[联合翻译] Exile meets homeland

政治不正确

正述补全：Critical geographers have suggested that we rethink diaspora as being 'without guarantees' -- a term borrowd from Hall (1986). This rethinking is a response to celebrations of diaspora and o ...
墨羽 发表于 2009-3-26 01:36

谢谢，补充翻译为

对于把流亡藏族聚居区和跨越国境宣扬为解放、抵制和反抗的象征，批判地理学家主张我们重新把流亡藏族聚居区重新想像为“不确定的”――一个向Hall(1986)借用的词汇。

墨羽

这里“diaspora”泛指任何民族的侨居群体，并非特指藏族侨民。还有，我在楼上已经说过了，“diaspora”指的不是地理区域，翻译成“聚居区”肯定是错的。

要想知道“guarantees”在这里的具体含义是什么，必须去翻看Hall那篇1986年的论文（The problem of ideology: Marxism without guarantees. Stuart Hall, Journal of Communication Inquiry, 1986）。该论文说：

...
The general question at issue is a particular conception of 'theory': theory as the working out of a set of guarantees.
...
Understanding 'determinancy' in terms of setting of limits, the establishment of parameters, the defining of the space of operations, the concrete conditions of existence, the 'givenness' of social practices, rather than in terms of the absolute predictability of particular outcomes, is the only basis of a 'marxism without final guarantees'. It establishes the _open horizon_ of marxist theorizing -- determinancy without guaranteed closures. The paradigm of perfectly closed, perfectly predictable, systems of thought is religion or astrology, not science.
...

我的理解是这样：“guarantee”指的是某个概念或理论在学术界中公认的定义和常理。“without guarantee”则是说有些概念或理论是模糊的、变化的，学术界认可的有关定义和常理随时有可能被推翻。回到本文（藏侨问题），作者说一些具有批判意识的地理学家认为“侨民”的概念就像Hall眼中的马克思主义一样，“没有理论保障”。你译为“不确定”，我看倒也未尝不可。

音乐盒

好难，好难。。。
试试领652、653

忧心

文章太专业了！凑个热闹，水平有限，试领656-658页The politics of language这一节。

孜心

谢谢音乐盒。我来试一下下面的一节：Staging cultural performance （pages258-260）, 如果不太慢的话，继续另一节Authoritie of homeland and suject formation. (pages260-263)

rhapsody

昨晚已短信总编让他帮忙召集人手（不知他找了没），希望这个联合翻译也能顺利完工。如有需要本人帮忙的地方也说一声。
P.S. 楼上的页码怎么不一样？在PDF里边看到Staging cultural performance是658-660页，而Authoritie of homeland and subject formation是660-663页吧。

孜心

呵抱歉，打字错误。

音乐盒

呵呵，你们真好{:9_364:}
呼唤楼主献身并检查，恳请大家参与校对

继续领养654、655。

音乐盒

请多多批评指正Q28)


652

This describes the Tibetan diaspora in the USA, in which the habitus of Tibetans from Tibet, of Tibetans from exile, and of those who have experienced both are unmoored from their social fields and places of sedimentation and encounter each other. Thus, I do not argue in what follows that the community fractures described here are fixed forever, but rather try to capture the present moment of confrontation and negotiation.
它描述了美国侨居藏人的状态，包括居住其间的来自西藏的藏人、流亡藏人、兼具两处体验的藏人，其惯习脱离了他们的社交场所和沉积惯习的地方，并遭遇彼此的惯习。因此，我不去争论本文所描述的社会断裂会以何种形式永远固定下来，而宁愿试着去捕捉当前这一对抗与协商的时刻。

Aftera brief overview of the Tibetan diaspora, I trace the experience of 'new arrivals' such as Tenzin from India to the USA. Next, I turn to two key arenas of struggle over authenticity: language choice andstaged 'cultural' performances, including embodied reactions of appreciation or distaste for certain types of performances. Of importance here is not only the fact that dispositions, mannerisms, andappreciation of style are different but that each set of dispositionsis understood as the only way to be authentically Tibetan. After this Iexamine different strategies of establishing cultural authority, and, finally, look at the political stakes in seemingly inconsequential matters of taste.
在对侨居藏人作一番简要概述后，我会追踪'新来者'的经历，如从印度来美国的丹增。接下来，会转而介绍两个关键的关于正统的战斗场所：语言选择和舞台'文化'表演，包括具体的鉴赏反应或对某些表演形式的厌恶。这里重要的是，不仅仅性情、癖好和欣赏方式各个不同，而且，每一组性格都被各自认作是正统藏人的唯一习俗。之后，我会调查建立文化正统的不同策略，最后会讨论在看似微不足道的品味方式里所含的政治厉害关系。

The multisited ethnography (Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995) presented here draws upon participant observation and a series of semistructured interviews with Tibetans living in Lhasa, Tibet, northern California, and the Denver metro area of Colorado. By participant observation, I refer to attendance at picnics, meetings, parties, discussions, and performances, and visits in private homes. The approach is grounded in the understanding that "unearth[ing] what the group takes for granted'' (Herbert, 2000, page 551) requires extensive interactions and familiarity with social setting. Interviews and unstructured conversations and interactions were conducted primarily in Tibetan,and, less frequently, in Chinese.
这里出现的多点民族志(Hannerz, 2003; Marcus, 1995) （译者注：在全球化人口、货物、资本和讯息到处流动的脉络下，单一地方的民族志已经无法理解文化和社会的生成，马库斯提出多点民族志(multi-sitedethnography)，建议研究者跟着人、对象、隐喻/符号、故事情节、传记/生命史、矛盾，书写以跨地域为背景的单一地方民族志(Marcus,1995:95-117)。这种民族志的目的并不是要呈现一个整体的社会(holisticsociety)，而是要透过流动的定位(mobile positioning)、视野，去探讨生命世界与文化、建制互动、以及文化社会的生成。 ），借由参与观察法（译者注：参与观察法（Participant observation）是指观察者参与到观察对象的活动之中，通过与观察对象共同进行的活动从内部进行观察。）和一系列对藏人的半结构访谈（译者注：一般民族志所使用的访谈形式包括结构(structure)、半结构的(semistructure)，非正式 的(informal)和追忆的(retrospective)访谈）来实现，他们居住在拉萨、西藏、加利福尼亚北部和科罗拉多丹佛主城区。参与观察法，我指的是在出席野餐、会议、聚会、讨论、表演和私人拜访时。此方式建立在这一理解之上，即“发掘这一群体视之为理所当然之处”(Herbert, 2000, page551)需要广泛的互动和对社会情境的熟悉。访谈和无结构的对话及互动主要以藏语展开，极少以汉语。

The Tibetan diaspora in brief
侨居藏人概况

Afterthe failed uprising in Lhasa in 1959, roughly 80 000 Tibetans followed the14th Dalai Lama to exile in South Asia. Some lived in towns such as Kathmandu, Delhi, Mussoorie, and Dharamsala, and others settled inagricultural and handicraft settlements established by the governmentin exile with the help of Western aid organizations. After the peak years of exodus from 1959 to 1961, the borders of Tibet were effectively closed (Nowak, 1984, page 9). The political isolation of China meant that there was very little contact between Tibetans inside Tibet and the refugee community for more than two decades.
在1959年的拉萨暴动失败后，约8万藏人随14世达赖喇嘛往南亚流亡。一些人住在市镇，如加德满都、德里、马苏里和达兰萨拉，其他人定居在西方援助组织帮助流亡政府建立的农业和手工业定居区里。继1959到1961的出走高峰年份之后，西藏边境被有效封锁 (Nowak, 1984, page9)。中国的政治孤立意味着西藏境内的藏人和难民团体之间有二十多年是几近隔绝的。

Only after the death of Mao, the beginning of reform, and the then Chinese Party Secretary Hu Yaobang's fact-finding visit to Tibet in 1980 were restrictions somewhat loosened. In the early 1980s refugees were allowed to visit their relatives in Tibet if they applied for 'overseas Chinese' passports (many refused to do so). Between 1985 and 1988 some Tibetans were given permission to go on pilgrimage and to visit relatives inIndia, where many of them stayed (Ström, 1997, page 37). At the same time, parents began to send their children to schools in India to receive a Tibetan education.
仅仅在毛泽东去世后，改革开始，接下来中共党委书记胡耀邦1980年到西藏的实地考察才使得限制稍微有所放松。八十年代早期，允许难民到西藏探亲，如果他们申请'华侨'护照的话（许多人拒绝这么做）。在1985到1988年间，一些藏人获得许可去印度朝圣和探亲，许多人就在那儿呆了下来(Ström, 1997, page37)。同时，家长们开始将他们的孩子送到印度的学校以接受藏族教育。

