 1997; Nagel, 2001). All of this is quite evident in the lyrics of Red China Robber Gang by Techung, a popular California-based Tibetan singer. In exuding a sense of defiance and pride in Tibetan identity, the song also plays directly into existing Western stereotypes of Chinese as alien, dog-eating, and/or Communist Others. This demonization of the Chinese is often extended by Tibetans reared in South Asia to Tibetans who have grown up in Tibet who are suspected of being `brainwashed' by China. The need to recognize that a diasporic condition is not always already politically progressive is acute in the Tibetan case, because of the way in which the diasporic struggle has been structured by the Cold War and by the conflation of Chinese-ness with Communism. The CIA's covert support for the Tibetan resistance army, Chushi Gangdrug, from 1956 until 1972 grew directly out of the Cold War project to contain Communism (Conboy and Morrison, 2002; Knaus, 1999). These geopolitical entanglements have made for strange political bedfellows; former Republican Senator Jesse Helms, known for his distaste for what he called ``Red China'' and the ``barbarous, Communist Chinese government'', was one of the earliest and most vocal supporters of the Tibetan cause in the US government (Collinson, 2001). In an ironic twist, performances in the 1970s by the Dharamsala-based Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts were heckled vociferously by audiences in Washington DC, Madison, and Berkeley, who were ideologically supportive of,if not well-informed about,theCommunist project in China (Calkowski, 1997). The partial structuring of the internal politics of Tibetan communities by this field of global geopolitics makes their dynamics all the more important to tease apart.
离散藏人聚居区 民族特征和习惯
Responding to celebrations of diaspora and of border crossings as metaphors of emancipation,transgression, and subversion, critical geographers have suggested rethinking diaspora as being `without guarantees', to borrow from Hall (1986). (实在不懂翻译)也就是说,流亡聚居的状况可能真的具有颠覆性或进攻性的,也它不一定要这样。此外,流亡藏族人的民族特征和这个群体经常是多样化以及争议中的(Mitchell, 1997; Nagar, 1997; Nagel, 2001)。由加州藏族流行歌手德琼创作的“红色匪帮”的歌词是其中一个很好的例证,这首歌展示了西方人眼中固有的中国形像,作异形,吃狗肉者以及或者可能是共产党。在南亚长大的藏族人经常把对中国人的妖魔化扩大至在西藏长大的藏族人,怀疑他们已经在中国被洗脑。认识到流亡状况在政治上不一定是进步的,这一点对认清西藏运动很重要,因为流亡藏族人的抗争是由冷战以及共产党的吞并构成的。中央情报局从1956年到1972年间对卡西康卓藏族抵抗军的秘密援助,完全是出于钳制共产主义的冷战策略(Conboy and Morrison, 2002; Knaus, 1999)。这些地缘政治上的姻缘成就了这对政治红尘知己;前共和党参议员杰西·赫尔姆斯以对他所称作“红色中国”、“野蛮的共产中国政府”的憎恶而著称,他是美国政府中其中一个最早期的和最强烈的西藏运动支持者。一个啼笑皆非的插曲是,以达兰萨拉为基地的藏族表演艺术学院的表演常常被华盛顿、麦迪逊和巴克利的观众喝倒彩,他们在意识形态上支持共产党人在中国的目标,当然他们可能对共产党人的目标不太了解(Calkowski, 1997)。藏族社群的内部党派政治斗争在世界地缘政治的大气候中得到了动力而不是分裂。
Of course, Tibetan communities have always been cross cut by multiple identities. Nevertheless,practices such as long-distance trade and pilgrimage gave a relative coherence to Tibetan cultural identity, including a sense of shared history, a common literary language, aspects of genealogy, myth, and religion, and folkloric notions such as Tibetans as eaters of tsampa (ground barley flour) (Kapstein, 1998). However, the `imagined community' of Tibet as a nation and the belief that Tibetans should thus have a unique nation-state (Anderson, 1983), emerged strongly only in the early 20th century, after the 13th Dalai Lama fled to India and then to Mongolia after British and Chinese invasions, and especially after the 1951 incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China (PRC).
当然,各种各样的身份特征一直交互影响着藏族社群。尽管如此,长途贸易和朝圣这些活动造就了一个相对连贯藏族的文化特征,包括共同的历史、共同的书面语言、血缘联系、神话和宗教,还有民俗概念,比如藏族是吃糌粑的(Kapstein, 1998)然而,,到了二十世纪初期,在十三世达赖喇嘛因为英国和中国的侵略而逃亡到印度再前往蒙古之后,那些把想像中的藏族社群当成一个国家,并且认为藏族应该有一个单一民族的国家的思潮(Anderson, 1983)清晰显现出来,尤其是1951年西藏并入中华人民共和国后更加强烈。
Prior to this century, Tibetans conceived of themselves primarily in relation to sectarian and regional affiliations. Thus, the term Bod-pa, now a general term for `Tibetan', was used only in reference to nonnomadic inhabitants of Central Tibet (Stoddard, 1994). Even in the 1970s the Tibetan government in exile worked hard to forge a national Tibetan identity to supercede divisive regional and sectarian identifications (Nowak, 1984).In exile communities today there are still undercurrents of regional divisiveness, but, like the `Kham for the Khampas' (3) movements of the 1930s and the history of the Kham-oriented Chushi Gangdrug resistance movement (McGranahan, 2005), they are largely papered over in the transnational nation-building project of the Tibetan government in exile and of the Tibet Movement. Tibetans in exile insist today that, ``For more than two thousand years, Tibet ... existed as a sovereign nation'' (http://www.tibet.net/diir/eng/enviro/overview/). As Renan (1939 [1882], page 190) has observed, ``To forget and to get one's history wrong, are essential factors in the making of a nation.''
在二十世纪以前,藏族人眼中的彼此联系主要是宗教派系和地区从属。因此,“Bod-pa”这个词,也就是现在的“Tibetan”仅仅指生活在西藏中部的游牧民(Stoddard,1994)。甚至在七十年代,西藏流亡政府尽力树立一个全民族的藏族民族特征,来取代地区性和宗派性的民族特征(Nowak,1984). 直至现在地区性派别仍然影响着流亡藏族人社区,如三十年代的“来自康藏的康巴人”运动和在起源于康藏的卡西康卓抵抗运动的历史(Mcgranahan,2005),但这些分歧在大体上被西藏流亡政府的跨国的“建国计划”和藏族运动掩盖起来。流亡藏族人今天坚持:“在超过二千年的时间里,西藏是以一个主权国家存在的” (http://www.tibet.net/diir/eng/enviro/overview/)。 正如Renan(1939[1882],page 190)评论道:“忘记、、、、或者一段谬误的历史,是编造一个国家的必要因素”
Responding to celebrations of diaspora and of border crossings as metaphors of emancipation,transgression, and subversion, critical geographers have suggested rethinking diaspora as being `without guarantees', to borrow from Hall (1986). (实在不懂翻译)各位童鞋,谁懂得翻译这句话?
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