However, the pro-independence demonstrations in Lhasa from 1987 to 1989 led to the imposition of martial law. Traveling legally to India became difficult once more, butthe political crackdown that ensued produced another wave of Tibetanswho fled to India. An estimated 2000-3000 Tibetans continue to leaveillegally for India every year, though in recent years this has become increasingly difficult with the Chinese government's pressure on Nepalto arrest and forcibly repatriate Tibetans passing through to India.'New arrivals' -- members of this second wave of Tibetans arriving in India are often referred to -- estimated to constitute more than 10% of the total diasporic population, which was estimated at 150 000 in 2002 (CTAC, 2002, page 4; Methfessel, 1997, page 14).
然而，1987到1989年间拉萨支持独立的示威致使颁布戒严令。合法去印度再度变得困难，但接踵而来的政治镇压却掀起了又一波逃往印度的浪潮。近年来，中国政府对尼泊尔施压要求逮捕和强制遣返经由尼泊尔入印度的藏人，从而使情形随之变得日益困难，但据估计，每年仍有二到三千名藏人继续非法前往印度。这第二波抵达印度的藏人成员常常被称为'新来者'，据估计约占2002年流亡藏人15万总人口（CTAC, 2002, page 4; Methfessel, 1997, page14）中的超过10%。

----------------
653

The two major processes in the Tibetan diaspora of interest here are, first, thearrival of this second wave of refugees from Tibet after 1985; and, second, the large-scale movement of Tibetans from South Asia to the USA after the passage of the 1990 Immigration Act. Section 134 of the Act,the Tibetan US Resettlement Program (TUSRP), granted permanent resident status to 1000 Tibetans living in South Asia. These were chosen by quota according to categories, including 100 slots for 'new arrivals' from Tibet (Hess, 2003). Beginning in 1996 the lottery winners, who had been assigned to resettlement clusters in eighteen states, became eligible to bring their families to the USA.
侨居藏人的两大进程令人感兴趣，第一，这第二波1985年以后来自西藏的难民的来临；第二，在《1990年移民法》(译者注：美国移民法 Immigration and Nationality Act 1990)通过后，藏人自南亚大举迁至美国。移民法第134章，藏人安居美国计划（TUSRP），准予了在南亚居住的1000名藏人的（美国）永久居留。依照各类别配额，这些人被选中，包括给来自西藏的'新抵埠者'的100个名额(Hess,2003)。1996年开始采取抽签的办法，抽中者可以在18个州重新聚居，可以携带他们的家人到美国。

A secondary effect of both the remittances that they began to send home and the heavy representation of Tibetan elites among the participants was theaccumulation of social capital to the migrants. This has motivated and facilitated the migration of Tibetans from Nepal and India through non-TUSRP channels as well. The current estimate of 10 000 Tibetans in North America is far beyond what TUSRP had origi-nally envisioned(CTAC, 2002, page 11). Economically, there is intense pressure forremittances, and, symbolically, 'the West' has come to be seen in South Asian exile communities as a surrogate Shangri-la, diametrically opposed to China (Diehl, 2002).
他们开始往家里汇款以及参与者中藏族精英的沉重陈述产生了一个附属效应，即移民社会资本的积聚。这驱使和方便了藏人从尼泊尔和印度通过非TUSRP渠道的移民。当前估计有1万藏人生活在北美，已远远超过TUSRP的原始预想(CTAC, 2002, page 11)。经济上，有汇款的紧张压力，象征意义上，'西方'成了南亚流亡团体眼中的香格里拉代名词，与中国一词截然相反 (Diehl, 2002)。

Increasingly, however, the USA has also become the destination of Tibetans who travel directly from Tibet. They are few in number, no more than a handful inall but the largest Tibetan communities (such as, New York or San Francisco) [Exact numbers are not available.]. Though a few have rural origins and minimal educational background [They come, for example,after fortuitously meeting Western travelers who are willing to sponsor their trips to the USA.], the dominant pattern of their transnational migration is through channels that rely on extensive education in the PRC, which in turn favors urban backgrounds. Some were cadres or staff for the small but increasing number of foreign development projects in Tibet, who come to the USA as visitors, trainees, or students. Their numbers also include a few who had come under political suspicion in their work units in Tibet. The contentious politics of authenticity between the long-time exiles, the 'new arrivals', and the Tibetans fromTibet, in the USA, grows out of the earlier reception of 'new arrivals' in India, to which I turn next.
然而，美国也逐渐成为直接来自西藏的藏人的目的地。他们数量很少，在大型藏人团体（比如，纽约或旧金山）[未给出准确数字]中加起来也只有少量。尽管有少数人出自农村，只受过基础教育 [比如说，他们是在偶然遇到愿意资助他们到美国的西方旅游者后前来的]，他们跨国移民的最主要方式是通过建立在中国的宽泛教学之上的渠道而来的，与前者相反，他们多为城市背景。西藏对外发展项目数量少但却在日益增多，有些人是这些项目的干部或员工，他们到美国访问、培训或留学。一些在他们西藏的工作单位受到政治上的怀疑的人也在其中。在美国的长期流亡者、'新来者'，和来自西藏的藏人间关于正统的有争议政见，产生于'新来者'在印度受到的早期接待，接下来我会谈到这个。

'New arrivals': from India to the USA
'新来者'：从印度到美国

Virtually all organized Tibetan community activity outside of Tibet has focused on reclaiming political control of thenational homeland, and on speaking and struggling on behalf of those Tibetans who remain in Tibet. When Tibetan border policies were first relaxed in the mid-1980s, the newcomers were warmly welcomed. Political prisoners and religious leaders, such as the 17th Karmapa, who have escaped Tibet recently continue to receive unreserved welcomes. However, this is not necessarily the case for many ordinary Tibetans. New arrivals, whose first destination is usually Dharamsala because itis the residence of the Dalai Lama, are, in fact, crucial to the exile community as sources of the latest information about the situation in Tibet. However, when exiles, particularly the younger generation, findthemselves face to face with the new arrivals and with their unfamiliar and hence 'Chinese' habits, mannerisms, and clothes the image of theirfellow Tibetans as pure and uncorrupted (Ström, 1997, page 37) quickly gives way to a belief that they have been brainwashed by their upbringing under Chinese rule. The fact that Tibetan identity in exilehas been constituted in opposition to China contributes to both thescorn and suspicion of the 'Chinese' appearance and behavior of new arrivals who, because they are different, are seen as less than authentically Tibetan.
实际上，所有有组织的西藏境外藏人团体活动的焦点都集中在：声称受到祖国的政治管控、为那些仍在西藏的藏人利益说话和战斗。当八十年代中期西藏边境政策首次被放宽时，新来者会受到热情的欢迎。政治犯和宗教领袖一直都受到毫无保留的欢迎，比如近年逃离西藏的十七世噶玛巴。然而，这不是可供许多寻常藏人参考的例子。新来者的第一目标通常是达兰萨拉，因为那里是达赖喇嘛的住处，实际上，他们对于流亡团体来说至关重要，因为他们是西藏局势最新消息的来源。但是，当流亡者，尤其是年轻一代，发现当他们真正面对新来者，面对其不熟悉的和因此是'汉人'的惯习、癖好和衣着，对他们当作纯正和未堕落的藏人的印象迅速使他们认定，新来者在中国统治下的教化中被洗脑了。流亡的藏人特征被构建得与中国正好相反，以至于新来者因其不同的'汉人'外表和举止而受到鄙视和怀疑，很少被视为正统藏人。

音乐盒

先发个草稿（请别改字体颜色，回头我再看看）
继续认领663-665的politics and national location。


-------------------
654

Even worse than being considered brainwashed, some new arrivals are suspected of being spies for the Chinese government, a situation that is reinforced both by the politics of language use, discussed in detail below, and by events such as the arrest in 1995 and 1998 of several new arrivals in Dharamsala for allegedly spying for China (Diehl, 2002)[China denied all allegations, although it has also accused Tibetans of spying for the exile government. One arrested Tibetan allegedly confessed during interrogation in 1998 (McGirk, 1998), but a conclusive answer in this and other cases is elusive. Although not completely implausible, suspicion about spying far exceeds the bounds of plausibility, as with Tenzin's case.]. As a result, many new arrivals report that they feel like outsiders among Tibetan exiles in India. Even those who leave because of political difficulties sometimes feel they are not completely trusted because their narratives do not conform to the standard, expected story of Chinese oppression. The situation is made no easier by the occasional Tibetan on an official visit to India. A PRC-based Tibetan who has founded a nongovernmental organization focused on cultural preservation, and who attended the 2004 World Social Forum in India, told me: ''When I saw all of the Tibetans there [in India], I felt they were my brothers and sisters, but [because he was being closely monitored], I ignored them and acted like I didn't know anything.'' Such 'acts' by Tibetans concerned about repercussions back home confirm long-term exiles' fears and also feed suspicions of new arrivals.
甚至比被认为洗脑了更糟，一些新来者被怀疑是中国政府的间谍，一种被语言运用的政治（下面会详细讨论）和几名据说为中国从事间谍活动的新来者在1995年和1998年的被逮捕事件(Diehl, 2002)加强了的情形[中国拒绝所有的指控，尽管它也指控了为流亡政府从事间谍活动的藏人。据说一名被捕藏人在审问期间已供认(McGirk, 1998),但是这例和其他案子的最终结果却泥牛入海。即使不都是不可靠的，但怀疑是间谍的程度也远远超过了真实性的界限，如丹增的例子。]。结果便是，许多的新来者报告，他们觉得像是印度流亡藏人的局外人。即使那些因政治困境离开的人，有时也感觉他们不完全被信任，因为他们的叙述不符合所期待的关于中国压迫的故事的常规。形势。一名来自中华人民共和国的藏人曾组建了关注文化保留的非政府组织，曾参加2004年印度的世界社会论坛，他告诉我：“当我看到那儿[在印度]的所有藏人，我觉得他们是我的兄弟姐妹，但是[因为他是被严密监视的]，我不理他们并装作什么都不知道。”藏人担心回去后产生不良影响的这种 '装作'证实了长期以来流亡者的担心，也滋长了对新来者的猜疑。

The other major reaction to the new arrivals' unfamiliar bodily stylizations is scorn and embarrassment. These attitudes, with a strong element of class and urban con-descension, are primarily directed at new arrivals from rural backgrounds; they tend to be looked down on, rather than seen as politically suspect (though sometimes the two reactions are mixed). Young Tibetan exiles often refer to the new arrivals (sarjor) as being kacha, or 'raw' in Hindi, which is a reference to their unfashionable clothing, haircuts, and musical tastes (Diehl, 2002). Decades of living in South Asia have produced a shift in style among Tibetan communities, whether it is the wearing of shawls and the salwar kameez by Tibetan women, or the Bollywood-inspired slicking back of men's hair. However, the exile community's view of themselves as the defenders and preservers of Tibetan culture (particularly in Dharamsala) prevents these influences from being fully acknowledged. Like all styles, those read as kacha vary over time, but among men they have included the wearing of large blocky sunglasses popular in Tibet, polyester pants, and thin-soled olive-green cloth army shoes (in contrast to the US-inspired jeans, T-shirts, and brand-name sneakers favored by exile youth). According to one exile from Nepal, in the late 1980s, "the most important thing was whether your pants were tapered or flared at the ankles; only the sarjors' pants were tapered.'' These sarjor are also said to be recognizable by their ruddy complexions, their propensity for wearing multiple thick layers of long underwear, and, say some, their tendency to bathe too infrequently.
对新来者那生疏具体的风格化的其他主要反应表现为轻蔑和尴尬。这些态度带有一种很强的阶级因素和城市人的居高临下，主要针对有农村背景的新来者；他们会被瞧不起，多过被从政治方面的猜测来对待（尽管有时这两种反应是混合的）。年轻流亡藏人常常指的是新来者（sarjor）而不是kacha，或是北印度语中的'原始的'，这是参照他们不时尚的衣着、发型和音乐品位(Diehl, 2002)。几十年来在南亚居住已使藏人团体中在风格上发生转变，即：西藏妇女穿的是披肩还是旁蔗普服，或者男人是否有着宝莱坞风尚的从背后看来油光水滑的头发。但是，流亡社团视自己为藏族文化的维护者和保存者（特别是在达兰萨拉），阻止这些完全公认的影响。就像读作kacha等所有的风格一样，一直都在变化，在西藏的人们也流行戴大墨镜，穿聚酯材质的长裤和薄底橄榄绿军鞋（与流亡青年喜爱美国时尚的牛仔体恤和名牌运动鞋相反）。一位八十年代后期从尼泊尔来的流亡者说：“最重要的一点在于你的裤子在脚踝处是变细或是张开；只有sarjors的裤子是张开的。”据说这些sarjor还可通过以下几点来辨认，他们的红润肤色，他们穿多件又厚又长的内衣的习性，和有些人说的，他们太不经常洗澡了。

An important and related image of the new arrivals is that they are 'impolite' and behave poorly, and that the men are 'aggressive' and prone to fighting. The Bir School for new arrivals was known for being a site of frequent fighting in the 1990s. Similarly, in the three main Gelukpa monasteries in exile, new arrivals are characterized by teachers and other students alike ''as having less respect for monastic discipline as well as being wild and unruly'' (Ström, 1997, page 41). For Tibetans in exile, long attuned to their positive public image as compassionate and gentle, nonviolence has become internalized as a marker of authentic Tibetan-ness (Huber 2001; Sperling, 2001). The Dalai Lama himself has framed the issue of authenticity in this way; when asked about the loss of Tibetan culture in a recent interview he replied:
一个对新来者的重要和相关印象是他们是'不礼貌的'和缺乏教养的，所以是'挑衅的'和好斗的。在比尔的为新来者准备的学校，因成为一个九十年代的频繁斗殴场所而出名。与之类似，在流亡政府的三大格鲁派寺院，新来者被教师和其他同样的学生划为“不遵守寺院规章，就像是野蛮和无法无天的”(Ström, 1997, page 41).。对流亡藏人来说，长期以来，努力适应他们是有同情心和温柔、非暴力这一正面公众印象，已内化为正统西藏特色(Huber 2001; Sperling, 2001)。达赖喇嘛自己以这种方式架构了正统问题；在近期的一次采访中，当问及藏族文化的丧失时，他回答道：

----------------------
655

"There are clear signs of the degenerationof the Tibetan traditions, and of moral principles. In recent yearsthere have been a number of murder cases in the Tibetan community inIndia. All of them took place among people newly arrived from Tibet.This shows the degeneration of the spirit of tolerance andself-discipline. And then in Tibet itself, there is gambling and alsoprostitution'' (Iyer, 2001).
“有明显的迹象表明藏族传统和道德信念的退化。近年来印度藏人团体有大量谋杀案。都是在从西藏新来者之间发生的。这表明了忍耐和自律精神的倒退。然后，在西藏内，有赌博，还有卖淫”(Iyer, 2001)。

Violence,then, is read as proof that Tibetans from Tibet have been Sinicized andare no longer authentically Tibetan. What this framing obscures is thelong history of socially and culturally sanctioned codes of honor andrevenge, and the celebration of weaponry and fighting as a performanceof masculinity in some parts of Tibet (for example, Norbu, 1997). Thisis not to suggest that all behavior of new arrivals is an unproblematiccontinuation from a pre-1959 past, but it is equally problematic toassume that everything that Tibetans in exile now associate withauthentic Tibetan-ness is a true preservation of a single 'pure'Tibetan culture.
暴力便被认为是来自西藏的藏人被中国化并且不再是正统藏人的证据。这一构想，掩盖的是社会和文化认可的荣誉与复仇准则的漫长历史，颂扬武器与格斗在西藏某些地方被看作是男子气概的表现(for example, Norbu,1997)。这并不意味着，所有新来者的举止都是对1959年前的过去没有争议的延续，但流亡藏人的问题同样存在，他们现在将每件事物都与正统藏族特色联系起来，认为这才是真正保存了藏族文化的单一“纯正”。

The behavior of some new arrivals isalso seen as deplorable because of the exiles' self-understanding ofTibetans as refugees, temporary guests of the Indian state. Long-termrefugees believe that bad behavior on the part of the new arrivalsengenders Indian resentment towards the Tibetan population as a whole,giving them an undeservedly bad reputation. These issues areexacerbated by the scarcity of resources in South Asian exilecommunities, which are further taxed by continual arrivals from Tibet.Thus, although sarjor means literally new arrival, many of thoselabeled sarjor understand the term as an insult.
一些新来者的举止也被视为是可悲的，因为流亡藏人将自己看作难民、印度政府的临时客人。老难民认为，部分新来者的不良举止会使印度人对藏人整个群体产生愤恨，带来不相符的坏名誉。这种观点被极少数南亚的流亡团体夸大，而这些团体更多是靠从西藏持续不断的新来者的税收维持的。因而，尽管sarjor在字面意义上意味着新来者，很多被打上这个标签的sajor都将这个词理解成一种侮辱。

In the USA, the newarrivals are on a more level playing field with other Tibetans than wasthe case in South Asia, where they were more structurally dependent onthe larger Tibetan community. Almost everyone struggles to make endsmeet, and the immediate Tibetan community diminishes in economic aswell as in political importance. In interviews several former newarrivals pointedly claimed that they were as successful in the USA asthe long-term exiles, if not more so. Nevertheless, the term sarjorcontinues to be used in sometimes perjorative ways. ''That man is sucha sarjor'', said one exile who himself had recently immigrated to theUSA, as a marker of his exasperation with another man with whom hesquabbled over a downtown Oakland parking space. On another occasion,when one Tibetan man called out in jest to two other Tibetan basketballplayers on a languid Saturday afternoon in Denver, "hey, you two sarjorare pretty darn good at basketball'', the comment nearly provoked afistfight, again indicating that the term continues to be saturatedwith meanings far beyond the length of residence time in a particularplace.
在美国，新来者与其他藏人打交道的的活动场所比在南亚更多元，在南亚，他们在组织结构上更多依赖于较大的藏人团体。几乎每个人都努力终止会面，无论是在经济上还在政治上，直属藏人团体的重要性都在降低。在访谈中，几位曾经的新来者直率的称，他们在美国与那些长期流亡者一样成功，并不差。而且，sarjor这个词一直被用于贬义。“那个人真是个sarjor”，最近刚移民到美国的一位流亡者说，作为他在奥克兰市中心为一个停车位与人吵架时发怒的标志。在另一例里，丹佛一个慵懒的周六下午，当一个藏人对另两位打篮球的藏人开玩笑，“嗨，你们两个sarjor，篮球打得不错啊”，这一评论几乎挑起了一场互殴，又一次表明这个词继续饱含的意义远远超过了在某特定地方的定居长度的意思。

In fact, the term sarjor isused in the USA in reference not only to Tibetans such as Tenzin whoarrived in India in the 1980s but also to those who have migrateddirectly from Tibet to the USA.[Of course, those who use the labels andthose to whom they refer are usually equally 'new arrivals' to the USA.In a similar example of how labels do not necessarily change to reflectthe actual structural situation, many Tibetans in the USA continue torefer to white Americans as phyi-rgyal or 'foreigner'.] This suggeststhat the term has taken on multiple valences. As discussed above, thosewho have migrated directly from Tibet to the USA are often urban andeducated, and thus are not seen as "raw'' or uncouth. But their moreurban styles are read even more strongly as 'Chinese'; something asinnocuous as wearing glasses, which is much more common in the PRC thanamong Tibetans in South Asia, can come to be read as part of a'Chinese' rather than Tibetan gestalt. These Tibetans are treated withmuch greater political suspicion, particularly because of theirlinguistic practices--one of the most emotionally charged arenas ofstruggle over authenticity.
实际上，sarjor一词在美国不只是被用来指像丹增一样在八十年代到印度的藏人，也指那些直接从西藏移民到美国的[当然，那些用标签的和那些通常同样被称为到美国的'新来者'的人。举一个不更换标记来反映实际构成情形的例子，许多美国的藏人继续称美国白人是phy-rgyal或'外国人'。]。这表明，这个词有多种含义。如上所述，那些直接从西藏到美国的移民者通常为城市人和受过良好教育者，因而不被视作“原始”或笨拙。但是他们的城市风格更多被解读为“中国的”；有些无害的，比如戴眼镜，这在中国比在南亚藏人间更为普遍，因而被解读为是“中国的”而不是西藏形式。这些藏人，尤其是因为他们的语言实践--有关正统之战中最充满感情的领域之一。

孜心

啊，你翻译得真快，汗颜。

rhapsody

这篇论文用的分析方法基于布尔迪厄（Pierre Bourdieu, 1930-2002）的“惯习-场域”（社会学）实践理论。理解了一些相关概念或许翻译起来就不会感觉那么难了。

惯习（habitus）
     习性这个概念在布尔迪厄的实践理论中占据着中心地位，他的实践理论试图超越两种理论之间的对立，其中的一种理论把实践仅仅看作是构成性的，诸如现象学这样的方法论和本体论的个人主义；而另一种理论则把实践看作是被构成性的，如列维—斯特劳斯的结构主义和涂尔干的追随者们的结构机能主义。
    布尔迪厄认为社会生活应被看作是结构（structure）、性情（disposition）和行为共同构成的交互作用，通过这一交互作用，社会结构和这些结构的具体化的（因而也是处于某种境遇之中的）知识，生产出了对行为具有持久影响的定向性，这些定向性反过来又构成了社会结构。   
     这里，我们推出惯习的定义：可持续的、可转换的倾向系统，倾向于使被结构的结构发挥具有结构功能的结构的功能。它们形成了社会实践，也被社会实践所形成。
       布尔迪厄把习性描绘成一个普遍的生成组合体系，这些生成组合既有持久性（被铭写在社会的自我建构中）；又可以互换位置，从一个场域转换到另一个场域，在无意识的层面上起作用。
      惯习是一种结构化了的文化语法，它来自于以前的经验积累，在社会化过程中习得。在实践中，它表现为即兴创作的能力，即前反思的、不言自明的、无意识的，行动者根据行动的场域特性即时发挥。在特定的境遇中，人们不得不在习性的背景资源中进行“即兴创作”，才能处理某些未曾预见的境遇，这恰恰是日常生活不变的特征。
     然而，即兴发挥不等于无迹可寻，行动者的行为是客观上有规律的东西。例如，不同阶级的群体表现出不同的品味、爱好。所以，布尔迪厄才说，阶级是由具有类似的惯习的群体构成的。
布尔迪厄在这里楔入了一个关键概念：惯习，有三个方面要注意。
首先，惯习不是习惯（habit）。习惯是个人的、日常生活用语，特别地，习惯是一种行为的例行化方式，如早起刷牙，饭后漱口等。惯习是一种性情倾向。习惯的背后往往有惯习的作用。
其次，惯习是布尔迪厄用来超越二元对立的关键。惯习的即兴反应不仅仅是对环境刺激的反应，也是策略性的因素；不仅仅表达了个别行为者的主观意图，而且也具有结构基础。
其三，惯习是对吉登斯略显宏观和空洞的结构化概念的推进和深化（尽管布尔迪厄并不是有意如此），惯习让我们更清楚地理解实践是如何展开的。

场域（field）
场域是一种空间隐喻。人们的惯习引导下的行为就是发生在场域之中。布尔迪厄提出场这个概念是为“关系分析”提供一个框架，它所涉及的是对地位的分析，对行动者占据地位的多维空间的阐述。
    每个场域都具有半自主性，由其自己明确的行动者诸如学生、小说家、科学家等来表明其特征，由其自身的历史积累、自身的行为逻辑、自身的资本形式来表明其特征。然而，场域并不具有完全的自主性。在一个场域中获得的资本酬劳可以被转换到另一个场域中；况且，每个场域都是处于权力场之中的，或者推而广之，处于阶级关系的场域之中。每个场域都是斗争的场所，在特定的场域的内部存在着斗争，存在着为争取权力来界定一个场域的斗争。布尔迪厄把资本的不同形式的构成以及资本在各种场域中的可转换性，放到了对“场域”的研究的中心位置。

rhapsody

一个侨民的故事 (A diasporic story)

藏族侨区概况 (The Tibetan diaspora in brief)

“新来者”：从印度到美国 (`New arrivals': from India to the USA)

语言政治 (The politics of language)

搬上舞台的“文化演出” (Staging `cultural performance')

代表家乡的权威与主体形成 (Authorities of homeland and subject formation)

政治与民族区位 (Politics and national location)

摘要： 藏族常常被想象成是纯粹和正统的，并且没地理造藏族常常被想象成是纯粹和正统的，并且没地理造成的差别。但事实上，藏族身份的形成是多样化的，深受地理位置以及各民族之间交往的影响。本文将探讨生活在美国的三个不同藏族群体在交往中的摩擦，他们几乎在同一个时期来到美国，但他们与家乡存在着不同的联系。人数上占主导地位的一个群体是那些1959年逃亡的难民或者出生在南亚的流亡者；第二群是在上世纪80年代离开西藏，到了印度和尼泊尔的藏人；第三群是那些直接从西藏来到美国的藏人。长期流亡藏人宣称的文化权威发源于在西藏境外保存传统的信念，然而本土藏人的文化权威却是基于其故土的表象认知。藏族侨民团体间对于“正统”的争论，从语言运用和具象反应等日常活动到“传统文化”的舞台演出，都很难得到一个共识。本文用“惯习”（habitus）作为分析方法以探讨民族身份是如何形成的，又是如何体现的，以及对日常行为的政治性划界是如何造成分裂与断层的。成的差别。但事实上，藏族身份的形成是多样化的，深受地理位置以及各民族之间交往的影响。本文将探讨生活在美国的三个不同藏族群体在交往中的摩擦，他们几乎在同一个时期来到美国，但他们与家乡存在着不同的联系。人数上占主导地位的一个群体是那些1959年逃亡的难民或者出生在南亚的流亡者；第二群是在上世纪80年代离开西藏，前往印度和尼泊尔的藏人；第三群是那些直接从西藏来到美国的藏族人。长期流亡藏人宣称的文化权威发源于在西藏境外保存传统的信念，然而本土藏人的文化权威却是基于其故土的表象认知。藏族侨民团体间对于“正统”的争论，从语言运用和具象反应等日常活动到“传统文化”的舞台演出，都很难得到一个共识。本文用“惯习”（habitus）作为分析方法以探讨民族身份是如何形成的，又是如何体现的，以及对日常行为的政治性划界是如何造成分裂与断层的。

P.S. 相对之前的摘要译文修改较多，主要在于多处关键词采用了不同译法；下边会陆续把一些关键词及译法列出来；而标题还没想好怎么译。欢迎大家就以上这些多提意见。

rhapsody

identity
identity包含特性、身份和认同等多重意思：特征是人或事物的属性，借以认定其所属或类别；“身份”一词在中文里更多外在（客体对主体）认定的成分，它是一种社会性标识，而“认同”更多内在（主体对主体本身）认定的成分，具有主体性；英文的identity是兼有以上三种意义。
个人感觉文中多指的是一种社会性标识的含义，故暂定首选译法为“身份”。
与之相关的还有identification一词，它是指“一个认知过程，自我被‘归入’他者” 。这个词也可译作“认同”，因为“身份”是一种属性，而“认同”是主体的认知。两者的联系在于，一方面认同依赖于主体的角色和身份，另一方面，认同也是主体身份形成（identity-formation）的过程。

diaspora; -ic
diaspora原指犹太族裔散居的社会形态或模式，多译作“流散”，与希腊式或中国式的“大一统”（universal）相对，参见汤因比的《历史研究》对人类文明两类典型模式的叙述；但随着迁居现象的普遍，尤其是全球化趋势的推动，现时多表示“侨居”，文中也不例外。

habitus详见34楼

authentic; -ity
目前译作“正统”，个人暂时没有意见

embodied
文中与这个相关的一些词组可能是社会语言学（socio-linguistics）里的术语，需作进一步查询。暂作“表现”或“表象”。

authority
个人暂译作“权威”。文中多次提到cultural authority（"文化权威"），此概念的一个定义来源于美国学者保罗·斯塔尔（Starr 1982），它有别于马克斯·韦伯所讲的"社会权威"（social authority）的三种理想类型；"文化权威"概念属于意义、象征和观念的范畴，亦可视为是"一种文化说服艺术"（an art of cultural persuasion）。

rhapsody

一个侨民的故事

2004年的二月份，一个地区性藏族协会的理事会收到一封用亮红色大写字母写的匿名信，举报其中一个会员把关于在美藏人的文件传真给中国政府，并且凭这些间谍活动得到数十万美元的收入。被告发的是一个35岁左右的藏人，笔者将称他为丹增。他出生在中国西藏自治区的一个村庄，在80年代末参加了争取西藏独立示威后逃亡到印度。到达兰萨拉（达赖喇嘛和西藏流亡政府所在地）不久后，他获抽签选中参加“藏人定居美国计划”。他在美国积极加入到当地藏族社区，也经常电话联系仍在西藏的家人和朋友，了解最新的音乐潮流和老家村庄的经济变化。

尽管丹增已归化为美国公民，但出于难以挥去的对家人的担忧，他还没有回过西藏；他的家人们确实也因为他的活动而受苦，他的一个兄弟就坐了六年牢。当笔者在西藏见到他年迈的母亲时，虽然她很想见到分别十多年的儿子，但仍然恳求道：“请你告诉他别要回来，至少要等多几年”。这个家庭的经历既是一个悲剧，也是一个跨国西藏运动要唤起世人注意的政治压迫的典型案例。丹增作为政治难民的事实以及他对改善西藏状况的努力表明他应该是西藏运动的一个模范，被社区当作典型来进行宣传。那么为什么恰恰相反，他（不止一次地）被怀疑及指控为中国间谍？

值得注意的是，在当地社区中，丹增是为数不多的在西藏本土而不是在印度或尼泊尔渡过大部分人生的藏人。至少对于一部分从印度来的藏人来说，他来自西藏、在当地组织非常活跃、有时拒绝把他的相片放在社区网站上，这些事实已经足够“证明”，他是一个间谍。更广泛地来说，他与家乡的紧密联系，以及他身上所铭刻的那种家乡的印记都使得他成为一个被嘲笑与怀疑的对象。

移民的故事具有超越其自身独特性的理论性力量。丹增的故事提醒我们注意一些由移民的原籍和路线的不同而在藏族侨区引起的政治上和文化上的矛盾。与其它跨国移民群体一样，在美国的藏人也“形成并维系着千丝万缕的社会关系，这些关系联结着他们的原居地社群和移居地社群”。然而移居美国藏人的构成现况是这样：对大部分藏人来说，“原居地社群”最直接指向的地方是南亚而不是西藏。根据他们的原居地社群和体现的西藏经历，在美国的藏族移民可以分为三组：第一组，也是最大的一组由1959年离开西藏或者出生在南亚的难民社区难民组成，为方便起见，我把他们称为“流亡藏人”；第二组是人数较少的一组，我称他们为“新来者”，他们在西藏出生和长大，但在上世纪八九十年代前往印度或尼泊尔；第三组是人数最少的一组，是那些直接从西藏来到美国的藏族人，我把他们称为“本土藏人”。[这种按照其移民美国的路线对藏人进行分类的方法并不是绝对意义上的。比如，来自印度并在台湾呆过几年的流亡藏人，或者从印度返回西藏的藏人（两者都超出了本文讨论的范畴），都无法明确划入上述三类中的任一类。尽管如此，关于主体形成的不同地域的主要论点，以及路线的重要性对于这些特例也同样是适用的。]

本文将探讨关于日常生活中以及舞台表演的“藏族文化”正统性的冲突，这些冲突撕破了藏族侨区看似天衣无缝的和谐幻像。虽同为“藏族”，但经由不同的国家地区迁居而来的藏人群体，都在运用不同的策略来争取让自己成为权威的藏族发言人。本土藏人倚仗的是他们对家乡的具体认知和经验。相反的，流亡藏人寻求把“正统藏族”重新定位，由地理上的传统家园转移到其它区域，尤其是达兰萨拉。在美国，流亡藏人在数量上居主导地位，这种不着边际的地理定位也正是他们的观点所在。但是他们的权威受到了本土藏人的挑战。因而正统性地理中心的重新定位这一课题是不牢靠的，需要进行大量的日常文化工作。
P.S. AC开工了，各位编译也要接着开工o059) AC停摆的三天也作了些校对，不过比较零散，先发第一节吧。各位多提意见。

音乐盒

Politics and national location
政治与民族区位

Why are these issues of cultural authenticity so contentious? Part of the reason is that the diasporic problem of maintaining a distinctive cultural identity faces new challenges in the USA, despite the fact that a major premise of TUSRP was precisely to help Tibetans "preserve Tibetan culture and identity'' (Yeh and Lama, 2006). In contrast to South Asia, the Tibetan national anthem cannot be sung in school, and inflexible work schedules make protests much smaller and more poorly attended. Defiant teens in baggy pants, oversized athletic jerseys, gold chains, sporting cornrows appear at Tibet Youth Congress events dedicated to celebrating Tibetan culture (Yeh and Lama, 2006). In this context, the encounter with other Tibetans who appear alien and 'Chinese' looms as an even bigger problem--another challenge to the already vexed problem of cultural preservation--than it might otherwise be. Another reason is that, in the Tibetan diaspora, cultural and political identity are assumed to stand in for each other. Thus, a Tibetan who appears to be culturally 'other' is assumed to be politically 'other' as well-that is, to be sympathetic to the Chinese state's claims of Tibetan 'liberation', rather than to the counternarrative of Tibetan occupation and colonization. The flip side is that only those who loudly proclaim a desire for independence are assumed to be authentically Tibetan--that is, not to have been hopelessly 'brainwashed' by China.
为什么这些有关文化正统性的观点如此有争议？部分原因是，侨居中的这一问题在美国面临新挑战，即如何保持自身独特的文化特征，尽管准确说来，事实上TUSRP的一个主要前提原本就是帮助藏人“保护西藏文化和特征” 的（Yeh and Lama, 2006）。与南亚相反，藏人不能在（美国）学校唱西藏国歌，而且，工作安排的无弹性使抗议规模大为减小，参加的人数也更少。叛逆期的少年们身着肥大的裤子、过大的运动毛绒衫、戴金链、梳运动型玉米辫，他们参加藏青会组织的事件，投身于宏扬西藏文化（Yeh and Lama, 2006）之中。在这种情形下，遭遇到其他看上去似外星人的藏人和'中国人'，被认为是个可怕的大问题---对已经很令人烦恼的文化保存问题的又一项挑战---尽管可能并非如此。另一个原因是，在侨居藏人中，文化和政治特征被看作代表各自的群体。因此，一个看上去在人文方面'另类'的藏人被视为政治上 '另类'，比如：同情中国政府声称的对西藏的'解放'，而不是与之相反的：西藏被占领和殖民。另一方面，只有那些大声宣称渴望独立的人被视为正统藏人，也就是说，还未被中国无可救药的'洗脑'。

The in-between position of the new arrivals in India who then come to the USA, between the long-term exiles and the new Tibetans from Tibet, speaks to the intensity of struggles over authenticity because of the new arrivals' imbrication with struggles for the nation. Like the 'homeland' Tibetans, the new arrivals can claim an authority derived from embodied knowledge of the homeland. However, as a group they tend to be less fluent in Chinese language and styles. At the same time, many are nevertheless enthusiastic consumers of Chinese music and movies, which can lead to ambivalence from others. A resident of Oakland, Dawa grew up near Lhasa but fled to India in the late 1980s. He also happens to be fond of watching Chinese soap operas, a hobby which led to a confrontation with a resentful roomate from India. Dawa defended himself by talking about his relatives who had been killed while they were participating in pro-independence rallies, and about his own harsh experience fleeing over freezing mountain passes to India. Content, he suggested, not language, is the better gauge for a person's political sympathies. Like him, many former new arrivals try to 'prove' their authenticity through public statements of their personal suffering and commitment to the Tibetan struggle. Others prominently display photographs of themselves at demonstrations or with the Dalai Lama, or work for Tibet Movement advocacy groups, but as in the case of Tenzin, such strategies do not always work.
之后去了美国的印度新来者的立场，介于长期流亡和来自西藏的藏人之间，这证明了有关正统之战的剧烈，因为新来者同样也在为民族而斗争。与'本土'藏人一样，新来者会宣称（自身）是一种源于家乡的具象化知识的权威。然而，他们这群人很少说流利汉语或具汉人风格。同时，许多人仍然是中国音乐和电影的热心消费者，这会导致同他人的矛盾。住在奥克兰的达娃在拉萨附近长大，十九世纪八十年代后期逃到印度。他正好也喜欢看中国肥皂剧，他的同屋来自印度，这个爱好导致了同屋的不满和对抗。达娃在谈话时辩护道，他的亲戚在参与主张西藏独立的集会中差点没命，他自己在翻越冰山要隘去印度时经受了严酷体验。他建议，衡量一个人政治主张的应该是内容，而不是语言。同他一样，许多曾经的新来者都有各自的个人遭遇和投身于西藏斗争，他们尝试借公众对他们的说法来'证明'自己的正统。其他人主要是展示他们示威时的照片，或与达赖喇嘛的合影，或是为拥护西藏独立运动的团体工作时的照片，但是正如丹增的案例所示，这些策略并不总是起作用。

Assumptions about authenticity and identity are read off of national location and citizenship. The Chinese state works hard to interpellate Tibetans as citizens of China, fostering Tibetans' conceptions of themselves as 'people of China' (zhongguo ren). Many Tibetans in Tibet do, in fact, use this term, regardless of how they might feel about issues of cultural identity, political repression, or future autonomy. The same Tibetan scholar who complained to me about the level of Tibetan linguistic competence of many Tibetan exiles also surprised me by telling me he was happy that the PRC (zhongguo) had finally won the bid for the 2008 Olympics, because "one is always happy when one's country [guojia] is shown to be powerful''. At the same time, he is also committed to the project of keeping alive Tibetan language and culture, and sees himself as authentically Tibetan; he does not see these stances as being incompatible. The fact that a number of dissident intellectuals as well as political asylum seekers have emerged from among urban Tibetans who have been educated within the Chinese system (for example, the poet Woser, who writes in Chinese) suggests that a self-identification of a Tibetan as a 'person of China' is not necessarily evidence of complete political allegiance to the PRC (it may instead simply be a practical acknowledgement of the current political situation). However, what the exiles insist on is precisely this ability to read political interests from these other signs.
关于正统和身份的判定很容易由说话者的民族区位和国籍识别出。中国政府努力为藏人的中国公民身份正名，培养藏人自身的'中国人'概念。许多西藏的藏人事实上的确在用（中国人）这个词，不论他们对文化特征、政治压迫或未来自治的观点如何。一位藏族学者曾向我抱怨过许多流亡藏人的藏语能力水平，他也会令我惊讶的告诉我，他很高兴中国最终赢得了2008年奥运会的主办权，因为“一个国家强大，这个国家的人总是高兴的”。同时，他也决心从事保存藏语和藏文化的项目，并视自己为正统藏人；他并不将这些立场看作是不兼容的。许多政治上持异见的知识分子和寻求政治庇护者，都是在接受了中国系统教育的城市藏人中产生的（比如用中文写作的诗人唯色），这一事实表明，作为一个中国人，在他自认为是藏人时，并不是一定会在政治上表现出对中国的完全忠诚（也许只是对当前政治局势的简单实际承认）。然而，流亡人士所坚持的，更确切的说，是这种将政治利益与其他事物分开来解读的能力。

Thus, a Tibetan from the PRC who identifies as such is immediately suspect. This extends to the type of passport he or she possesses.When some of the first Tibetan exiles were naturalized as USA citizens, they found that they were not allowed to list 'Tibet' as their 'place of birth' because the USA does not officially recognize Tibet as a country. A long struggle ensued, leading to the concession in which Tibetans are allowed to list the city or town of their birth, without appending either 'Tibet'or 'China' after it. Given the symbolic importance of this issue, many exiles are somewhat taken aback by Tibetans who travel to the USA as Chinese citizens with Chinese passports. This has resulted in misunderstandings and in a closing down of chances at dialogue. One Beijing-based Tibetan researcher, originally from Lhasa, recalled an academic trip to the USA several years ago. It was his first visit to the USA, and he was excited about meeting other Tibetans, until they asked him "strange questions, like 'do you have a Chinese passport?' Well, what kind of passport did they think I could possibly have? Then they seemed to become very wary of me, so I didn't spend that much time with them after all.'' There is no way to make the journey from Tibet directly to the USA except with a Chinese passport, which categorizes the passport bearer as 'a person of China'. For Tibetan exiles, however, this identification with China is sometimes understood not as a practical necessity but as a capitulation, as a rejection of Tibet's mythico-history, and thus further confirms the apparent rightness of recentering the locus of authenticity away, at least for the time being, from the actual place of the homeland.
因此，一位来自中国的藏人被确定有这些特征的话，就会立即引起怀疑。这延伸到了他或她所持有的护照类型。当首批流亡藏人中的一些人归化为美国公民时，由于美国官方不承认西藏是一个国家，他们发现'出生地'一栏没有列'西藏'。接下来他们作了漫长的斗争，最后妥协为藏人可以填自己出生的城镇，但不许在后面加上'西藏'或'中国'。鉴于这一问题在象征意义上的重要性，许多流亡者在遇到作为中国公民持中国护照到美国的藏人时不免会大吃一惊。结果就是误解隔阂以及关闭对话渠道。一位原籍拉萨从北京过来的藏族学者，想起几年前一次到美国的学术访问。这是他第一次到美国，遇见其他藏人他很兴奋，直到他们问他“诸如 '你持有中国护照么？'这样的一些奇怪问题，他们以为我可能会拿什么护照？接着他们就显得对我小心翼翼，我就没再花那么多时间和他们在一块了。”从西藏直接到美国是不可能不持有中国护照的，只要他是'中国人'。但是对于流亡藏人来说，与中国的这项关联有时并不被理解成是一种实际必要，而被看作是一种投降，一种对西藏神话历史的抛弃，从而更加证明，重新确立正统中心所在地而不是在家乡的实际位置，显然是正确的，至少暂时是这样。

Unlike Tibetans from exile who have been engaged in political protest for their entire lives, Tibetans from Tibet often profess that they have no interest in politics. Their studied lack of interest in 'politics' and the low priority given to attending protests, rallies, and meetings arise not only out of the frictions of their encounter with other Tibetans but also importantly from their concern about repercussions for close family members in Tibet and for their own possible plans to return. There is, in fact, a wide spectrum of political opinion among Tibetans from Tibet vis-à-vis Tibet's political status, though many are focused on a hope for policies that will allow for equitable economic development without a complete loss of Tibetan language and culture. Regardless, most Tibetans came to the USA for reasons similar to those that motivated most TUSRP participants--because they see it as a way to a better life, whether through the opportunity for higher education or through the ability to send remittances home. However, because of the structure of migration to the USA and the cultural politics of routedness, they are challenged to 'prove' their Tibetan-ness in a way that others do not have to.
与那些终生从事政治抗议的流亡藏人不同，来自西藏的藏人常常表示他们对政治不感兴趣。他们有意识的缺乏在'政治'上的兴趣，很少优先考虑参加抗议、集会和会议，这不仅仅是出于他们与其他藏人相对时产生的摩擦，更重要的是因为，他们担心这会对他们在西藏的近亲成员和自己可能回国的计划产生不良影响。实际上，受西藏政治状况影响，来自西藏的藏人间的政治观点差别很大，尽管许多人注重的是希望政策能允许公平的经济发展，同时不完全丢失藏语和藏文化。不管怎样，大多数藏人到美国的原因与那些TUSRP期盼者相似，他们都将它视为一种过更好生活的途径。但是，因为美国移民的结构和路线化的文化政治，他们受到挑战，得用一种他人不必采用的方式来'证明'他们的西藏特色。

音乐盒

identity很难翻，有时我翻作身份，有时翻作了特征。还要有劳各位校对了。

Authorities of homeland and subject formation 这一节我先接了吧，孜心，等你回来呀，还有好多好多

rhapsody

楼上辛苦{:10_403:}根据上次跟孜心通的短消息，他得下月才能回来，还是找其他人吧。

忧心

The politics of language
语言上的政治

Language——dialect and words used, as well as intonations and accompanying gestures——is an embodied competence which in turn structures social relations. Bourdieu (1977, page 81) writes that:
``every confrontation between agents … brings together … systems of dispositions, such as a linguistic competence and a cultural competence, and, through these habitus, all the objective structures of which they are a part, structures which are active only when embodied in a competence acquired in the course of a particular history (with the different types of bilingualism or pronunciation, for example, stemming from different modes of acquisition)’’ (emphasis in original).

语言——方言、用字以及语调和伴随着的手势——是一种能力的具体体现，这种能力进而构造了社会关系。布尔迪厄（1977年，第81页）写道：
“对话者之间的对抗……和解……管理体系，比如语言能力和文化能力，通过这些惯习，所有的客观事物都构建了它们中的一部分，这种构建仅在某一特定历史时期所要求的能力被表现出来的时候才能实现（方法为不同类型的双语或发音，比如，起源于不同种类的需求。）”（加重是原文中就有的）。（译者：这段译的非常不好还请大家多提意见）

Not surprisingly, then, a key element in the distrust of `new arrivals' in India, and, even more so, of Tibetans from Tibet in the USA, is the fact that they speak Chinese, which is understood as `the language of the enemy'. Many Tibetans who escaped to India in the 1980s——particularly those who came of age during the Cultural Revolution——recounted to me their frustrations at arriving in Dharamsala unable to read or write Tibetan because they had not been taught in school.

一点也不奇怪的是，对印度的“新来者”——甚至是对那些从西藏来到美国的藏族人不信任的一个关键因素是他们讲中文这样一个事实，而中文被认为是“敌人的语言”。很多在20世纪80年代——尤其是在文化大革命的岁月里逃到印度的西藏人向我叙述了到达达兰萨拉后无法读写藏语而遇到的挫折，因为他们在学校里没有学过藏语。

Linguistic tensions are considerably heightened by certain characteristics of the Tibetan language itself. Classical literary Tibetan has a remarkably conservative orthography, but the many spoken dialects have changed dramatically, such that they are consistent neither with the literary language nor with each other. Vernacular Tibetan is highly nonstandardized, with large regional variations that are mutually incomprehensible; dialects diverge significantly even within small geographical areas. In exile a version of Lhasa dialect is taught in schools and has become the common, standardized language of the diaspora. As a result, few younger Tibetans in the diaspora are able to speak or understand regional dialects. In Tibet, by contrast, regional dialects continue to be used, but much less has been done to promote a transregional standardized Tibetan with Mandarin instead filling the role of a lingua franca. Linguistic differences thus inflect the different national contexts with which Tibetans are associated.

语言上的紧张关系极大地加深了藏语本身的某些特点。正统的西藏文采用一种非常保守的拼字法，但许多方言口语已经发生了巨大的变化，这些方言口语和书面语不同，互相之间也不一致。西藏语口语非常不标准，到了较大区域间口语的变化难以相互理解的地步。即使是在小的地理区域间，方言的差异也很显著。在流亡地区，学校教授拉萨方言的一种版本，这种方言已成为这一侨居区域共同的、标准化的语言。其结果是，侨居区域几乎没有年轻的藏人能够说或者懂得其它地域的方言。相比之下，在西藏，地区方言在继续使用，但是在普通话充当通用语角色的情况下，更加不能发展出跨地区的标准化藏语。藏人因民族背景而互相联系，语言上的差异就这样造成了藏人不同的民族背景。（译者：这句好像不太对，还请诸位指点）

As a result, many new arrivals from the eastern regions of Kham and Amdo are perfectly fluent in their own Tibetan dialects, but have a great deal of difficulty with the Lhasa dialect that has become the diasporic standard. On the other hand, many of them can speak at least some Chinese. Indeed, several Tibetans from Gyalthang, in Yunnan, recalled that, when they first arrived in Lhasa on the way to India, they resorted to Chinese to communicate with other Tibetans, even though their own Mandarin was far from perfect. When they tried the same way of communicating in India, however, they were chastised for speaking Chinese. Another man from Chamdo remembers, ``When I first arrived in India, I constantly had to explain [to other Tibetans] that just because I sometimes read a Chinese newspaper didn't mean that I didn't understand [Tibetan] politics. I always had to explain that one must consider the contents of a book or what someone is saying, not just what language it's in.'' These misunderstandings are exacerbated by the changing regional composition of the diasporic population. In 1991 only about 5% of Tibetans in South Asia were from Amdo, though Amdo accounted for 27% of the Tibetan population before 1959 (Methfessel, 1997). The proportion of Tibetans from Amdo leaving Tibet has been increasing, however. The fact that Amdo dialects are the most divergent from the `standard' Lhasa dialect means that these Tibetans are especially likely to encounter these linguistic difficulties, which are sometimes read as problems of authenticity and, by extension, of national loyalty.

因此，许多来自东部地区康巴和安多的新来者完全精通自己地区的藏语方言，但说起已成为侨居地区标准的拉萨方言来却有很大的困难。另一方面，他们中的许多人至少会讲一点中文。实际上，几名从云南建塘来的藏民回忆说，当他们在去印度的路上第一次来到拉萨时，他们用中文来和其他藏人交流，虽然他们的普通话也不算太好。当他们在印度想用同样的方式来进行交流时，却因说中文而被严厉批评。另一名从昌都来的男子记得：“当我刚刚到达印度时，我不断的（向其他藏人）解释说，仅仅因为我有时读中文报纸并不意味着我不明白（藏人的）政治。我老是不得不解释说，人们必须通过一本书或是一个人所说的内容来评价这本书或这个人，而不能仅仅以使用什么语言来评价。”由于侨居区域的人口来自的地域不断变化，这些误解被加剧了。在1991年只有约5 ％在南亚的藏人来自安多，但是1959年前安多藏人已占到藏人人口的27 ％（Methfessel，1997年）。而且，安多地区离开西藏的藏人一直在增加。事实上，安多方言最不同于“标准”的拉萨方言，这意味着安多藏人特别有可能遇到语言上的困难，这种困难有时候会被错误的当成是同等待遇的问题，并且推而广之，当成是民族忠诚度的问题。

For example, one day in the winter of 2001 I walked down a busy street in Berkeley, California, with a young woman from Amdo whom I had worked with several years prior, in Qinghai province, and who had just arrived in the USA. We ran into an older man, a former headmaster of a Tibetan high school in India. I introduced the two, and was part of the following exchange:

例如，2001年冬季的一天，我和一位来自安多的年轻女子一起穿过加州大学伯克利分校的一条繁忙的街道，我数年前曾和她在青海省一起工作，她刚刚来到美国。我们碰到了一个老人，一位印度藏人高中的前校长。我介绍这两人认识，并参与了如下的交流：

Man [in Lhasa Tibetan]: ``So you're from Amdo? Did you come to the US for school?''
Woman [not comprehending]: [no response]
Man [in Lhasa Tibetan]: ``I said, did you come to the US to go to school?''
Woman [to me in Chinese]: ``What did he say?''
Author [in Chinese]: ``He asked whether you came to the US to study.''
Woman [in Amdo dialect to man]: ``No, I came to visit my boyfriend.''
Man [in Lhasa Tibetan, not understanding her response]: ``Such a shame. When
I see Tibetans who can't speak Tibetan, I feel very sad.''
Author [in Lhasa Tibetan, protesting]: ``But she's speaking Tibetan!''

老人（用拉萨藏语）：“你从安多来？你到美国是为了上学吗？”
女子（听不懂）：（没回答）
老人（用拉萨藏语）：“我是说，你到美国来上学吗？”
女子（对我用中文说）：“他说什么？”
作者（用中文）：“他问你是不是到美国来学习的。”
女子（用安多方言对老人说）：“不，我来看望男朋友。”
老人（用拉萨藏语，听不懂她的答复）：“多么羞耻。当我看到藏人不会说藏语时，我感到非常难过。”
作者（用拉萨藏语，抗议说）：“但她是在说藏语啊！”

The linguistic sensibilities of the long-time exiles include not only the view that using Chinese is unacceptable but also, particularly among the younger generation, a tendency to code switch with Hindi and English.(8) Indeed, many younger Tibetans in South Asia speak Hindi and Nepali as well as, or better than, Tibetan; in the USA, virtually all Tibetans speak English better than Tibetan. However, whereas mixing Hindi and English words into Tibetan sentences is considered hip and stylish, the use of Chinese words is considered unacceptable. For them, a Tibetan who speaks Chinese cannot be truly Tibetan and cannot be trusted for his or her political viewpoints.

长期流亡者在语言上的情结不仅包括认为使用中文是不可接受的，而且，尤其是在年轻的一代人中，有一种和印地语及英语语码转换的倾向。（注8）事实上，很多在南亚的年轻藏人印地语和尼泊尔语说得和藏语一样好，或者比藏语更好；在美国，几乎所有的藏人英语都说得比藏语好。然而，虽然把印地语和英语单词混入藏语句子中被认为是新潮和时尚的，使用中文词语却被认为是不可接受的。对他们来说，一个讲中文的藏人不是真正的藏人，他的政治观点是不能信任的。

By contrast, those Tibetans who have experienced `new arrival' status in India have had personal experience in Tibet and thus have had a closer engagement with Chinese culture. Though many of them left Tibet for political reasons, they do not assume that other Tibetans' use of the Chinese language has a necessary connection to political views. There is an even greater linguistic gap between long-time exiles and the Tibetans who come directly from Tibet, because many of the latter come having finished college in the PRC, and thus may find speaking Chinese just as convenient as speaking Tibetan (or, at least, Lhasa-dialect Tibetan). Even more than the new arrivals in India, they are likely to speak excellent Chinese, enjoy Chinese television and music, and have mannerisms, gestures, and taste in food and clothing that mark them as `un-Tibetan' to the Tibetan exiles from South Asia.

相比之下，那些在印度经历过“新来者”地位的藏人有着生活在西藏的亲身经历，从而密切接触过中华文化。虽然许多人由于政治原因离开了西藏，但他们并不认同其他藏人认为使用中文与政治观点有必然联系的想法。在长期流亡的藏人和直接来自西藏的藏人间还有一个更大的语言差距，就是后者中的许多人是在中华人民共和国完成大学学业的，因此，人们可能会发现他们讲中文像讲藏语（或者，至少像讲藏语拉萨方言）一样方便。他们很可能会讲流利的中文，欣赏中文的电视和音乐，甚至比印度的新来者更厉害，习惯、手势、食物口味和衣着，标志着他们是与南亚流亡藏人不同的“非藏人”。  （译者：最后这句Even more than the new arrivals in India我有点译得不太好，那个“un-Tibetan”暂译成“非藏人”还请大家出主意）

They also use Chinese loan words. Indeed, Tibetan intellectuals in exile as well as Western Tibet scholars have expressed dismay at the general inability of most Tibetans in Lhasa to speak Tibetan without extensive borrowing of Chinese. This includes not only relatively new words, such as `television' and `fax', for which Tibetan equivalents have been created but have failed to be widely adopted, but also familiar words such as numbers and days of the week. Tibetans in Tibet are well aware of, and worried about, the fact that Tibetan literacy rates are low, and that some youth, particularly those whose high marks allow them to study in schools in other parts of China, have a hard time speaking pure Tibetan. In Tibet today some Tibetans privately voice dismay that their own language is, in their words, `so useless'. With both government affairs and business conducted in Mandarin there is little incentive for students to study Tibetan.

他们还使用中文外来语。事实上，对于通常无法使大多数在拉萨的藏人不说大量借用中文的藏文，藏人流亡知识分子以及在西藏的学者都在表示失望。这种借用不仅包括相对较新的词语，如“电视”和“传真”——人们已创造出这些词语相应的藏语词汇却没被广泛采用；而且还包括一些熟悉的词语，如数字和星期。在西藏的藏人完全认识到并在担心着这样一个事实，西藏的识字率很低，一些年轻人，尤其是那些得到高分可以在中国其它地区学校学习的藏人，不太会说纯正的藏语。今天，在西藏的一些藏人私下里表达了对他们自己的语言是——用他们的话说——“那样无用”的失望。在政府事务及商业事务都用普通话进行沟通的情况下，几乎没有什么东西能激励学生学习藏文。

At the same time, however, many `homeland' Tibetans wonder about Tibetan intellectuals in exile who feel more comfortable speaking English. From their perspective it is the diasporic Tibetans who really have a choice about whether to use Tibetan, and, in this, they have done no better than those who live in Tibet. Thus, they point out the hypocrisy of diasporic critics who also have trouble speaking Tibetan without code switching to English. In fact, except in some remote areas in Tibet, in monastic settings, and among the elderly, there are few spaces in the contemporary world in which Tibetans do not make extensive use of loan words and code switching to another language. A historian in Lhasa spoke caustically to me about the criticisms he had encountered at an international conference of Tibetan scholars:

然而，与此同时，许多“本土”藏人质疑藏人流亡知识分子感觉讲英语更舒服的行为。从他们的角度来看，侨居的藏人真正能够选择是否要使用藏文，他们在这方面并没能做得比那些生活在西藏的藏人好。因此，他们指出侨居的批评家们的虚伪，这些人也不能说不和英语语码转换的藏语。事实上，除了在西藏某些偏远地区、在寺院环境里、在老年人中间，在当代世界中几乎没有空间留给没有广泛使用外来语及没有与其它语言语码转换的藏语。一位拉萨的历史学家谈到他在一次国际会议上遇到的藏人学者的批评时尖刻地对我说：

``The Tibetans outside [Tibet] call us ra-ma-lug [literally `neither goat nor sheep', ie hybrid or mixture, implying that they are not `real' Tibetans]. Well, I'd like to challenge them to a contest. I'd like to see who can speak more Tibetan without mixing in another language! We'd [Tibetans in Tibet] win that competition for sure. Then we could find out for sure who is more ra-ma-lug?! ''

“（西藏）以外的藏人说我们是ra-ma-lug（字面意思是“既不是山羊也不是绵羊”，即杂种或混合物，这就意味着他们不是‘真正的’藏人）。那么，我愿意举行竞赛来挑战他们。我倒要看看谁可以说更多没有混入其他语言的藏语！我们（在西藏的藏人）肯定能赢得比赛。然后我们就可以明确地知道谁更ra-ma-lug了？！”

Unlike this scholar, whose own mastery of literary Tibetan makes him resentful of exile charges of linguistic incompetence, a Tibetan woman from Amdo, who spent a number of years in Beijing before immigrating to the USA, calls her own inability to read and write Tibetan ``a victory for the Chinese government''. She explained to me that she wants independence for Tibet and is a Tibetan Buddhist (nangpa, literally an `insider'). However, she also believes that Tibetans outside should not hold anything against the Chinese language, people, or culture per se. Even more importantly, she would like more sympathetic understanding from other Tibetans in the USA that she cannot just erase seventeen years of Chinese education, and, at the same time, that this does not make her sems (mind) any less Tibetan.

这位学者对藏文的掌握使他不满流亡者所指责的语言上的无能，与他不同的是，一个来自安多的藏人妇女移民到美国前在北京待过多年，她认为自己无法读写藏文是“中国政府的胜利”。她向我解释说，她希望西藏独立，她是藏传佛教徒（nangpa，字面意思是“会员”）。然而，她也认为海外藏人不应该不顾一切的反对中文、中国人或中华文化本身。更重要的是，她希望得到其他在美国的藏人更多地同情和理解，她不能抹去十七年的中文教育，与此同时，这并不会使她对西藏的sems（关心）有任何减少。

`Homeland' Tibetans also bring their own linguistic sensibilities, shaped in the reality of contemporary Tibet, with them to the USA, leading to considerable friction.(9) In addition to language choice, regional dialect, and the actual vocabulary used, divergent linguistic sensibilities also include the more subtle issue of how words are spoken. Even when the same Lhasa dialect is being spoken, there are subtle differences in intonation and insertion of marker words. As Bourdieu (1977, page 87) writes, ``Body hexis speaks directly to the motor function, in the form of postures that is both individual and systematic ... a way of walking, a tilt of the head, facial expressions, ways of sitting and using implements, always associated with a tone of voice, a style of speech, and ... a certain subjective experience.'' Class habitus, and the distinction between aristocratic and nonaristocratic ways of speaking, remains strong even today in the diasporic community. At the same time, speech patterns and movements, such as a subtle tilting of the head to indicate agreement or dissent, or gestures that indicate embarrassment, can distinguish PRC Tibetans from their South Asia counterparts. Thus, even Tibetan that is relatively `pure' in vocabulary and authentic to some, can sound or feel `Chinese' to others.

“本土”藏人也把自己在当代西藏的现实中形成的语言上的情结随他们一起带入到了美国，从而引起了大量的摩擦。（注9）除了语言倾向、地区方言和实际使用的词汇外，不同的语言情结还包括如何措辞这样更微妙的问题。即使都在说同一种拉萨方言，在语调和语素的插入上也会有微妙的差异。正如布尔迪厄（1977年，第87页）所写的那样，“机体惯习直接告诉运动官能，个人和系统姿态的形式……走路的方式、头部的摇动、面部表情、坐姿和器具的使用，总是与语气、讲话的风格和……主观经验有关。”等级惯习及贵族和非贵族讲话方式之间的区别，即使在今天仍然强烈地存在于侨居社会中。与此同时，语言和行为模式——如微妙地摇动头部表示同意或反对或者用手势表示尴尬——可以用来区分中华人民共和国的藏人和他们的南亚同胞。因此，即使藏人在使用词汇上相对的“纯粹”并被一些人认为是正统的，可其他人仍能听出或是感觉到“中国味”。

(8) Common Hindi usages include hapta instead of gz'a-'khor or bdun-phrag (`week'); tarik for tshes-pa (`date'); and jola for lto-phad (`backpack').
（注 8 ）常用印地语的使用包括用hapta代替gz'a-'khor或bdun-phrag（“星期”），用tarik代替tshes-pa（“日期”）以及用jola代替lto - phad（“背包”）。

(9) For example, Tibetans from Lhasa tend to use dug-ga (`isn't it so?') at the end of many sentences; slang such as yamatsha-a-la (`how annoying') marks exile speech.
（注 9 ）例如，来自拉萨的藏人倾向于在句末使用dug-ga（“是不是这样？”），而像yamatsha-a-la（“好讨厌啊！”）这样的俚语标志着流亡者在讲话。

忧心

补充几个关键词：

hexis  拉丁文，就是habitus。

Code Switching  语码转换，语言学术语，是指说话者在对话或交谈中，从使用一种语言或方言转换到使用另一种语言或方言。语码转换作为谈话策略之一，可以用来显示身份、表现语言优越感、重组谈话的参与者、表明中立的立场、用来改善人际关系和谈话气氛等。

maker word Linguistics An element that indicates grammatical class or function; a derivational or inflectional morpheme.【语言学】 标记：表示语法种类或功能的成分；衍生的或曲折演化来的语素。我译成“语素”。